

P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE



ADVANCE OF AYUB KHAN ON KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1880.



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1880.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. News just received from Colonel St. John and General Burrows, that Ayub, with his regulars, reached the Helmand 20th. He has sent back his carriage for baggage, left a day's march in rear. Tribal sowars and some ghazis have joined him. His intention stated to be to move *vid* Sungboor and Mir Karez and attack General Burrows. At Sungboor there are 200 ghazis with two standards. Spy states Luinab, with cavalry, had moved down river, intending to skirt desert and attack.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 22nd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 22nd July. Letter from General Burrows, dated evening of 21st; no further news.

TELEGRAM from COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (Quartermaster-General), Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 5181, dated 22nd July 1880.

SIMLA, 22nd July. My telegram of yesterday, and yours of last night. You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government consider it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means from passing on to Ghazni.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 413 K., dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Your telegram. I am almost entirely dependent for intelligence on the Political Department. I have spies out, and obtained some information from sources in the town.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Report received from General Burrows, dated 22nd. No further news regarding Ayub. Our force at Khushk-i-Nakhud well entrenched and defended against any night attack. Supplies plentiful, except wood which is very scarce. A detachment, 4th Native Infantry, escorting ammunition, arrives here to-morrow, and 200 rifles, 28th Native Infantry, the day after.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Report just received from Colonel St. John. Spies state Ayub has crossed Helmand at Haidarabad. Party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sungboor and returned again. Small party of Ghazis collected there; stated they expected 5,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and main body to-morrow. Few supplies at Sungboor, so Ayub cannot halt there more than one day. Report raises number of men who have joined Ayub to 4,000.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, dated 24th July 1880, and received on the same date.

On morning of 23rd our cavalry patrol, proceeding in the direction of Sungboor, came upon the enemy's advanced parties. Lieutenant Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse, who was in command, sent in word to camp, and, dismounting some of his men, checked

the enemy, who retired out of range. Brigadier-General Nuttall, with 180 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns, E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, now came up, and a reconnaissance reported 600 sowars, marching parallel with a body of infantry, three miles beyond our advanced post. General Nuttall advanced 160 sabres and two guns for about three miles, the enemy retiring. When he got within 1,800 yards of the cavalry our men opened on them, and they bolted faster than ever, making for cover. General Nuttall pursued until he was six miles from camp, when he gave up the chase. Some horses of the enemy were killed, and men carried off wounded. No infantry were seen.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 422 K., dated 25th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 25th July. General Burrows reports, that in the event of enemy moving up north, he purposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and moving up Kakrez Valley, opening up fresh line of communication.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 25th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 25th July. Information received this evening that Ayub's cavalry fell back last night to Helmand. Report received to the effect that 150 cavalry crossed into the Argandab three days ago; believed to have been sent to take back Surteep's family hidden in village there. Efforts appear to be made by Habeeboolla Khan, Barakzai, to raise people in Kakrez, without much success. There is much excitement throughout the country.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 430 K., dated 26th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 26th July. Your telegram, 21st July. General Burrows states that should the enemy advance direct on Maiwand or on Khushk-i-Nakhud, he is prepared to attack him; should he attempt to reach Maiwand *via* Melmand, he would intercept him by Garmao Valley; should Ayub's force try to avoid him by taking road to Nish *via* Melmand and Ghorak, he proposes to move by Maiwand into Kakrez. To do this he will reduce his baggage and send back some sick reported unfit, and I will assist him in every way to lighten his column and make it more moveable.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 27th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 27th July. General Burrows, under date evening 25th, reports situation unchanged. Two Sind horsemen shot when patrolling near Sungboor. At Kandahar I hear, on best authority, that Habeeboolla has been to Kakrez and has tried to raise the people without success. He was at Soznee on Sunday, and then proposed crossing into the Argandab. The second detachment, 11th Foot, left Sibi last night. Five men of first detachment, struck down by sunstroke at Nari, are all doing well. Headquarters 9th and two mountain guns left Quetta for Gulistan this morning.

TELEGRAM from GENERAL PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 28th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 27th July. General Burrows' force completely defeated; we take refuge in citadel; thirty sowars have escaped.

Enclosure 4 in No. 35.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force,
to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA. (Dated Kandahar, 6th September 1880.)

IN forwarding the accompanying despatches from Generals Burrows and Nuttall, relative to the action of Maiwand, I have the honour to submit the following observations for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. On the 27th June the Political Resident reported to me that Ayub Khan had left Herat with infantry, cavalry, and 30 guns. He at the same time strongly urged that active support should be given to the Wali of Kandahar, then at Girishk. After considering the matter, I decided on recommending that a brigade of infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a battery of horse artillery should be sent to the Helmand.

To strengthen the garrison to be left here, the 4th Native Infantry were ordered to be concentrated at Quetta, and a wing of the 2nd Beluchis to march from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar, with the concurrence of the Political Resident.

3. On the 1st July the orders of Government were received through the Quartermaster-General, sanctioning an advance on Girishk, but that the Helmand was on no account to be crossed. The Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison and line of communications were not to be weakened, and troops from the reserve were to be pushed forward at once, as the Commander-in-Chief considered the force proposed to be left at Kandahar weak in all arms.

4. On the 2nd July I received intelligence that Government intended Kandahar being reinforced by the 15th Foot, a battery of artillery, one Native cavalry and two Native infantry regiments.

5. I was fully aware that immense difficulties would present themselves in pushing forward these corps, and that it would take some time before they could reach me; but as Ayub's advance would, I considered, have a disturbing effect on Kandahar and the country, I thought it advisable that the force approved of by Government should move to Girishk in accordance with their orders.

6. Accordingly it marched on the 3rd July, and I was then left at Kandahar with the following garrison :—Squadron of Poona Horse, details of 3rd Light Cavalry, 3rd Sind Horse, four guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery, 5/11th Royal Artillery (Heavy Battery), 7th Fusileers, and a wing of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry,—*vide* return attached. This of course was a very weak garrison; but the 4th Native Infantry, followed by the 28th Native Infantry, were moving up along the line, and I trusted to this becoming known, as also that other troops were coming, to prevent anything disturbing the ordinary state of affairs here.

7. On the 13th July the head-quarters of the 4th Native Infantry arrived here, and between that date and the 28th July, the remainder of the regiment and the 28th Regiment Native Infantry joined at Kandahar.

8. It will thus be seen that I had no means of strengthening General Burrows except by sending him some details of the 1st Regiment, N.I., and 30th N.I., left behind or joined at Kandahar from escort or other duties, and by 50 sabres of the 3rd Sind Horse under Lieutenant Monteith, who took out horses, &c., to equip the smooth-bore battery which had been rescued from the Wali's troops. On the 23rd July, however, by which time the 4th N.I. were nearly complete, and some of the 28th had arrived, I arranged to send some 230 rank and file of the former regiment, with a convoy of commissariat stores, and that some 130 of these should remain with General Burrows, the others returning as escort to a convoy of his sick.

9. Before this could be carried out, General Burrows had moved from Khushk-i-Nakhud, and the battle of Maiwand was fought.

10. I had, however, in the meantime, kept General Burrows fully informed of the instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief, notably the Quartermaster-General's telegram dated 15th July, to the effect that he must act according to his own judgment, and also the one dated 21st July, saying that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked.

11. Acting on this judgment, and on information which turned out to be inaccurate, he advanced from Khushk-i-Nakhud on Maiwand, and there found himself in contact with overwhelming numbers.

12. General Burrows' report attached enters into the details of the action.

13. The further details regarding the movements of General Burrows' force and intelligence will be submitted in a separate report to the Quartermaster-General.

RETURN referred to in para. 6 of the foregoing Despatch.

	Effective.			Sick.			Total.	Followers.	Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Elephants.
	Europeans.		Natives.	Europeans.		Natives.						
	Officers.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.	Warrant, N.C. Officers.	Officers.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.						
Head-quarters Staff - - -	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	22	12	—	—	—
1st Brigade Staff - - -	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	1	—	—	—
2nd Brigade Staff - - -	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	7	5	—	—	—
R.E. Staff - - -	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	6	4	—	—	—
R.A. Staff - - -	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—
Medical Staff - - -	6	10	—	2	1	—	19	90	6	1	5	—
Political Department - - -	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	2	—	—	—
Ecclesiastical Department - - -	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
Commissariat Department - - -	8	11	—	—	—	—	19	1,887	19	2	84	—
Ordnance Department - - -	1	6	31	—	1	3	42	22	—	—	—	—
Transport Department - - -	5	3	38	—	—	—	46	450	21	—	105	—
E/B, R.H.A. - - -	—	10	1	—	9	1	21	38	12	—	3	—
C/2nd, R.A. - - -	5	109	10	—	25	2	151	224	90	—	20	—
5/11th, R.A. - - -	3	87	—	—	3	—	93	283	11	—	374	—
Poona Horse - - -	5	—	190	—	—	17	212	231	209	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse - - -	1	—	178	—	—	—	179	212	232	—	—	—
3rd Light Cavalry - - -	1	—	83	—	—	26	110	111	113	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners. - - -	—	3	30	—	1	5	39	12	—	—	—	—
2/7th Foot* - - -	18	588	—	6	73	—	685	264	10	—	16	—
66th Foot† - - -	—	—	—	1	90	—	91	3	—	—	—	—
1st Regiment N.I. - - -	—	—	91	—	—	16	107	1	—	—	—	—
4th " " - - -	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—
19th‡ " " - - -	6	—	524	—	—	51	581	138	6	—	6	—
29th " " - - -	—	—	2	—	—	6	8	—	—	—	—	—
30th " " - - -	—	—	28	—	—	12	40	3	—	—	—	—
Total - - -	71	827	1,272	11	203	139	2,463	4,016	753	3	613	—

* Includes men attached from the Bengal Army.

† 66th Regiment. Includes clerks and a few men employed departmentally.

‡ 19th Regiment N.I. Includes men attached from the Bengal Army.

(Signed) F. J. S. ADAM, Major,
Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force.

Enclosure 5 in No. 35.

From Brigadier-General G. R. S. BURROWS to the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Kandahar Force. (Dated Kandahar, 30th August 1880.)

I have the honour to report that, on the 26th ultimo, whilst encamped at Khushk-i-Nakhud, I received information that 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry and a large number of ghazis had arrived at Garmao and Maiwand, and that it was Ayub Khan's intention to follow with the main body of his army immediately.

2. A sketch is attached to this report, showing the positions of Maiwand and Khushk-i-Nakhud, from which it will be

* Vide correspondence from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, attached.

seen that to carry into effect the instructions I had received,* viz., to prevent

Ayub Khan from passing on to Ghazni, it was incumbent on me to intercept him either at Maiwand or Khushk-i-Nakhud.

3. Hitherto I had found it impossible to obtain any reliable information regarding Ayub Khan's intended movements, for although, when the expedition set out, it was understood that we were to operate in a friendly country, and in concert with a loyal army, the actual circumstances were the reverse of this. The Wali's army had gone over to the enemy; the Wali himself was a refugee in my camp. Whatever little

political influence there may previously have been in the country was at an end, and every man's hand was against us.

4. In the absence of intelligence beyond such as my cavalry patrols brought in, and from which I knew that the enemy's advanced post was at Sungboor, twelve miles in my front, on the Khuskh-i-Nakhud road, I considered it advisable to await events in the position I had taken up at the latter place.

5. On learning, however, that the enemy was making for Maiwand, I determined to move on that place at once.

6. The force, strength as per margin, marched at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th July, encumbered by an enormous quantity of ordnance and commissariat stores and baggage. This was unavoidable, as the hostile state of the country rendered it impossible to leave anything behind in safety, and I could not divide my already too weak force.

E/B, Royal Horse Artillery,—	
Officers	5
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	141
Horses	191
Six 9-pdr. M.L.R. guns.	
Smooth-bore Battery of,—	
6-pdrs. taken from the Wali's mutinous army, and manned by 1 Officer and 42 men, 66th Foot.	
66th Foot,—	
Officers	19
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	497
3rd Light Cavalry,—	
Officers	6
Native Officers	13
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	297
Horses	306
3rd Sind Horse,—	
Officers	5
Native Officers	8
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	247
Horses	252
Sappers and Miners,—	
Officer	1
European Non-commissioned Officers	2
Native Officer	1
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	41
1st Native Infantry (Grenadiers),—	
Officers	7
Native Officers	15
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	626
30th N. I. (Jacob's rifles),—	
Officers	8
Native Officers	14
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	603
Of these numbers, 34 Europeans and 50 Natives were in hospital.	

7. After proceeding about eight miles, large masses of troops were discovered, about four miles distant, moving in a diagonal direction across our right front, and it was evident that a collision with Ayub Khan's army must take place before we reached our destination.

8. Advancing on a village which lay about a mile in my front, I placed my baggage there, and on the higher ground beyond I deployed my infantry into line with guns in the centre, and the cavalry on the left, covering the movement with two horse artillery guns and a troop of cavalry.

9. It was difficult, on account of the haze and dust, to estimate the number of the enemy, but, judging by the extent of country covered, I believe I am within the mark when I set down his strength at 25,000 men.

10. At 11.45 a.m., the fight commenced by the advanced guns under Lieutenant H. Maclaine coming into action on our left, followed by two horse artillery guns and the smooth-bore battery in our centre. The remaining two 9-pounders were also brought up from the rear guard.

11. In about half an hour, the enemy began to reply from their right, gradually extending along their front, and concentrating the fire of thirty guns on our position.

12. The infantry were ordered to lie down, and the wing of Jacob's Rifles, which had been in reserve, was brought up on the flanks, which were threatened on the right by ghazis, and on the left by the enemy's regular cavalry.

13. In this position we remained for nearly three hours, our artillery making excellent practice, the cavalry holding the enemy's cavalry in check, and the infantry keeping up a steady fire on the ghazis on our right.

14. A large body of the enemy's regular infantry were on our left front, and about the middle of the day they advanced in line, but well delivered volleys checked them, and they did not come on again.

15. Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the fire of the enemy's guns slackened, and swarms of ghazis advanced rapidly towards our centre.

16. Up to this time, the casualties amongst the infantry had not been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily and the guns were sweeping the ground with case shot, I felt confident as to the result.

17. But our fire failed to check the ghazis; they came on in overwhelming numbers and making good their rush, they seized the two most advanced horse artillery guns.

18. With the exception of two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops had been splendid up to this point; but now, at the critical moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the infantry gave way, and commencing from the left, rolled up, like a wave, to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I went for the cavalry. (I was obliged to go myself, having no Staff Officer left).

19. The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to charge across the front and so give the infantry an opportunity of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my order.

20. All was now over, and I returned to the infantry to do what might be done to save them from complete annihilation.

21. After retreating across the nullah, and through the gardens near the village, a small walled enclosure was reached, and in this about 150 men of different corps, with several Officers, made a stand and checked the enemy for a time; but, seeing that we were rapidly being outflanked, and that our line of retreat would presently be cut off, I gave the order to retire.

22. A wide open plain lay before us, and, with discipline utterly gone and the men all scattered, the prospect was discouraging; but we succeeded in making our way without much loss for a distance of three miles, when we joined the guns and cavalry in rear of the baggage, which was by this time stretching for miles over the country towards Kandahar.

23. Small parties of the enemy continued to hover in our rear, but no vigorous pursuit was made.

24. After daylight, we were fired on from every village we passed, until we reached Kokeran, when we met a small force under General Brooke, which cleared the way for us into Kandahar.

25. Of the four horse artillery 9-pounder guns and six smooth-bore guns with which we left the field, the whole of the former and one of the latter were brought safely into Kandahar; the five other smooth-bore guns had, one by one, to be abandoned during the retreat, the horses being unable to bring them on.

26. Of the conduct of the troops, generally, I have already spoken, but I wish to bring the artillery to special notice; their behaviour was admirable; exposed to a heavy fire, they served their guns coolly and steadily as on parade, and when the guns were rushed, they fought the ghazis with hand-spikes, sponge-rods, &c.

27. In explanation of the unfortunate loss of the two horse artillery guns, the Officer commanding the battery has reported that Lieutenant Maclaine, who was in charge of them, waited to fire another round of case after the order to limber up and retire had been given, and the delay was fatal.

28. The detachment of the 66th Regiment, under Lieutenant G. De la M. Faunce, which manned the smooth-bore battery, also behaved extremely well.

29. On Major Blackwood being wounded during the action, Captain J. R. Slade, R.H.A., took command of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

30. I beg to bring the conduct of this Officer to very special notice. Captain Slade was not only conspicuous for his gallantry during the day, but throughout the long and trying retreat of forty miles, he worked with unflagging energy, encouraging his men and tending the wounded Officers and men who crowded his guns.

31. I was indebted to Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E., for valuable assistance during the retreat.

32. The casualty returns have already been forwarded to you.

Documents referred to in paragraph 2 of the foregoing Despatch.

Memo. from Major F. J. S. ADAM, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. R. S. BURROWS, commanding the Girishk Column. (No. 473 K., dated 22nd July 1880.)

The following telegram, received from the Quartermaster-General in India, is forwarded to Brigadier-General Burrows, commanding the Girishk Column, for information and guidance. It is requested that a copy may be furnished to the Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

From QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar. (Dated Simla, 22nd July 1880.)

Simla, 22nd. My telegram of yesterday and yours of last night. You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government considers it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented, by all possible means, from passing on to Ghazni.

From Major F. J. S. ADAM, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. S. R. BURROWS, commanding the Girishk Column, (No. 470 K., dated 22nd July 1880.)

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Lieutenant-General commanding, to forward you a copy of a telegram received last night from the Commander-in-Chief in India:—

TELEGRAM from the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar. Dated Simla, 21st July 1880.

“Simla, 21st July. You have not answered Chief's question relative to suitability of Burrows' position for striking a blow at Ayub. It is of the utmost importance that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked. As your reinforcements arrive, to what extent can you strengthen General Burrows? What are that Officer's views and intentions, and what steps are taken by Intelligence Department to obtain information of Ayub's movements? The Argandab road should also be observed. You must keep Chief more fully and early informed of situation, as reports of Ayub's and Burrows' moves are received by Foreign long before yours.”

2. General Primrose desires you will at once report what plans you have resolved on in the event of Ayub's main body crossing the Helmand at Girishk, and what you would propose in the event of his moving north and covering himself in your direction with cavalry. He would also much like to know if you are solely dependant for information on what is supplied you by the Political Resident, and if any steps have been taken by you to send out spies in the direction of Girishk, Maiwand, and south towards Killa-i-Biet and the desert.

3. General Primrose desires me also to thank you for the letter received last night relative to an attack which it was reported would be made on the camp by Ayub's cavalry, but as this may not have taken place, he would be obliged by your furnishing, as soon as possible, the information called for by the Commander-in-Chief.

Enclosure 6 in No. 35.

From Brigadier-General T. NUTTALL, commanding the Cavalry Brigade, to the Brigade-Major, 1st Brigade, Kandahar Field Force. (Dated Kandahar, 3rd August 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report the operations of the Cavalry brigade under my command in the action fought in the vicinity of Maiwand on the 27th July 1880.

2. On the morning of that day, agreeably to orders, by 5.30 the camp was struck, baggage packed, and the brigade, strength as per margin, mounted at 6 o'clock and marched from Khushk-i-Nakhud on Maiwand about 6.30. My dispositions were as follows. The advanced guard was

E/B., R.H.A., 6 guns.
3rd Light Cavalry, 260 sabres.
3rd Sind Horse, 200 sabres.

composed of a troop under the command of Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Light Cavalry; in rear of the advanced guard, at about half a mile interval, followed the remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry, with four guns of E/B, R.H.A.; the rear guard was brought up by Colonel Malcolmson, C.B., which consisted of 96 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, which regiment also provided parties of a troop to the left flank under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, with another party of 50 sabres, under Lieutenant E. D. N. Smith, to the right, to protect the baggage, which marched on this flank.

3. About 10 a.m., the enemy's cavalry were seen on our left front at some distance, crossing our front, and moving in the Maiwand direction, and on the nearer approach of our columns, the greater portion of them inclined in a northerly direction towards the Gurmao Valley, their advanced parties standing fast to watch our movements.

A village stood on our left front, and Lieutenant Geoghegan, with two guns, E/B, under Major Blackwood, were directed to clear it if occupied.

It being found unoccupied, Lieutenant Geoghegan was directed to stand fast in front of the village, and there await the arrival of the baggage, which was ordered to be collected there. In the meantime the two guns of E/B, R. H. A., under Major Blackwood, moved on to the edge of a rather difficult broad nullah, that ran in front of the village. It was at this place that both Major Blackwood and myself halted to reconnoitre the enemy's position, when we noticed that Lieutenant MacLaine, who had been left with the other two guns, had crossed the nullah some little way to our left, and, having been joined by Lieutenant Monteith with a troop of the 3rd Sind Horse, was advancing rapidly towards the enemy.

Mounted orderlies were despatched to recall him, but before they reached he had halted and had come into action. On noting Lieutenant MacLaine's unauthorized movement, I at once, with Major Blackwood's two guns, crossed the nullah, and with the remainder of the 3rd Cavalry moved rapidly to the front. In the meantime, orders were sent to bring up the two guns of E/B, R. H. A., then detached with the rear guard. After advancing some little distance the enemy's position and forces were distinctly seen drawn up towards Gurmao, covering some miles. Their cavalry, infantry, and the ghazis appeared in countless numbers, and Major Blackwood at once brought his guns into action. As I considered Lieutenant MacLaine's guns were still rather isolated, I sent orders for him to move down and take up another position nearer the main body.

The guns now advanced two or three times, when they halted and awaited the advance of the Infantry brigade and the battery of smooth-bore guns. It was observed that large bodies of foot-men and mounted men were making towards us from the Maiwand direction, and on the guns opening on them, large numbers of foot-men streamed away along our right flank. The position now of the Cavalry brigade was as follows:—two guns, R.H.A., on the right, supported by 130 sabres of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Major A. P. Currie, who, with Captain M. Mayne, also watched the right flank, and two guns E/B, R.H.A., under Lieutenant MacLaine, on the extreme left, supported by a troop, 3rd Sind Horse; and in rear, echelloned outside the guns, but with left thrown back, was a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry under Lieutenant J. H. E. Reid, formed thus to watch a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who had formed with the evident intention of turning our left flank.

A number of cavalry, regular and irregular, were now seen moving along on our left flank towards the baggage and the rear, with which were Colonel Malcolmson, C.B., and Lieutenant Geoghegan, the former with 96 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, and the latter with 50 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry. Their cavalry had now completely enveloped our flank, and were threatening the rear. Fifty sabres of the Sind Horse, under Lieutenant Smith, who had originally been detached as right flanking party, joined and were now placed to watch the left flank.

Our guns opened fire about 10.50, and for half an hour no reply was made by the artillery of the enemy. However, about 11.15, the enemy replied and opened from their batteries with a well directed fire. It will be observed that the necessities of the situation precluded my forming any reserve cavalry which could be kept out of range of the artillery, the whole available force amounting to 460 sabres, and these were fully occupied as above detailed. The configuration of the ground about was a level plain, which rendered it quite impossible to get any cover either for the guns and cavalry, which were exposed thus for three hours to a raking, well directed and concentrated fire from five batteries.

4. Firing in the direction of the rear now told that our rear was engaged. The action had proceeded some little time, when more masses of cavalry appeared on our

left flank, and to meet this movement, I placed all the cavalry that could be spared on the left flank. As the enemy, however, did not appear anxious to close with us, at my request General Burrows sent two smooth-bore guns, under Captain Slade, to this flank, who opened a well-directed fire on the masses assembled. After this the two guns under Captain Slade were moved to their former position in the front. Several demonstrations were now made from this flank by my cavalry against the enemy's cavalry, who kept firing at long ranges at us, but they only retired firing. Our men were, however, ordered every now and then to fire dismounted.

It was about this time (12.30) that the enemy succeeded in establishing a battery towards our right flank. During all this time, and till about 2 o'clock, our cavalry were losing heavily in horses and men, although I did all I could, by changing position and moving them, opening out, &c., to lessen the effect of the artillery fire.

5. Nothing could have been steadier or finer than the conduct of all ranks of the cavalry during the very severe and trying artillery cannonade to which they were exposed for about three hours, playing a passive part as escorts to the guns, and protecting the flanks from the enemy's cavalry, which literally swarmed round our left flank.

The guns of the E/B, R.H.A., under their officers, and those of the smooth-bore battery under Captain Slade, were most admirably and steadily served, and nothing could equal, and certainly never excel, the gallant, cool and collected bearing of Officers and men during the action.

6. At about 2.20 o'clock, it was evident that the immense superiority of the enemy in numbers had began to tell with effect, for not only had the enemy swarmed round us on the left flank, and the artillery were plying us with a well-directed and destructive fire, not only from the front but from a flank, but the ghazis, who had led the van of the enemy's attack from the first, were advancing in overwhelming numbers in spite of our artillery and infantry fire, and were supported by a long line of infantry a short distance behind, and threatened to outflank the infantry. Captain Slade had

* To bring up more ammunition.

withdrawn some of the guns and had moved to

G.B. the rear.* About 2.30, I now perceived the in-

fantry were in a confused state, falling back, and as their fire was slackening, I ordered the cavalry to form line, and by a charge stem the rush of ghazis on the infantry; but I bitterly regret to have to record that, although I was most ably seconded by the Officers, only portions of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse formed up, and we charged, but the men bearing away to the right and rear, the charge was not delivered home, and was of but little effect.

All subsequent attempts made at this time by myself and the Officers to induce the men to rally and face the enemy failed.

The men seemed totally demoralized by the combined effects of the very heavy artillery fire which had, during the action, killed and wounded 149 of the horses, and about 14 per cent. of the men engaged in the front, the retreating infantry and the swarms of *ghazis* that*

There was now nothing left but to fall back on the rear guard, which had advanced a short way towards us, but it was not till we reached the four guns, Royal Horse Artillery, brought out of action by Captain Slade, that the men, through the exertions of the Officers, Staff, and myself, were formed up facing the enemy. Here I halted, but could see no sign of any formed body of infantry retiring; but a long stream of scattered infantry could be seen stretching away for about two miles on our right as

No cavalry came near me. I was in the rear of the retreating infantry with three or four other Officers.

G. B.

we stood facing the enemy. I, however, sent my Orderly Officer, Lieutenant Monteith, to see if he could rally any stragglers, or see any Officers, but after some little time, he returned with the

report that the men he had met were quite disorganized and out of hand, and were making to the rear.

In the meantime, it was reported that General Burrows was amongst the slain.

I was determined, if possible, to save the guns, &c.

7. The enemy's guns had now got the range again, and commenced playing on us.

I saw no cavalry between myself and the column of baggage. There may have been a few irregular horsemen.

G. B.

Captain Slade, with his guns, now retired, and I covered the retreat with the cavalry, Captain Slade two or three times coming into action, and firing one or a couple of rounds. A large number

* *Sic* in original.

of cavalry were to be seen on our left flank, about a mile off, making evidently for our rear.

8. After proceeding some distance the enemy's guns ceased playing on us, and I then threw out a troop of the Sind Horse to cover the retreat, which was well and ably conducted by Lieutenant Monteith.

9. After proceeding some little way, information was brought that the rearguard was hard pressed; and leaving a troop with the guns, I returned with the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse to reinforce Lieutenant Monteith, but found all was going on well. After we had placed some tired-out and wounded men on camels and horses, we retired, agreeably to instructions, on Ata Karez, which was the nearest place where water was obtainable on the road.

10. I joined General Burrows with the rearguard about 2 o'clock in the morning at Hauz-i-Madat. After a halt of half an hour there, General Burrows gave the order to advance. I threw out a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry as a rear guard, which was well commanded by Lieutenant Geoghegan. After daylight we had to fight our way to Kokeran, where a small brigade under General Brooke, which had been sent to our aid, met us.

11. It is now my painful duty to record the death of the Officers of the Cavalry Brigade who lost their lives during the action. Major Blackwood, commanding E/B., R. H. A., was wounded early in the action, returned to his duty after his wound had been dressed, and resumed command of the battery till he was again wounded, and subsequently killed. Lieutenant Osborne remained with his guns to the last moment, and was then cut down.

Lieutenant Maclaine was slightly wounded during the action, and lost his life subsequently during the retreat. In the 3rd Cavalry I regret to record the death of Lieutenant W. C. Owen, who was killed when charging the enemy.

12. I have now the great satisfaction of bringing to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following Officers who did special good service on this day :—

Captain J. R. Slade, who commanded the E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, whilst Major Blackwood was having his wounds dressed.

Major G. C. Hogg, my Brigade Major, and Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, my Orderly Officer, rendered me most effective and efficient service.

The list of killed and wounded in my brigade has been submitted direct to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Field Force.

P.S.—I had one Orderly, 3rd Cavalry, shot dead, and another Orderly, Sind Horse, had his horse shot down during the action.

LIST OF CASUALTIES.

3rd Light Cavalry :—

			Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
European Officers	-	-	1	2	= 3
Rank and file	-	-	26	18	= 44
Horses	-	-	58	42	= 100

3rd Sind Horse :—

European Officers	-	-	0		
Rank and file	-	-	14	5	= 19
Horses	-	-	40	9	= 49

(Signed) T. NUTTALL, Brigadier-General,
Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

Enclosure 7 in No. 35.

RETURN showing the Number of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the action at Mainwand, on the 27th July 1880.

Corps.	Europeans.									Horses.									Followers.		Horses.	
	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.						
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.		Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.		Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.		Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.		Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.		Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.					
		Total.			Total.			Total.			Total.			Total.			Total.		Total.		Total.	
Staff	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ordnance Department .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
Commissariat Department	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
No. 2 Field Hospital .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery	2	12	14	1	12	13	1*	6	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	107	—	100	9
No 2 Company Sappers and Miners.	1	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	15	1	6	7	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse.	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	14	14	—	5	5	—	—	—	24	3	39	17
3rd Light Cavalry . .	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	26	26	—	18	18	—	—	—	46	1	58	42
66th Foot	10	276†	286	2	30	32	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	43	—	—	—
1st Grenadiers Native Infantry.	2	—	2	2	—	2	—	—	—	8	356	364	4	55	59	—	—	—	48	3	4	—
30th Regiment Native Infantry.	3	—	3	1	—	1	—	—	—	3	232	235	4	25	29	—	—	—	20	—	—	—
	20	290	310	8	42	50	1	6	7	11	643	654	9	109	118	—	—	—	331	7	201	68

* Prisoner in Ayub's Camp.

† Includes one Corporal, 50th Regiment.

(Signed) C. J. BURNETT, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Force.

J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Kandahar Force.

Kandahar, 3rd August 1880.



No. 36.

No. 219 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

OUR Despatches of the 3rd and 17th August, and of the 7th September, will have made known to your Lordship the general outline of the events connected with Sirdar Ayub Khan's invasion of the province of Kandahar; but we propose now to enter into somewhat fuller detail with regard to these transactions, from the time when authentic news of Ayub Khan's actual advance towards Kandahar first reached us down to the defeat and dispersion of his army by the forces under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts. It will be in your Lordship's recollection that, on the 18th June, we were informed that no attempt at an advance from Herat, beyond the pitching of the standards outside the gate, an event which had occurred often before, had been made by Ayub Khan, and that it seemed probable that nothing would be done by him. But on the 22nd we received intelligence that the Wali of Kandahar had heard from Herat that an attack was really contemplated, and that 2,000 horsemen were about to be despatched under the command of the Luinab to Zamindawar; and in sending this report Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, our Resident at Kandahar, stated that, under these circumstances, he recommended the advance of a brigade to Maiwand. Immediately upon the receipt of this information, a telegram was despatched to Mr. Thompson, Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, to ask what news he could furnish of the military movements and state of affairs at Herat, it having been found that the most accurate intelligence of what was going on in that quarter was generally obtained from the Agent at Meshed. On the 26th a reply was received

from Mr. Thomson, confirming the rumour of Ayub Khan's advance against Kandahar, and giving an account of the strength and composition of his army, which was communicated on the same day to Colonel St. John. On the 27th, General Primrose telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General, to say that he had arranged, pending orders from the Commander-in-Chief, that a brigade, with a battery of Horse Artillery, and a regiment of Native Cavalry, should move on Girishk, and that he was of opinion that active support to the Wali, who was then at Girishk, would be more efficacious than if the whole force remained at Kandahar. No time was lost after Mr. Thomson's telegram reached us in considering what measures it would be advisable to take. The advance of a hostile army upon Kandahar threatened our military position in Southern Afghanistan, and it would have been impossible, in our judgment, to have remained quietly in our cantonments while Ayub Khan advanced across the Helmund, occupying the territory of our ally, and gathering strength at every step, in consequence of our apparent supineness. As he approached Kandahar the disaffected portion of the population would have joined him from every side, and if the authority of the Wali had been then overthrown, he might fairly have attributed it to our refusal to give him the support for which he asked. As we have already informed your Lordship in our letter of the 17th August, those best qualified to advise upon the situation recommended that Ayub Khan's advance should be met by a demonstration towards the Helmund, and, under these circumstances, we came unanimously to the conclusion, that, if the intelligence of the march of the Herat army should be confirmed, a British force ought to advance to the Helmund, and that reinforcements should be sent forward to Kandahar as soon as possible. But though we were ourselves convinced of the advisability of the measures above described, we felt it our duty to obtain your Lordship's sanction to them before any orders upon the subject were issued by us; and, in order to be prepared to act at once, if the necessity should arise, a telegram, informing you of our proposed action, was despatched by the Viceroy on the evening of the 27th June, and your approval was received by us on the 1st July.

2. On the 30th June we were informed by Colonel St. John that the Luinab was supposed to have reached Farah, and, therefore, as soon as your Lordship's message of the 1st July reached us, the proposals contained in General Primrose's telegram of the 27th were at once sanctioned by us, and orders were simultaneously issued to move up reinforcements from the rear to the extent of a brigade, consisting of a British Infantry and two Native Infantry regiments, with a battery of Artillery and a regiment of Native Cavalry. General Primrose had suggested that the garrison at Kandahar should be strengthened by moving up one regiment of Native Infantry from Quetta, to be replaced on the line of communication by another from the reserve division in Sind, and by bringing a wing of the 2nd Biluchis from Kelat-i-Ghilzai; but Sir F. Haines considered that these proposals would not sufficiently meet the occasion, and his views being fully approved, the larger force detailed above was at once ordered to commence its march to Kandahar. It is due to the Commander-in-Chief to place on record that, in the latter end of May, His Excellency considering that Kandahar was weakly held, recommended that the Bombay Reserve Division should be mobilized as soon as possible after it should be known for a certainty that Ayub Khan contemplated a move on Kandahar; and although, as your Lordship will have learnt from the 5th and 6th paragraphs of our letter of the 17th of August, it was not until the receipt of Mr. Thomson's telegram of the 25th of June that we were in possession of certain intelligence of the Sirdar's movements, the Military Department had already, in consequence of the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion, been in communication with the Bombay Government, by whom the arrangements for the transport of the Reserve Division were made, with a view to be prepared for immediate action, if the necessity should arise.

3. In issuing instructions to General Primrose with reference to the advance of a brigade to the Helmund, we deemed it advisable to direct that the troops should not cross that river. Both military and political reasons led us to desire to confine our operations to the Kandahar side of the Helmund. General Burrows, when he arrived at the destination thus assigned to him, was already at a considerable distance from his supports, and, if he had been allowed at the outset to enlarge the sphere of his operations, any indiscretion on the part of the Wali, who was commanding his own forces, might have drawn him on still further from his base, and diverted him from the principal object of his movement, which was to secure our position at Kandahar. We were also anxious on political grounds not to interfere directly in Zamindawar,

where the Wali's authority was not fully recognized, and where the presence of our troops might have involved us in very undesirable complications.

4. General Burrows reached the Helmund on the 11th July. On the 15th we received intimation that the Wali's infantry were not to be trusted, and that the General had consequently decided to cross the river and disarm them without waiting for orders. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, immediately telegraphed to General Primrose that, in the altered situation of affairs, General Burrows must act according to his own discretion, reporting fully and observing caution, on account of his distance from his supports. Full discretion was thus given upon all points to the General Officer upon the spot, who had already very properly understood the restriction of his operations to the left bank of the Helmund contained in our original instructions as not precluding him from crossing the river when the Wali's troops had broken out into mutiny; and that restriction, having been removed altogether on the 15th July, exercised no influence whatever upon subsequent events. In the meanwhile General Burrows, having crossed the Helmund, had defeated the mutineers, and recovered the Wali's guns, and on the evening of the 15th he determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nakhud with a view to greater facility of supply and casier communication with Kandahar. He reached that position on the 17th, and two days afterwards he shifted his camp three miles nearer to Girishk for the purpose of occupying what he considered to be a better military position. General Primrose, in answer to direct questions from the Commander-in-Chief, described the position of Khushk-i-Nakhud as an important one covering the roads leading from the Helmund to Kandahar, and as within fair supportable distance of that city.

5. Whilst these movements were going on, the reinforcements were being pushed up to Kandahar as rapidly as possible, in spite of the delays occasioned by the railway between Jacobabad and Sibi having been broken by floods on several occasions. The first detachment, consisting of the Head Quarters and 270 of the 4th Bombay Native Infantry, reached General Primrose on the 13th July, and others followed in as quick succession as was practicable up to the time when communications with Kandahar were interrupted in consequence of General Burrows' defeat. We consider that much praise is due to General Phayre and Sir R. Sandeman for their exertions in despatching these reinforcements under circumstances of considerable difficulty, owing to the frequent interruption of the railway communications, and to other causes.

6. After General Burrows' retirement from the Helmund, the advance of Ayub Khan's army was slow, and rumours were rife of dissensions in his camp. On the 19th, General Primrose reported that the impression abroad was that Ayub would not meet our troops in the open, but that if he crossed the Helmund at all he would do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni for political reasons; and on 21st, he informed the Quartermaster-General that General Burrows was ready for them (the enemy), and that his troops were healthy and in excellent spirits. As we have already pointed out to your Lordship, in our letter of the 17th August, the effect upon our military reputation, and upon the political situation generally in Afghanistan, if Ayub Khan had moved without interruption straight upon Ghazni, would have been very damaging, and the political reasons for desiring to prevent him from doing so are so obvious that we need not enter upon them in detail. But, at the same time, it was clear that political considerations of a general kind must be subordinated under the circumstances to the requirements of the military situation on the spot, and the Commander-in-Chief, therefore, while drawing General Primrose's attention, in his telegram of the 22nd July, to the importance of preventing Ayub Khan from slipping past our forces and passing on to Ghazni, was careful to avoid giving any positive orders to that Officer, and in intimating to him that he was at full liberty to attack the enemy, His Excellency made his doing so strictly dependent upon his being satisfied that he was strong enough for the purpose. In thus subordinating political to military considerations, His Excellency acted in entire accordance with the views of the Government of India.

7. On the 25th, the Quartermaster-General was informed by General Primrose that, in the event of the enemy moving up to the north, General Burrows proposed to send back his superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and to move up the Kakrez Valley, opening up a fresh line of communication. It is much to be regretted that this intention to send the baggage and sick to the rear was not carried into effect. On the 27th July, General Burrows left Khushk-i-Nakhud, and having unexpectedly, as it appears, encountered Ayub Khan's whole army in the neighbourhood of Maiwand,

he sustained the defeat with respect to which we have addressed your Lordship in the Military Department.

8. Immediately upon the receipt of the news of the loss of the battle of Maiwand, General Primrose abandoned the cantonments at Kandahar and retired into the city, having first despatched a telegram to the Quartermaster-General, which was received on the 28th July. After that date communication with Kandahar became very difficult, and up to the 23rd August neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Government of India received any intelligence from General Primrose, except that which was conveyed in two letters addressed by him to General Phayre on the 11th and 21st August respectively, and forwarded to the military authorities here; and it was not until the 6th September that any reports were sent in giving an account of the battle of Maiwand, or of the events which followed it. We were aware that your Lordship was most naturally anxious for information with respect to these occurrences, and that you especially desired to be furnished with the names of the Non-commissioned Officers and privates who had fallen at Maiwand and during the investment of Kandahar, but it was out of our power to relieve your anxiety or that of the public upon these points until the middle of September, when the reports above mentioned reached the Commander-in-Chief. The garrison of Kandahar during the investment consisted of a total force of 5,068 men of all ranks. We have addressed your Lordship in the Military Department on the subject of the sortie of the 16th August, and we need not now allude to it further.

9. As soon as the news of the loss of the battle of Maiwand reached us, we lost no time in making every preparation in our power to relieve Kandahar. Orders were issued immediately for the despatch of large additional reinforcements from India by the Sibi Railway and the Bolan and Khojak Passes; but, as we were aware that a considerable time must elapse before a sufficient force could be collected under General Phayre's command to enable him to advance with safety through a hostile country, we also determined to order the despatch of a powerful division from Kabul to Kandahar, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts. This division was able to move out of Kabul on the 8th August, and to commence its march on the following day. The circumstances of the country through which it had to pass were at the time peculiarly favourable for such an expedition; the harvest had only recently been got in, so that supplies were likely to be plentiful, and the Indian corn, which would afford both grain and forage for the animals, was still upon the ground; while the information received from our Political Officers at Kabul before Sir F. Roberts commenced his march gave us good reason to hope that, at all events as far as Ghazni, he would meet with no opposition. This hope was more than realized, and on the 23rd August General Roberts reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai totally unopposed, and found there fresh supplies, which had already been laid in, in anticipation of his arrival, by the foresight and energy of Colonel Tanner, who was in command of the garrison of that place. On the following day Ayub Khan broke up the investment of Kandahar, and retired to the Arghandab valley. General Roberts arrived at Kandahar on the 31st, and on the 1st September he attacked and completely defeated the enemy, capturing his guns and dispersing his army. We have already, in our letter of the 7th September, conveyed to your Lordship our high appreciation of the great services which have been rendered on this occasion to their Sovereign and to their country by Sir F. Roberts and the troops under his command.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 " F. P. HAINES.
 " JOHN STRACHEY.
 " WHITLEY STOKES.
 " JAMES GIBBS.
 " D. M. STEWART.
 " C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

From Herat there is no news of importance. The son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, is said to have come to Herat with 500 horsemen, but all other attempts at raising

the tribes have failed. No attempt at an advance had been made 15 days ago beyond the pitching of standards outside the gate reported last week. It seems probable that nothing will be done. In the meantime the excitement occasioned here by the menaced attack seems dying away.

The Wali is still at Girishk, where he has summoned the Chiefs of the Alizais to meet him. He continues to receive promises of support from most of the influential Chiefs on the Herat side, and his policy of moving out to meet the threatened attack seems to have had good effect.

At Kelat-i-Ghilzai all is quiet.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st June 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes from Girishk that authentic news, 12 days Herat, informs that regular infantry had encamped outside city. Intention is that 2,000 horsemen, under command of Luinab, should advance to Zamindawar in expectation of Alizais joining them in attacking Wali's forces. Should Alizais keep promise and attack succeed, Ayub will follow with regular troops; but, if rising failed, Herat horsemen will return. Wali has ordered Alizai Chiefs to come to Girishk, and they promise to do so, but put it off from day to day. He has sent 1,000 horsemen to Washir, but does not consider himself strong enough to take more decided measures, unless supported by us to extent of advancing brigade towards Girishk, which he earnestly requests.

I am writing to him that we do not wish to move troops in this very hot weather except positively necessary, and that he ought, with assistance given him in money and arms, to be able to be put down threatened rising in Zamindawar, but supported from Herat in no more formidable manner than he describes.

At the same time I am inclined to think that should it be desired to keep affairs in Southern and Western Afghanistan in *statu quo* for the present, advance of brigade to Maiwand, together with prohibition to Wali of crossing his present frontier, would be advisable. An outbreak in Herat border, however slight, and however it turned out, may lead to complications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th June 1880.

From MR. RONALD THOMPSON, Tcheran, to VICEROY, Simla.

I HAVE received the following telegram from the Meshed Agent, dated yesterday:— Begins. Special messenger from Herat correspondent, with letter, dated 18th June, arrived last night, and brought intelligence that Ayub Khan has marched for Kandahar with 10 regiments of infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 30 guns, and blank mule-loads of ammunition; the tribes were to join him on the road; he left Herat on the 9th of June; his force consists of 5 Kabul, 1 Kandahar, and 4 Herat regiments of infantry, 1,400 horsemen from the Herat tribes, 1,600 regular cavalry, Ends.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

WITH reference to telegram from Foreign to Political Resident, regarding Ayub Khan's move towards Kandahar, I have arranged, pending reference and orders, that a brigade, with Battery Horse Artillery and a regiment of Native Cavalry, shall move on Girishk. I am of opinion that active support to the Wali, who is now at Girishk, will be more efficacious than if the whole force remained at Kandahar. To strengthen garrison here on departure of the brigade, I propose moving up 4th Native Infantry from Quetta, to be replaced on line of communication by a regiment from reserve

division, and have ordered a wing Biluchis from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar; the latter move is with concurrence of Political Resident.

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, No. 4503½, dated 1st July 1880.

From QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar.

1st JULY. Government have decided that an advance is to be made on Girishk, but the Helmund is on no account to be crossed. Report as to fordability. The force you proposed in your telegram of 27th is to be employed, you should therefore take promptest measures to reinforce Kandahar without weakening Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The necessary troops from the reserve should be pushed forward at once, and garrisons on line when relieved moved up. Commander-in-Chief considers the force you propose to leave at Kandahar weak in all arms. What information have you regarding state of road from Jacobabad upwards? Will it delay troops?

Repeated to General Phayre.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th August 1880.

From General PHAYRE, Quetta, to ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Simla.

I HAVE just received the following letter from General Primrose, dated Kandahar, 11th August. Letter begins. Yours of 30th received to-day. Position of enemy,—small body three miles west of city near picket hill; there are one or two Armstrong guns, 2,000 yards off in hill west of city, and one or two yesterday opposite Shikarpur Gate; they have our range, but have done little damage. Rumour of an attack on south side at Shikarpur Gate. Firing kept up morning and evening from villages three sides of city; only a few shots. Our defences nearly completed, and much clearance made outside walls. Our casualties up to date trifling. Dr. Trafford, Fusiliers, slightly wounded; Private Orton, Fusiliers, killed; two men, Fusiliers, slightly wounded; Jemadar Matula Sing, 30th N. I., killed; and several Natives wounded, and several followers wounded. All wounded and sick previously reported doing well. Good supply water as yet from wells in city. About 45 days' supplies, except bhoosa, of which 10 days' in hand, but daily collections made in town sufficient for current wants. Up to date, strength of garrison is,—Effective: Europeans, 1,243; Native soldiers, 3,386. Sick: Europeans, 157; sick Natives, 225.

No. 37.

No. 439 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary,
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's

* G. G. O., No. 566, dated the 8th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

Sketch illustrating the attack on the village of Deh Khojah.

Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the siege of Kandahar by Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, of Herat, and the sortie from that place on the 16th August last.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.
"	D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 8th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 566.---His Excellency the Governor General in Council directs the publication, for general information, of the following correspondence and Despatches relating to the siege of Kandahar, and the sortie from that place on the 16th August last.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8535 K., Kabul Field Operations, dated Simla, 2nd October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 5418 A., dated the 29th September 1880, forwarding Despatches from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting the arrangements made for the protection of the citadel and city of Kandahar during their investment by Ayub Khan, and the sortie made by the garrison on the 16th August 1880.

2. These Despatches will be published for general information. Meanwhile, I am to state, for the Commander-in-Chief's information, that His Excellency's remarks on the several points they contain are concurred in by the Government of India.

3. The Government of India, I am to state, deplore the great loss of life on the occasion of the sortie; but the Government of India desire to place on record their deep sense of the loss sustained by the army in Brigadier-General Brooke, whose death was marked by so conspicuous an instance of self-devoted courage.

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5418 A., Kabul, dated Simla, 29th September 1880.)

I have the honour, by direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatches from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., commanding at Kandahar, reporting the arrangements made for the protection of the citadel and city of Kandahar during the investment by Ayub Khan, and the sortie made by the garrison on the 16th August last.

2. The siege arrangements appear to have been good, but do not call for any remarks from His Excellency.

3. Sir Frederick Haines, however, thinks that the abandonment of the cantonment was too precipitate, considering the force which General Primrose had under his command on the 28th July, and must have tended to confirm the demoralization of the troops caused by the imperfect information then received of the events at Maiwand.

4. In regard to the sortie, the Commander-in-Chief regrets to be under the necessity for saying that the reasons assigned for it are not satisfactory to him. The details of the operation appear to have been well and successfully carried out up to the time of the withdrawal of the troops and cavalry from the south side of the village of Deh Khoja into the city by the Kabul gate. From this point, however, General Primrose's narrative is confusing, though it is clear that, from the fact of the dead, among whom was a Brigadier-General, having been left on the field, the troops in returning to the city must have been closely followed up by the enemy.

5. In regard to the effect produced on the enemy by this sortie, His Excellency considers that, even were the results such as Lieutenant-General Primrose reports them to have been, they were too dearly bought with the loss of so many valuable Officers and men.

Brigadier-General Brooke, who fell on this occasion while endeavouring to save the life of a wounded comrade, was an Officer of the highest promise, and one whose death is greatly to be deplored.

6. I am to add that General Primrose has been called upon for a copy of any instructions which he may have issued to Brigadier-General Brooke for his advance towards Sinjuri on the 28th July, and of any report which that Officer may have rendered on his return to Kandahar.

7. The casualty returns were forwarded with my letter, No. 5327 A., dated 24th September, and the sketches will be sent hereafter.

Enclosure 4 in No. 37.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 3, dated Kandahar, 30th August 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the morning of the 28th July, at about 1 a.m., I received intelligence of the action near Maiwand.

2. In consultation with Brigadier-General Brooke, I decided on moving into the citadel during the day, and at once ordered the heavy battery, sick, and baggage to be taken there, directing Brigadier-General Brooke to proceed along the Kokeran road with a small force of all arms, in the direction of Sinjuri, with a view of helping in the men and followers of Brigadier-General Burrows' column and protecting them from the villagers, who were then firing on them, and holding the cantonments in the meantime with the 4th Native Infantry and a portion of the 28th Native Infantry, with two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery.

3. I myself proceeded to the city, and ordered all the gates to be seized and strongly held.

4. It was utterly impossible for me to remain in the cantonments, which are quite indefensible (except with a very large force), and from which the water supply could be diverted at any moment, and in fact had already been cut off for some days.

5. My ordnance and commissariat stores were in the citadel, and I therefore decided on taking possession of the whole town.

6. It thus became of paramount importance to occupy the city with the least possible delay, as it had become evident that the whole of the Pathan population in and around Kandahar were inimical to us, and were only waiting for any success of Ayub Khan's to rise.

7. This conviction had forced itself upon me as events developed themselves at Girishk, and clearly seeing that the Wali had neither influence nor power in the country, I made up my mind to seize and occupy Kandahar.

8. Could I have expected the slightest assistance from the representative of the Wali, I would have held on to the cantonments, at all events for some time; but there was no disguising the fact that a settled Government had ceased to exist, and that unless the most stringent measures were at once taken, the city would be in a state of anarchy.

9. Having seen to the immediate security of the place, I returned to cantonments, as heavy firing was reported in the direction of Sinjuri. This turned out to be Brigadier-General Brooke's force engaging the villagers, who fired upon him directly he quitted the lines.

10. On my re-entering the city, I met the Wali, who requested a confidential interview with me.

11. I at once accorded it (Colonel St. John had not then arrived), and he strongly advised my retiring from Kandahar, unless my force was very strong, as the country was in a blaze, Ayub Khan's army was very large, and his guns overpowering.

12. I informed him that my force was not large, but that I had not the slightest intention of leaving Kandahar, as, in the first place, it was my duty to remain, and, secondly, the true interests of my country were now centered in the city.

13. He then most strongly urged upon me the necessity of turning the Pathans and other disaffected people out of the city, and, as I fully agreed with him on this point, I told him I would see that it was done.

14. Shortly before dusk on the evening of the 28th, Brigadier-General Brooke having returned and reported he could see no signs of any more men coming in, I withdrew all my force from the cantonments, and told them off to the city walls, as below:—

15. To the Shikarpore Gate front,—400 men, under the command of Brigadier-General Brooke, with Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry, commanding the gate.

Length of this front, 1,300 yards.

16. To the Herat Gate front,—500 men under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, with Colonel S. De B. Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, commanding the Herat Gate, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith, 1st Native Infantry, the Tôp-khana Gate.

Length of this front, 1,987 yards.

17. To the Eedgah Gate front,—400 men, at first under my own personal command, with Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Native Infantry, to command the gate; but later on Brigadier-General Burrows was transferred to the charge of this front, and Colonel Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, posted to the Herat front.

Length of this front, 1,178 yards.

18. To the Kabul Gate front,—500 men, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with Colonel W. Bannerman, 4th Native Infantry, in command of the Kabul Gate, and Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, 30th Native Infantry, in command of the Bah Durani Gate.

Length of this front, 1,700 yards.

19. Colonel C. T. Heathcote, 19th Native Infantry, had the command and supervision of the Tôp-khana square.

20. A reserve of 200 men were located in the Char-sú, for distribution to posts as required, under the command of the Field Officer of the day, and a second reserve of 100 men in the Tôp-khana square, to replace men drawn from the first service.

21. A body of marksmen were told off to the bastions and other good positions for long range shooting, and, under the command of Major F. G. F. Moore,* 7th Fusiliers, did excellent service during the siege.

22. The remainder of the men available for duty were held in reserve in the citadel.

23. The total strength of my garrison was as under, including the head-quarters of the 28th Native Infantry, which marched in on the morning of the 28th, and those troops who came in from Maiwand, as to the numbers of which I could obtain no reliable information until late in the afternoon of the 28th:—

Regiments and Batteries.	Officers.	Effective.	Sick.	Horses.	Guns.	8-inch Mortars.	Bullocks.
		Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.				
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery -	4	115	19	123	4	—	—
C/2nd Royal Artillery -	5	101	14	81	4	—	—
5/11th ditto -	4	90	1	12	4	2	373
Poona Horse -	5	213	11	226	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse -	5	358	9	396	—	—	—
3rd Light Cavalry -	6	354	29	355	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.	1	59	7	7	—	—	—
7th Fusiliers -	24	620	45	10	—	—	—
66th Regiment -	12	241	70	7	—	—	—
1st Native Infantry -	6	273	72	7	—	—	—
4th ditto -	7	533	21	8	—	—	—
19th ditto -	6	586	27	6	—	—	—
28th ditto -	7	671	36	7	—	—	—
30th ditto -	5	319	77	6	—	—	—
Total -	97	4,533	438	1,244	12	2	373

* Paymaster.

The baggage animals consisted of 1,021 camels, 135 bullocks, 602 ponies, and 68 mules.

24. The length of walls to be manned was 6,165 yards, not including the interior defences of the citadel.

25. The final distribution of artillery on the walls was as follows :—

Ordnance.	Position.	Officer in Charge.	Officer Com. manding Force.
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, C/2nd -	N.-E. Bastion -	- - -	} Major P. H. Greig.
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun C/2nd, R. A. -	Durani Gate -	Lieut. H. L. Gardiner, R. A. -	
9-pdr. ditto, ditto -	Kabul Gate -	- - -	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	S.-E. Bastion -	Lieut. W. A. Plant, R. A. -	} Captain G. M. B. Hornsby.
6-pdr. S.B. gun -	Shikarpore Gate -	- - -	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	S.-W. Bastion -	Lieut. A. Bell-Irving, R. A.	
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, E/B, R. H. A. -	S.-W. Bastion -		
9-pdr. ditto, E/B, R.H.A. -	Herat Gate -	Lieut. G. S. Jones, R. A. -	} Capt. J. R. Slade.
9-pdr. ditto, C/2nd, R.A. -	Tôp-khana Gate -	Lieut. G. B. Smith, R. A. -	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	N.-W. Bastion -	Lient. T. F. T. Fowle, R. A.	
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, E/B, R.H.A. -	N.-W. Bastion -		
9-pdr. ditto, ditto -	Eedgah Gate.		
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th, R.A. -	S.-W. Bastion of Citadel.		

26. The skeleton map of Kandahar attached shows disposition and distribution of troops, &c.

27. The question of posts along the line had also received my careful consideration and I had resolved, in any case of emergency, to bring the Mandi Hissar detachment into Kandahar, and to order those of Abdul Rahman, Mel-Karez, Dabrai, and Gatai to fall back on Chaman, where, with the men already in garrison at that place, they would form a strong post (strength as per margin*) capable of holding their own against any force likely to be brought against them before help could arrive from Quetta.

* No 2 Mountain Battery.
Poona Horse, 106 sabres.
19th Native Infantry, 195 men.
Head quarters and 4 Companies, 27th Native Infantry.
Sappers and Miners, 26 men.

28. Chaman (a strategic point of the greatest value) would thus form an important connecting link between Quetta and Kandahar, and become an intermediate base for the concentration of troops marching in relief.

29. Under ordinary circumstances, the above posts, which had been strengthened, could easily have withstood any sudden attack made by the villagers around, but it was hopeless to suppose they could hold out against artillery fire and a regularly organized system of attack.

30. Communication would have been cut off between them, and they must have fallen one after another.

31. I therefore telegraphed to Abdul Rahman, ordering the garrison to retire at once on Chaman, picking up the other garrisons as they fell back, and I am firmly of opinion that it was solely in consequence of the promptness of their withdrawal that they were enabled to reach Chaman without serious loss. The Mandi Hissar post arrived here on the afternoon of the 28th.

32. On the movement of troops to co-operate with the army of Sher Ali on the Helmund, I had directed the Commissariat Department to lay in at once a full month's supply of *bhusa* and grain for all the animals of the force, but such was the scarcity of carriage that, on the 28th of July, only a thirteen days' supply was in hand.

33. Daily search, however, was made in the city, and, by reducing the *bhusa* ration, I found I had enough to last for more than a month.

34. All other food supplies were plentiful, both for men and animals.

35. The wells in the city had been previously inspected and reported upon, and, though all reports agreed that there was a well in nearly every house, they mostly stated that they would run dry if heavily drawn upon.

This latter statement I am happy to say has proved unfounded, and there is still an abundant supply of water within the city walls.

36. An increased provost establishment was organized for the purpose of putting a stop to looting and keeping order in the town, and I am happy to say that, considering the number of followers and the great temptations to which they were exposed, the complaints that reached me under this head were almost *nil*, and in nearly every case the culprit was caught and severely punished.

37. Regiments, corps, and departments had various wells in the city allotted for their use, and a constant supply of water was always kept on the city walls.

38. Medical arrangements as under, in case of an attack, were made by Deputy Surgeon-General J. O'Nial:—

“ Surgeon-Major J. F. Keith, M.D., will have charge of the Eedgah Gate and the North Front.

“ Surgeon A. H. C. Dane will have charge of the Tôp-khana Gate and North-west bastion. He will communicate by his right with

“ Surgeon-Major Keith, and by his left with

“ Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., who will have charge of the Herat Gate and south-west bastion, communicating by his left with

“ Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., who will have charge of the Shikarpore Gate and south front, communicating by his left with

“ Surgeon E. W. Kellsall, who will have charge of the Kabul Gate and south-east bastion. He will communicate by his left with

“ Surgeon K. R. Kirtikar, who will have charge of the Durani Gate and north-east bastion, and will communicate by his left with Surgeon-Major Keith.

“ The above are to be quite independent of, and are not to be in any way interfered with, by regimental arrangements.

“ Each Medical Officer will put permanently at his gate two *dandies* or *doolies*. He will find some fixed place for them, in which they are always to remain, and he will take steps to ensure that this place is known by the Officer in command.

“ On the ‘ Assembly ’ being sounded, he will proceed at once with six additional *dandies* or *doolies*, and the necessary surgical material, to his post, and will report himself to the Officer commanding at the time.

“ Medical Officers will take care that their dooley-bearers are well acquainted with the route from their respective posts to the European and Native base hospitals, and will take precautions against their crowding or in any way obstructing the communications.

“ Each Medical Officer will render assistance to all wounded or sick men of whatever branch of the service within his area.

“ Surgical operations involving any delay are not to be performed at these posts.

“ Assistance is to be limited as to what is absolutely necessary to the men's transfer to the base hospital.

“ Surgeon-Major C. H. Harvey, M.D., will have charge of the Reserve in the Char-sú.

“ Surgeon J. McNamara will join No. 2 field hospital.

“ Surgeon T. E. Worgan will join the Native base hospital.

“ The Officers of the base and field hospitals will have everything necessary for the treatment of the wounded always in immediate readiness.”

39. Signal stations were established at the four angles of the city walls, and all the gates and the Char-sú placed in telegraphic communication with one another and with head-quarters.

40. My next care and consideration was to improve and strengthen the existing fortifications, both inside and out.

41. Numerous walls and houses which had been built up to the city gate had to be destroyed and cleared away, and trees cut down to allow of a good fire, and to prevent the enemy using them as cover.

Free and easy communication along the entire length of the city walls, both on the ramparts above and the roadway below, had to be arranged for.

Platforms for mounting guns in important positions on the walls were constructed and repaired, ramps made up to them, traverses erected, and other works undertaken, the details of which are all enumerated in the Diary of the Siege.

42. A wire entanglement made with telegraph wire was constructed all round the walls, *abatis* placed in front of all the entrances and weak portions of the wall, and the gates themselves secured from fire by a covering of iron fastened on outside.

43. The curtains, which were badly loop-holed, and were much too high for a man to fire over, had to be cut down in places between the towers to allow of a direct fire on the country around.

44. The ranges of all the noticeable objects around the city were taken, and range tables posted up in each bastion and gate.

45. Though every available man was employed on work all day, assisted by hired labour, it was not until the 13th August that the Commanding Royal Engineer reported he had no further need of military labour.

46. Our covering parties were daily engaged with the enemy, and on the 12th August inflicted severe loss upon them, killing amongst others the Governor of Farrah.

47. Early on the morning of the 8th August, the enemy opened artillery fire on the citadel from Picket Hill, and shortly afterwards on the city from guns in Deh Khojah and Deh Kuttee; and though this fire was sustained regularly for many days, it did little or no harm, as the men and animals were placed under cover of existing high and substantial walls in the citadel, at right angles to the artillery line of fire.

48. Appended is a complete detailed list of killed and wounded during the whole siege. The casualties at Deh Khojah were forwarded separately, but are included.

49. All details relating to the siege will be found embodied in a diary now under preparation.

50. The behaviour of the troops during the whole siege was excellent, as the almost entire absence of crime proves; and though Officers and men were often for days at a time on continued duty without relief, such was their vigilance that only on one occasion was the garrison turned out by a false alarm.

51. I wish here to record my high appreciation of the bearing of all ranks, who for days, under a burning sun, worked most willingly and cheerfully, mounting guard on completion of their day's work with as much alacrity as if they had been on ordinary garrison duty.

52. I would especially bring to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following Officers who, during the siege, rendered me great assistance in the performance of their various duties :—

Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows, commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, commanding the Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General A. G. Daubeney, 7th Fusiliers, who assumed temporary command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the 16th August.

Colonel W. French, commanding the Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hills, commanding Royal Engineer.

Major P. H. Greig, commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery.

Captain G. M. B. Hornsby, commanding 5/11th Royal Artillery.

Captain J. R. Slade, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

Major F. Beauchamp, 7th Royal Fusiliers.

Captain J. Quarry, 66th Regiment.

Colonel W. Bannerman, commanding the 4th Rifles, Native Infantry.

Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, commanding the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Colonel C. T. Heathcote, commanding the 19th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. D'U. La Touche, commanding the Poona Horse.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith, 1st Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, commanding the 28th Native Infantry.

Major F. C. Singleton, 28th Native Infantry.

Captain and Brevet Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E., who did duty as Brigade Major, Royal Engineers, and as Field Engineer throughout the siege.

Lieutenant G. T. Jones and Lieutenant E. A. Waller, Royal Engineers.

Captain Mosely Mayne, 3rd Light Cavalry.

Captain F. C. Keyser, 7th Fusiliers, Superintendent of Army Signalling.

Colonel S. De B. Edwardes, Director of Transport.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary-General, who, ably assisted by Major E. S. Walcott, kept the garrison well supplied with provisions during the whole siege.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. O'Nial.

Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., Army Medical Department.

Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., Indian Medical Department.

Veterinary Surgeon W. B. Spooner, who, in addition to his duties with the Transport Department, did duty on the walls.

Captain W. Law, Royal Artillery, Brigade Major, 1st Infantry Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. Beville, Deputy Judge Advocate, and who also performed the duties of Provost Marshal.

Major F. J. Caldecott, Royal Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance, who was always ready to do any work.

Lieutenant E. V. P. Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse.

Mr. C. L. Griesbach, Geological Survey of India, who did duty with the 66th Regiment.

To Father T. Jackson I am deeply indebted for his constant care and attention to the sick and wounded; as also to the Rev. A. G. Cane, M.A.

My thanks are specially due to Major C. J. Burnett, my Assistant Adjutant-General, for the manner in which he performed his arduous duties, and who at all times was prepared and volunteered to proceed to any post of danger.

To Major F. J. S. Adam, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, my special thanks are due for the zeal and ability with which he carried on the important duties appertaining to his position.

My Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton, 2nd Queen's, deserves my thanks for the satisfactory way in which he always performed his duties.

My special thanks are due to Mr. R. Boteler, Telegraph Superintendent, who, in addition to performing duty with the 19th Native Infantry, acted as an Assistant Field Engineer, doing excellent work. I trust his name may be brought to the favourable notice of Government.

My thanks are also due to Mr. H. T. Pinhey, of the Government of India Telegraph Department.

Note.—From information received, I estimate the strength of the enemy around Kandahar during the siege at from 25,000 to 30,000 men, with 32 guns.

Enclosure 5 in No. 37.

NUMERICAL RETURN of Killed and Wounded of the Kandahar Force during the Siege of Kandahar, from the 28th July to the 31st August 1880.

Corps.	Killed.						Wounded.						Total.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	
Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
C/2nd Royal Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
No. 5/11th Royal Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8th Bombay Light Cavalry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	2	5
Poona Horse	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	3
3rd Sind Horse	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2*	—	2
7th Fusiliers	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	3*	2	8
66th Foot	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	1
1st Bombay Native Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1†	3
4th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1†	2
19th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8†	1	9
28th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	4
30th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	4
Transport Department	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	1
Total	—	—	—	—	4	—	1	1	1	1	25	11	
Grand total	4						40						44

* One man since dead.

† Since dead.

‡ Two men since dead.

Enclosure 6 in No. 37.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 2, dated Kandahar, the 26th August 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that the enemy, having clearly shown his intention of making a complete and careful investment of Kandahar, by occupying and fortifying the adjacent villages, which are all enclosed by high mud walls, under cover of which batteries could easily have been constructed and unmasked, when required, at the shortest notice, without any one being either aware of the number of guns or their distribution to villages, and in the absence of reliable information regarding the dispositions of the enemy, whose movements were all carried out at night, it became absolutely necessary to make a sortie to cause the enemy to show his hand.

2. Before resorting to this measure, I, on two occasions, carefully searched the villages to the south and east of the city by artillery and mortar fire, but without any apparent result, a few villagers only quitting the villages after the fire had ceased.

3. I, therefore, on the 15th August, determined to bombard one village heavily, and then to put some infantry through it.

4. The village I selected was that of Deh Khojah, situated to the east of the city, exactly opposite the Bar Durani and Kabul Gates, and running almost parallel to the city wall, distant from the former gate 600 yards, and from the latter 950 yards.

5. In making the selection the following points influenced me:—

- I. The village was isolated from the main body of the enemy's regular troops, who were encamped beyond Abasabad, some four miles to the west of the city, with Kandahar between them and Deh Khojah, and therefore out of supporting distance.
- II. The only supports available for the village would have to come from the south, and pass over ground on which my cavalry could act with effect.
- III. The village lies on the regular road from Mandi Hissar to Kandahar, and I was most desirous to clear and keep this road open for the advance of General Phayre, as the Kushab road was studded with villages which, if held in succession by the enemy, could only have been forced at immense cost.
- IV. Artillery had been fired from this village completely screened, and I was very anxious to ascertain what number of guns the enemy had in position there, where they were in battery, and what was the calibre of the guns. This information was most necessary, as all reports from Maiwand agreed that Ayub Khan had with him thirty guns, including two batteries of 12-pounder Armstrongs. Up to date he had only unmasked two Armstrong guns, and it was therefore a matter of vital importance to prevent his establishing an overpowering artillery fire within one thousand yards of the walls.
- V. I wished to confine the enemy's artillery to positions perpendicular to the shorter faces of the city walls, as batteries placed opposite the east and west fronts would take these faces respectively in reverse.
- VI. The disarrangement of the enemy's dispositions to the east would practically limit his attack to the west and south fronts, as the ground to the north is open and devoid of cover.

6. On the afternoon of the 15th August, I ordered the infantry force, as per

- * 4 companies, 7th Fusiliers.
- 4 companies, 19th Native Infantry.
- 4 companies, 28th Native Infantry.
- A party of Sappers, to be told off by the Commanding Royal Engineers.
- † 3rd Light Cavalry, 100 sabres.
- Poona Horse, 100 „
- 3rd Sind Horse, 100 „
- ‡ One 40-pounder.
- Two 9-pounders.
- Two 8-inch mortars.

margin,* under the command of Brigadier-General Brooke, to attack the village early on the morning of the 16th, to force their way through it, obtain all the information they could, and, if possible, to destroy any works the enemy might have constructed under cover of the walls.

The cavalry (strength as noted†) under the command of Brigadier-General Nuttall, to co-operate with the infantry, and to keep the ground clear to the south and east of Deh Khojah.

Artillery, as per margin,‡ to keep up a rapid fire from the walls on the village before the attack, and to cover the advance of the infantry.

7. The cavalry were ordered to leave by the Ecdgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and to trot round out of musketry fire to the east of the village, and there await the result of the attack.

The artillery were ordered to open fire at 4.45 a.m., and infantry to leave by the Kabul Gate at 5 a.m.

8. Brigadier-General Brooke made his own dispositions for carrying out the attack, which were as follows:—

“ 1. The force will be divided into three columns as follows,—

“ 1st. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeney, will consist of—

2 companies, 7th Fusiliers. 2 companies, 19th Native Infantry.

“ 2nd. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo—

1 company, 7th Fusiliers. 3 companies, 28th Native Infantry.

“ 3rd. Under Colonel Heathcote—

1 company, 7th Fusiliers. 2 companies, 19th Native Infantry.

1 company, 28th Native Infantry.

“ II. To each column will be attached an Engineer Officer, with a proportion of Sappers, with tools and powder bags.

“ III. A Medical Officer and sick carriage will accompany each column. The reserve ammunition will remain within the Kabul Gate.

“ Arrangements for carrying an ample supply of water are to be made by all Commanding Officers.

“ IV. The following will be the duties assigned to each column:—

“ The first column will, on leaving the Kabul Gate, take the road to the right, and, after proceeding 150 yards along it, advance towards the south of the village, the advance being covered by skirmishers, and the details carried out as may seem best to Colonel Daubeney, with reference to the features of the ground and the resistance offered. The object of this column is to seize a good position at the south of the village from which to advance to the north of the village, driving out all the enemy who may be met there.

“ The second column will conform to, and follow the movements of, the first, but, on reaching the village, will seize a position on the right of that taken up by the first column. Both columns will make their advance in as open order as possible.

“ The third column will remain within the Kabul Gate awaiting orders. The duty assigned to them will probably be to enter the village at the main entrance and seize the enclosure on the left of the entrance, where the gun embrasure is, and clear that part of the village. The other instructions will be issued to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd columns by the Brigadier-General on their reaching the south of the village. The cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, is under orders to co-operate, and will be on the east and south of the village.”

9. As previously arranged, the cavalry quitted the Eedgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and trotted round into the position assigned, a few shots being fired at them, but at very long ranges, and doing no damage.

10. The guns opened fire at 4.45 a.m., and at 5 a.m. the first two parties of infantry debouched from the Kabul Gate, making for the south of the village, which they entered under a heavy fire of musketry at 5.30 a.m.

11. At this moment numbers of ghazis were seen making their way to Deh Khojah, across the open ground to the south of the village.

12. They were at once charged by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Geoghegan, and driven back with heavy loss into broken ground, where further pursuit was hopeless.

13. The cavalry now formed up to the south of Deh Khojah, waiting for another opportunity to charge, and the infantry were steadily making their way through the village, beating down all opposition.

14. Once more the ghazis in large numbers tried to cross from the south to the support of Deh Khojah, but Major Trench, 19th Regiment Native Infantry, met them with three well-directed volleys, which turned them, and Brigadier-General Nuttall, seizing the opportunity, charged again with the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse, dispersing and cutting up many of the enemy, who again took shelter in the nullahs and open ground.

15. The enemy's fire in the village had now nearly ceased.

16. On re-forming after this charge, Brigadier-General Nuttall received a note from

Brigadier-General Brooke, asking him to cover the retirement of the infantry from the south of the village into the Kabul Gate.

17. In consequence of this request, the cavalry were withdrawn, and entered the city by the Kabul Gate, and it was in carrying out this movement that they suffered most of the loss sustained throughout the day, as they were exposed to infantry fire from the village (which recommenced as they were being withdrawn) in cramped ground, which prevented their being in open formation.

18. My intention had been that the cavalry should have remained out to the last in the open plain, well out of musketry fire, charging whenever opportunity should offer, and returning the same way they went out after the infantry had passed through the village.

19. The cavalry and infantry at the south end of the village being withdrawn allowed the enemy's reinforcements to move up from the south, and the fighting in the middle of the village became general and very heavy.

20. Notwithstanding the determined resistance of the enemy, who fought, under cover of their walls, with the greatest obstinacy, the infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny and Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo, forced their way through the village, debouching at about 7 am. from the northern end, whilst the party under the command of Colonel Heathcote held their ground near the centre of the village until ordered to withdraw.

21. At 7.15 am., the firing had entirely ceased and the enemy were seen streaming away from Deh Khojah, carrying some of their dead with them. Their loss has been reported as very heavy, several chiefs of note having been killed, and one of the two guns in the village destroyed.

22. Whilst the fighting was going on in Deh Khojah, the enemy opened artillery fire on the city from Picket Hill, and from a gun in position about 1,200 yards from the west face of the city wall. He also attempted to form up his infantry in the old cantonments under cover of this fire; but such was the steadiness and accuracy with which our guns were served, that he was unable to do so, and within an hour his artillery fire was silenced, and one gun on Picket Hill dismounted.

23. No words of mine can express my appreciation of the cool and gallant behaviour of all ranks.

24. Brigadier-General Brooke was killed whilst attempting to save the life of Captain Cruickshank, R.E., and by his death the service and the country have suffered a heavy loss.

25. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Native Infantry; Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry; Captain G. M. Cruickshank, R.E.; Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; and Second Lieutenant F. P. F. Wood, 7th Fusiliers, all died whilst leading their men in the most forward manner; and Second Lieutenant E. S. Marsh, 7th Fusiliers, was killed in helping to bring in Lieutenant Wood, who was then severely wounded.

26. The Reverend G. M. Gordon, Church Missionary Society, who was also mortally wounded whilst attending the men under a heavy fire; and I take this opportunity of paying my small tribute of admiration to a man who, by his kindness and gentleness, had endeared himself to the whole force, and in the end died administering to their wants.

27. The sketch appended will show the movements executed. Attached is a list of our killed and wounded.

28. Whilst deeply regretting the loss of so many gallant Officers and men, it would be difficult to over-estimate the effect produced on the men of the garrison and on the enemy by this affair.

29. The spirits and *morale* of the troops under my command, which had been considerably damped and shaken by the result of the action at Maiwand on the 27th July, and the continued confinement within the city walls, were raised, and confidence in their superiority over the enemy restored.

30. They were convinced that even when holding a strong position and in vastly superior numbers, the enemy could not withstand their attack, and the dread of the word "ghazi" was dispelled.

31. On the other hand, the overweening confidence of the enemy received a shock from which it never recovered.

32. The villagers and ghazis, who had been carefully instructed that there were only some eight hundred British troops in Kandahar, and the remainder were followers dressed up as soldiers, had it conclusively proved to them that this was a fallacy.

33. The feeling of security which had hitherto marked all their movements gave place to feelings of insecurity and doubt, and they refused to remain any longer distributed about in the surrounding villages, streaming back to their camp by thousands, numbers having been reported as having gone off to their homes.

34. Hardly a shot was fired by the enemy after the 16th; and, on the 24th, I received intelligence that Ayub Khan had shifted his camp into the Arghandab Valley, where he was entrenching himself, and that the majority of the local contingent had dispersed.

35. On the morning of the 25th, I reconnoitred the whole of the enemy's position about Picket Hill, the cantonments, and Del Khojah, and found the guns gone and the villages perfectly empty and abandoned; and I am now supplying myself with *bhusa* and grain from them.

36. The same afternoon I caused all the dead, whose bodies had not been brought in on the 16th, to be collected and buried.

37. Brigadier-General Nuttall brings to favourable notice the following Officers:—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. D'U. La Touche, commanding the Poona Horse.

Captain Mosley Mayne, commanding the detachment of the 3rd Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Light Cavalry.

Major G. C. Hogg, Poona Horse, Brigade Major; and

Lieutenant John Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, his Orderly Officer.

38. I would myself wish to bring forward the names of Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny, 7th Royal Fusiliers, who gallantly led the assaulting party right through the village;

Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Regiment, Native Infantry, who commanded the support, and was severely wounded; and

Colonel C. T. Heathcote, 19th Native Infantry, whose coolness under a heavy fire inspired his men with the greatest confidence.

39. My thanks are also due to Brigadier-General T. Nuttall and Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows; to Colonel W. French, commanding the Royal Artillery; Major P. H. Greig, commanding C/2nd, Royal Artillery; Captain J. R. Slade, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery; to Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Showell, Deputy Commissary General, who attached himself to my Staff; to Deputy Surgeon General J. O'Nial, whose arrangements for the sick and wounded were all that could be desired; to Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., Army Medical Department, doing duty with the 7th Fusiliers, whose great attention to the wounded on the field has frequently elicited my admiration; to Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., and Surgeon E. W. Kelsall.

I cannot overvalue the services rendered on the 16th, and on many other occasions, by Father T. Jackson, who was always in the foremost of the fight, attending upon and offering every assistance to the wounded, both European and Native.

40. I would wish also to bring to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant W. St. L. Chase, 28th Regiment, Native Infantry, who, under a heavy fire, carried a wounded man (Private Murray, 7th Fusiliers*) from the front into a place of safety; also of Private Ashford, 7th Fusiliers, who accompanied and remained with Lieutenant Chase. I purpose making a further recommendation on the part of this Officer and private.

41. My best thanks are due to Major C. J. Burnett, my Assistant Adjutant-General, and to Major F. J. S. Adam, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, who possess my entire confidence, and in their arduous duties have rendered me the greatest possible assistance.

Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton, 2nd Queen's, my Aide-de-Camp, has invariably performed his duties much to my satisfaction.

* No man of this name is included in the casualty rolls; probably Private W. Massey is meant.

No. 38.

No. 442 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of your Lordship in Council, the accompanying copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., together with the remarks thereon of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, reporting the march of the Kabul-Kandahar force to the relief of Lieutenant-General Primrose, and the victorious action fought on the 1st September 1880 against the force under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan.

2. The clear and comprehensive account given by Sir Frederick Roberts, and the appreciative commentary on it by His Excellency Sir Frederick Haines, render any further detailed remarks on the operations unnecessary.

3. We have, it will be observed, already published a General Order expressing the deep appreciation by this Government of the valuable services rendered to the State by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts and his army, and we now desire to request that your Lordship in Council will submit these Despatches to the Queen for Her Majesty's most gracious recognition.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
„	F. P. HAINES.
„	J. STRACHEY.
„	W. STOKES.
„	J. GIBBS.
„	D. M. STEWART.
„	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

No. 582.

Simla, 12th October 1880.

The Viceroy and Governor General in Council, having received from the Commander-in-Chief in India the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., reporting the march of the force under his command from Kabul to Kandahar, and the successful engagement with the Afghans under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan on the 1st September 1880, desires that it shall be published in the "Gazette of India" for general information.

2. Sir Frederick Roberts has achieved what the Commander-in-Chief in India justly describes as one of the most complete and successful operations of recent times.

3. The Government of India appreciate the foresight which governed the preparation of the force at Kabul, the energy which conducted it to Kandahar, and the skill through which its operations were fitly crowned by the total defeat of the enemy against whom its movements had from the first been directed.

4. These operations, in their inception and their execution, will remain an enduring record, no less of the courage and devotion of the troops than of the skill of the Officers, on whose services the Queen-Empress can rely for the security and honour of Her Indian Empire.

5. The high soldierly spirit which animated this force throughout its ranks had been conspicuous in every arm of the service during all the operations of the war in Northern Afghanistan and on Sir Donald Stewart's march from Kandahar, and formed the ample justification of the Government of India in sanctioning an enterprise that could not have been prudently entrusted to a leader less able, or to troops less efficient, than Sir Frederick Roberts and the soldiers so worthy of his leading.

6. Even had the march thus undertaken and carried out served merely to raise the investment of Kandahar, it would have been a military achievement of which any country might be proud. All the more, therefore, is Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick

Roberts to be congratulated on the opportunity afforded him of showing, in the defeat of Ayub Khan, that the enterprise and endurance of himself and his troops were perfected by a consummate skill and devoted gallantry, adequate not merely to the battle of Kandahar but to any eventuality of war which they might be called on to meet.

7. The Government of India deplore the loss of those Officers and men who fell in the gallant performance of their duty; at the same time it is incumbent on them to record their recognition of the strategical skill displayed in the dispositions, through which it arose that the loss was so light in comparison with the difficulties to be overcome and the important results which were attained.

8. The Government of India will not now make more than a general reference to the individual services rendered in all ranks in this, the fitting close of a war in which so much distinguished service has been rendered. They desire, however, to add to the high and deserved commendation these services have received from Sir Frederick Roberts and the Commander-in-Chief in India an expression of their own deep appreciation of their value; and it will be their most pleasing duty to submit to the Queen-Empress the names of those thus distinguished, for Her Majesty's most gracious consideration.

9. Meanwhile, the Governor General in Council tenders to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts and the Kabul-Kandahar force the cordial congratulations and thanks of the Government of India.

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5585 A., dated Simla, 7th October 1880.)

I am directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., reporting the march of the force under his command from Kabul to Kandahar, and the successful engagement with the Afghans under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan on the 1st September last.

2. The events reported are so ably and so clearly described by Sir Frederick Roberts, as to require no word in explanation. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief cannot, however, refrain from expressing the pride with which he presents this despatch to Government, recording as it does one of the most complete and successful military operations of recent times.

3. In the last days of July, when the enemy under Ayub Khan had, after the unfortunate events at Maiwand, acquired a prestige and strength which some thought to be irresistible, the Commander-in-Chief felt that unless his proposal to despatch a division from Kabul met with the fullest support from the Officer selected to command it, it would have been impossible to carry out the intention.

It is therefore most gratifying to His Excellency to find that Sir Frederick Roberts was so strong an advocate for the measure.

4. The promptitude with which this force was organized and prepared to advance reflects the greatest credit on all concerned, and the Commander-in-Chief would here desire to record his appreciation of the admirable spirit displayed by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, then in supreme command in Kabul, in depriving himself of the flower of his force in order to make up a division for Sir Frederick Roberts. On the skilful and successful manner in which Sir Donald Stewart brought the remainder of his troops to India, it will be His Excellency's pleasing duty to address the Government hereafter.

5. Sir Frederick Roberts has referred to the fact that no wheeled artillery accompanied his force, and as regards this I am to say that, notwithstanding the reports which had been received of Ayub Khan's artillery and of the manner in which it had been served, Sir Frederick Haines, after some doubts on the matter, fully concurred in the wisdom of the view urged by Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts that no wheeled carriage of any kind should accompany the force.

6. The march from Kabul to Kandahar has been criticised as a most rash military operation, with no base in case of ill fortune, scant supplies, and a hostile population

along the whole route. It would be out of place to point to success in justification of undue rashness, but it is right to state here that, after a full consideration of all these circumstances, those who knew best felt satisfied that such troops, with such a commander, could cope successfully with any obstacles which might present themselves, and the results have fully borne out this feeling.

7. In alluding to the troops, Sir Frederick Haines would invite the attention of Government to Sir Frederick Roberts' report regarding their discipline and behaviour on the line of march; neither fatigue, privations, nor the murder of their straggling comrades shook their discipline or *morale*, nor induced reprisals.

8. The report touches lightly on this superb march from Kabul to Kandahar,—a feat which will take its place amongst the most brilliant records of military history. It stands out as a proof of the wonderful power of endurance possessed by our troops, both British and Native, and of the admirable spirit which animates the men of all ranks and races of which our army is composed; whilst the mutual confidence which has been engendered by sharing together so many dangers in the field and so many hardships on the march, must prove a bond of union between the British and Native soldiers, which cannot fail to be a source of strength to the Government.

9. The Commander-in-Chief must here express his regret that, after the admirable efforts made by the troops under Major-General Phayre to reach Kandahar in time to assist in the overthrow of Ayub Khan, they should not have succeeded in doing so, and Sir Frederick Haines shares with these troops and their able Commander the disappointment which all have felt in regard to this. The troops under General Phayre had to toil through Sind and the Bolan at the very hottest time of the year. Floods and the difficulty in procuring forage and supplies were serious obstacles to be overcome, causing great delay in the advance. The attitude of the Marri and other tribes created anxiety regarding the safety of the line of communications, by which alone supplies could be furnished for the garrison of Kandahar and the Kabul-Kandahar Force; further delay was caused by this. It is solely due to the ability and energy of the Commander, and the spirit and discipline of the troops, that they were so far forward on the 1st September.

10. In regard to the action at Kandahar and to the reconnaissance of the 31st August which preceded it, His Excellency is only desirous of bringing prominently to the notice of Government the quick military appreciation of the situation by Sir Frederick Roberts, and the excellent dispositions made by him. The admirable manner in which his orders were carried out, and the gallantry of the troops, are shown by his report.

11. It may be said that it was a misfortune that the enemy did not suffer more in the pursuit, but a pursuit of Afghans is notoriously a difficult operation; and this will be readily understood when it is considered how easily they, under such circumstances, merge into the population, and casting away for the moment their arms, assume the rôle of peaceful inhabitants.

12. The Kandahar force rendered good service in the engagement of the 1st September; but as no report has been received on the subject from Lieutenant-General Primrose, His Excellency is not in possession of the details beyond what are gathered from Sir Frederick Roberts' despatch.

13. Sir Frederick Haines laments the death of such gallant soldiers as Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, Captains Frome and Straton, and Sergeant Cameron. To Lieutenant Maclaine's murder His Excellency has already alluded in my letter of the 25th ultimo. In such men the army has experienced a serious loss.

14. The Officers who are mentioned by Sir Frederick Roberts are commended to the favourable notice of Government, but their names will be more specially brought forward hereafter in the general recommendations for rewards for service in Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

From Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, G.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., Royal Artillery, commanding the Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, Army Head Quarters, Simla. (No. 88, dated Camp, Quetta, 26th September 1880.)

Before detailing the operations on the 31st August and the 1st September, which resulted in the defeat of the Afghan army assembled at Kandahar, under the command

of Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, it may be desirable to give a short account of the march from Kabul, a distance of 318 miles, which was accomplished in 23 days, including two halts.

The strength of the force, placed at my disposal at Kabul by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B., consisted of—

- 3 Brigades of Infantry.
- 1 Brigade of Cavalry.
- 3 Batteries of mountain guns.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., commanded the Infantry Division, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of which were commanded respectively by—

Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.

Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.B.I., C.I.E.

Brigadier-General Hugh H. Gough, C.B., V.C., commanded the Cavalry Brigade.

Colonel Alured C. Johnson commanded the artillery; Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer, and Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer.

In the detail of the forces* it will be noted that the strength in artillery was not in proportion to the strength of the other branches. But there were strong reasons which made it desirable that the artillery with the column should consist only of mountain batteries. The whole question was one of grave importance, and it was not without due consideration decided that the force should proceed to Kandahar unaccompanied by wheeled artillery.

The object was to reach Kandahar in the shortest possible time; and it was not improbable that the main road would have to be left, should the Afghan army at Kandahar endeavour to make its way towards Ghazni and Kabul by the valleys of the Argandab or the Arghastan.

The nature of the ground throughout Afghanistan is such that artillery can never be safely employed with cavalry alone, unsupported by infantry. Nor is rapidity of movement so much required of artillery in countries like Afghanistan, as the power of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without causing delay to the rest of the troops.

It was not forgotten, moreover, that on arrival at Kandahar the column would be augmented by a battery of 40-pounders, a battery of field artillery, and four guns of horse artillery.

It is unquestionable that, had either horse or field artillery accompanied the force, the march could not have been performed with the same rapidity.

Before leaving Kabul, everything that was possible was done to lighten baggage. Ten British soldiers were told off to each mountain battery tent, usually intended to hold six, and 50 to a sepoy's tent of two *páls*, 34 lbs. of kit only being allowed for each man.

To each Native soldier 20 lbs. of baggage was allowed, inclusive of camp equipage.

Each Officer was allowed one mule, and one mule was allowed to every eight Officers for mess.

* DETAIL OF FORCE.

1st Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
92nd Highlanders - - - -	651	—
23rd Pioneers - - - -	—	701
24th Punjab Native Infantry - - -	—	575
2nd Goorkhas - - - -	—	501
Total - - - -	651	1,777

2nd Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
72nd Highlanders - - - -	787	—
2nd Sikh Infantry - - - -	—	612
3rd Sikh Infantry - - - -	—	570
5th Goorkhas - - - -	—	561
Total - - - -	787	1,743

3rd Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
2/60th Rifles - - - -	616	—
15th Sikhs - - - -	—	650
25th Punjab Native Infantry - - -	—	629
4th Goorkhas - - - -	—	637
Total - - - -	616	1,916

Cavalry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
9th Queen's Royal Lancers - - - -	318	—
3rd Bengal Cavalry - - - -	—	304
3rd Punjab Cavalry - - - -	—	408
Central India Horse - - - -	—	495
Total - - - -	318	1,207

Artillery Division.

	British.	Native.	Guns.
6/8th Royal Artillery, screw guns -	95	139	6
11/9th Royal Artillery - - - -	95	139	6
No. 2 Mountain Battery - - - -	—	110	6
Total - - - -	190	418	18

TOTAL OF FORCE.

British Troops - - - -	2,562
Native - - - -	7,151
British Officers - - - -	273
Guns - - - -	18
Cavalry horses - - - -	1,579
Artillery mules - - - -	450

The amount of supplies which it was determined to take with the force was as follows:—

30 days' tea, sugar, rum, and salt for Europeans.

8 days' rum for Natives drinking spirits.

5 days' flour for Europeans.

5 days' rations for Native troops.

1 day's grain, carried by cavalry horses and transport animals in addition to the ordinary load.

For the above, and for the carriage of foot-sore* soldiers and followers, it was found that the numbers of transport animals required, inclusive of 10 per cent. spare, were:—

* European soldiers were allowed 2 per cent. of ponies.

Native soldiers were allowed $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Native followers were allowed $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

1,589 yaboos (large Kabul ponies).

1,244 Indian ponies.

4,510 mules.

912 donkeys.

In addition to these, there were purchased on the line of march:—

35 yaboos.

1 mule.

208 donkeys.

171 camels.

The casualties were:—

410 yaboos.

106 Indian ponies.

217 mules.

The numbers of Native followers were:—

Doolie bearers	-	-	-	-	-	2,192
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Followers in the Transport and other Departments	-	-	-	-	-	4,698
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Private followers and syces of Native Cavalry regiments	-	-	-	-	-	1,244
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Total	-	-	-	-	-	<u>8,134</u>
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The desertion of the whole of the Afghan drivers belonging to the Transport, shortly after leaving Kabul, and of the Hazara drivers directly their own country was reached, threw exceptionally heavy work upon the troops.

† Captain A. T. S. A. Rind, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. C. M. FitzGerald, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. H. M. P. Hawkes, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. H. F. Lyons-Montgomery, Bengal Staff Corps.

† Captain W. A. Wynter, 33rd Foot.

Captain G. H. Elliot, Bengal Staff Corps.

Captain C. R. Macgregor, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. L. E. B. Booth, 33rd Foot.

Lieut. H. J. Elverson, 2nd Foot.

Lieut. R. B. W. Fisher, 10th Hussars.

Lieut. R. H. F. W. Wilson, 10th Hussars.

C. G. Robertson, 8th Foot.

As regards supplies, the greatest difficulty would have been experienced but for the admirable arrangements made by Major A. R. Badcock and the Officers of the Commissariat Department,† and by Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low and the Officers of the Transport Department.‡

Sufficient praise cannot be bestowed upon all these Officers. They never spared themselves; and often, after the longest march, and with the prospect of having to start off again at a very early hour the following morning, had to work on until a late hour in the night.

In the collection of supplies the Commissariat and Transport Departments were materially aided by Major E. G. G. Hastings and his staff of Political Officers.

Fortunately for the welfare of the cavalry horses and transport animals, a fair amount of green Indian corn was almost everywhere procurable. Barley was very scarce; but the Indian corn proved to be so nutritious that the large majority of the horses, ponies, and mules reached Kandahar in excellent health and condition.

The reserve of flour had on several occasions to be indented upon; but, by replenishing whenever supplies were to be obtained, we arrived at Kandahar with still about three days' flour in hand.

The force appointed for the relief of Kandahar moved into camp by brigades on the 8th August in the vicinity of Kabul, the 2nd Infantry and the Cavalry Brigade proceeding respectively to Indiki and Charasia. The 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades encamped at Beni Hissar.

The following morning the march commenced. The route lay through the fertile Logar Valley, that line being chosen instead of the usual road by Maidan on account of the facilities it offered for collecting supplies.

On the 15th August Ghazni was reached,—a distance of 98 miles having been marched in seven days.

At Ghazni, I was met by the Governor, and received from him the keys of the city gates.

I placed my own guards and sentries in and around Ghazni, deeming it best for the preservation of order, for the prevention of collisions between the troops and people, and for the execution of our demand for supplies.

The fort was visited by numbers of Officers and men, but no disturbance occurred, and before the break of the following day the force was many miles on its way towards Khelat-i-Ghilzai.

No news having reached me from either the latter place or Kandahar, I determined to push on with all possible speed.

I may here mention that I frequently despatched messengers while on the road, with telegrams reporting our progress. I am led to think that none of these messengers ever reached their destination, except those sent from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and from between that place and Kandahar.

On the 20th August, shortly after reaching Panjak, I received a letter from Colonel Tanner, 29th Bombay Native Infantry, commanding at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, written on the 18th, to the effect that all was well with his garrison, that the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzai was quiet, and that General Phayre, writing from Quetta on the 12th August, had stated that he hoped to be in Kandahar on the 2nd September at the latest.

The following day, at Shahjui, Captain Straton was able to open heliographic communication with Khelat-i-Ghilzai. By this means I heard of the sortie which had been made from Kandahar on the 16th August, and at the same time I received reassuring news as to the staying power of the garrison,—that they were in no straits for supplies for troops and followers, that they were all in good health and spirits, and that they had forage sufficient to hold out for a longer period than it would take the force under my command to reach Kandahar.

I decided, therefore, to push on to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and there give the troops a well-earned rest of one day.

We arrived at Khelat-i-Ghilzai on the 23rd August, having marched from Ghazni, a distance of 134 miles, in eight days. This gives an average daily rate of $16\frac{3}{4}$ miles.

Colonel Tanner had everything in good order at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and had been enabled to collect a fair amount of supplies.

Being of opinion that it would be inconvenient to keep open communication with Khelat-i-Ghilzai for some time to come, and seeing no immediate advantage in continuing its occupation, I determined to withdraw the garrison and take it with me to Kandahar.

All the necessary arrangements for this purpose were made during the day the force halted,—the 24th August; and the charge of the fort was handed over to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Toki Ghilzai, who had had possession of it when the British troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart reached Khelat-i-Ghilzai in January 1879.

On the 26th August, at Tirandaz, I received news from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., commanding at Kandahar, that, on the 23rd, Sirdar Ayub Khan had abandoned the villages to the east and west of Kandahar; and that, on the 24th, he had struck his camp and had taken up a position in the Argandab Valley between Baba Wali and Mazra, due north of the city,—thus practically giving up the investment of Kandahar.

Being anxious to open up heliographic communication with General Primrose, and, if possible, with General Phayre, I ordered two regiments of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, to march the following morning (27th August) to Robat, a distance of 34 miles, the remainder of the force moving about half way.

Shortly after arrival at Robat, Brigadier-General Gough was met by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, the Resident, and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General at Kandahar. From the information brought by these Officers, and from what I heard from other sources, I was led to believe that Ayub Khan intended to make a stand, and was strengthening his position, which was said to extend from Gandizan to Kotal-i-Murcha.

Upon receipt of this news I determined to halt for one day at Robat, and to divide the remaining distance to Kandahar, 19 miles, into two short marches.

Soldiers, followers, and transport animals were much fagged by the long and continuous marching, and somewhat exhausted by the now daily increasing heat. I was, moreover, desirous of bringing the troops into Kandahar in as fresh a state as possible, and fit for any work that might be required of them.

During the halt at Robat, on the 29th, I received a letter from Major-General Phayre, C.B., dated Kila Abdulla, the 24th August, stating that he had hoped his division would be assembled there on the 28th, and be able to march for Kandahar on the 30th.

I felt at once that this precluded the possibility of General Phayre's arrival at Kandahar in time to co-operate with me. I much regretted this, as I was well aware of the strenuous exertions he had made to relieve the beleaguered garrison, and the privations and hardships which he and his troops had undergone to effect this object.

On the 31st August the force reached Kandahar, having marched from Khelat-i-Ghilzai (88 miles) in seven days, including the halt at Robat.

The position I determined to take up was to the west of the city, with my right on the cantonments, and my left touching Old Kandahar.

Such a position covered the city, gave me command of a good and ample supply of water, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp.

Not knowing what opposition might be expected once we advanced beyond the city, arrangements were made, in communication with Lieutenant-General Primrose, for giving the troops their breakfast outside the Shikarpore Gate, and for watering and feeding the transport animals.

At 10 a.m. the 1st and 3rd Brigades moved off from under the city walls, and took up the position as shown in the plan attached, viz., Picquet Hill, Karez Hill, and the north-eastern spur of the hill over Old Kandahar.

This movement was accomplished without opposition.

The Cavalry and the 2nd Brigade of Infantry were at this time on baggage and rear-guards.

From such a cursory examination of the ground as I was able to make on arrival in the morning, I was quite satisfied that any attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by a direct attack would be attended with very severe loss. I determined, therefore, if possible, to turn it.

To enable me to decide how best this operation could be carried out, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise extent of the position occupied by the enemy. I was anxious to obtain this information without delay, and I therefore ordered

* 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

15th Sikhs.

Two guns of 11/9th Royal Artillery.

a small column* under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough to start at once and make

as complete a reconnaissance as possible.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, was directed to accompany the party and to assist Brigadier-General Gough with his great local knowledge and experience.

The reconnaissance started at 1 p.m. from our left near Old Kandahar, and proceeded towards the high ground immediately above the village of Gandizan. Here the infantry and guns halted, while the cavalry advanced some two or two and a half miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal village, where it was found the enemy were strongly entrenched.

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry fell back, admirably handled by their Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.

In the meantime the guns were brought into action, partly to test the range, and also to check the enemy, who were now observed to be passing rapidly into the gardens near Gandizan.

A retirement of the infantry and artillery of the reconnaissance to within our piquets was then ordered.

The instant our troops commenced to fall back, the enemy advanced in great strength and pressed the infantry. They eventually assembled in such large numbers, and endeavoured so persistently to follow, that the whole of the troops of the 3rd Brigade, and part of those of the 1st, were ordered under arms.

The retirement was conducted with great steadiness by the 15th Sikhs, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessy. At the end of the day our casualties numbered only 10.

The reconnaissance of the 31st August having afforded me all the information I required, I decided on attacking the enemy the following morning.

Orders were accordingly issued for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and for one day's cooked rations to be carried by all ranks.

Brigades were to be in position by 8 a.m., tents being previously struck, and, with the kits, stored in a walled enclosure.

The plan of operations was explained by me personally to the Officers commanding divisions and brigades at 6 a.m.

This plan, briefly, was to threaten the enemy's left (the Baba Wali Kotal) and to attack in force by the village of Pir Paimal.

The whole of the infantry of the Kabul-Kandahar Force, upon whom devolved the duty of carrying the enemy's position, were formed up in rear of the low hills which covered the front of our camp, the right being at Picquet Hill, and the left resting on Chilzina, while the cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, was held in readiness, in rear of the left, to operate by Gandizan towards the bed of the Argandab river, so as to threaten the rear of Ayub Khan's camp, and endanger his line of retreat towards Girishk and Kakrez. E/B Royal Royal Horse Artillery (four guns), two companies of the 2/7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, were placed at the disposal of Brigadier-General Gough to take up a position near Gandizan, and, when opportunity offered, to support his advance.

Guards for the protection of the city having been detailed, as shown in the accompanying return, marked No. 9, the remaining troops under Lieutenant-General Primrose's command were ordered to be distributed as follows:—

Brigadier-General Daubeney's brigade to hold the ground from which the Kabul force would advance to the attack.

The remnant of Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade, with No. 5/11th Royal Artillery and the cavalry of the Bombay force under Brigadier-General Nuttall, to take up a position north of the cantonment, from which the 40-pounders might be brought to bear directly on the Baba Wali Pass; the cavalry being instructed to watch the pass called Kotal-i-Murcha, and to cover the city.

It was clear, from a very early hour in the morning, that an offensive movement was contemplated by the enemy. The villages of Gandizan and Gandhi Mullah Sahibad were held in strength; and desultory fire was brought to bear upon our front from the orchards connecting these two villages, while an ill-directed shell fire was opened from the Baba Wali Kotal, which was held in force during the greater part of the day's operation.

At 9 30 a.m. fire was opened from the 40-pdrs. upon the Baba Wali pass.

Shortly afterwards the brigades of the Kabul-Kandahar force were ordered to the attack, the 1st Brigade being on the right, the 2nd on the left, and the 3rd in reserve. Two batteries of artillery, viz., C/2nd and 6/8th,—the latter being the new pattern jointed guns,—had meanwhile been placed in position to cover the advance of the infantry, and commenced shelling the village of Gandhi Mullah Sahibdad.

The instructions given by Major-General Ross to Brigadier-General Macpherson were to make his first attack on that village, after which he was to clear the enemy from the enclosures which lay between the village and the low spur of the hill short of Pir Paimal. He further ordered Brigadier-General Baker to advance in a westerly direction, keeping touch with the 1st Brigade on his right, and clearing the gardens and orchards in his immediate front.

The attack upon the village of Gandhi Mullah Sahibdad was made by the 2nd Goorkhas and the 92nd Highlanders, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye and Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker respectively, the remaining two regiments of the 1st Infantry Brigade being in support. The village was carried in the most dashing style, Goorkhas and Highlanders vying with each other in the rapidity of their advance. The enemy withdrew sullenly and leisurely, a good number remaining to the last in the village to receive a bayonet charge.

On this occasion the following Officers and men were brought to notice as having behaved with distinguished gallantry:—

Major G. S. White,	92nd Highlanders.
Private John Dennis	„
Drummer James Roddick	„
Lieutenant H. S. Wheatley,	2nd Goorkhas.
Scpoy Mangal Jaisi	„
„ Wazir Sing Nargarkoti	„
„ Makkareah Rana	„
„ Bisram Thápá	„
„ Maniram Lohar	„

During the advance of the 1st Brigade on the village of Gandi Mullah Sahibdad, the 2nd Brigade had been threading its way through the lanes and walled enclosures which lay in the line of its attack. The resistance it encountered was most stubborn, the enemy being well protected by high walls, which they had carefully loopholed. The loss suffered in clearing these enclosures was necessarily severe. Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, C.B., Captain Frome, and Lance Sergeant Cameron (a grand specimen of a Highland soldier) being amongst those who fell.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow met his death while gallantly leading his regiment, the 72nd Highlanders, and in him the army has experienced a great loss. He had on many occasions highly distinguished himself as a leader,—at the Peiwar Kotal, during the operations around Kabul at the latter end of 1879, and notably on the 14th December, when he won the admiration of the whole force by his brilliant conduct in the attack and capture of the Asmai Heights.

Of the regiments of this (the 2nd) Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs had the chief share of the fighting. They were the two leading battalions, and frequently had to fix bayonets to carry positions or to check the determined rushes of enemy. Brigadier-General Baker speaks in high terms of the gallant behaviour of these two regiments, and notices especially the manner in which a charge of the enemy was repulsed by the 2nd Sikhs under the able and immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell, who was well supported by Majors H. M. Pratt, J. B. Slater, and F. E. Hastings.

The following Native Commissioned Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and soldiers are brought forward as having been very conspicuous during this part of the action:—

Colour Sergeant G. Jacobs,	72nd Highlanders.
Colour Sergeant R. Lauder	„ „
Lance Corporal J. Gordon	„ „
Subadar-Major Gúrbáj Sing,	2nd Sikhs.
Jemadar Alla Sing	„
Naick Dír Sing	„
Sepoy Hakim	„
„ Jai Sing	„
„ Partab Sing	„
„ Bír Sing	„

After severe fighting, both brigades emerged at the point of the hill near Pir Paimal; and bringing their left shoulders forward, they pressed on and swept the enemy through the closely wooded gardens and orchards which cover the western slopes of the hill.

The village of Pir Paimal was in our possession soon after noon.

When I heard from Major-General Ross of the success of the troops under his command, I determined to support his further advance by the 3rd Brigade, which had been drawn up in front of the village of Abasabad, with the double object of being a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and of meeting a possible counter-attack by the enemy from the Baba Wali pass.

The capture of Pir Paimal, however, brought our troops in rear of that pass; and, feeling that nothing had now to be feared from the enemy's left, I pushed on with the 3rd Brigade to join Major-General Ross.

That Officer, seeing the advantage gained, and knowing that he could rely upon the courage and eagerness of his troops, had very wisely determined to press forward without waiting for reinforcements.

The position to which the enemy retired, after the capture of Pir Paimal, was an entrenched camp to the south-west of the Baba Wali Kotal, commanding an open piece of ground.

This entrenchment they were evidently prepared to hold with their usual determination; reinforcements were being rapidly pushed up from their reserves, while the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal were turned round, so as to increase the heavy fire of artillery which was brought to bear upon our troops.

It became necessary to take this position at once by storm.

Recognizing this with true soldierly instinct, Major G. S. White, who was leading the advance companies of Her Majesty's 92nd Highlanders, called upon his men for just one charge more "to close the business."

The battery of screw guns, under Brevet Major J. C. Robinson, had been shelling the enemy with a well directed fire; under cover of which, and supported by a portion of the 2nd Goorkhas and the 23rd Pioneers, the Highlanders, responding with alacrity

to their leader's call, dashed forward and drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet.

The gallant and ever foremost Major White was the first to reach the enemy's guns; being closely followed by Sepoy Inderbir Lama, who, placing his rifle upon one of the guns, exclaimed that it was captured in the name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Goorkhas.

While the 1st Brigade was advancing towards the enemy's last position, a portion of the 2nd Brigade, viz., a half battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money, charged a body of the enemy on the extreme left, and captured three guns.

The enemy were now completely routed; but, owing to the nature of the ground, it was impossible for Major-General Ross, who was commanding in the front line, to realize the extent of the victory he had won.

He, therefore, expecting the enemy to take up a fresh position further on, and to continue their resistance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigades to halt and replenish their ammunition.

When this had been done, and the troops had advanced about a mile, Major-General Ross found himself in sight of the whole of Ayub Khan's camp standing deserted, and apparently as it had been left in the morning, when the Afghans moved to the attack.

With his camp, Ayub Khan lost all his artillery, numbering 32 pieces, including the two guns of E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, which had been taken by his troops at Maiwand on the 27th July.

During this part of the engagement, the following Officers and men were especially remarked for their gallantry and forwardness :—

Major G. S. White,	92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant C. W. H. Douglas	„
Corporal William McGillvray	„
Private Peter Grieve	„
„ John McIntosh	„
„ D. Grey	„
Major S. E. Beecher,	2nd Goorkhas.
Havildar Gopal Borah	„
Sepoy Inderbir Lama	„
„ Tikaram Kwas	„

Further pursuit with infantry being hopeless, the two brigades were halted on the far side of the village of Mazra, where they were shortly afterwards joined by the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General McGregor.

I had, meanwhile, ordered the cavalry of the Bombay force, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, to advance over the Baba Wali Kotal, and pursue the enemy up the left bank of the Argandab.

The operations of the cavalry under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough were continued throughout the day, the brigade crossing the Argandab and pushing beyond the line of the enemy's retreat towards Kakrez.

During this movement none of the regular troops were encountered, but some 350 of the fugitive ghazis and irregulars were killed.

With the exception of the 1st Brigade, which halted at Mazra for the night, all the troops returned to Kandahar before dark.

Shortly before the final advance, Major-General Ross, wishing to inform me by heliograph that he had succeeded in turning the enemy's position, directed Captain Straton, 22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, to proceed with a company of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry to the Baba Wali Kotal. This gallant Officer had only gone a short distance when a ghazi, springing out of a ravine close to him, shot him dead. In Captain Straton Her Majesty's service has lost a most accomplished, intelligent Officer, under whose management army signalling, as applied to field service, reached a pitch of perfection probably never before attained. His energy knew no difficulties, and his enthusiasm was beyond praise. He had won the highest opinions from all with whom his duties had brought him in contact, and his death was very deeply felt throughout the whole force.

On the capture of Ayub Khan's camp, the body of Lieutenant Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, was discovered, lying outside what had been his own, and close to Ayub Khan's, tent. It was evident that he was quite recently murdered, the act, I believe, of the guard placed over him by Ayub Khan. This incident I record with deep sorrow at the melancholy fate of a brave young Officer, whose short career had had been so full of promise.

I have requested Lieutenant-General Primrose to furnish a report regarding the part taken by the troops under his command in the engagement of the 1st September. I beg to acknowledge the assistance that the Lieutenant-General and the Officers under his command afforded me. The presence of these troops released the whole of the Kabul-Kandahar Force for the turning movement by Pir Paimal, and contributed materially to the success of the day.

I annex the following returns :—

- No. 1. Numerical Return of Casualties at Kandahar on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880, together with a Nominal Roll of British Officers killed and wounded.
- No. 2. Nominal Roll of Native Officers, British Non-commissioned Officers, and followers of the Infantry Division, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, killed and wounded on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880.
- No. 3. Nominal Roll of killed and wounded, Cavalry Brigade, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 4. Return of actual number present of the Infantry Division, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, at the action of the 1st September 1880.
- No. 5. Return of actual number present of the Cavalry Brigade, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, at the action of the 1st September 1880.
- No. 6. Return of gun and rifle ammunition expended by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880.
- No. 7. Numerical return of casualties in the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 8. Return of ammunition expended by the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 9. Number of Officers and men of the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, who were on duty in the citadel and city on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 10. Number of the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force under arms on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 11. Return of ordnance captured on the 1st September 1880.

I also attach four plans illustrative of the country over which the battle was fought,—

- No. 1. Gives the dispositions of the Kabul-Kandahar brigades at several important stages.
- No. 2. Shows the position taken up by the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, as the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force were breaking ground for the attack.
- No. 3. Has the position of the whole force engaged, together with that of the enemy, and of the ground covered by our cavalry.
- No. 4. Is a pen and ink sketch of the battle field taken from the hill over Gandizan.

It will be seen that our casualties amounted to—

Killed, of all ranks	-	-	-	40
Wounded, of all ranks	-	-	-	228
Total, killed and wounded				268

It is difficult to estimate the loss of the enemy, but it must have been considerable, for upwards of 600 bodies were buried by us between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone. Probably 1,200 killed would not be an over-estimate.

The number of the enemy against us has been calculated at :—

Regular infantry	-	-	-	-	4,000
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	800
Ghazis	-	-	-	-	5,000
Irregular cavalry	-	-	-	-	3,000

Having briefly described the march from Kabul to Kandahar, and having given the chief incidents of the operations around Kandahar on the 31st August and 1st September, I am desirous of bringing to the special notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Government of India the conduct and bearing of the troops under my command.

The rapidity with which the march was accomplished,—taking into consideration the strength of the force, the variations of climate, and the difficult nature of the country traversed,—is the best testimony I can produce to the efficiency, discipline, and spirit of the troops.

Their conduct, under circumstances often of the most testing nature, cannot be expressed in terms too strong or too full. They all seemed to be animated with but one desire, that, cost what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort, they would effect the speedy release of their beleaguered fellow-soldiers in the city of Kandahar.

The unflagging energy and perseverance of the troops seemed to reach the full height when they knew they were about to put forth their irresistible strength against a hitherto successful enemy.

Notwithstanding the provocation caused by the cruel murder of any stragglers (soldiers as well as followers) who fell into the hands of the Afghans following in the wake of our column, not one act infringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by our troops. The persons and property of the Natives were respected, and full compensation for supplies was everywhere given.

In short, the inhabitants of the districts we passed through could not have been treated with greater consideration, nor with a lighter hand; and the conduct of the troops will ever remain as memorable as the results which they achieved.

Where all did their duty so willingly and effectually, there may seem little room for the selection of individuals for prominent notice. I cannot, however, refrain from recording the names of some Officers whose exceptional services, I consider, entitle them to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., commanding the Infantry Division and second in command, afforded me every assistance during the march from Kabul and the operations at Kandahar. By the able manner in which he conducted the attack on the Afghan position, on the 1st September, he has given a fresh proof of his many soldierly qualities, and of his fitness for command.

Major-General Ross speaks in high terms of the following Officers of his Staff:—

Major G. de C. Morton, Assistant Adjutant-General.	
Major R. G. Kennedy, Assistant Quartermaster-General.	
Officiating Deputy Surgeon-General J. Ekin, M.B.	
Captain J. D. Mansel, Rifle Brigade, A.D.C.	
Lieutenant A. Davidson, 2/60th Rifles,	} Orderly Officers.
Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E.,	
Lieutenant F. B. Longe, R.E.,	

I am greatly indebted to—

Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., commanding the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General Hugh H. Gough, C.B., V.C., commanding the Cavalry Brigade.

With such able and experienced Officers in command of brigades, success was a certainty. Throughout the long and trying march from Kabul they maintained the strictest discipline, and brought their troops to Kandahar in the highest state of efficiency.

I desire to bring to the special notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the valuable services of these distinguished Officers.

Brigadier-General Macpherson reports favourably of the following Officers, who served under his command:—

Major J. C. Robinson, R.A., commanding No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker, commanding the 92nd Highlanders.
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye, commanding the 2nd (P. W. O.) Goorkhas.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett, commanding the 23rd Pioneers.
 Colonel F. B. Norman, commanding the 24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Captain R. E. C. Jarvis, 67th Foot, Brigade Major, "for the intelligent manner in which he carried out the duties of his appointment."

Captain A. D. M'Gregor, 92nd Highlanders, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, "for his intelligence and untiring energy."

Captain R. P. Tickell, R.E., Field Engineer, "for his valuable services during the march from Kabul, and usefulness during the action of the 1st September."

Lieutenant E. S. E. Childers, R.E., Orderly Officer.

Brigadier-General Macpherson records that the devotion of the Medical Officers of the brigade in attending to the wounded in the field under fire was most admirable.

He mentions,—

Surgeon-Major S. B. Roe, M.B., 92nd Highlanders.
 Surgeon-Major W. Finden, 2nd (P. W. O.) Goorkhas.
 Surgeon E. H. Fenn, No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.
 Surgeon H. J. Linton, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Surgeon H. Hamilton, M.D., 23rd Pioneers.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker would wish to mention specially the names of the following Officers :—

Major G. Swinley, R.A., commanding No. 2 Mountain Battery.
 Major C. M. Stockwell, commanding the 72nd Highlanders.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell, commanding the 2nd Sikhs.
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. FitzHugh, commanding the 5th Goorkhas.
 Colonel O. V. Tanner, commanding the 29th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Captain W. C. Farwell, General List, Infantry, Brigade Major.
 Lieutenant F. T. N. Spratt, R.E., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Captain W. G. Nicholson, R.E., Field Engineer.
 Captain M. N. G. Kane, 72nd Highlanders, Orderly Officer.
 Surgeon-Major G. W. M'Nalty, M.D.

Surgeon-Major C. A. Atkins, "for the manner in which he attended the wants of the wounded in the fighting line."

Brigadier-General MacGregor desires to record his appreciation of the support and assistance he received from—

Major J. M. Douglas, R.A., commanding No. 11/9th Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Collins, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 60th Royal Rifles.
 Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessy, commanding the 15th Sikhs.
 Colonel J. W. Hoggan, commanding the 25th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft, commanding the 4th Goorkhas.

Captain R. Chalmer, 2/60th Rifles, Brigade Major, who proved himself a most zealous Officer.

Captain A. Gaselee, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, who aided much by his knowledge of the country.

Captain M. C. Brackenbury, R.E., Field Engineer, an excellent and energetic Officer.

Captain H. M'L. Hutchinson, 14th Foot, Orderly Officer, who rendered every assistance in his power.

He further brings forward the following regimental Officers :—

Captain A. E. Duthy, R.A., 11/9th Royal Artillery.	
Major W. G. Byron,	} 2/60th Rifles.
Captain J. N. Blackwood-Price,	
„ H. S. Marsham,	} 15th Sikhs.
Major D. W. Inglis,	
Captain H. A. Abbott,	
Captain W. V. Ellis,	} 25th Punjab Native Infantry.
Lieutenant C. H. H. Beley,	
Major E. P. Mainwaring,	} 4th Goorkhas.
Captain C. A. Mercer,	
Surgeon-Major G. C. Chesnaye,	
Surgeon-Major E. C. Markey.	

Brigadier-General Hugh Gough states that his thanks are specially due to,—

Major J. A. Tillard, R.H.A., commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Bushman, commanding the 9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers.
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie, commanding the 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, commanding the Central India Horse.
 Major A. Vivian, commanding the 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
 Captain J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade Major.
 Major B. A. Combe, 10th Hussars, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Captain C. F. Call, R.E., Field Engineer.
 Captain H. Burnley, 6th Dragoon Guards, } Orderly Officers.
 Lieutenant M. O. Little, 9th Lancers, }
 Surgeon-Major R. Lewer.

I beg to acknowledge with thanks the aid I have received throughout from Colonel Alured C. Johnson, R.H.A., commanding the Royal Artillery, and Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer. Officers commanding batteries, whose names are brought forward by the Officer commanding the Royal Artillery, have already been mentioned by the Brigadier-Generals commanding the brigades to which their batteries were attached, with the exception of Major P. H. Greig, R.A., commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery, whose services on the 1st September Colonel Johnson desires to acknowledge, and Major T. Graham, commanding No. 6/8th Royal Artillery, who shared the arduous march from Kabul, but was unfortunately prevented by sickness from commanding his battery during the operations at Kandahar.

He mentions also,—

Captain H. Pipon, R.H.A., Adjutant, Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant R. A. Bannatine, R.A., Orderly Officer, both of whom afforded him every assistance.

Colonel Perkins speaks favourably of the assistance he received from Lieutenant T. P. Cather, R.E., Adjutant, Royal Engineers.

I trust I may be permitted here to record my opinion of the excellent services performed by the following regimental Officers who have been with me throughout all, or the greater part of, the campaign in Afghanistan, and are still serving under my command:—

Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant E. A. Smith.

9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers.

Captain H. W. Apperley.		Captain B. Gough.
Captain J. A. H. Stewart-Mackenzie.		Lieutenant E. B. M'Innis.

72nd Highlanders.

Major C. W. N. Guinness.		Captain R. H. Murray.
Captain Garnett.		Lieutenant R. L. Milne.
Captain M. N. G. Kane.		Lieutenant S. C. H. Monro.

92nd Highlanders.

Major G. S. White.		Captain the Hon. J. Scott Napier.
Captain L. C. Singleton.		Captain C. W. H. Douglas.
Captain R. F. Darvall.		Lieutenant W. H. Dick Cunyngnam.

3rd Bengal Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel B. Cracroft.		Major G. W. Willock.
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3rd Punjab Cavalry.

Major W. C. Anderson.		Major J. D. Macpherson.
Captain C. C. Egerton.		

Central India Horse.

Major H. M. Buller.		Major J. Colledge.
Major M. G. Gerard.		

2nd Goorkhas.

Major S. E. Beecher.		Lieutenant H. S. Wheatley.
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23rd Pioneers.

Captain H. Paterson.		Captain S. V. Gordon.
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24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Captain E. Stedman.

2nd Sikh Infantry.

Major H. M. Pratt.		Major J. B. Slater.
Major F. E. Hastings.		

3rd Sikh Infantry.

Major C. J. Griffiths.

| Major W. B. Aislabie.

5th Goorkhas.

Major J. M. Sym.

Captain E. Molloy.

| Lieutenant A. R. Martin.

| Lieutenant C. C. Chenevix-Trench.

Lieutenant C. C. St. E. Lucas.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, R.A., who has held the important post of Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, has afforded me throughout the most valuable and material assistance. His services in Afghanistan are well known to the Commander-in-Chief in India; I am glad, however, to have this opportunity of bringing the name of this excellent Staff Officer prominently before His Excellency.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hanbury, M.B., proved himself to be an efficient administrative Medical Officer, and carried on the duties of his responsible office to my entire satisfaction.

To Major A. R. Badcock, Deputy Commissary-General, the entire force is deeply indebted. The manner in which he, and the Officers under his orders, overcame difficulties of no ordinary nature, and the manner in which they exerted themselves to procure the daily supply, are deserving of particular mention. The administrative talent possessed by Major Badcock is of the highest order, and I cannot recommend his services too strongly for recognition by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

Major Badcock speaks in the highest terms of all the Officers of the Commissariat Department with the force, but he brings forward especially the name of Captain A. T. S. A. Rind, Bengal Staff Corps.

The valuable services performed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, Bengal Cavalry, Chief Director of Transport, and the Officers of his Department, can scarcely be considered apart from those of the Commissariat Department.

I would wish here to record my high sense of the admirable work accomplished by Lieutenant-Colonel Low and his able staff of assistants. The mobility of the force depended upon the efficiency of the transport, and it is mainly due to the untiring energy of these Officers that the troops were able to perform such long and continuous marches, and to reach their destination with the transport animals in such excellent condition. Lieutenant-Colonel Low brings to special notice Captain W. A. Wynter, 33rd Foot, and Lieutenant L. E. P. Booth, 33rd Foot.

Major C. A. Gorham, R.A., Deputy Judge-Advocate General, has carried on his duties entirely to my satisfaction.

Major C. Cowie, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance, had a difficult and arduous task to perform, his successful accomplishment of which deserves my acknowledgment. My thanks are also due to Lieutenant W. G. Small, 59th Foot, in charge of the field treasure chest.

The Reverend J. W. Adams, B.A., Chaplain, Church of England, the Reverend G. W. Manson, B.D., and the Reverend Alexander Ferrier, M.A., the Presbyterian Chaplains, and the Very Reverend Father G. Browne, were throughout most attentive to their duties.

Major E. G. B. Hastings, Chief Political Officer, and the following Officers of the Political Staff:—

Captain J. W. Ridgeway,
Major C. B. Euan Smith, C.S.I.,
Major M. Protheroe,

have rendered me every assistance, and have spared themselves no trouble nor exposure in their endeavours to gain information, and to procure supplies for the force.

It affords me much pleasure to bring forward the names of the Officers serving on my personal staff, who have at all times been unremitting in the performance of their duties.

Major G. T. Pretyma, R.A., has, in addition to his duties as Aide-de-Camp, held the position of Commandant of Field Force head-quarters.

Lieutenant J. Sherston, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-Camp.

Captain R. Polc-Carew, Coldstream Guards, } Orderly Officers.

Captain the Hon. W. C. Rowley, R.A., }

Surgeon J. F. Williamson, M.B.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

NUMERICAL RETURN of CASUALTIES in the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force and the Kandahar Field Force in the operations of the 31st August and 1st September, 1880, near Kandahar.

Remarks.	Killed.						Wounded.						Total.	Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.		
Staff -	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1 horse wounded.
C/2nd Royal Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1 horse killed.
No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	6	4 mules killed; 1 horse and 2 mules wounded.
No. 5/11th Royal Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
No. 2 Punjab Mountain Battery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 mule wounded.
9th Lancers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
3rd Bengal Cavalry -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1*	-	2	* Since dead. Two horses killed, 1 wounded.
3rd Punjab Cavalry -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	4	-	7	3 horses killed, 9 wounded.
Central India Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	4	-	6	
3rd Bombay Cavalry	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1 horse killed, 3 wounded.
3rd Sind Horse -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	8 horses killed, 1 wounded.
7th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
60th Rifles -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	
72nd Highlanders -	2	-	-	-	7	-	2	-	1	-	19†	2	33	† 4 men since dead.
92nd Highlanders -	-	-	1	-	10	-	2	-	7	-	62‡	2	84	‡ 8 men since dead. One horse and 1 mule killed; 2 mules wounded.
15th Bengal Native Infantry.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1§	-	3	-	6	§ Since dead.
23rd ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	1	1	10	2	17	2 mules killed.
24th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	10	1	13	
25th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	
2nd Goorkha Regiment.	-	-	-	-	8	-	1	1	-	1	20	2	33	2 men since dead. One horse wounded.
4th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	4	-	7	
5th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	2¶	5	¶ Both since dead.
2nd Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	1	-	2**	2	29	** 1 man since dead.
3rd ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	-	6	
4th Bombay Native Infantry.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
28th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
29th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	
Commissariat Department.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1††	1	†† Since dead.
Total -	3	1	1	-	35	-	11	4	16	2	177	18		
Grand total -	40						228						268	{ 16 horses and 7 mules killed; 17 horses and 5 mules wounded.

No. 39.

No. 43 of 1880.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

India Office, London,
15th October 1880.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter of Your Excellency's Government, No. 205, dated the 7th September, with accompanying papers, reporting the arrival at Kandahar of the force which marched from Kabul under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, and the defeat of the army of Sirdar Ayub Khan.

2. Immediately upon receipt, by telegraph, of the news of these events, I had the satisfaction of communicating to Sir F. Roberts and to the Commander-in-Chief in India the congratulations of Her Majesty the Queen and the Government upon the complete success by which the operations of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force had been crowned. Her Majesty's Government desire now to place upon record their entire concurrence in the sentiments upon this subject, which are expressed by Your Excellency in Council in your letter under notice. They have the highest appreciation of the very distinguished service which Sir F. Roberts and his troops, both European and Native, have rendered to the country; and they are extremely sensible of the obligations which they owe to Lieutenant-General Sir D. Stewart for the zeal and energy displayed by him in the organization and equipment of the force, to which was entrusted a task as arduous as it was honourable, and fraught with political and military issues of the first importance.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 40.

No. 223 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 19th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the diary of the Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan, for the period from 1st to 28th July 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 40.

DIARY OF THE KANDAHAR RESIDENCY FROM 1ST JULY TO 28TH JULY 1880.
(Extract).

1st July.—Wali writes from Girishk that messengers have arrived from Farah, stating that when they left Ayub Khan was said to be at Khushkeha, 16 miles to the north. They went to that place, and found him there with all his force, intending to go to Farah the next day. This was about the 24th. Those men of the Kabuli regi-

ments who had married in Herat had brought their wives with them. A second messenger stated that the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, with a large number of sowars, had reached Khurmali, and that his advanced guard was at Chah-i-Gaz. The Wali asked for orders about his troops in Washir. I wrote, recommending him to order Roshdil Khan to withdraw in presence of the regulars, but to hold his ground against cavalry alone.

The Wali's letter also contains a pressing request for money, and recommends, in case of the major part of the force moving out to Girishk, that the remainder of the troops should be concentrated in the citadel.

It having come to my knowledge that the severity with which Sirdar Nur Ali Khan is treating the families of the men who deserted last week from Girishk is exciting much bad feeling, I wrote telling him of it, bringing to his notice at the same time that the superintendents of canals are said to be making large sums by the sale of the water to people not entitled to it.

Wrote to the Wali, telling him that orders had come for the despatch of a force to Girishk.

2nd July.—Wali writes that Ayub had arrived at Farah, and is coming on to Khurmali at once. The Luinab had reached Bakwa.

A letter from a Herat agent who is in Ayub's camp reached me. He says that they were to start on the 19th June. Sowars to the number of 3,500 had been paraded for inspection. Only nine percussion caps per man were available, a supply promised from Meshed having been stopped by the Persian Government. The Khutba had been read in the mosques, and coin had been struck in the name of Ayub Khan.

It is rumoured in the city that talibs are taking away arms packed in bales of merchandise for the Garmsir with the intention of joining Ayub, and the disaffected are plucking up their spirits at the news of Ayub's advance.

Sirdars Nur Ali Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan called on me to discuss arrangements for supplies for troops on the march to Girishk.

Note.—He did not actually desert for some days after this.

(Sd.) O. St. J.

3rd July 1880. A rumour is current that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan has deserted the Wali, and gone with his sowars to Ayub's camp.

4th July.—The Wali writes that he cannot hope to oppose Ayub with his small number of comparatively raw troops, and that if a force is not sent to his assistance, he will have to fall back on Kandahar on which the whole country will fall into a state of disorder, which it will be difficult to repress.

The Wali's Mirza writes secretly to Mirza Hassan Ali Khan that, if the Wali does not receive support from us on the Helmund, both his own troops and the Zamindawar levies are likely to desert him. Wrote informing the Wali that the cavalry and artillery are to-day leaving Kandahar, to be followed by the infantry to-morrow.

E/B, R.H.A., the whole of the Q. O. Light Cavalry, and the greater part of the 3rd Sind Horse, marched to Kohkaran to-day, with two companies of infantry and half a company of sappers.

A further loan of a lac of rupees to the Wali having been sanctioned by the Government of India, it was paid over, at his request, to Sirdar Nur Ali Khan.

5th July.—Marched to Ashukan, 14 miles, and found the artillery and cavalry there. Mirza Hasan Ali Khan accompanies me, Lieutenant Muir remaining in Kandahar.

The infantry brigade, consisting of Her Majesty's 66th Foot, the 1st and 30th Bombay Native Infantry, under Brigadier-General Burrows, marched this morning to Kohkaran.

The Wali writes that he has recalled his infantry from from Washir to a place named Bacharabia, midway between Washir and Girishk. The cavalry remains at Washir.

Ayub's advanced guard is at Bakwa. He has written to the Washir and Zamindawar Chiefs, some of whom have sent his letters to the Wali, while others have not.

A messenger sent to Herat has returned through Taiwara. He accompanied Ayub's army as far as the Araskund. It consists, he says, of ten infantry regiments, thirty-six guns, and sixteen or seventeen hundred cavalry. A battery of artillery had pre-

ceded him to Farah. The ammunition was in the exclusive charge of the Kabul troops, who had their families to the number of seven or eight hundred with them. The officers in command were Hafizulla Khan, Taj Muhammad Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Nasiri. Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzal Khan, has been left in charge of Herat. General Muhammad Jan holds the city gates, and the Aimak Chiefs, Fathulla Beg, Firuzkohi, Yalantush Khan, son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, and Muhammad Khan, Begler Begi, the citadel.

6th July.—Marched to Karez i-Ata, 19 miles. Before marching, a gunner of the artillery committed suicide with his carbine. There was some difficulty about obtaining supplies, principally wood.

7th July.—To Khushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles. Wali writes that the enemy's sowars have reached the Khash river, 18 miles from Washir. Supplies of all sorts plentiful.

8th July.—Khushk-i-Nakhud to Miskarez eight miles. To break the long march to Girishk, 24 miles, the Wali has arranged for supplies at Choghrak, six miles on this side. There is no village here, but water can be turned into an old canal from the Helmund by stopping the irrigation channels further up.

A correspondent from Washir writes on the 6th that a messenger from Farah states that when he left Ayub had been there for a week. That he has with him ten regiments of infantry, 5,000 sowars, and 30 guns. His daily consumption is 67 kharwars of grain. Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken the safe custody of the families of the Kabul regiments during their advance on Kandahar.

9th July.—Miskarez to Choghrak, 18 miles, Provisions plentifully supplied by the Wali, with fowls, eggs, and fruits for the officers.

10th July.—Choghrak to the bank of the Helmund opposite Girishk, five miles. Sirdars Muhammad Hassan Khan and Gul Muhammad Khan crossed the river to meet me. They brought information of the desertion of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, his son, Shir Muhammad Khan, and his nephew, Habibulla Khan, with their sowars, some 70 in number. An attempt made by them to induce the regular infantry and others to join them was unsuccessful. They went to Naozad, and proclaimed "Ghaza," on which some talibs and others joined them.

Mirza Hasan Ali Khan went over to the Wali's camp, and returned in the afternoon with the following news:—

The Wali has written to Sirdar Nur Ali Khan in Kandahar to confiscate all the Sartip's property, and is sending Gul Muhammad Khan with one thousand sowars to seize him.

A. B. writes to the Wali not to believe the stories current about the quarrels between the Kabuli and Herati troops. The fact of their having reached Farah without fighting is sufficient to show that they can be unanimous on occasion. He advises him, therefore, to strengthen himself in every way. C. D. has sent a message to the Wali to the same effect. E. F. writes that it is hopeless for the Wali to expect to possess himself of Herat alone, there being traitors among his people, who are the real cause of Ayub's advance; and that if the English assist him with a force, there will be no difficulty in the matter. He adds that whatever is done should be done quickly.

Intelligence arrived that Ayub's sowars who were collecting supplies on the Khash, had returned to Bakwa on hearing that an English force had left Kandahar.

The Wali's sowars in Washir fell back on Sadat Kalah, 18 miles from Girishk, being unable to get provisions.

The Wali came over to see me in the evening, but the news he had to give had been already communicated through Mirza Hassan Ali Khan. He said that now a British force had arrived he looked to us for orders.

The letter from the Governor of Bombay to him, accompanying presents in return for those given to Sir Richard Temple, was presented to him.

11th July.—Information was received from Ayub's camp that he arrived at Dilaram (on the bank of the Khash) on the 9th, and would reach Washir to-day. Some of the Maliks of the latter district had gone to meet him.

A second messenger brought the news that his advanced guard of 100 sowars had reached Washir.

General Burrows arrived with the infantry brigade.

Rode out in the morning with a party of cavalry to the south of our camp, and found the river fordable nearly everywhere, except just below the numerous rapids.

In the evening met the Wali by appointment on the other side of the river, and communicated to him the orders we had received not to cross it. He said that in that case it was useless his remaining alone on the other side now that Ayub Khan had got so far, and that he would concentrate his men at Girishk as soon as possible. Had he perfect confidence in his troops, he would attempt to hold his own, or, indeed, would have held the frontier, but at present he trusted entirely to our support. He was evidently in very low spirits.

12th July.—My conversation with the Wali the previous evening having left an impression on my mind that the disaffection in his camp was more than reported, I sent a man in my service, formerly in the Kabul army, to the camp, to see what was going on. He returned with the news that the Wali's sepoys, particularly those of the Kabir regiment, were openly declaring their intention of joining Ayub Khan as soon as he came near enough. I therefore sent for Mirza Ali Akbar, the Wali's confidential Secretary, who confirmed the truth of the report. I therefore told him to return, and tell the Wali that I had discovered that his troops were ready to mutiny at a moment's notice, and that the only thing left to do was to disarm them before they had an opportunity of doing so. I also asked him to meet me the next morning early, to talk over the situation.

Intelligence was brought that Sirdar Ghulam Dastgir Khan (son of Sirdar Ghulam Muhaieddin Khan) had deserted the advanced cavalry with 20 sowars. Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan pursued him, but made no real attempt to capture him. His baggage, however, was taken, and among it was found a letter from Luinab Khushdil Khan to Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, dated 10th July, to the effect that he (the Luinab) had arrived at Washir with a thousand sowars and a collection of Ghazis. He, therefore, urged the Sartip to lose no time in joining the troops of Islam.

Mirza Ali Khan, sent some weeks ago to Herat to bring news, reached the camp. He had fallen in with Ayub's army at Sabzwar, and accompanied it to Farah, which he left eight days ago. He states that Ayub's army consists of nine regiments of regular infantry and three of cavalry, the latter of 260 men each. The infantry regiments are 600 strong. This is nominal strength.

He has about 1,000 tribal cavalry and 36 guns, six of which were to be left at Farah. One battery has breech-loaders made at Kabul.

While at Farah the Herati irregular cavalry and the three Herat regiments conspired to take Ayub prisoner and return with him to Herat, but Naib Hafizulla Khan, the General, discovered it, and sent off the irregular cavalry to the front with the Luinab. With them he travelled as far as Saki, where he left them and came on to Girishk. The Herati infantry was not trusted with ammunition. Ayub's army was very short of carriage. Some of the ammunition had to be left at Sabzwar, and camels were sent back from Farah to bring it on. Information had been brought to the Luinab by some deserters from the Wali's army, that his troops had dispersed, and that English troops were coming from Kandahar.

A correspondent in Ayub's army sends a letter from * * * * * Herat to Naib Hafizullah Khan, informing them that Faizu, the leader of the mutiny of the Herat troops last year, had been attempting to raise disturbances. But his son and cousin had been caught and blown away from guns, some others hanged in the Char-su, and some infantry soldiers punished and imprisoned. These measures effectually quieted the city.

Rode out with General Burrows to inspect site for new camp in a better position further up the river.

13th July.—Rode across the river and met the Wali, who returned with me to our camp. I repeated what I had told him the day before, namely, that General Burrows had the strictest orders not to cross the river, but only to prevent Ayub Khan doing so. General Burrows came to my tent, and joined the conversation, and after some time it was agreed, on the Wali's proposition, that he should bring his troops to our side, where it would be easy to disarm them. He asked me to write to him, requesting

him to bring his men to our side, that he might show the letter to his officers. This I did.

During this and the previous day I made unsuccessful efforts to get a strong party sent with a sufficiency of camels to bring the stores collected by the Wali across the river.

In the evening a sowar of the 3rd Sind Horse, who had lagged behind a foraging party, was murdered in a village across the river.

14th July.—At daylight our camp began to move to its new ground, a mile to the north, a very strong rearguard remaining on the old position. At the same time I went with a squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry to watch the Wali's camp from the heights opposite it. Nothing stirred till sunrise, when the tents were struck and camels loaded. About half-past six Sirdar Dilawar Khan came across to select ground for the new camp, and reported all quiet. I had gone down with him to the river valley, when Mirza Hasan Ali Khan rode up with the report that the Wali's troops had mutinied, seized the guns, and driven him and his cavalry across the river. Riding back I met the Wali, who repeated the same story, and begged that we might fall back on Kandahar at once as all the country would rise. I told him that we must first take the guns and punish the mutineers. Near the old camp I met General Burrows, who had heard the news, and begged him to cross and attack the mutineers at once. After some time it was decided to do so, and four companies of infantry were sent across the ford to hold the farther bank thickly wooded. At the same time General Nuttall was ordered to take the cavalry and artillery across and attack the mutineers, who were now in full sight formed up in rear of the fort. A portion of the Wali's sowars with a quantity of baggage were by this time moving off along the Kandahar, and a Staff Officer seeing this declared that they were moving to attack our rear. This caused all previous orders to be countermanded, while the mutineers, after plundering the fort, moved leisurely along the opposite bank of the river, some three miles off. It was not till the head of this column of baggage had passed our camp that definite orders for pursuit were given, and the horse artillery, the greater part of the cavalry, and eight companies of infantry crossed the river opposite the new camp. Half an hour later the cavalry came in sight of the mutineers, when they formed up in a single line on the high bank. After waiting in this position for some time they fell back a mile, and took up a new one with the guns on their left next the river. From this they opened a harmless artillery fire on the cavalry. Half an hour later the horse artillery came into action, after experiencing much difficulty and delay in crossing the water cuts and jungle. Before long the mutineers' guns were abandoned, but the day was so hazy that the fact was not discovered for some ten minutes or more, when the cavalry rode up to them, and were received with musketry fire from the fields below which caused them to fall back for a time. Our guns and infantry coming up soon put the few mutineers that remained to flight, and the cavalry pursued them for some distance. Some 50 may have been killed, including three artillerymen found dead at the guns, which were brought back to our camp four miles distant.

On returning I found the Wali at my tents, his own having been lost. He had, like myself, indeed, considered it impossible that we should catch the mutineers, and it can only have been the badness of the road along the river bank for the guns that enabled us to do so. Had they gone by the direct route towards Farah we could not have caught them up.

The Wali suggested that he should send his sowars, under his nephew, Muhammad Hassan Khan, to Kushk-i-Nakhud to collect supplies, and keep open communications, and they accordingly started at once.

Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry came in. They declared that the whole army was on the point of mutinying, but that, of course, the news of the mutiny of the Wali's men would keep them together.

15th July.—Received news that two hundred of Ayub's sowars had reached Mahmudabad. At 5 p.m. the force marched to Miskarez. The Wali accompanied us.

16th July.—Received a letter from the Walidah, Bibi Ilawa, asking leave to write to Ayub Khan and Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with the object of arranging a peace. I replied that, as she was well known to be our friend, any communication from her

would be looked on as coming from us, and that as I had no power to promise anything either to Ayub Khan or the Sartip, it would be better if she refrained from writing.

17th July.—Marched at daybreak to Kushk-i-Nakhud, and after some discussion halted not far from our previous halting place, known as the Takia. Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan and the rest of the Wali's relations, with their sowars, are camped in the gardens close by. Taj Muhammad Khan, Sistani, with 70 horse of his own tribe is with them. A report sent from Kandahar stated that Sadu Khan and the son of Muhammad Afzal Khan, Hotakis, had passed through on their way to Kelat-i-Ghilzai. On sending to ascertain the truth of this, it was found that Muhammad Afzal's son had left this morning only, while Sadu Khan was still in camp with the rest of the Wali's sowars.

18th July.—Rode to Maiwand with Major Leach, R.E., and a squadron of cavalry. Found everything quiet, and arranged for supply of atta from the mills, of which there are eight.

A spy from Girishk states that two hundred sowars arrived there on 17th, and sent back to Ayub to inform him that we had left the Helmund. A writer in the Wali's service taken off by the mutineers on the 14th to Kalah-i-Gaz, about 10 miles above Girishk, states that the Luinab and the son of Sartip Nur Muhammad are there with a large body of sowars. The Wali sent the greater part of his sowars, some 400 in number, under Sirdar Abbas Khan, his brother-in-law, to Khalifeh-Robat to collect supplies and send them to us.

19th July.—Moved camp to an open position, some three miles nearer Girishk. A spy (formerly a sepoy in the 1st Biluch Regiment) returned from the Helmund with news that the Luinab, with about 1,500 sowars, arrived at Girishk on the 18th, and said that Ayub, with the main body which is now at Mahmudabad, would come in on the 19th or 20th. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed us by bye-roads to join Ayub. Abubakr, a minor Alizai Chief (the same who attacked Colonel Malcolmson here last year), has brought a contingent from Zamindawar. Cavalry patrols are sent by General Burrows towards Maiwand, Sangbur, and the Arghandab.

A man of the Wali's came from Maiwand to report that Abubakr has come to Malmund, and is plundering the place.

A. B. writes from his village (Nahar-i-Sarkar), near the junction of the Arghandab and Helmund, that bodies of ghazis have passed from the Garmsir direction.

20th July.—Strong patrols of cavalry sent to Miskarez and Garmawak this morning, brought no intelligence except that some ghazis had passed the latter place.

The Wali received intelligence that the family of Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, returning to Kandahar, had been attacked by Aitchakzais beyond Panjwai. Sirdar Abbas Khan, who was near at hand with 400 sowars, came up and drove off the Aitchakzais, killing four of them. The Wali sent the remainder of his sowars under Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan and Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, to Panjwai to aid in keeping order.

From Gurek news arrived that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, nephew of the Sartip, has plundered the village of Taj Muhammad, Popalzai.

21st July.—A spy returned from Kalah-i-Gaz (on the further bank of the Helmund opposite Haidarabad) with news that half of Ayub's force reached the Helmund yesterday and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at the last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them.

It is reported in their camp that Ayub Khan will move by Sangbur and attack us here. Luinab, with 2,500 cavalry, is reported to have started down the Helmund with the intention of crossing to the Arghandab and attacking our camp at night. The people about the Helmund at first refused to supply Ayub with provisions, but on his assembling the chief men, and declaring that this was a holy war, and that it was incumbent on all Muhammadans to devote their lives and property to his service, moreover, that he would excuse them from payment of two years' revenue should the

country become his, they brought in provisions freely. The same informant states that there are 200 ghazis at Sangbur on their way to join Ayub.

Another spy states that half the enemy's camp is at Shoraki, and the other half coming up (Shoraki and Kalah-i-Gaz are adjacent districts). Nazir Muhammad Sadik (a dependant of the Sartip's) has been appointed Governor of Girishk, with two hundred sowars.

The patrol returning from Sangbur captured a prisoner, unarmed, who states that Ayub's regulars have crossed the Helmund to Haidarabad, but that the ghazis are still on the further bank.

As a precaution against the night attack said to be projected by the Luinab, General Burrows this evening moved the entire force to a new position, a few hundred yards west of the camp. Here the whole of the heavy baggage was parked in two small walled enclosures, between which the camels were placed, with an entanglement of pack saddles and ropes beyond them. On the east the cavalry and artillery horse lines were established, with Officers' tents between them and the enclosures. Outside all, the infantry were disposed in a semicircle, with guns at intervals, behind a breastwork formed of their tents and packs.

22nd July.—Spies returned from Helmund report Ayub Khan's camp to be on this side of river about Haidarabad, and that his cavalry has made a reconnaissance to Sangbur. It was reported that his whole cavalry force, 4,000 in number, would return there to-morrow, Ayub Khan, with the rest of the army, following the next day. The force was currently stated at 4,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 8,000 ghazis, and 36 guns. A small party of ghazis, about 40 in number, were at Sangbur.

Cavalry patrols sent to Maiwand captured five armed sowars, who proved to be followers of one of the Wali's people who had been sent to bring in supplies. They had run away the evening before on hearing a report that Ayub's cavalry was approaching, and were returning when captured.

One of my spies returning from the Helmund was captured by our cavalry patrol, and kept in the guard for six hours before being made over to me. He corroborated report of the first generally, but said that Ayub's irregulars had not yet crossed the river. He was told by some of the Kandahari sepoy that Ayub's intention is to incite the ghazis and cavalry to attack the English, and await the result with the regulars. He intends to advance to Maiwand. The Luinab, with four hundred sowars, was coming *via* Malmund to Maiwand, which he intended to reach to-morrow. The main body will march to Sangbur either to-morrow or the day after. He heard two Herati sepoy discussing the situation, and saying that it would be absurd for them to fight the English, as, if Ayub won, he would take them on to Kabul. The Kandahari regiment was also discontented at the non-receipt of a year's arrears of pay, and saying that they had come on because they could not help themselves. The soldiers received less than a pound of meal a day as a ration. This informant declared that in his belief they had not more than a thousand irregular sowars, and an equal number of ghazis. Eighty sowars were at Sangbur when he passed.

The Wali suggested that we should set fire to the corn ricks about Maiwand. General Burrows arranged that a party should go out the next morning to carry out this suggestion.

23rd July.—At daybreak this morning shots were heard from the westward. Shortly afterwards a sowar of the Sind Horse came in with a message from Captain Monteith, that on proceeding on patrol with a troop of his regiment he had come upon a strong body of the enemy's cavalry, with whose scouts he had exchanged shots. He had fallen back towards camp, and halted a mile distant. The force, which was at the time getting under arms as usual, moved out at once. After a short time I rode out, and found Captain Monteith's troop drawn up facing the enemy, who were moving leisurely along in a long straggling line towards Maiwand. They were about two miles off. With Major Leach, R.E., I rode out about half way towards them. There appeared to be about four hundred, and their advanced guard had already entered the northern villages of Khushk-i-Nakhud. About this time, probably seeing our force, they commenced to return along the road they had come. Seeing that no attempt at intercepting them was being made on our side, we returned and found that a staff officer had reported three battalions of infantry concealed behind a hill. This and another report that another body of cavalry had been seen to the south proving erroneous, General Nuttall, with two guns, Royal Horse Artillery, and a couple of

squadrons of cavalry, galloped off on pursuit of the now disappearing enemy. After a couple of miles, their rearguard of thirty or forty men being within gunshot, the artillery fired four shells at them, causing them to ride off, but apparently doing little or no damage. The cavalry and artillery then returned to camp.

A special messenger from Kandahar, who returned this morning, reports that he met a hundred sowars* coming from the direction of the Maiwand pass towards Hauz-i-Madat.

* These proved to have been men sent by the Sartip to bring away his women who were concealed in the villages about Koh-karan.

In consequence of the affair of the morning, the expedition to burn the stacks at Maiwand did not start, but one of the Wali's sowars sent there reported none of the enemy to be seen.

A troop of cavalry sent later in the afternoon brought back similar intelligence, but a man of the Wali's told the Officer in command that he had heard that the enemy's cavalry intend attacking us to-night.

A certain Malik came into camp to the Wali, and states that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, a nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, came to him a few days ago with a letter from Ayub Khan, to the effect that he has arrived on the Helmund with twelve regiments, 42 guns, 7,000 sowars, and many mullas and seyyids, to commence a religious war and drive the infidel from the country. He therefore calls on him to collect his tribe and join Habibulla Khan on the Arghandab. The Malik affected compliance, but warned his people that they had better keep quiet, and came off to tell the Wali. On the way he came across some more of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan's sowars, who pursued, but failed to capture him.

Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan writes from Khalifah-Robat that he has attacked the Aitchakzai robbers, killed one of them, and sent several prisoners to Kandahar.

Arrangements were made for sending off all baggage and stores that can be spared to Kandahar.

24th July.—A spy from Band-i-Taimur (on the Arghandab) returned with news that no one had passed that way, nor had any of the enemy's cavalry appeared in that direction.

Cavalry patrols to Sangbur and Garmawak report both places empty.

25th July.—The cavalry patrol sent to Sangbur found it apparently unoccupied, but was suddenly attacked by a body of mounted men, who issued from a ravine and cut off two of their number. A strong party was sent out under a European Officer, who found the place empty, and brought in the bodies of the two sowars stripped and decapitated.

A spy from Haiderabad reports the enemy's camp still there. He was told that they had eleven regiments and 35 guns, with a very large number of cavalry and ghazis. He himself counted 13 guns only. It was generally said in the camp that they were to march the next day or the day after, though some people expected to remain on the river for two or three days longer. It is also said that half the force would go by Malmund and half by Sangbur. They make a cavalry reconnaissance every day to Kalah-i-Surkh (about a mile east of Sangbur), some remaining there during the day. There are a great many ghazis with the force, but the majority have only sticks and pikes. All these are anxious to attack the British force, but the regulars wish to avoid fighting and pass on to Kandahar.

A spy from the Helmund reports that it is intended to send four thousand sowars, with an equal number of infantry riding behind them, to Shorawak, *via* the sandy desert, to attack our line of communications with India. Many Ghazis have come to Ayub's camp, but nothing is decided about a move. No one has arrived at Malmund or Maiwand. Provisions are reported very scarce in enemy's camp, and it is said that Ayub Khan has ordered all villages in his vicinity to furnish a quota of bullocks to drag his guns.

Considerable quantities of grain and atta were brought by the Wali's people from Maiwand and Khalifah-Robat.

26th July.—The cavalry patrol to Sangbur reports about 300 horsemen and Ghazis there. Men of the Wali's sent in the morning to Maiwand to bring atta returned in

the afternoon with intelligence that Muhammad Zaman Khan, Barakzai, and Abubakr, Alizai, with a number of sowars and ghazis, have occupied Garmawak (four or five miles from Maiwand), and that a few ghazis have arrived at that place.

General Burrows held a meeting of Commanding and Staff Officers at the receipt of this intelligence, and decided to move towards Maiwand in the morning to prevent Ayub turning his flank and cutting him off from Kandahar, or passing into the Arghandab valley and making his way to Ghazni.

27th July.—Orders were issued for the march of the force at 6 a.m., but owing to the difficulty of unpacking and loading the stores in the confined enclosure where they have been for the last six days, it was not till seven that a start was made. The cavalry and horse artillery led, and the baggage was massed on the right flank of the infantry which marched in contiguous columns of companies at deploying distance. Owing to the necessity for allowing the camels to keep up, the pace was very slow. From 9 to 10 a halt was made near a large village, at which time a spy came up with the intelligence that Ayub had arrived yesterday with his whole force at Sangbur, and was now on his way to Maiwand.

At half past ten the advanced guard reached the first village of Maiwand, a small hamlet surrounded by walled gardens with few trees and a central building commanding the whole. At its west side a considerable karez issuing from high banks afforded an ample supply of water. About three-quarters of a mile further up the same karez and on the same side of it was a second village surrounded by thick orchards. From two to three miles beyond, the little fortified enclosure of Maiwand was barely visible through the haze to-day unusually dense. To the west a wide plain stretched away to the hills, some four miles distant, at the foot of which the trees of the villages of Garmawak were just discernible with field glasses.

Shortly afterwards a considerable body of cavalry was perceived about due west of the nearest village and from a mile and half to two miles distant. Two guns Royal Horse Artillery with an escort of cavalry crossed the karez between the villages, galloped about a mile beyond, and opened fire. Immediately afterwards large masses of men became visible apparently marching towards Maiwand, from which a number of horse and foot also issued. In a very few minutes a long line of regular infantry was formed, and there could be no doubt that we were in presence of Ayub's whole army.

The rest of the cavalry and horse artillery had now crossed the Karez, and advanced some thousand yards beyond it, taking up a position about the same distance from the two guns already in action, and to their right.

The infantry also crossed the karez, but remained halted not far from it. The baggage was mostly massed under the walls of the furthest of the two villages mentioned before, but part of it crossed the karez. The Wali and his people, with Nawab Mirza Hasan Khan, remained with it.

About half an hour after our artillery came into action, the enemy's guns replied. This was at half-past eleven. The distance was about two thousand yards, and their fire did little or no harm, though many of the projectiles, lead-coated Armstrong shells, passed over our heads.

After several rounds had been exchanged, Major Blackwood, commanding the Artillery, informed General Burrows that his guns could do no good at that range, and requested leave to advance 500 yards nearer. General Burrows assented, and a forward move was made.

The infantry and four guns of the smooth-bore battery were now brought up, and the latter came into action. The infantry was disposed as follows:—On the right and inclined at an angle to the front, five company's of Her Majesty's 66th; next to them and facing the enemy's line directly, Jacob's Rifles; beyond them the guns, and, lastly, the Grenadiers. All the infantry lay down, the 66th being in a hollow that afforded almost complete protection. This formation was retained till the close of the action, except that two companies of Jacob's Rifles were later on withdrawn from the centre to make room for Captain Slade's guns, and placed on the extreme left, facing slightly outwards. The force then formed three sides of an irregular hexagon.

The cavalry under General Nuttall was formed up on the extreme left.

The enemy's order of battle had before this become clearly developed. In his centre was a long line of infantry, estimated by the standards at seven battalions. On his right a cloud of irregular horse enveloped our left, and while keeping at a safe distance from our cavalry, menaced the baggage. On the enemy's left a swarm

of irregular infantry with a few mounted men among them formed a broken line between the left of the regulars and the village of Maiwand, whence another considerable body came up to the village, behind which the baggage was posted. The enemy's guns, as was apparent from the flashes, (the haze made the guns themselves quite indistinguishable) were posted at five different points of the line of infantry.

The object appeared to be to attack the baggage with irregulars on both flanks while engaging our main body with the regulars and guns. Two attacks were accordingly made on the baggage, but were repulsed by the rearguard without difficulty.

A number of irregular infantry also came up in front of the 66th, but were kept at a distance by slow file firing. A good many, however, took advantage of inequalities of the ground, and kept up a steady fire which passed over the heads of the 66th, but caused some loss beyond them.

About one or half past the enemy advanced to about one thousand yards, and the fire became very much hotter, though still doing little harm.

Two mounted men now rode out of the enemy's line and reconnoitred our position, advancing to 300 or 400 yards. The sharp-shooters of the Grenadiers fired several shots at them, but without effect.

Shortly afterwards the enemy's line advanced to 600 yards. Their artillery fire was now crossing in several directions, and they began to use grape. The left of their infantry ceased to be visible, but their right opposite the Grenadiers was in full view, and a few volleys from that regiment drove it back in disorder. Two of the enemy's guns now appeared not more than three or four hundred yards distant on our right front, from which they enfiladed our line at an angle of 45° , while a heavy musketry fire from the same direction showed the position of the left of the line of infantry. At the same time the irregular infantry on our right and cavalry on our left advanced closer, and rifle fire on our side, which had previously been intermittent, became general, though not fully developed. This was about half-past two, and about this time the four smooth-bore guns were sent out of action, their ammunition being exhausted.

All efforts to keep down the fire of the two guns on our right were ineffectual, and the enemy gradually came on, except in front of the 66th, whose steady slow fire kept the irregulars opposed to them at a distance. It would appear, however, that a considerable number of ghazis were brought up by a hollow of the ground imperceptible to us, for they suddenly charged the front of our line, the irregular cavalry on our left at the same time closing right in, and the enemy's guns ceasing to fire. The two companies of Jacob's rifles on the left were the first to give way, the Grenadiers then formed square, but immediately began to fall back, while the rest of Jacob's Rifles fell back on the rear of the 66th, leaving the guns. Four of these were limbered up and galloped off, but two, whose limbers I believe had gone to the waggons for fresh ammunition, were left on the field.

Having been with the 66th at the time, I cannot describe from personal observation what followed on the other part of the field, but I believe that the Artillery, Grenadiers, and Sappers fell slowly back towards the karez, which may have been three quarters of a mile distant, pursued closely by a few ghazis only, the Afghan regulars continuing their slow advance in line.

The 66th, as I have mentioned, were lying down in a hollow. When the general attack began they rose and almost immediately a crowd of Jacob's Rifles came running into their rear. As they had been concealed by the ground till within a few yards, this sudden irruption took the British soldiers by surprise, and before long all formation was lost.

General Burrows now rode up alone, and attempted to turn the men towards the rest of the force, but it was in vain, though the left of the slowly retreating crowd came gradually round, and after 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour's retreat under a very heavy fire we reached the karez, here a nullah 30 yards wide with steep banks 10 feet high, just opposite the further end of the village, at the other extremity of which our baggage was massed. The village at this time was crowded with the enemy, who kept up a heavy fire. The ghazis in our front were still falling back, not daring to come to close quarters.

Seeing no further use in remaining with the infantry, I left them and galloped along the bank of the karez past the enemy's cavalry to the rest of the force, which I could see falling back, hoping to obtain assistance towards extricating the infantry and bringing them back to the proper line. Nothing, however, could be done.

The greater part of the baggage had by this time started off on the road to Kandahar.

Of these there are two. One to the left leading direct to Sinjiri, across the desert, and utterly waterless at this season, and the other following the route we had come by Khushk-i-Nakhud and Karez-i-Ata; the first is unfortunately well marked by a broad trodden path, and along this the fugitives were moving in a scattered column. Small bodies of the enemy's cavalry moving in the right from village to village further tended to keep our people from the proper road. Until we left the Karez the

Note.—During the night and the next morning certain heavy reports were attributed to the enemy's guns, and very circumstantial accounts were given me of the enemy's cavalry having been seen as far as Sinjiri, 10 miles from Kandahar, but I saw none myself, and there is every reason to believe that the pursuit ceased at four or five miles from the field.

Afghan infantry kept up a pretty hot fire. After that the pursuit was confined to cavalry and artillery, and was not, I believe, continued beyond four or five miles, and that very languidly.

The artillery and part of the cavalry still retained order and discipline and covered the retreat; but all or nearly all the infantry were dispersed in small parties.

The cavalry, with whom were General Burrows and Nuttall, left the great road two miles beyond Khushk-i-Nakhud and went to Karez-i-Ata, where they arrived shortly after dusk, and halted a couple of hours.

At Hauz-i-Madat, nine miles distant, the cavalry caught up the artillery, whose carriages were crowded with wounded Officers and men, and where a little drinking water was discovered in a well by the exertions of Major Leach, R.E., and Captain Slade, R.H.A.

As soon as day broke our infantry commenced firing at everything living within sight, but the fire was hardly returned from any of the villages along the road.

About seven water was reached in a canal near Sinjiri, and here some 50 infantry were assembled, and kept together during the rest of the march. About nine the river Arghandab was reached, and here the last of the smooth-bore guns, which had been left along the road as the horses became exhausted, had to be abandoned.

The infantry crossed first, and lined a bank facing Kohkaran, which was evidently occupied in force, it was feared, by a body of country people, determined to dispute the passage. But half an hour later an Officer, with an escort of cavalry, rode up with the information that Kohkaran was being held by Brigadier-General Brooke with a force of all arms detached to the assistance of General Burrows by General Primrose.

From him I learnt that the news of the defeat had been brought in by a Native Officer and 25 men of the Sind Horse at 2 a.m., that orders had been at once issued for the abandonment of the cantonment, and the removal of all troops to the citadel, which was at once carried out; and that the people of the villages had fired on General Brooke's force on its way out.

The Wali and Mirza Hasan Ali Khan had arrived at 5 a.m., preceded and followed by several Officers.

The work of bringing in the guns was so slow that it was not till 2 p.m. that we reached the cantonment.

I here learnt that at daybreak the wire between Kandahar and Abdur Rahman was found cut. A party was sent out and successfully repaired it. The fact of the defeat at Maiwand was communicated to Government, together with the names of Officers who had returned up to 11 a.m., when the wire was again cut. In the meantime orders had been sent to the garrisons of the posts at and beyond Abdur Rahman to retire to Chaman, and to that of Mund-i-Hisar to come to Kandahar.

A large number of Afghans, estimated at 2,500 to 4,000, at the invitation of Sirdar Nur Ali Khan, had left the city.

The Idgah gate was still open. All the others had been closed and blocked up with earth.

All troops, stores, and baggage animals were being collected in the citadel and adjoining enclosures. None were in the city; but the guards on the gates were doubled.

As much property and stores as possible were brought into the citadel before evening, but much was left behind, besides what had been plundered by the villagers in the early morning when the Native Infantry square and the Engineers' quarters were abandoned. Very little of the stores belonging to the sutlers in the cantonment bazaar were brought. At my quarters in Muhammad Amin's garden a new single-poled tent was left standing for want of labour and carriage to bring it in. A quantity of wine and stores, a large case of books, another of books, manuscripts, and maps, crockery, glass, &c., had also to be abandoned.

Finding no quarters in the citadel, I obtained a guard of a Duffadar and 12 sepoy, and went to Mir Afzal's house in the city, in which Mirza Hasan Ali Khan has been living for the last year.

The Wali hearing late at night that I had come to the house, and fearing that some attempt at a rising might be made by the Afghans in the city in the absence of troops, sent a number of his followers under his son Nur Ali Khan, to remain the Char-su during the night, while his brother Muhammad Husain Khan patrolled the streets. The night, however, passed perfectly quietly.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 41.

No. 460 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her
Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 26th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the operations of a detachment under the command of the late Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke, between Kandahar and Kokeran, on the 28th July last.

*G. G. O., No. 589, dated the 22nd October 1880, and papers published therewith.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, 22nd October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 589.—The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication, for general information, in continuation of the previous accounts of the Maiwand and Kandahar operations, of the following correspondence and despatches, relating to the operations of a detachment under the command of the late Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke, between Kandahar and Kokeran, on the 28th July last.

2. The Governor General in Council entirely concurs in His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's appreciatory remarks on the excellent service rendered by Brigadier-General Brooke on this occasion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

From Colonel T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Deputy Adjutant-General in India, to the
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department, No. 5726A.,
Kabul, dated Simla, the 13th October 1880.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 5351A., dated the 25th September 1880, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward the accompanying letter from Lieutenant-General Primrose, transmitting Brigadier-General Brooke's report of the

part taken by the troops under his command in protecting and bringing in the remnants of Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade returning from Maiwand.

2. His Excellency feels sure the Government will concur with him in considering the above report a record of excellent service performed by the late Brigadier-General Brooke and the small force placed at his disposal.

3. The delay which has taken place in rendering this Despatch is much to be regretted, it having been obtained only on being called for.

Enclosure 3 in No. 41.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kandahar, the 28th September 1880.

With reference to your telegram to the address of Sir Frederick Roberts, K.C.B., received this day, intimating that copies of any instructions issued to Brigadier-General Brooke on his proceeding to meet the troops returning from Maiwand on the 28th July should be forwarded, I have the honour to inform you that my instructions were given verbally to that Officer, to the effect that he should proceed along the Kokeran road, with a small force of all arms, in the direction of Singiri, with a view of helping in the men and followers of Brigadier-General Burrows' column, and protecting them from the villagers, who were then firing on them. He was to use his own discretion in carrying out these instructions.

2. I beg herewith to forward a copy of Brigadier-General Brooke's report of his proceedings.

3. With regard to paragraph 8 of Brigadier-General Brooke's report, the information he received was probably conveyed to him in a note from Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, who was also returning to Kandahar, in the following terms:—

"The hills about Abásábad and neighbouring villages are full of men, and passage to cantonment impossible. Skirmishers going out, but guns wanted.

Enclosure 4 in No. 41.

From Brigadier-General H. F. BROOKE, Commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Field Force, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Field Force, (No. 300, "Field Operations," dated Kandahar, the 8th August 1880).

I have the honour to report that, in compliance with the orders received from the Lieutenant-General, I left cantonments at 5.30 a.m. on the 28th July, with the force as per margin,* to proceed to Kokeran to cover the retirement of the force under Brigadier-General Burrows, whose movement on Kandahar was, as reported by an Officer who had arrived half an hour previously, being endangered by the opposition of the country people, who had collected in large numbers for that purpose.

2. On leaving cantonments, the only practicable road to Kokeran passes for about one mile (as the Lieutenant-General is aware) through walled gardens, and along the main street of the village of Abásábad, which is narrow and tortuous. The gardens were full of armed men, who, however, fell back without much resistance before my skirmishers, and thus allowed the guns and the remainder of the column to pass unopposed through the village of Abásábad into the more open country beyond.

3. From the time of leaving Kandahar, parties of the retiring force were met, who reported that they had been attacked by the country people all along the route, but especially at the villages of Singiri and Kokeran.

4. I therefore pushed on as quickly as the weakness of my force and the necessity of clearing my flanks of the large number of armed men who crowded the high hills on my left, and the walled enclosures and strongly-placed villages on my right, would allow. Although the resistance offered was not important, considerable time was

necessarily occupied in clearing the numerous positions taken up by the enemy, and it was nearly 9 o'clock a.m. before I reached Kokeran.

5. Here I took up a position which enabled me to command the Herat road, the village, and the fortified residence of the Sártíp; and at once sent on some cavalry to communicate with the force under Brigadier-General Burrows, which had at that time completed the crossing of the Argandab river, and was halted about a mile from Kokeran.

6. On the appearance of the force under my command, the village and fortified post at Kokeran were hurriedly evacuated by a very considerable body of armed men, who, up to this time, had been harassing and killing all small parties of the retiring force who had passed within their range. This body of men then established themselves in a village on the bank of the Argandab, about 800 yards from my right flank, from which position, however, they were quickly dislodged, and all further firing from the enemy prevented until the rearguard of General Burrows' force had passed me on their way to Kandahar. I caused the Sártíp's house to be entered by a party of the Royal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Rodick, but no one was found in it.

7. When the last man of the retiring force had passed me, I recalled that portion of my cavalry which, under Captain Anderson, had been watching the ford of the Argandab, and as soon as they had rejoined my column, I commenced to return to Kandahar, picking up all stragglers who had been unable to keep up with General Burrows' force. In returning from the ford Captain Anderson's small party of cavalry were attacked by very superior numbers, but they quickly overcame the resistance, and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.

8. Our return was unmolested for about three miles and a half, when I received information from the front that the hills immediately over the village of Abásábad and the walled enclosures round it were strongly occupied by the enemy. I at once sent forward the two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery, under Captain Law, with a cavalry escort, following myself with the remainder of the cavalry and infantry, and, passing through General Burrows' force, which was then halted, pushed rapidly to the front, throwing out skirmishers to clear the gardens and village. Some excellently directed shells from the guns caused the enemy to evacuate their fortified posts on the hills, while the skirmishers cleared the walled enclosures of all opposition, enabling both my force and that of Brigadier-General Burrows to pass through the extremely difficult village of Abásábad with trifling loss.

9. On reaching the open ground on the Kandahar side of Abásábad, I again halted and formed up my force, and so remained until the main portion of the force of Brigadier-General Burrows had passed me, sending back a company of the Royal Fusiliers,* under Captain E. W. Adderley, to keep the outskirts of the village of Abásábad clear of the enemy and bring in all stragglers. I then followed General Burrows' force into cantonments, where I arrived about 1.30 p.m.

* Obtained from the regiment.

10. The loss of the enemy in the operations above described must have been considerable, not only from our artillery and rifle fire, but also consequently on two well executed charges which were made by the Poona Horse, admirably led by Captain J. W. Anderson, whom I desire to commend to the favourable consideration of the Lieutenant-General.

11. The conduct of the troops under my command was, in all respects, excellent and full of spirit.

12. The well directed fire of the two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery proved most useful. They were excellently commanded throughout the day by Captain W. Law, whom I desire to bring to special notice as an Officer of much professional knowledge, zeal and forwardness.

13. Major F. C. Singleton, 28th Bombay Native Infantry, and Lieutenant R. P. B. Rodick, Royal Fusiliers, commanded their respective detachments to my entire satisfaction, leading them in a very forward manner against positions of exceptional difficulty.

14. I would ask the Lieutenant-General's special consideration and approval for my Staff Officers,—Captain F. W. V. Leckie, 8th Bombay Native Infantry, Brigade

Major, and Captain F. C. Keyser, Royal Fusiliers, Orderly Officer,—both of whom are Officers of superior attainments and qualifications. The zealous assistance they afforded me throughout the whole day was invaluable. Surgeon J. McNamara, the Medical Officer in charge of the column, was also most useful to me.

* Sowar Rugotoollah Khan, Poona Horse, killed. 15. I annex the usual casualty roll.*

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 42.

No. 473 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 2nd November 1880.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 434, dated the 5th October 1880, we have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,† relating to the gallant and devoted conduct of the 66th Foot in the action fought at Maiwand on the 27th July last.

† G. G. O., No. 598, dated the 27th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	J. STRACHEY.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 27th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 598.—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in directing the publication, for general information, in continuation of G.G.O. No. 551 of 1880, of the subjoined correspondence regarding the gallant and devoted conduct of the 66th (The Berkshire) Regiment of Foot at the affair of Maiwand, on the 27th July last.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5994 A., "Kabul," dated Simla, the 25th October 1880.)

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the information of Government, the accompanying letter from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting on the gallant and determined stand made by the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.

The events mentioned have already been referred to in my Letter, No. 5351 A., dated the 25th September 1880; but the details now given show the gallantry and devotion to duty of the Officers and men who fell on that occasion.

The "accompanying documents" mentioned in paragraph 1 of Lieutenant-General Primrose's letter are Brigadier-General Daubeny's report and accompaniments of the proceedings of the force under his command in connection with the burial of the dead on the field of Maiwand, which have been forwarded to Government with this Office, No. 5948 A., dated the 22nd instant.

Enclosure 3 in No. 42.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, Simla. (No. 1050 K., dated Kandahar, the 1st October 1880.)

IN forwarding the accompanying documents, I would most respectfully wish to bring to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's notice the gallant and determined stand made by the Officers and men of the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.

The disposition of the regiment was as per margin, and, of this number, 10 Officers and 275 Non-commissioned Officers and men were killed, and 2 Officers and 30 Non-commissioned Officers and men wounded.

<i>Fighting Line.</i>	<i>With Smooth-bore Battery.</i>
15 Officers.	1 Officer.
364 men, all ranks.	42 men, all ranks.
<i>Baggage Guard in rear.</i>	<i>Sick.</i>
4 Officers.	32 men.
63 men, all ranks.	

These Officers and men nearly all fell fighting desperately for the honour of their Queen and country.

I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Artillery of Ayub Khan's army, who was present at the time, that a party of the 66th Regiment, which he estimated at one hundred Officers and men, made a most determined stand in the garden marked "A" in the accompanying plan.

They were surrounded by the whole Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy.

These eleven charged out of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death.

Such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur of their bearing that, although the whole of the ghazis were assembled around them, not one dared approach to cut them down.

Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven Officers and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down that the ghazis dared advance upon them.

He further adds that the conduct of these men was the admiration of all who witnessed it.

This is the testimony of a man who witnessed the scene, and who gave the information before Brigadier-General Daubeny proceeded to Maiwand.

From an examination of the ground, from corroborative evidence, and from the position in which the bodies were found, I have not the least hesitation in stating that this account is true; and I think His Excellency will agree with me when I say that history does not afford any grander or finer instance of gallantry and devotion to Queen and country than that displayed by the 66th Regiment on the 27th July 1880.

A nominal roll of the Officers and men who fought and died thus nobly has been already forwarded to you; and inquiries from survivors elicit the following facts:—

Lieutenant-Colonel James Galbraith was last seen on the nullah bank, kneeling on one knee, with a colour in his hand, Officers and men rallying round him; and on this spot his body was found.

Here too fell Captain William Hamilton M'Math, a gallant soldier, and one who would, had his life been spared, have risen to distinction in Her Majesty's service.

Close by, Second Lieutenant Harry James Outram Barr was shot dead over one of the colours.

Captains Ernest Stephen Garratt and Francis James Cullen were both killed on the field in front of the nullah, up to the last moment commanding their companies and giving their orders with as much coolness as if on an ordinary regimental parade.

Captain Walter Roberts was mortally wounded in the garden, where the last stand was made; and here also fell Lieutenant Maurice Edward Rayner, Lieutenant Richard Trevor Chute, Second Lieutenant Walter Rice Olivey, and Second Lieutenant Arthur Honeywood.

The two latter Officers were seen holding up the colours, the pole of one of which was shattered to pieces, as rallying points; and Lieutenant Honeywood was shot down whilst holding a colour high above his head, shouting, "Men, what shall we do to save this!"

Sergeant-Major Alexander Cuppage was shot dead outside the garden whilst carrying a colour; and many other Non-commissioned Officers and men laid down their lives in the attempt to save the colours of their regiment on that day.

With the gallant band who made this last grand effort, fought and died Major

George Frederick Blackwood, Royal Horse Artillery; Lieutenant Thomas Rice Henn, Royal Engineers; and Lieutenant Charles William Hinde, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, Native Infantry, with some of his men.

The men of the 66th on baggage guard, under the command of Captain J. Quarry, did excellent service during the retreat.

The party told off to man the smooth-bore battery, under Lieutenant G. De la M. Faunce, worked their guns steadily and well during the fight.

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 43.

No. 474 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 2nd November 1880.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 442, dated the 12th October 1880,

* G. G. O., No. 599, dated the 27th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

we have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the pro-

ceedings of the troops under the command of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., during the operations of the 1st September last, near Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	J. STRACHEY.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 27th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 599.—The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication, for general information, in continuation of G.G.O. No. 582 of 1880, of the following correspondence and despatch, relating to the part taken by the troops of the Kandahar garrison, under the command of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., in the action of the 1st September last, near Kandahar.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8853 K., "Kabul Field Operations," dated Simla, the 27th October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter, No. 5754 A., dated the 14th instant, forwarding a despatch from Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., detailing the part taken by the troops under his command in the operations of the 1st September 1880, near Kandahar.

2. With reference thereto, I am to state that the Governor General in Council concurs in the remark made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in paragraph 12 of your Letter, No. 5585 A., dated the 7th instant, that these troops rendered good service on the occasion referred to.

3. Lieutenant-General Primrose's report will be published in the "Gazette of India," on an early date, for general information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 43.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5754 A., dated Simla, the 14th October 1880.)

IN continuation of my Letter, No. 5585 A., dated 7th instant, paragraph 12, I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward herewith Despatch No. 999, of the 27th ultimo, from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting the part taken by the troops under his command on the 1st September.

2. His Excellency concurs in the remarks already made by Sir Frederick Roberts, that the Kandahar Force rendered good service in the engagement.

Enclosure 4 in No. 43.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., Commanding in Southern Afghanistan. (No. 999 K., "Field Operations," dated Kandahar, 27th September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with instructions received from you early on the morning of the 1st September 1880, I issued the following orders:—

" I. E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by two companies of the 7th Fusiliers and four companies of the 28th Native Infantry, will march from Kandahar, *via* the Edgah gate, so as to reach the hill beyond the village of Gandizan by 9 a.m.

" II. The Officer in command of this party will report himself to Brigadier-General Gough, V.C., commanding the Kabul Field Force Cavalry Brigade, which is to be formed up behind the Gandizan Hill by 9 a.m.

" III. The infantry and guns will precede the cavalry, and clear the way for them.

" IV. The detachment of infantry with E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, at Gandizan, will remain stationary when the cavalry advances.

" V. The troops, as per margin,* under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, will be formed up at Kalacha-i-Haidar (the old cavalry lines) at 8 a.m., for the purpose of threatening the Baba Wali Kotal and watching the Kotal-i-Murcha.

" VI. The Commanding Royal Engineer will detail a party of sappers to accompany the force.

" VII. This force will remain stationary during the day.

" VIII. The Officer commanding the Royal Artillery will see that a good position is taken up by No. 5/11th, Royal Artillery, for firing at the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal, and, in doing this, he will bear in mind that the object of the movement on the right is entirely to hold the enemy on and about the pass, whilst the real attack is delivered by the left in the direction of Pir Paimal.

" IX. The following troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Daubeny, will at once occupy a line of pickets (in relief of those of the Kabul Field Force) extending from Picket Hill on the right by Karez Hill to Chil-Zina on the left:—

4 companies,	66th Regiment.
2 "	1st Bombay Native Infantry.
2 "	28th " " "

" X. The whole of the available cavalry of regiments, as per margin,† under the command of Brigadier-General Nuttal, will move out in advance of Brigadier-General Burrows, and take up a good position for watching the Baba Wali

and Kotal-i-Murcha passes, with the ground intervening.

" XI. C/2nd Royal Artillery will proceed at once to Picket Hill, where Major Greig will report to Colonel Johnson for further orders.

" XII. A day's cooked rations to be taken by the troops.

" XIII. Only the first reserve of ammunition will accompany the troops.

" XIV. Signallers to accompany each party.

" XV. The Deputy Surgeon-General will make all arrangements for the reception and care of the wounded.

* No. 5/11th, Royal Artillery, four guns,
40 pounders.

4 companies, 7th Fusiliers.
4th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

19th " " " "

† 3rd Light Cavalry.

Head-quarters, Poona Horse.

3rd Sind Horse.

"XVI. The head-quarters of the Lieutenant-General will be at first in the Sappers' garden.

"XVII. Colonel Mainwaring, 30th Native Infantry, will take command of the city during the day, and make all local arrangements."

2. In accordance with the above, the cavalry moved out at about 7.30 a.m., and Brigadier-General Daubeny followed at about 8 a.m., occupying the ground ordered as follows:—

- 2 companies, 1st Bombay Native Infantry, were posted on Picket Hill.
- 2 " 66th Regiment, on Karez Hill.
- 1 company, 66th Regiment, between Karez Hill and Picket Hill.
- 1 " 28th Bombay Native Infantry, between Chil-Zina and Karez Hill.
- 1 " 28th Bombay Native Infantry, watching the gardens in left rear of the Chil-Zina.

3. Brigadier-General Burrows marched shortly after, taking up a strong position in the old cavalry and Jacob's Rifles' lines.

4. An excellent position was found for No. 5/11th Royal Artillery, about one hundred yards to the right of Picket Hill.

5. During the whole of the march of the above troops into position they were constantly shelled by the enemy from guns in battery on Baba Wali Kotal, but no casualties occurred.

6. At 9.15 a.m. No. 5/11th came into action under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, and remained in action until 12.30 p.m., engaging the guns on the Kotal, which replied with much spirit until about noon, when they were apparently directed upon the troops who were making the turning movement by Pir Paimal.

7. During the early stage of the advance of the 1st and 2nd Brigades on the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, the enemy gathered in strong force on the low hills directly in front and east of the Baba Wali Pass, evidently contemplating a rush on the guns of No. 5/11th, but their leaders, who could be distinctly seen urging them on in the direction of Kalacha-i-Haidar, could not force the ghazis collected there to face the position taken up by Brigadier-General Burrows, and, though some few actually advanced down the hills, the main portion would not follow, and they remained under cover until the position was turned, when they retreated rapidly over the Kotal.

8. At 9 a.m. Major Tillard, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, with the escort of the 7th Fusiliers and the 28th Native Infantry, arrived at the village of Abásábad and reported to Brigadier-General Gough, who directed him to proceed along the Kokeran road and clear the low hills near the village of Gandizan.

9. Immediately on opening fire the enemy commenced a heavy musketry fire on the guns (which was, however, soon silenced), and also fire from the two guns at the foot of the south-west spur of the Pir Paimal.

10. The practice of these two guns was continuous and good, and, though the guns of E/B were engaging them some time, they were unable to silence them.

11. Shortly after 11 a.m. Brigadier-General Gough directed this party to advance and hold the hills by Gandizan, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and in this position they remained until ordered to return to quarters at 5 p.m.

12. On reporting to Colonel Johnson, Major Greig, commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery, was ordered to form up behind Karez Hill with the rest of the attacking troops.

13. At about 9 a.m. two guns of this battery moved to the right of Karez Hill, and opened fire against the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, and were shortly after joined by the rest of the battery, which kept up a fire on the village until masked by the advance of the 1st Brigade.

14. The battery then limbered up and followed the 1st Brigade during the remainder of the day, coming into action on the left of the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, but, the enemy dispersing, they did not fire.

15. At 2 o'clock the cavalry, which had been watching the passes, received orders to cross by the Baba Wali Kotal and pursue up the Arghandab valley in the direction of Kajah Mulk.

16. Brigadier-General Nuttall, taking with him the 3rd Sind Horse and the 3rd Light Cavalry, proceeded at once to carry out these orders, and, pushing on, came upon bodies of the enemy making for the hills and along the valley.

17. These he charged and dispersed, following up the retreating enemy to Mansurabad, a distance of some fifteen miles.

18. Night coming on compelled him to abandon the pursuit, and he, therefore, returned, reaching the lines at about 10 p.m.

19. Brigadier-General Nuttall estimates the loss of the enemy in this pursuit at one hundred men killed.

20. At 5 p.m. the whole of the pickets being relieved returned to quarters.

21. A complete casualty list, with amount of ammunition expended, has been already forwarded.

No. 214, "Field Operations," dated Quetta, 2nd October 1880.

Forwarded to the Adjutant-General in India, in continuation of Field Force, No. 88, dated 26th September 1880, to which I beg that it may be attached.

F. S. ROBERTS, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

No. 44.

No. 485 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 9th November 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's

* From the Adjutant-General in India, No. 5498 A., dated the 22nd October 1880, and enclosures.

Military Department Letter, No. 8876 K., dated the 29th October 1880.

Government, the correspondence noted in the margin,* relating to the proceedings of a column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers, which was sent out from Kandahar to Maiwand in September last,

for the purpose of burying the dead on the field of battle, and recovering prisoners, arms, &c. that may have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

We have, &c.

(Signed) J. STRACHEY.

" W. STOKES.

" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44.

From Colonel T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Deputy Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5948 A., Kabul, dated Simla, the 22nd October 1880.)

IN forwarding, for the information of Government, the accompanying papers, relating to the proceedings of the special column of troops sent to bury the dead on the field of Maiwand, and to recover prisoners, arms, &c. captured by the enemy, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to state that the duty which devolved upon Brigadier-General Daubeny appears to have been performed in a thoughtful and thoroughly satisfactory manner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 44.

From Brigadier-General A. G. DAUBENY, Commanding the Maiwand Field Column, to the ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, 1st Division, Kandahar Force, Bombay Army. (No. 350, dated Kokeran, the 23rd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lieutenant-General, that, in consequence of orders received, the Field Column destined for Maiwand moved into camp on the maidan opposite the Herat front on the night of the 8th September, and marched for Kokeran at 5.30 the following morning. On the road, one body, a sowar of the Poona Horse was found and buried. At Kokeran we found some difficulty in procuring supplies, and no atta could be got, all being required for the use of the cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Gough, encamped on the other side of the river. During the night we had a heavy fall of rain, which delayed our marching until the tents were dry. In the meantime I sent Colonel Tanner with a force to search Singiri and to procure atta. The result of the search was four old guns, quite useless; 30 maunds of atta were procured. After leaving Singiri the road opens out into a wide plain; here the cavalry were spread out, and a body of skirmishers passed through the enclosed ground to the left, searching for bodies; 18 in all were found and buried.

The Transport Officer reporting that the camels were much fatigued with the day's march, I decided to remain here (at Ashu Khan) to-morrow, and utilize the day in searching for arms and bodies.

11th September.—The search for arms was carried out under Colonel Baurnerman, but was not satisfactory; 23 bodies were found on the line of route to Maiwand and buried, and a few were found on the outskirts of the village. A reconnoitring party was sent in the direction of Hauz-i-Madat, and reported all quiet; in fact most of the villagers seem to have deserted their homes. In the evening, Shirindil Khan sent in a man of Jacob's Rifles, a doolie-wallah, and a milkwoman, who had been made prisoners by the enemy; they appear to have been well treated, especially the woman. Three rifles have also been sent in (Snider).

12th September.—Marching on a wide front, with the cavalry well ahead, and provided with picks and shovels, we continued the search as far as Hauz-i-Madat, where, owing to the late rain, I was able to halt; just as we were coming into camp, one of the missing field guns was found, partly covered over with earth. Shirindil Khan, late Governor of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, came into camp in the evening, bringing prisoners and a rifle with him; he asked us to breakfast the following morning, an invitation which I accepted for a few of us, hoping that our visit might procure us information regarding the remainder of the lost guns.

13th September.—The column continued its march in the same order as yesterday, while I, attended by Lieutenant Muir, Colonel Tanner, and eight others, rode over to Shirindil Khan's house, where we were most civilly and hospitably received; but we procured but little information. Shirindil Khan said that the people of the villages which had opposed us had fled, taking the rifles with them, but he hoped on their return to be able to get some of them back for us, and also information as to the whereabouts of the guns. Supplies were sent in freely to camp.

The cavalry were sent along the line of retreat from Maiwand under the hills, and buried a good many bodies.

14th September.—The cavalry were sent to recommence their search at the point they left off yesterday, and the column marched straight to Khushk-i-Nakhud.

Patrols were sent out in the direction of Girishk, who, on return, reported all quiet, and that the people seemed to have deserted the country.

15th September.—On reaching Maiwand we encamped to the right (to east) of the line of villages below the battle-field, where there is good water in abundance from a karez. The position occupied by our troops is easily traced by the line of empty Henry-Martini and Snider cartridge cases, and the positions of the artillery and of the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry could be further traced,—in the former by the bodies of horses, and in the latter by the small caps which are worn by that regiment. The bodies on the field had all been buried, but the earth on the graves of our men was quite fresh; whereas the ghazis had evidently been buried shortly after the battle, the earth on their graves having set. I considered it best to form a committee to examine the graves on the field of battle and in the gardens in rear of the position, and also to

institute a thorough search for unburied bodies, and erect a cairn to those who had fallen, on a conspicuous spot on the field of battle. Colonel Bannerman, 4th Rifles, Captain Beresford Peirse, 66th Regiment, and Lieutenant Waller, R.E., constituted the committee; they continued their labours for two days. Where the dead had been insufficiently buried fresh graves were dug, and the bodies carefully transferred to them, under the superintendence of an officer, and the names of all those who could be recognized recorded; in other instances it was considered sufficient to make the graves secure by the addition of fresh soil. In almost all cases stones were likewise placed over the graves, to render them still more secure. On the 16th and 17th instant, services were held over the freshly made graves by the Reverend Mr. Cane and Father Jackson, all Officers off duty attending, and on the concluding day the band of the Fusiliers played the "Dead March in Saul." The proceedings of the committee have been most complete, and a neat cairn has been erected on the battle field. A report of their proceedings is attached, and a sketch of the ground, by Lieutenant Waller, R.E., showing the positions of the graves.

During the days I remained halted at Maiwand, as also during the march, the country was well scoured by patrols, and neither in the direction of Girishk or elsewhere have there been indications of anything but perfect quiet. At first the villages near which we passed were deserted, the people evidently expecting retaliation for the part they had taken in cutting up our wounded and stragglers, but lately supplies have been freely sent to camp, and the inhabitants appear to be aware that they have nothing to fear as long as they maintain a peaceful attitude, and I think the passage of the column through the country to Maiwand will be found to have had a beneficial effect in re-opening our intercourse with the people, and therefore facilitating the transmission of supplies to Kandahar and other places.

As regards the main object of the expedition, viz., the burial of the bodies of our people on the line of march to and on the field of battle, I have to report that 144 bodies were found and buried on the line of march, and that about 522 bodies were buried on the field of battle and in the gardens in rear of the position. This number is based on measurement of the unopened graves, and on the number of bodies found in those that were opened.

As regards the recovery of small arms, I regret to say that little has been done, although many villages have been searched, and, for the few we have, we are indebted to the agency of Sirdar Shirindil Khan, as also for prisoners.

As already mentioned, the field gun was found by the troops at Hauz-i-Madat. I have reason to believe that the remaining four guns are buried at Kokeran; this I communicated to General Gough, but, as far as I am aware, all search has hitherto proved ineffectual.

I am much indebted to Mr. Muir for his arrangements and help on all occasions.

To the Brigade generally, and especially to Colonel Bannerman and the burial committee, for the patient and careful manner in which they performed a painful, and at times anything but an agreeable duty.

To Colonel La Touche, for the thorough search that was made of the line of retreat.

To Major Bryant, Provost Marshal, and to Captain Dobbs, Commissariat Officer, and Captains Leckie and Harris.

Attached—

- (1) Report of burial committee, with plan of graves on the field of battle and in the villages in rear of the position, by Lieutenant Waller, R.E.
- (2) Statement of guns and artillery, stores, &c. recovered.
- (3) List of small arms recovered.
- (4) List of prisoners recovered.

No. 594 K, dated Kandahar, 27th September 1880.

Forwarded for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding the Southern Afghanistan Force.

(Signed) J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 1st Division, S. A. F.

No. 192, dated Quetta, 2nd October 1880.

Submitted. Brigadier-General Daubeny seems to have performed the duty entrusted to him in a very creditable manner.

(Signed) FRED. ROBERTS, Lieut.-General,
Commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 44.

List of Prisoners, Arms, &c. recovered by the 2nd Brigade.

Prisoners.

Lance-Naique Narayen Lokhunday, 1st Grenadier Native Infantry.
 „ Ramzan Khan, 30th Regiment Native Infantry.
 Transport Surwan Oomer.
 Dooli-bearer Luximon.
 Bhisti Peerbux, 3rd Light Cavalry.
 „ Shaid Adam, 66th Regiment.
 Doodwalec Moonia, 66th „

Arms, &c.

2 Martini-Henry rifles.
 3 Snider rifles, 1st Grenadier Native Infantry.
 2 „ „ 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 2 Bayonets, 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 1 Cleaning rod, 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 1 6-pdr. smooth-bore field gun.
 1 Waist-belt with pouches, 66th Regiment Native Infantry.
 1 „ „ 1st Grenadier „ „

(Signed) A. G. DAUBENY, Brigadier-General,
Kokeran, the 23rd September 1880. Commanding 2nd Brigade.

Enclosure 4 in No. 44.

From MAJOR P. H. GREIG, Commanding C Battery, 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery, to the BRIGADE MAJOR, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. (Dated Camp, Kokeran, the 22nd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Brigadier-General Commanding, that on the arrival of the brigade at Hauz-i-Madat, I found one of the 6-pdr. guns belonging to the Wali of Kandahar lying on the side of the road, together with the remains of the gun carriage. I mounted the gun on my spare gun carriage, and have brought it in with me, together with two wheels; three other wheels I handed over to the Assistant Political Agent, and the remainder of the gun-carriage I destroyed. On arrival at Maiwand, I found the *debris* of four wagons of E/Battery Royal Horse Artillery on the field of battle, consisting of the ironwork of two limbers and four wagon bodies and the tires of eleven wheels. I had them brought into camp, and mounted the ironwork of one wagon on my spare wheels, and placed the remaining ironwork on the top of it, and have brought the whole in. The tires of the wheels I placed in a deep karez. Colonel LaTouche, commanding the Poona Horse, also sent me in two naves of wheels, which I buried. I examined the field of battle and the surrounding villages and removed all traces I could find of the wagons, &c., of E Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

On returning to Khushk-i-Nakhud, two camel loads of old harness, shafts, lifting jacks, &c., were sent to me. I found nearly the whole of the things worthless and buried them, with the exception of two shafts, two lifting jacks, and a few straps. At Ashar Khan, the *debris* of the store wagon of E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, was found in the nullah near the village. The axletrees, a few of the boxes, the pole chain, and one shaft I have brought in.

Enclosure 5 in No. 44.

Proceedings of a Committee ordered to assemble at Maiwand, Southern Afghanistan, by order of Brigadier-General Daubeny, commanding the Maiwand Field Column, for the purpose of counting the approximate number of graves containing our troops who fell in the battle of Maiwand, and to select a site for the erection of a memorial cairn. (Dated 15th September 1880.)

President :

Colonel W. Bannerman, 4th Rifles.

Members :

Captain W. J. De la P. Beresford-Peirse, 66th Regiment,
Lieutenant E. A. Waller, R.E.

The Committee having assembled pursuant to order, proceeded to inspect the battle field and line of retreat through the villages as indicated on sketch attached, and find that the number of graves on the battlefield are in number as per margin, and estimated to contain 400 bodies. Those in the gardens and enclosures consisted of, in the place marked "A" on the sketch, three large graves; that at place marked "B," one large grave; and at the place marked "C," one large grave. On examination, the Committee determined to have the bodies disinterred at the three last named places and marked "A," "B," and "C" on the annexed sketch, and reinterred in one grave at each place, on account of the bodies being only slightly covered over with earth.

The Committee, after having examined the field of battle, selected the spot marked "M," as a suitable place for the erection of a cairn in memory of the men who fell in the action at Maiwand. To Captain Beresford-Peirse, 66th Regiment, was entrusted the duty of preparing the new graves and re-interring the bodies of our men who were buried in the gardens and enclosures.

At "A" were found three large graves; the remains of the men, numbered as per margin, were interred in one grave in the corner of enclosure.

At "B" was found one large grave, which contained the remains of men, number as per margin, and were entered in one grave close by.

At "C" was found one grave, which contained the remains of men, number as per margin, which were interred in one grave close along side.

The graves of the remains of men on the field of battle were enlarged and improved by Lieutenant Waller, R.E., to whom was entrusted the erection of the memorial cairn.

The bodies of the following officers were identified :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Galbraith, late commanding the 66th Regiment.
Major Blackwood, late commanding E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
Captain M'Math, 66th Regiment.
Lieutenant Henn, Royal Engineers.
" Rayner, Adjutant, 66th Regiment.
" Chute, 66th Regiment.
2nd Lieutenant Olivey, 66th Regiment.
One officer's body not identified.

These bodies were interred with the bodies of the men at the places where they were found.

The body of Captain Smith, 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), was discovered by Lieutenant Monteith of the Sind Horse, on the 17th September, and buried that same evening at the place marked "K" on the annexed sketch.

The following are the names of the bodies identified and buried in graves marked "A," "B," and "C":—

Corporal Eugene Mahoney.
Lance Corporal Lester Weston.
" " George Hinton.
Drummer John Groves.
Lance-Corporal Edward Beggs.

Lieutenant and Adjutant M. E. Rayner.
Private John Mannon.
" John Evans.
" Geo. Carter.
Surgeon William Guntrip.

Private Crispin Barrett.
 Lance Corporal George Tuttle.
 No. 850, Private John Beard.
 Private Benjamin Watts.
 „ Robert Donnon.
 488 Private Wm. Brown.
 1449 „ Joseph Jackson.
 „ Samuel Welch.
 „ George West.
 Colour-Sergeant Frederick Gover.
 (Signed) W. BANNERMAN, Colonel,

Private Martin Diamond.
 „ Alfred Castle.
 „ George Anderson.
 „ John Ferney.
 „ William Wilson.
 831, Private Joseph Jones.
 Drummer Michael Darby.
 Private Henry Murrell.
 Private Owen McCaffrey.

4th Rifles, President.
 W. J. DE LA P. BERESFORD-PEIRSE, Captain,
 66th Regiment.
 E. A. WALLER, Lieutenant, R.E.,
 Assistant Field Engineer, 2nd Brigade.

Enclosure 6 in No. 44.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA. (No. 8876 K, Kabul (Field Operations), dated Simla, 29th October 1880).

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 5948A, dated the 22nd instant, forwarding papers regarding the proceedings of the special column sent out from Kandahar to Maiwand under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers, to bury the dead on the field of battle at the latter place, and to recover prisoners, arms, &c. ; and, with reference thereto, to state, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India fully concur in His Excellency's estimate of the very satisfactory manner in which the duty referred to was carried out.

L O N D O N :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

R E T U R N

(To an Address of the HOUSE OF LORDS, dated 28th February 1881.)

FOR

COPY of GOVERNMENT of INDIA DESPATCH, No. 40, of 9th March 1877, with other PAPERS.

No. 40 of 1877.

Government of India.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

POLITICAL.

TO THE MOST HON. THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, the 9th March 1877.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 120, dated the 12th of June 1876, and with reference to our proceedings marginally noted, we have the honour to forward, for the information of

Political A., June 1876, Nos. 106-108.

Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the correspondence noted in the accompanying abstract of contents, on the subject of Kohat Pass affairs, and to append a brief statement of the principal events which have occurred in connexion therewith since the date of our last report.

2. In the month of June 1876 a body of about 50 men committed a serious raid in British territory in the neighbourhood of Shumshuttoo on the Southern Mohmund frontier of the Peshawur District. As the raiders, if not actually belonging to the Hassan Khel section of the Adam Khel tribe, must at any rate have passed through their territory, and as other outrages had occurred on the Southern Mohmund frontier, for which the Hassan Khel had been more or less responsible, it was determined by the Punjab Government to call on that tribe, and also on the Asha Khel* who had been

* A sub-division of the Adam Khel section of the Afridi tribe.

† A section of the Afridi tribe, occupying territory in the vicinity of the Kohat Kotal.

‡ A section of the Orakzai tribe.

concerned in the Shumshuttoo affairs, to follow the example of the Jowakis† and Daulatzai,‡ and furnish hostages for good behaviour and strict neutrality in the Pass road dispute, under penalty of inclusion in the blockade if they refused compliance. The two tribes having declined to accede to the demand, were, at the end of August, included in the general blockade of the Afridi tribe, and warned not to trade in British territory.

3. Meanwhile other outrages had been committed. On the morning of the 15th of July a water party proceeding to Fort Muhammadzai, an outpost near Kohat, was attacked by a band of Afridis in ambush, who killed one of the mounted troopers in charge of the party, and made off with his rifle, accoutrements, and ammunition. On the night of the 20th of August Private Thomas McNeill of the 51st Regiment encamped at the sanitarium of Cherat received a gunshot wound, which ultimately proved fatal. It appeared, however, on subsequent inquiry, that the act had no political significance, but had been committed by one of two Afridi thieves who had been disturbed in an endeavour to commit robbery in the camp. On the following day (August 21st) three grasscutters who had gone on forbidden ground near Fort Mackeson were carried off by Hassan Khels. All three eventually effected their escape unharmed.

4. During the month of September the border remained free from aggression. In consequence, however, of the bad feeling evinced by the Adam Khel Afridis, arrangements were made for the protection of Cherat and the Government mules at Chuppri, a village in its vicinity.

5. In the month of October the only outrages reported were the murder near Eymul Chabutra, an outpost on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass, of a foot constable by some Pass Afridis, and an unsuccessful attack made by that tribe on a body of workmen employed on the construction of a new tower near Fort Garnett.

6. On the 4th of November the headmen of the Jowaki Section of the Pass Afridis came into Kohat and tendered their submission, which was accepted on payment of a fine of nearly Rupees 2,000. The general state of affairs, however, did not improve. On the night of the 13th of November three outlaws from Janakur made a raid on Chuppri. They were driven off with the loss of their Chief "Nasir," supposed to be the man who shot Private T. McNeill. Two more raids were committed on the 15th. In the first case a body of 60 men came down from the Kohat Pass and carried off 65 sheep, 70 goats, and 4 donkeys from the village of Mattani on the Mohmund border. In the second case a party of five Afridis captured three head of cattle from the village of Regi on the Khalil border.

7. About this time his Excellency the Viceroy, who was then on tour, arrived at Peshawur; he found that the blockade on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass was not maintained with sufficient strictness, and, after consultation with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and other officers, decided that the blockade on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass should be made more effective, and that our communications with Kohat should be improved by putting in order the route between Kohat and Attock, *viâ* the Nilabgashah and the Quarra jungles, and making it suitable for the passage of guns, and by the establishment of a bridge of boats over the Indus at Kushalghar, and of a mail-cart service between Kohat and Rawul Pindi, *viâ* Kushalghar.

8. During the month of December other raids took place. The Afridis made a demonstration on the Peshawur side of the pass, firing on Fort Mackeson and the Eymul Chabutra Police Post; more thefts were committed in British territory. Eventually some daring outrages by a gang of the Hassan Khel induced the Commissioner of Peshawur to recommend the despatch of an expedition against the recalcitrant tribes. As it transpired from the reports which reached us of this matter that the Commissioner of Peshawur had delayed giving effect to the orders of his Excellency for increasing the stringency of the blockade, we expressed our disapproval of his neglect in this respect, and desired that the measures decided on by his Excellency at Peshawur should be immediately adopted. At the same time we expressed our concurrence in the objections entertained by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to the despatch of a military expedition. Further, with reference to an order issued by the Government of the Punjab for the employment of troops for the more effectual enforcement of the blockade on the Peshawur side, we prohibited their use for this purpose, except in such a manner as would not involve them in the active duties of the blockade, it being undesirable that they should be exposed to risks of collision where they could not act with decisive effect, but we sanctioned an increase being made, if necessary, to the police, and their being armed with Enfield rifles; we further sanctioned the issue of smooth-bore arms and ammunition to the villagers of the Southern Mohmund border.

9. Whilst the above orders were under consideration and despatch, intelligence was received of a daring attack having been made on the Nowshera Cantonment Sudder Bazaar by a party believed to have been composed of Hassan Khel and Pass Afridis under the leadership of one Gulfiroz, a Nowshera outlaw, resident in the Hassan Khel country. We also continued to receive reports of the almost daily occurrence of aggressive acts by the Afridis of a more or less serious character, and we therefore addressed to the Government of Punjab a letter, No. 138P., dated the 26th of January 1877, expressing our grave concern at the unsettled state of the Peshawur border, and our disappointment and dissatisfaction at the failure of the blockade to effect the objects for which it was established. We observed that the general condition of affairs on the Peshawur frontier, and the whole system of border policy applied to them, demanded serious attention; and, in order that we might be in possession of the facts necessary for the formation of a definite opinion as to the course to be pursued, we desired the Government of the Punjab to submit a comprehensive report giving a complete history of the blockade of the Afridis, and of all the events in the Peshawur border since the commencement of that blockade. On receipt of this report it is our intention to address your Lordship a further communication.

10. We have to conclude this despatch by reporting the submission on the 9th February of the Hassan Khel, an important section of the blockaded Afridi tribe. The

circumstances under which the local officers were permitted to treat with the Hassan Khel, and the terms they were offered and have accepted, are set forth in the papers herewith forwarded.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord Marquis,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servants,
(Signed) LYTTON.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.

* * * * *

Enclosure 29 in the foregoing Despatch.

No. 25 (a.) C.P., dated Peshawur, 25th November 1876. Confidential.

RESOLUTION by the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

*Proceedings of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Peshawur,
25th November 1876.*

Having conferred with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and other officers, on the subject of the blockade of the Pass Afridis, the Right Honourable the Governor-General is pleased to Resolve, that :

1. The blockade on the Peshawur side be made more effective, and that for this purpose the Commissioner of Peshawur be authorised to entertain a reasonable number of mounted and foot levies.
2. That measures be taken for more effectively preventing supplies being furnished to the blockaded sections by traders from British territory.
3. That a mail-cart service be established between Kohat and Rawul Pindi; the road between Kushalghar and Pindi, and the approaches to the ferry, being put into order for that purpose, and that a bridge of boats be established in lieu of a ferry.
4. That the route between Kohat and Attock *via* the Nilabgashah and the Quarra jungles be put in order and made suitable for the passage of guns.

No. 26, C.P.

Ordered, that a copy of the above Resolution be sent to Military Department for information.

No. 27 C.P.

Ordered, that a copy be sent to the Government of the Punjab for information and guidance.

No. 28, C.P.

Ordered, that a copy be sent to the Financial Department for information and the issue of the necessary orders to the Postal Department.

EXTRACTS of Military Proceedings of the Government of India for March 1877.

GENERAL MEASURES for the Equipment of the Force for Service on the North-West Frontier, and selection of Corps.

No. 224, Confidential. From Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General in India (No. 903, Field Operations, dated Fort William the 16th December 1876).

I am directed to inform you that it seems desirable to the Government to put you in possession of full particulars of the measures that have been taken for the equipment of a force to be in readiness for field service on the North-West Frontier, as far as these measures have yet proceeded; for although some of the steps taken are known to his

Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with whom the President in Council has been in direct telegraphic communication, others are not.

2. It was decided that the force shall be held in readiness to move to, or to assemble at, Kohat or its neighbourhood, and that it should consist of the following troops:—

- A field battery of Royal Artillery.
- A mountain battery, Royal Artillery.
- A mountain battery of the Punjaub Frontier Force.
- Two companies of Sappers and Miners.
- A regiment of British Cavalry.
- Two regiments of Native Cavalry.
- Two regiments of British Infantry.
- Four regiments of Native Infantry.

3. The Inspector-General of Ordnance has been instructed to make the following arrangements —

- I.—To provide 200 rounds of reserve ammunition for each of the batteries of field and mountain artillery in addition to what is with the batteries, including that in the spare ammunition waggons of the field battery, and giving a double proportion of case shot (as recommended by Colonel Russell) to the mountain batteries.
- II.—To despatch to Rawul Pindi, if not already complete, the full service proportion of ammunition for the cavalry force detailed in paragraph 2.
- III.—To complete the infantry of the force to 60 rounds in pouch, 240 in first reserve, and 300 in second reserve.
- IV.—To supply the field battery and the British cavalry and infantry with the proper complement of double fly-bell tents, leaving for hospital purposes European privates' tents in the following proportion:—
 - Two for the field battery.
 - Four for British cavalry.
 - Six for each British infantry regiment.
- V.—To supply pāls for followers in the following proportion:—
 - One for syces and one for grasscutters for each troop of British cavalry, and double this number for the field battery, and pāls for doolie bearers to the extent of one for the field battery, two for the cavalry, and three for the infantry regiments.

4. The mountain battery is already equipped for field service as respects tents.

5. It is not quite understood what is meant by "first reserve," which term has been taken from the Commander-in-Chief's telegram. In Indian warfare heretofore the first reserve has been the regimental ammunition, but this point can be settled hereafter.

6. The Commissary General has been instructed to make the following arrangements:—

- I.—To equip with carriage the troops detailed for service, substituting mule for camel carriages as far as may be readily practicable, withdrawing no carriage from Peshawur, and replacing any taken from Rawul Pindi as soon as possible.
- II.—To send a commissariat officer to Kohat to collect three months' supplies for the force, and at once to entertain carriage for one month's supplies.
- III.—To provide carriage for the ammunition ordered.
- IV.—To procure as early as possible 10,000 blankets, 4,500 neemchas, and 500 posteens.
- V.—To detail commissariat officers for the force to be in readiness to join when wanted; and to direct the senior commissariat officer to report himself at Delhi for instructions on the 20th instant.

7. The Punjaub Government has been requested to direct its officers to aid the Commissariat in the collection of supplies and carriage.

8. I am to add that any further orders of Government on the subject of this force will be communicated to you as soon as issued; but I am to point out that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having named the regiments and batteries for a larger force than that ordered, this Department is still in ignorance of the exact corps to be selected out of the larger number for service, and I am to beg that a detail of those actually to compose the force named may be furnished as soon as practicable.

GENERAL MEASURES for the Equipment of the Force for Service on the North-West Frontier, and Selection of Corps.

No. 230. (Confidential.) From Major-General F. S. Roberts, C.B., V.C., R.A., Quartermaster-General in India, to Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Camp Delhi (No. 380 C.), Field Operations, dated Camp Delhi, the 21st December 1876.

With reference to the concluding paragraph of Military Department Letter No. 902, *Field Operations*, dated 16th instant, I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit a revised list of corps his Excellency would propose to hold in readiness for field service on the North-West Frontier in the place of those telegraphed by Sir F. Haines before his Excellency was in possession of the further views of the Government on the subject.

Royal Artillery.

G. Battery 8th Brigade at Rawul Pindi.
No. 6 Battery 13th Brigade do.
Hazara Mountain Battery at Kohat.

Cavalry.

4th Huzzars at Rawul Pindi.
Guide Cavalry at Murdan.
12th Bengal Cavalry at Jhehun.

Infantry.

2nd Battalion 9th Foot at Rawul Pindi.
4th „ Rifle Brigade at do.
Guides at Murdan.
20th Punjab Infantry at Peshawur.
32nd Pioneers at Jhehun.
5th Goorkhas at Abbottabad.

Sappers and Miners.

1 Company at Rawul Pindee.
1 Company at Roorkee.

231. (Confidential.) From Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General in India (No. 19 C. D.), *Field Operations*, dated Camp Delhi, the 22nd December 1876).

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 380 C. of the 21st December 1876, and in reply to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the corps therein detailed, which it is proposed to hold in readiness for field service, are approved by the Honourable the President in Council.

4th March 1881

}

ENFIELD,

Under Secretary of State for India.

AFGHANISTAN.

R E T U R N

(To an Address of the House of Lords, dated
28th February 1861.)

FOR

COPY of GOVERNMENT of INDIA DESPATCH, No. 40,
of 9th March 1877, with other PAPERS.

(*The Earl of Lytton.*)

Ordered to be printed 4th March 1881.

(41.)

Under 1 oz.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

ESTIMATES

FOR THE

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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1881.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 65.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, September 8, 1880.

War Estimates. Do you intend to reply to my Despatch 7th June, or is yours of June 1st final explanation?

No. 51.
Corresp-
ence giv-
to Parli-
ment.
No. 48.

No. 66.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, September 10, 1880.

Shall not answer your 179 till you answer our 176, which contains final explanation.

No. 67.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, September 23, 1880,
No. 317 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. I desire to draw the attention of your Excellency to the following passage in Her Majesty's speech, delivered on the occasion of the prorogation of Parliament on the 7th instant:—

"I regret that it has not hitherto been possible to give you such information on the general state of Indian finance, and the recent miscarriages in presenting the accounts of military expenditure, as you would justly require before entering on a practical consideration of the subject. You may, however, rest assured that I shall redeem my pledge to supply you with this information at the earliest period in my power."

2. You will perceive from these words the necessity of losing no time in taking such measures as may be necessary in order to present to Parliament immediately on its reassembling the most complete statement that can be given of the expenditure incurred in the Afghan war.

3. Inasmuch, too, as Her Majesty's Government have determined that a substantial contribution to these expenses shall be made by the Imperial Treasury, and as the financial arrangements for the ensuing year, both of the British and the Indian Governments, will be largely affected thereby, it is essential that the actual cost of the war should be determined without delay.

4. If the recent success in Southern Afghanistan should, as may be hoped, lead to a termination of the active military operations, there is no reason that the accounts should not be completed within a few months, provided that measures are at once adopted for their systematic preparation, while the officers on whose orders the expenditure has been incurred are at hand to render any requisite explanations. Otherwise, the experience of former campaigns shows that claims are preferred, the correctness of which it is impracticable to check, and that not merely is much time lost in the endeavour to verify their accuracy, but frequently payments are unavoidably admitted which it might at an earlier period have been possible to refuse.

5. Your Excellency will be able to judge of the propriety of forthwith issuing a notification that all claims of every description, in connection with the war, shall be submitted at once to the respective Military Controllers in the three Presidencies, and that none will be entertained if brought forward after a specified date, say the 31st of December next, unless sufficient cause is shown to your Government for the delay.

6. All possible efforts should be made to obtain accounts from the Paymasters and the Officers of the Commissariat, Transport, and Supply Departments, who have to

account for money advanced to them for the purposes of the war, as well as to expedite the audit and classification of the accounts when received, and the requisite clerical aid should be sanctioned for this purpose.

7. Complete returns should be rendered of payments, of whatever description, made from Civil Treasuries for military purposes during the years 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81.

8. All civil and military account officers should be enjoined to co-operate heartily in giving effect to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government for an early adjustment of the expenses of the war, and the results of the accounts, as progress is made, should be carefully noted, and thrown into the form of a comprehensive account and report, which should be submitted by your Excellency to Her Majesty's Government as soon as you are in a position to do so.

9. The account will of course include all civil and political charges connected with the war, and, bearing in mind the heavy burden likely to be imposed for pensions, it will be necessary to frame an estimate of the capitalized value thereof. It may be possible for you to send a brief abstract by telegraph, with sufficient information to furnish the means of arriving at a decision regarding the apportionment of the expenditure between the two Treasuries.

10. In the foregoing paragraphs I have not referred to the question of the causes of the error in the Estimates. You will of course lose no time in completing the investigation which you are conducting into the matter, and in reporting to me the conclusions at which you may arrive.

I have, &c.,
HARTINGTON.

No. 68.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, October 2, 1880.

Essential in view of contribution from English Treasury that we should have by middle November complete account of cost of war to latest possible date, and best estimate possible of war expenditure after such date to probable close.

Please take immediate steps for preparation of such account and estimate. Despatch sent 23rd September with instructions on the subject, but necessary to anticipate complete account by preliminary information required by us.

No. 69.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 10, 1880.

Yours dated 1st (2nd).

Including occupation of Kandahar to end of March, we estimate gross cost of war at 1,578 and frontier railways at 590 lakhs. These amounts include all sterling expenditure, converted at 1s. 8d. Deducting net war gains to railway and telegraph revenues, grand total of estimated net cost of war and frontier railways, about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, viz., 5 for railways and 12½ for war.

Despatch by next mail.

No. 70.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 22, 1880.

Yours dated 1st.

Including occupation Kandahar to end March, we estimate gross cost of war 1,578, and frontier railways 590 lakhs. These amounts include all sterling expenditure converted at 20 pence. Deducting net war gains to railway and telegraph revenues, grand total estimated net cost of war and frontier railways about 21 crores, or 17½ millions sterling, namely, 5 railways and 12½ army. Despatch next mail.

No. 71.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, October 26, 1880, No. 354
(Financial). (Received November 24, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the following telegram from No. 68. your Lordship, dated the 1st instant:—

"It is essential, in view of the proposed contribution from the English Treasury, that we should have by the middle of November a complete account of the cost of the war in Afghanistan to the latest possible date, and the best estimate possible of the war expenditure after such date to the probable close of the war. Please take immediate steps for the preparation of such an account and estimate. A despatch was sent on the 23rd of September with instructions on the subject, but it is necessary to anticipate the complete account called for in that despatch by the preliminary information required by us in November."

2. The Despatch No. 317 of the 23rd September, to which your Lordship refers, No. 67. reached us on the 16th instant, and will receive our immediate attention. We had already taken measures to hasten, by every means in our power, the completion of the accounts of the war.

3. In complying now with the request contained in your telegram we shall make the following assumptions:—

First—That, until our future permanent military frontier position is settled and occupied, all extra expenditure for the troops which continue upon a war footing, beyond our old frontier, is part of the cost of the war:

Second—That upon this basis the war expenditure may be expected to continue to the end of the current financial year:

Third—But that no expenditure within our old frontier (excepting that upon the frontier railways), incurred after the end of the current month of October, should be attributed to the war:

Fourth—That our military expenditure in the Year 1877–78 may be taken, for purposes of comparison, to be a fair measure of our normal military expenditure before the war.

4. We append an account and estimate of the cost of the war in Afghanistan, prepared upon these hypotheses, from which Her Majesty's Government will learn that we now estimate the net cost of the war, including that of the frontier railways, at about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, as follows:—

	Rs.	£
Net military expenditure proper	- 15,77,71,000	=@ 1s. 8d. 13,148,000
Frontier railways	- 5,90,03,000	4,917,000
Grand total	- 21,67,74,000	18,065,000
Deduct excess revenues from telegraphs and railways attributed to the war	- 68,00,000	567,000
Estimated net cost of the war	- 20,99,74,000	17,498,000

5. We offer the following observations upon this account and estimate:—

- (1.) Our object being to make as correct a calculation as possible of the cost of the war, we have converted all the sterling expenditure upon the war into rupees, at the rate of Re. 1=1s. 8d.
- (2.) We have included the whole civil and political expenditure beyond the frontier during the war.
- (3.) The estimated cost of the frontier railways does not include the sum of Rs. 76,98,000,=£641,500, expended, or to be expended, on the completion of the Jhilm-Rawalpindi section of the Panjab Northern State Railway; because, under the orders contained in paragraph 4 of Lord Cranbrook's Despatch No. 54, dated 19th February 1880, this amount is being recorded, in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, under the head 32, Railways.

- (4.) It will be easy for your Lordship to deduct any portion of the estimated remaining monthly cost of the war if you deem it expedient to close the account of the expenditure to be attributed to the war, upon any hypothesis other than what we have assumed.
- (5.) On the one hand, we have made no allowance for the proceeds sale of surplus stores and animals on the return of our army into its quarters within our frontier: on the other hand, (i) without detailed inquiries, which will take time, we are quite unable to frame any estimate whatever of the capital value of the pensions, in excess of the average incidence of such charges, which will result from the war; (ii) we have not specially provided for the cost of the extra British troops temporarily upon our hands, owing to their earlier despatch to India after the defeat at Maiwand; and (iii) we have estimated no further expenditure from the Home Treasury excepting upon the frontier railways. We are disposed, however, to think that a better aggregate estimate cannot now be made than the total which we have named.
6. It is impossible for us at present to say how the war expenditure will be distributed in the Finance and Revenue Accounts among the several years affected.
7. The Military Accounts, classified and audited to the end of July in India, and of August in England, contain the following record of the net expenditure on the war:—

	In India. £	In England. £	Total. £
1878-79 Fin. & Rev. Acct. No. 57	600,109	76,111	676,220
1879-80 - -	4,595,300	174,480	4,769,780
1880-81 - -	1,623,116	38,016	1,661,132
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total - -	6,818,525	288,607	7,107,132

or, if the sterling expenditure be converted into rupees at 1s. 8d., Rs. 7,16,49,000; so that, if our estimate is correct, there remains, apart from the cost of the frontier railways, net, Rs. 8,61,22,000 yet to be recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, under the head 36, *Army*. We are doing all that we can to expedite this process.

8. The distribution of the record of the cost of the frontier railways is equally uncertain. We do not expect that this record will be completed before the year 1882-83.

9. In anticipation of this despatch, we telegraphed, on the 22nd instant, the following reply to your Lordship's message:—

"Your Lordship's message dated 1st instant. Including our occupation of Kandahar to the end of March, we estimate the gross cost of the war at 1,578 lakhs, and that of the frontier railways at 590 lakhs. These amounts include all the sterling expenditure converted into rupees at 20 pence the rupee. Deducting the net war gains to the railway and telegraph revenues, the grand total estimated net cost of the war and frontier railways is about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, namely, 5 millions for the railways and 12½ millions for the Army et cetera. Despatch by next mail."

We have, &c.,

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

W. STOKES.

J. GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 71.

NET COST of the WAR in AFGHANISTAN, as now estimated.
(In Rupees, 000's omitted. No digits omitted from the sterling figures.)

I.—NET MILITARY EXPENDITURE PROPER.

Net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India to the agents of, or on account of, the Military Department, from 1st April 1878 to the 31st August 1880	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	39,81,26
Deduct—Advances by the Military Department for the Malta Expedition, recovered at the Home Treasury	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	20,89
Nágá Campaign	-	-	-	-	-	-		5,88
Preparations for military operations in Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-		7,53
Added to the balances of the Military Department	-	-	-	-	-	-		28,39
Deficiency as compared with 1877–78, in the supplies obtained by the Military Department from sources other than the Treasuries (causing a corresponding excess demand upon the Treasuries)	-	-	-	-	-	-		5,39
Excess net military expenditure due to other causes*	-	-	-	-	-	-		24,51
								92,59
								38,88,67
Corresponding net disbursements on the scale of 1877–78, namely, two years at 11,10,67=22,21,34+(first five months) 4,58,15	-	-	-	-	-	-		26,79,49
Excess net disbursements to the end of August, in India, due to the war								12,09,18
Spent in England—						£		
In 1878–79	-	-	-	-	-			76,111
In 1879–80	-	-	-	-	-			174,480
In 1880–81	-	-	-	-	-			38,016
Total	-	-	-	-	-			288,607 @ 1s. 8d.
								34,63
Estimated net military disbursements proper on account of the war, to the end of August	-	-	-	-	-	-		12,43,81
Add—Donation Batta authorised by G. O. G. G. No. 459, dated 6th April	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	60,00
Compensation to the Native Cavalry ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-		10,00
Compensation for the loss of hired camels	-	-	-	-	-	-		12,00
Subsidy to the Amír Abd-Ur-Rahmán (still to pay)	-	-	-	-	-	-		13,00
Postal war expenses (1880–81)	-	-	-	-	-	-		16,90
Telegraph ditto (1880–81 and 1881–82)	-	-	-	-	-	-		12,00
Current war expenses for seven months, @ Rs. 30,00 a month	-	-	-	-	-	-		2,10,00
								3,33,90
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	15,77,71

	1878–79.	1879–80.	1880–81.
			(First four months.)
* Thus calculated :—	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Recorded military expenditure in India	12,18,26	16,41,26	5,42,93
Deduct—Afghán war expenditure	60,01	4,59,53	1,62,31
Nágá campaign	—	3,88	2,00
Burma preparations	—	7,53	—
Total deductions	60,01	4,70,94	1,64,31
Remains for comparison with 1877–78	11,58,25	11,70,32	3,78,62
Recorded expenditure, 1877–78	11,54,85	11,54,85	3,74,11†
Excess due to causes other than war	3,40	15,47	4,51
Abstract.	Rs.		
1878–79	3,40		
1879–80	15,47		
1880–81	4,51		
Do. August 4,51÷4	1,13		
	24,51		

† Includes 3,86 for stallions transferred to the Civil Department, for which credit was originally taken in the Military Accounts, but which was written back after the Monthly Accounts were closed.

II.—FRONTIER RAILWAYS.

	Rs.	Rs.
Expenditure to the end of 1879-80—		
In India - - - - -	1,09,00	
In England, 244,475 <i>l.</i> @ 1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> - - - - -	29,33	1,38,33
Estimated remaining expenditure—		
In India (less expected recoveries) - - - - -	2,13,50	
In England, 1,985,000 <i>l.</i> @ 1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> - - - - -	2,38,20	4,51,70*
Total - - - - -	-	5,90,03

III.—GRAND TOTAL.

	Rs.	£
Net military expenditure proper - - - - -	15,77,71=@1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	13,148,000
Frontier railways - - - - -	5,90,03	4,917,000
Total - - - - -	21,67,74	18,065,000
Deduct—		
Excess revenue from railways (55,50), and telegraphs (12,50), attributed to the war - - - - -	68,00	567,000
Grand total estimated net cost of the war - - - - -	20,99,74	17,498,000

No. 72.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, November 2, 1880. (Financial.)
(Received December 1, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 354, dated 26th ultimo, and with reference to paragraph 9 of your Lordship's Despatch No. 317, dated 23rd September, we think it right to point out that the calculation of the capital cost of the pensions which will result from the war will involve considerable labour and expense, and that as it will not always be possible to trace the connection between the war and its consequences in this respect, the result must, after all, be inconclusive and unsatisfactory.

2. It must be borne in mind that the whole true cost of the war is not susceptible of precise calculation. Doubtless the bulk of the expenditure upon the war can be so classified, without doubt or difficulty, but there must always remain a large margin of expenditure concerning which it will be a matter of opinion whether it should or should not be attributed to the war.

3. Moreover, some items of public outlay cannot, under any circumstances, be so charged. For example, there can be no question that one effect of the war has been largely to increase the cost of labour, transport, and supplies in many parts of India, especially in the Punjab, and that this has caused much excess expenditure on the general administration, particularly on Public Works and on the Army in garrison. But it would be quite impracticable to calculate this excess with any sufficient accuracy for its inclusion among the war charges. On the other hand the calculation of the war gains to the Telegraph and Railway Revenues is equally problematical.

* Distributed in the Department of Public Works, with all reserve, as follows :—

	In India. Rs.	In England. £
1880-81 - - - - -	1,73,50	1,285,000
1881-82 - - - - -	80,00	700,000
1882-83 - - - - -	20,00	—
	2,73,50	1,985,000
Deduct—Expected recoveries - - - - -	60,00	—
	2,13,50	1,985,000

4. We venture, therefore, to think that it will not really be worth while to undergo the labour and incur the expense of the detailed calculations necessary for an estimate of the capitalised value of the pensions attributable to the war, and we shall be glad if Her Majesty's Government should see fit to relieve us from this duty.

We have &c.,

J. STRACHEY.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
J. GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

No. 73.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, November 4, 1880, No. 368
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN my Despatch of the 7th of June, No. 179, I drew the attention of your No. 51. Excellency to various points connected with the preparation of the estimates for the war in Afghanistan, on which I considered the explanations then before me to be unsatisfactory, and I stated that I was only awaiting the explanations which your predecessor's Government had promised me, to communicate to you the conclusions at which Her Majesty's Government might then arrive.

2. Shortly afterwards I received the Letter from the Government of the Earl of Lytton dated the 1st of June, No. 176, forwarding minutes by his Lordship and Sir No. 48. John Strachey; but I have hitherto deferred the further communication promised, under the impression that you might wish to make some reply to my Despatch of the 7th of June. As, however, I have now learned, from your telegram of the 10th of September, No. 66. that the final explanation which the Government of India have to make was contained in the letter of the 1st of June and its enclosures, I proceed to communicate to you the views which Her Majesty's Government entertain on the subject of this correspondence.

3. From the Minute of Sir John Strachey I learn that the estimates of the war Encl. 1 expenditure in the year 1880-81 were framed on a calculation based on the amounts No. 48. actually brought to account and audited at the time when the estimates were prepared; that the Government were thus misled, both as to the expenditure already incurred, and as to that which was likely to occur in the coming year; that, notwithstanding the doubts freely expressed on various occasions in public criticisms, no mistrust was felt of the military estimates; and that the Financial Department never tested their accuracy by reference to the issues of cash from the civil treasuries to the military disbursing officers.

4. Sir John Strachey sums up his explanation in the concluding paragraphs of his Minute as follows:—

“The error in the estimate is, in my judgment, mainly due, not to any misapprehension as to the extent or character of the military operations, but to the fact that we were ignorant of the actual current cost of the war. I attribute this ignorance mainly to the defect which I have described in the military accounts, which although themselves perfectly correct, failed to give to the Government timely information of the expenditure which was really going on. In this respect the whole history furnishes a fresh illustration of the fact that, in regard to such matter as keeping accounts and framing estimates, it is never safe to assume that the care and intelligence of individuals will afford sufficient safeguards against the dangers of a defective system.

“I admit that if, instead of depending, according to custom, on the accounts alone, the Government of India had itself watched the current cost of the war, it might have, to a great extent, avoided the error into which it has fallen. But I place the defect in the system of the military accounts in the forefront, because, but for that defect, no oversight, omission, or negligence by departments or individual officers, whether in the Secretariat or in the Account offices, could have prevented the earliest possible knowledge of the facts, and because such knowledge would itself have neutralized all individual and minor failures.”

5. It is thus admitted by Sir John Strachey that if the Government of India “had itself watched the current cost of the war,” it might have, to a great extent, avoided the errors into which it has fallen. I am compelled, therefore, in estimating their

responsibility for these errors, to inquire what were the means at their command for obtaining the requisite information.

6. In considering this question, I must remark that, whatever defects may exist in the system of military accounts, there was nothing, as Sir John Strachey himself observes, "to prevent the Government of India in the Military and Financial Departments from being acquainted, soon after the end of each month, with the actual amounts disbursed to the Military Department from all the treasuries all over India."

7. It is admitted that no recourse was had to this obvious check, viz., the comparison of the issues of cash with audited expenditure, nor can I discover any other trace of the careful examination and deliberation with which, it is stated in the Government Despatch of the 4th May, the estimates were prepared and accepted in the Military Department.

8. The Memorandum of the Military Accountant General, transmitted with that Despatch, gave an account of the procedure adopted, and there is nothing whatever in the information before me to show what were the measures taken for verifying its sufficiency or for inquiring as to the current expenditure of the war.

9. In a war, the scale and duration of which is uncertain, and of which the circumstances may vary from day to day, it is obviously impossible to frame any accurate estimate for a period far in advance, but there were two elements in such a calculation which it was both possible and necessary to take into account, viz., the actual war expenditure of the past, so far as means existed for ascertaining it, and the duration of the war in the future, so far as it was possible to foresee it.

10. Neither of these elements of opinion appears to have received consideration.

11. As I have already observed, no attempt was made to compare the actual disbursements with the audited expenditure, and, with a full knowledge that there was little hope of a termination of the campaign before the end of the autumn, an estimate was sanctioned which was avowedly framed on the assumption that it would be brought to a close at the same time as in the preceding year, viz., at the end of the spring.

12. The failure in the estimates, therefore, is in no way due to causes which might not have been known or foreseen, but to the fact that they rested on no solid foundation either of actual experience or of reasonable opinion. Nor was the error under review an error merely in an estimate of future expenditure.

13. It is not denied that both the Financial and Military Departments were altogether ignorant of the scale of expenditure in progress at the time when the estimate was framed, and which had been going on for several previous months.

14. From Lord Lytton's Minute of 26th May, I learn that the Government of India had striven to render the war expenditure, and believed it to be, both "reasonable and economical."

15. I am unable to perceive how the smallest results can be expected from the efforts of a Government to secure reasonable economy in expenditure, when neither its Financial nor Military Departments possess any accurate or even approximate information as to the scale of that expenditure, as it is difficult to see how, in such circumstances, any intelligent or effectual control can be exercised.

16. I cannot, therefore, refrain from expressing my surprise that the responsible members of the Government of India should have accepted the military estimates thus placed before them. As pointed out in my Despatch of the 7th June, the estimating officers took no account of the increase of force, of the greater extent of the operations, and of the probability of their being longer protracted than in the previous year; but no inquiries were made by the Government regarding the principle on which the estimate was prepared, nor any steps taken to ascertain whether allowance had been made for facts which could not have been known when the estimate was first framed, and of which the framers of the estimates might have still been ignorant.

17. Yet, although no such examination had been made, the language publicly used regarding the estimates was calculated to convey the idea that all that was possible had been done to ascertain their accuracy. It was stated by Sir John Strachey that they had "been prepared with much care," and that there was "no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low;" and the Governor General said that, "so far as

it has hitherto been possible to verify them," the estimates have proved to be remarkably accurate.

18. Lord Lytton has now vacated the office of Viceroy, and the Military and Financial Members have resigned; and it is, therefore, unnecessary to enlarge on their responsibility for statements by which Her Majesty's Government were seriously misled, not merely as to the amount of the military expenditure, but also as to the care and attention which the estimates had received before sanction, by language which could not fail to have the effect of allaying any suspicion of error. But it is with great regret that I feel it to be my duty to place on record the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Government of India must be held to have failed in taking measures of ordinary precaution, at a time when unusual vigilance was peculiarly required; to have neglected the means at their command for obtaining the materials of trustworthy estimates of the cost of great operations which were being conducted under their orders; and to have given public expression to their confidence in those estimates for which in such circumstances there was no justification.

19. It is not my wish, even if I had the means of doing so, to attempt to decide as to the degree of blame attaching to the officers of your Government in these transactions. I can only observe that the explanations which I have received convey a general impression of inefficiency in the Financial Department as well as in the Department of Military Accounts. In a Despatch of the Government of India, of the 1st June, I was informed that an inquiry was in progress which would enable them to decide how far the errors under review were the result of defects of system, and what responsibility attaches to individual officers by whom the system has been administered. I have also deemed it to be my duty to appoint a Committee in this country to inquire, with reference to the recent error, into the system of military account and estimate in India, and as to the relations existing between the Military Account Department and the Comptroller-General, and to report whether any defects exist therein, and, if so, the best mode of remedying them. No. 48.

20. I hope that I may be shortly furnished with the result of these inquiries, which I consider essential in the interests of good government, and also in justice to the several officers concerned, on some of whom an undue share of blame may otherwise devolve.

I have, &c.,

HARTINGTON.

No. 74.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, November 11, 1880.

Your Telegram of 22nd October. I understand your estimate of war expenditure, exclusive of railways, down to 31st March 1881 to be 12½ millions. Does promised despatch state total disbursements on military account from civil treasuries from beginning of war to 30th September 1880, and basis of estimated war expenditure to 31st March next, and if any remaining liabilities beyond that date? No. 70.

No. 75.

TELEGRAM from the PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, Simla, November 12, 1880.

Despatch of 26th October explains fully basis of war estimates. Please await.

No. 71.

No. 76.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, November 20, 1880.

Your Financial 354 Appendix. Doubt correctness of comparison with net disbursements at 11,10,67 in 1877-78. If made with audited expenditure at 11,54,85 in 1877-78 and deficiency in other supplies 539 omitted, result gives 14,92,13 to August, or 15,21,17 if audited September is added, estimating in each case 30 monthly to end of year. Or taking net disbursements for three years estimated at 49,49,03, and deducting advances, except deficiency in other supplies, there is excess over net Encl. in No. 71.

audited expenditure on scale of 77-78 of 13,97,28. Adding English expenditure, batta compensation, subsidy, post and telegraph, result is 15,55,81. Have you ascertained from frontier treasuries and military chests all claims advised but outstanding?

No. 77.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, November 22, 1880.

Yours 20th. We prefer our own method and deprecate reduction of our war estimate. Treasuries know nothing about outstanding claims, which are probably moderate.

No. 78.

LETTER to the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, dated India Office,
November 24, 1880.

SIR,

WITH reference to the intention expressed by Her Majesty's Government in Parliament to propose that a contribution should be made from Imperial Revenues towards the expenses of the Afghan war, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a Letter* which has been received from the Government of India, enclosing an estimate of the total expenses in connection with that war.

It is explained that the estimate is framed on the basis of including all probable extra expenditure for troops beyond the former frontier line to the 31st of March 1881 (estimated at 30 lakhs a month from September 1880 to March 1881 inclusive), and all civil and political expenditure beyond the frontier during the war, but no expenditure within the frontier, except on the railways, after the 31st October last.

On this hypothesis it is estimated that the net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries to the Military Department will, after allowing for abnormal expenditure not connected with the Afghan war, and after the inclusion of expenditure in England and of certain other expenses which are specified, amount to Rs. 15,77,71,000, or (at the exchange of 1s. 8d. the rupee) 13,148,000*l.* in excess of the military expenditure of 1877-78, which is taken as the normal military expenditure before the war.

The outlay on the frontier railways, after deducting the cost of completing the line from Jhiam to Rawalpindi, which would probably have been undertaken irrespectively of the war, is estimated at Rs. 5,90,03,000 or 4,917,000*l.*

From the aggregate of these sums is deducted Rs. 68,00,000 or 567,000*l.*, estimated to be the revenue derived from telegraphs and railways in consequence of the military operations; and the result is to show a total estimate of Rs. 20,99,74,000 or 17,498,000*l.* as the net cost of the war.

It would seem that, while the Government of India may, perhaps, be able, in the spring, to show a larger portion of the expenditure as audited and a smaller portion as estimated, it is not probable that any very different figures can be given as the aggregate expenditure until the whole outstanding amount has been finally audited.

In these circumstances I am directed to say that, for the purpose of distributing the expenses between the two Governments, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared, on his part, to accept the statement now forwarded as representing the whole cost of the late war, any further charges being treated as ordinary Indian expenditure, and I am to inquire whether the papers now forwarded are sufficient for the purposes of their Lordships, as, if further information is needed, it will be necessary to give instructions to the Government of India without delay to procure it.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 79.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, December 9, 1880, No. 410
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council your Excellency's Letters, dated the 26th of October and 2nd of November, Nos. 354 and 363, regarding the estimate of Nos. 71 expenditure incurred and likely to be incurred to the 31st of March 1881 in connection with the war in Afghanistan. 72.

2. As I did not feel sure that the basis of comparison with the net disbursements from Civil Treasuries to the Military Department in 1877-78 afforded so accurate a measure of the true war charges as would a comparison with the actual audited military charges of that year, I addressed to your Excellency a telegram on the 20th ultimo, in No. 76. which I also inquired whether allowance had been made for claims still outstanding, but of which advice had been sent to the frontier treasuries and military chests by the officers incurring the liability.

3. Learning from your Excellency's telegraphic reply of the 22nd ultimo that you No. 77. deprecated any reduction of your estimate, and that there was no information at the treasuries about any outstanding claims, I caused your Letter of the 26th of October, with the accompanying estimate, to be sent to the Treasury in a letter dated the 24th of November, of which I enclose a copy for your information. No. 78.

4. Your Excellency will observe that, in view of the necessity for placing before Her Majesty's Government at once an estimate on which it would be possible for them to act, in deciding the proportion of the cost which they propose to Parliament to defray from Imperial revenues, I have determined that, unless further information is required by the Treasury, the estimate which you have transmitted shall be taken as representing, for the purpose of that decision, the whole cost of the late war, any further charges being treated as ordinary Indian expenditure. It will, therefore, be unnecessary that you should attempt to frame an estimate of the capitalised value of the pensions.

I have, &c.,
HARTINGTON.

No. 80.

LETTER from the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY to the SECRETARY OF
THE INDIA OFFICE, dated Treasury Chambers, December 31, 1880.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 24th ultimo, covering a Despatch from the Government of India, giving an estimate of the total expense of the Afghan war. I am to say that there are some points on which my Lords would be glad if the Secretary of State in Council could supply further information, with the view of facilitating the main question of the contribution to be made by this country towards the cost of the war. No. 78.

1. It is assumed, in paragraph 2 of your Letter, and under No. 3 of paragraph 3 of the Despatch of the Government of India, that no expenditure within the old frontier incurred after 31st October last—except upon the railways—is included in the account. I am to ask whether my Lords are to understand that, from that date, your establishment within the frontier is a normal one.

2. In paragraph 5 (5) of the Despatch, allusion is made to the proceeds of sale of surplus stores and animals hereafter; but it is not stated whether on the whole the stock of stores has been unduly swollen or unduly depleted by the war; if the former, the real cost of the war has been overstated, if the latter, understated. Is there any information on the subject in the possession of your Department?

3. My Lords observe that the net cash issues from Civil Treasuries to the 31st of August have been taken as the basis of the estimate. But it is not said whether on that date large or abnormal balances existed in field chests, or in the hands of Military

Disbursing Officers. If there were, the excess should be applied in diminution of the estimate of issues in the period 1st November 1880—31st March 1881, which is taken at Rs. 3,00,000 a month.

I have, &c.,
F. CAVENDISH.

No. 81.

LETTER to the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, dated India Office,
January 4, 1881.

MY LORD,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, No. 20143/80, regarding the estimate of the total expense of the Afghan war, and, in reply, to make the following observations.

With reference to the inquiry whether the military establishment within the frontier of India has, from the 31st of October last, been a normal one, I am to point out that, immediately after the close of the war, and while the political condition of Afghanistan remains as unsettled as at present, it is impossible that the military establishment to be eventually kept up within the frontier of India can be determined, and that, in the fifth clause of the fifth paragraph of the letter from the Government of India, dated the 26th of October 1880, a temporary excess of strength was mentioned. Measures are, however, in progress for reducing the military force to the point at which it is for the present considered necessary to maintain it.

With regard to the inquiry whether the stock of stores has been unduly swollen or depleted, the only information sent to the Secretary of State is contained in the 27th

• See Command Paper 2560, page 13. paragraph of Sir John Strachey's Financial Statement,* in which it was mentioned that the waste

of stores and camp equipage could not be then determined, but that the reserves in the arsenals were being maintained at their proper standard.

It is, however, evident that the Government of India consider that it will be not unfair to set off the proceeds of the sale of surplus stores and animals against the temporary excess in the Military establishment, and the cost that will have to be borne by that Government on account of pensions arising from the war.

On the question whether the military balances on the 31st of August 1880 were large or abnormal, I am directed to state that they had been reduced from 1,009,600l. on the 1st of April 1880 to 432,900l. on the 1st of September; and that the estimate of expenditure contained in the enclosure to the above-mentioned letter from India was apparently based on the supposition that the disbursements in the last seven months of the year 1880–81 would amount to the sum therein mentioned *in addition* to the excess of the departmental balances above the amount of 149,000l. at which they stood on the 31st of March 1878, and to which it was assumed, for the purpose of the estimate, that they would be reduced by the 31st of March 1881.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE


RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING

THE RECOGNITION OF SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN AS AMIR OF KABUL.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

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No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd January 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING from Stewart, 1st. Begins :—Effect of Kabul disturbances begins to be felt here. Another Ghazee yesterday. Seditious meetings in mosques last two nights. Sirdar alarmed, and has twice asked permission to send his family to India. Please remember I have nothing to offer him but vague assurances, and cannot even promise our friend that we do not intend to abandon Kandahar again. Ends.

I consider it is now necessary to give Sirdar confidential but precise assurance, that if he behave well, Kandahar will be placed under his hereditary government, supported by us, in order to secure him to our interest, and detach him permanently from other influence, which may increase through his uncertainty of our intentions.

No. 2.

No. 2 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

IN our letter, No. 160, of the 7th July last, we reviewed the course of events which preceded the signature of the treaty concluded at Gandamak with the Amir Yakub Khan. We explained the objects and reasons of this treaty, and stated the grounds upon which we considered ourselves justified in regarding it as an advantageous resettlement of our relations with Afghanistan. We drew attention, at the same time, to contingencies which might affect the character and permanence of the relations thus established; observing that the practical value of the treaty mainly depended upon the conduct or disposition of the Amir himself; that a settlement effected under the most favourable conditions, and with the most promising prospects, might be impaired by the disloyalty of Afghan princes; and that, for these reasons, we had been careful to render our position substantially independent of the caprices of any Afghan ruler, by securing permanent command of the main avenues from India into Afghanistan. But we thought, and still think, that the arrangements entered into with Yakub Khan at Gandamak were the best that could then be made; we believe that, at the time, the treaty was regarded by the Amir, and his best advisers, as a satisfactory conclusion of hostilities; and, even if an advance on Kabul had, in these circumstances, been justifiable, the serious inexpediency of it has, we think, been sufficiently proved by the political disorganization which has ensued from the unsought, and unavoidable, renewal of hostilities.

2. On the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir returned to Kabul, accompanied by his Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, his Commander-in-Chief, General Daud Shah, and a Native Agent in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, named Bakhtiar Khan, who was entrusted with the duty of making preparations for the reception of the British Mission. As already reported to your Lordship, the Amir had at no time evinced reluctance to the subordination of his foreign relations to British control, as a necessary condition of British protection. This claim, with the subsidiary one requiring him to admit British officers to reside at certain places, not specified, within his territories, the Amir had accepted unhesitatingly. When these two conditions were proposed to His Highness in reply to his overtures for the cessation of hostilities, and for the renewal of friendship, he characterized the former as "a good and proper" proposal, in conformity with friendship," leaving "no room for discussion or refusal."

To the second condition the Amir added only the qualification that the British officer should reside at Kabul, under his immediate protection; and during subsequent negotiations the Amir's language certainly conveyed the impression that he admitted the presence of a British Envoy at his capital to be, on the whole, the best means of giving practical effect and recognition to the alliance between the two Governments. It had not been our intention to propose Kabul for the residence of our representative; but, when the capital was thus expressly selected by the Amir himself, there were many motives for deferring to the choice of His Highness, and there was no tenable ground for opposing it. If the Amir felt reluctance to the establishment of a British Embassy at Kabul, he certainly exhibited no sign of it, he raised no difficulties, he suggested no impediments, and while strenuously combating some clauses of the treaty he expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to receive the Envoy, nor any mistrust of his power to protect him.

3. In these circumstances, we deemed it desirable that the British Resident should proceed without delay to take up his appointment at Kabul. Assuming the Amir to be dealing with us in good faith, the advantage to both parties of early action under the treaty was incontestable, while hesitation or inactivity appeared likely to operate adversely not only to our own interests, but to those of the Amir. This view of the situation was strengthened by reports received from Bakhtiar Khan, whose letters warned Sir L. Cavagnari that the party opposed to the British alliance were making open endeavours to neutralize the effect of our recent successes, and to render the Amir averse to a liberal treatment of those persons in whose interests the amnesty clause had been framed, and in whose protection the honour of the British Government was specially concerned. The Amir himself had expressed to Bakhtiar Khan his desire for an early meeting with Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the impression produced by these letters and messages was that the mission should be organized as speedily as possible, and that it should proceed to Kabul without loss of time. This was undoubtedly the view of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was at the time at Simla, and whose opinion on such a point necessarily carried great weight.

4. The constitution of the Envoy's staff, and of his escort, was carefully considered with Sir Louis Cavagnari at Simla. A strong military escort had been attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission; but the duties which this escort was intended to perform, and the contingencies against which it was meant to provide, were of a wholly different character. Sir Neville Chamberlain, carrying with him valuable gifts for Sher Ali, was about to enter the country of predatory and probably hostile tribes, while the disposition of the Kabul Government toward his mission was very uncertain. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on the other hand, entered Afghan territory under the safe conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, who had recently been a guest in our own camp. Moreover, the strength of Sir Neville Chamberlain's escort, although, for the reasons above mentioned, it was in our opinion absolutely requisite, had furnished the late Amir with a pretext for attributing an unfriendly purpose to the mission which that escort accompanied. It had also been criticised by others, on the ground that, whilst too great for an escort, it was too small for an army, and calculated to provoke an opposition which no mere escort could overcome. Such criticism, though inapplicable to the conditions of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission, would have been relevant to those which the Government of India had to consider in connection with the Embassy of Sir Louis Cavagnari. If our original plan of placing British officers at some points in Afghanistan, other than the capital, had not been overruled by the Amir's express stipulation regarding Kabul, it might have been expedient to attach to the Envoy a force that would have rendered him independent of the Afghan Government for protection against sudden attacks of local outbreaks. But Sir L. Cavagnari went, at the special desire of the Amir, to reside at the capital of the Amir's country, within the Amir's own stronghold, and in the closest proximity to the Amir's own residence. It was well known that the Bala Hissar was always occupied by the household troops upon whom the actual ruler believed he could best rely; and it was recollected that, at previous periods of extreme anarchy and revolt, the fort had afforded a secure refuge to those officers who succeeded in reaching it. To have required the Amir to entertain within the Bala Hissar a British escort sufficient for ensuring the safety of the Envoy in all eventualities, or to have demanded that these troops should be allowed to occupy an entrenched position within the Amir's own fortifications, would have been inconsistent with the whole character of the relations which Sir Louis Cavagnari's embassy represented; and compliance with such a demand would have relieved the Amir from the greater part of the responsibility

which his treaty guarantees had solemnly affirmed. It is probable, indeed, that a force of this strength and character would not have been admitted within the fortress; while the objections against placing our Embassy, thus guarded, upon the confines of the city, would have been found to be very serious. All experience shows that in such situations the risk of collisions and misunderstandings is multiplied in proportion to the number of British soldiers and camp followers that are brought into contact with an armed and excitable population. The dangers to which Sir L. Cavagnari considered himself and those who accompanied him most liable were those of assassination by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort and those of the Amir; and he was therefore personally desirous that his staff and escort should be reduced to the most moderate and manageable dimensions. In accordance with these considerations, the Envoy's suit was restricted to a Secretary (Mr. Jenkyns), a Medical Officer (Dr. Kelly), and a Military Attaché (Lieutenant Hamilton) in charge of a carefully picked escort of 25 cavalry and 50 infantry of the Guide Corps.

5. Sir Louis started for Kabul from the British frontier at Thull on the 14th July, and entered that capital on the 24th of the same month. He was received beyond the Shutargardan pass by the Amir's Ministers and troops, treated with distinguished attention along the route, and conducted to the Court of His Highness with every possible demonstration of honour and respect, as a welcome guest. The unfortunate death of Bakhtiar Khan, who died suddenly, just before the arrival of the Envoy, had closed a valuable channel of information regarding intrigues or movements below the surface. So far, however, as the disposition of the Amir and his chief officers could be judged from their public acts, such as, for instance, their dismissal of the Russian Envoy, and their compliance with various minor requests and suggestions, it betrayed no tendency towards reaction against the British alliance. The letters and telegrams of the Envoy mentioned the disorderly and mutinous behaviour of some regiments recently arrived at Kabul from Herat, but expressed confidence in the Amir's determination and ability to remove or overcome any danger arising from the disaffection of the soldiery. There had been a dispute in the bazaar between some men of the British escort and some of these troops from Herat, but this had been settled to the satisfaction of Sir Louis Cavagnari; the regiments from Herat were being paid off and dismissed to their homes, and the uneasiness caused by their presence and conduct at the capital appeared, from later news, to be passing away. The principal difficulties anticipated by our Envoy arose from the opposition of Sirdar Yahia Khan, the Amir's father-in-law, who had great influence with the Amir, and from the general discontent created throughout the country by the maladministration and oppression of the late Kabul Government, from which all classes hoped to obtain relief through the agency of the British representative. As regards the second article of the Gandamak Treaty, which engaged the Amir to publish a full and complete amnesty, Sir Louis more than once mentioned in his correspondence that the persons it concerned had not been dealt with in a liberal spirit, and that the Amir showed no disposition to treat them with generosity. He added, however, that there had been no actual infringement of the article; that the persons protected by it had been molested neither in person nor in property; and that His Highness had "done nothing and will do nothing" opposed to the letter of the treaty. His last letter (30th August) concluded with the words, "I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." Sir Louis Cavagnari always described the personal relations between himself and the Amir as satisfactory. The Amir had suggested that his proposed visit to the Viceroy should take place in the end of December, and had commenced some preparations for carrying it out. His Highness had given orders to tradesmen for the equipment of his retinue, and many of the later communications from Sir Louis Cavagnari referred to the details of the forthcoming visit. The last personal telegram addressed by Sir Louis to the Viceroy was on this subject. That telegram was dated the 2nd September, and it concluded with the words "all well."

6. On the 3rd of September the British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three regiments, called the Ordal regiments, who had come to the Pay Office in the Bala Hissar to receive arrears of pay. These regiments, it is understood, were the Amir's household troops, composed of men picked from the whole army, and principally, it is said, recruited from the Wardak tribe. They were quartered in the Chaman, under the walls of the fort, and on that day had furnished several of the guards in the Bala Hissar. Two of these three regiments broke out into violent mutiny at the Pay Office

on finding that they were not to be paid up in full; and suddenly turned upon the Residency. The mutineers appear to have been joined by men from other regiments and by some of the city populace; they besieged the Residency from all sides in great numbers, the building was set on fire, and its defenders perished after a desperate resistance. The Government of India must lastingly deplore the untimely and irreparable loss of Sir Louis Cavagnari; who, by his life and death, has bequeathed to the service he adorned a splendid example, and to the Empire for whose interests he lived and died the grateful guardianship of his honoured memory and spotless name.

7. The first intelligence of this catastrophe was received on the morning of the 5th of September last; and on the afternoon of the following day General Roberts left Simla under instructions to lose no time in advancing upon Kabul with a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 men. General Massy was instructed to re-occupy the Shutargardan, and General Stewart to re-occupy Kandahar; whilst a force of the same strength was detailed for the re-occupation of Jellalabad, with an efficient reserve of 5,000 men between Rawal Pindi and Peshawur. We need not here recapitulate the results of these measures, which have been reported to your Lordship, as they occurred, in our preceding Political letters. Their practical consequence has been the occupation of Kabul and the re-occupation of Kandahar and Jellalabad, the voluntary abdication of the Amir Yakub Khan and his deportation at his own request to India, and the complete dissolution of the Afghan Government. These events have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and materially altered the situation to which that Treaty had reference.

8. In our accompanying Letter, No. 3, we shall state, and explain, the general principles on which, subject to the approval of them by Her Majesty's Government, we now contemplate the resettlement of our relations with the Afghan people, whenever adequate guarantees for the stability of such a resettlement shall have been thoroughly secured by the successful completion of our present military operations.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 3.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

1. IN our letter, No. 2, of this day's date, we have reviewed the series of events which, terminating in the occupation of Kabul and the dissolution of Yakub Khan's Government, have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and totally altered the political situation to which that treaty was applied. It now devolves on us to indicate, so far as it is at present possible to do so, the general lines of the policy which, under these altered circumstances, we propose to adopt in pursuance of the object we have kept constantly before us, viz., the safety of the Indian Empire and the permanent tranquillity of our northern frontier.

2. Before proceeding, however, to the consideration of a future Afghan policy, we desire to express our strong conviction that no purely political action is desirable, or can be effective, until all military resistance has been effectually overcome, and the pacification of the country fully completed. We also feel that, owing to the unsettled

character of events now passing in Afghanistan, and our still imperfect knowledge of the changing influences by which, from day to day, they are forcibly affected, any present indication of future policy must necessarily be somewhat conditional and indefinite. In short, we can deal only with the general principles of arrangements, subject, in detail, to such modification as may hereafter be dictated by increased knowledge and experience.

3. The Treaty of Gandamak represented a final endeavour to bring into effect the policy of maintaining on our frontier a strong and independent kingdom with a foreign policy exclusively subordinate to British direction, a national unity relying upon the British Government for support against external aggression, and a commercial system connected with India by a natural community of interests. It had been in the hope of consolidating such an alliance that the British Government aided the Amir Sher Ali with money and arms, and enabled him, by his countenance and diplomatic support, to bring under his sovereignty a larger territory than had ever before been united under the rule of the Barakzais. But Shere Ali's estrangement from our Government increased in proportion to his power, until finally, at a critical moment, he leagued himself with a foreign Power which openly courted his friendship, in furtherance of projects and preparations directed against the Government of India.

4. After the discomfiture and death of Sher Ali, his son made overtures for the restoration of peace and friendship between the two Governments; and, believing, as we still do, that Sher Ali's estrangement arose partially from misunderstandings and other causes, to some extent at least preventible, we did not then abandon the hope that arrangements requisite for the permanent security of the Indian Empire might be reconciled with the maintenance of an independent and united Afghan kingdom under a friendly ruler. The result has disappointed this hope. The Amir Yakub Khan has failed altogether to maintain order even in his own capital, or to prevent the treacherous massacre of the British Embassy. The kingdom, laboriously recovered by Sher Ali, has fallen to pieces at the first blow; and it would now be a difficult if not impracticable task, even were it politically desirable, to reunite these fragments under any single ruler.

5. It must not be forgotten that the absorption of the Afghan principalities into one kingdom under Dost Muhammad, and again, after an interval, under Sher Ali, represented only a temporary, and to some degree an accidental, phase of their recent political history. In 1818, the Suddozai monarchy, after much internal dissension, was completely dismembered; and all its territories, except Herat, passed into the hands of different members of the Barakzai family. Dost Muhammad succeeded, after many vicissitudes, in obtaining possession of all the provinces which have since been recognized as belonging to Afghanistan. But he only established his permanent supremacy over Afghan Turkestan in 1850; Kandahar remained separate till 1856; and Herat did not surrender to him until just before he died in 1863. Immediately after Dost Muhammad's death, the ill-compacted and discordant kingdom was plunged into civil war, during the course of which Kabul and Herat became the head-quarters of rival Chiefs, until, after five years of anarchy, the Amir Sher Ali obtained the predominance which, partly through British countenance and support, he consolidated into a well defined kingdom. That kingdom, which it took Dost Muhammad a lifetime, and Sher Ali five years, to rebuild, has been again dissolved. Its provinces are left disconnected and masterless, and any attempt on our part to reconstitute them under one Government would commit us to a course of military and political interference which would certainly entangle us in great and protracted difficulties, and would end, as we believe, in failure.

6. We are of opinion, therefore, that the question of the resuscitation of the fallen kingdom of the Barakzais cannot now be entertained, and that we must accept the separation of its constituent provinces as our basis for the political reconstitution of Afghanistan. But, while the political conditions of the problem we have to deal with are thus altered, the military position, and the objects towards which our military and political action is directed, remain unchanged. It is our desire to avoid territorial annexation and the further extension of our administrative responsibilities. While maintaining a dominant influence over those provinces which form the outworks of our Indian Empire, we still desire to minimize our interference in their internal affairs; and it is still our wish to hold only such military positions as will enable us to maintain

that influence, by commanding the highways which cross our frontier. It has been to us a source of satisfaction to observe how fully the operations of the past autumn have justified the selection of the military positions secured under the Gandamak Treaty. When, in September last, a rapid march on Kabul became suddenly necessary, our forces already held open the two main lines of advance; our communications with India were established without difficulty, and our advanced position at Ali Khel gave us short and speedy access to the capital. Until all resistance has been overcome, and the situation has further developed, it is impossible to say precisely what military positions it may be necessary to hold permanently. But the unanimous opinion of the officers now holding high command in Afghanistan is that the military frontier should not be very materially extended beyond the line taken up under the treaty of last year, and to this line we propose to adhere as closely as circumstances permit.

7. In dealing with a disunited Afghanistan, the more difficult problems are presented by the remoter provinces. The value of Herat to India has been long recognized; and hitherto the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to keep it in the hands of an independent Afghan State whose interests on that frontier of Afghanistan were considered to be identical with our own. But the circumstances which dictated that policy have now entirely changed; the Afghan States which we maintained in possession of Herat have ceased to exist; and it has become necessary to make, without delay, upon a different basis, some fresh dispositions for the conservation of our interests in this important fortress and province. It is obvious, however, that the distance of Herat from India places it beyond the ordinary range of our military operations, and would, therefore, render difficult the exercise of direct political control. The annexation of Herat to Kabul or Kandahar would neither be popular at Herat, nor provide for the political security of a province peculiarly exposed to the intrigues and cupidity of powerful neighbours; while, as a separate State, Herat would be too weak to stand by itself, and might thus be compelled, in default of control from India (which, as we have already said, would be difficult), to look elsewhere for protection and support. For these reasons we concur in the decision which, as we understand, has already commended itself to Her Majesty's Government on grounds of Imperial policy, whereby Persia will be provisionally permitted to occupy Herat, under sufficient guarantees for her good administration of it, and for her adequate protection of British and Indian interests at that point, and with a special reservation of our right to occupy the place with British forces in certain eventualities.

8. While the terms of this understanding with Persia will, we feel certain, receive from Her Majesty's Government an attention proportionate to the magnitude of the question it raises, and the interests it involves, we are more immediately concerned with those conditions which directly affect our dealings with the rest of Afghanistan. Of these, one of the most important is the future boundary to be assigned to Herat; and this is a point so intimately connected with the territorial and political re-arrangement of the rest of Afghanistan that, if any room is left for misunderstanding or dispute as to the extent of the territory to be assigned to Persia, much confusion and embarrassment may ensue. We are not yet in a position to demarcate this boundary, but we conceive that the question is one that should be decided mainly and specially on considerations of Indian interests and policy; and we are of opinion that Farrah certainly, and possibly Lash Jowain also, should be excluded from the territories placed under Persian control. We are now actively engaged in pushing forward a railway towards Kandahar; and, believing, as we do, that the opening of such communication affords the surest guarantee not only for the peaceful development of the countries traversed, but for the permanent security of our frontier, we consider that Persia should be bound to contribute substantially towards the ultimate extension of this line to Herat. It will be apparent to Her Majesty's Government that such an extension of our Kandahar Railway will be a most effective means of ensuring the stability of any political arrangement with Persia regarding Herat, and will materially strengthen Persia in fulfilling her engagements.

9. The question of Seistan is nearly connected with that of Herat. The conditions which justified our intervention and arbitration in 1872 no longer apply; and if it is decided to make over Herat to Persia, we are prepared to recommend a revision of the Seistan boundary also in favour of Persia. This, however, is likewise a question on which we are not yet in a position to express a decided opinion; though we trust that the decision of it will be practically left to this Government when the general delimitation of the provinces of Afghanistan is considered.

10. Assuming that Herat, and possibly a part of Seistan, will be bestowed conditionally upon Persia, and reserving for separate examination the questions that may arise as to the status of certain semi-independent tribes, we would propose to subordinate the remainder of Afghanistan, directly or indirectly, to distinct Native Governments at Kabul and Kandahar. There can, we conceive, be no doubt of the expediency of separating Kandahar from Kabul. The Duranis of South Afghanistan, who form the predominant class, have no leanings towards the Kabul Government, which has always represented, to the mass of the Kandahar people, an alien and oppressive rule. We propose, therefore, to establish the province of Kandahar as an independent and separate State, under an hereditary ruler selected from the representative of the old ruling families. Having regard to the advance of Persia to Herat, and the responsibilities devolving on us, in relation to that province, as well as to the maintenance of our due influence in Western Afghanistan, we consider that it will be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near Kandahar. But we contemplate no interference in the internal administration of the province. The ultimate boundaries of the province, and the precise terms of the treaty or agreement under which it is made over to the Native ruler, are questions on which we are not yet in a position to place our views before Her Majesty's Government; but they will receive our earliest attention when the broader questions of policy have been decided.

11. The districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram were assigned to us by the Amir Yakub Khan, under the Treaty of Gundamak, and are now being administered by our officers. We have had under consideration the question of restoring Pishin to Kandahar under its new constitution, and of transferring Sibi to the Khan of Khelat, in recognition of his loyal services during the late and present military operations. It appears to us, however, that there are objections to placing under a Native ruler populations that have once been under our own administration. Furthermore, Sibi and Pishin are both on the line of the proposed Sind-Kandahar Railway, which will run for a considerable part of its course through these districts; and, while the fact of its running through territory administered by us will undoubtedly facilitate the construction and working of this line, it seems also right and desirable that we should reap such profit and advantage as accrues from the development of the districts traversed by a railway constructed at our cost. There are also political advantages in interposing a belt of territory under British administration between the Afghan and Biluch provinces. For these and other reasons, therefore, we do not recommend any present change in the status of the assigned districts.

12. Of the future of Kabul it is difficult to speak at this moment, when military operations are still in progress around its capital. We are decidedly of opinion that this province must remain under military occupation until all resistance has ceased, and until its turbulent population has been thoroughly convinced of our military power, and of the futility of contesting it. Until this has been effected, any attempt at a political settlement would be delusive and dangerous. General Roberts has, however, already, by his large captures of guns, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds, done much to weaken that military power which the Amir Sher Ali had so carefully fostered; and we trust that it will be thoroughly broken by the result of the present operations. When this task has been fully accomplished, and not till then, it will be possible to undertake the political settlement of the country. In this part of the country the disorganization is more complete, and the elements of disorder are stronger and more intractable than elsewhere; and it is impossible at present to forecast with any precision the period within which our occupation of the capital and our direct authority over the surrounding districts are likely to be withdrawn. Our aim, however, is to minimize that occupation and control, and ultimately to make over the internal administration to a Native ruler in subordinate alliance with ourselves, supported and controlled by a strong British cantonment established at some suitable point. Where, however, that cantonment should be, and what should be our permanent line of communication with Kabul, we are not yet in a position to state. The determination of such questions requires more accurate knowledge than we yet possess of the country generally, and a more detailed examination than has yet been made of the several routes and their capabilities for roads or railways.

13. We are unable at present to make distinct proposals regarding the Oxus provinces of Afghanistan. Our information about the events and state of feeling in that country is at present most scanty; it is divided from Kabul by a strong natural boundary, and our interests, whether strategical or political, in these districts are.

comparatively, of minor and less pressing importance. So long, therefore, as Russia observes the engagements which place all Afghan-Turkestan beyond the sphere of her political action, we should deprecate interference with these provinces, which might remain nominally subject to the Kabul Governor, though enjoying practical independence. But on this side, our policy must largely depend upon the action of Russia; and upon the truth, or otherwise, of the rumours which ascribe to that Power the intention of moving forces to the Oxus, next spring, with ulterior designs against Afghanistan. We consider our withdrawal from Kabul to be impossible if the Oxus provinces are entered, or seriously threatened, by a foreign Power; and indeed any political interference from beyond the Oxus would unavoidably embarrass our plans for the evacuation of Kabul. We earnestly trust, however, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to secure us against any such contingency, which might not only necessitate the continued occupation of Kabul, but might possibly compel us to uphold, by force of arms, our supremacy up to the banks of the Oxus.

14. Such are, in general outline, the arrangements we should regard as most suitable for the resettlement of our permanent relations with the Afghan States, whenever the requisite material conditions for the stability of such arrangements have been effectually secured. We consider that the outlines thus sketched may, with safety and advantage, be firmly filled in, as time proceeds and opportunity occurs. And, although the task immediately before us is the removal or destruction throughout Northern Afghanistan of all existing means of armed menace or resistance to our authority, we are of opinion that, when this task has been completed, the political arrangements above indicated will be more conducive than direct annexation, or permanent military occupation, to the attainment of that object which we have already described as the untroubled peace, and improved defensive power, of the Indian Empire, so far as these depend upon the military strength of its north-western frontier, and the undisputed character of its relations with the States beyond.

15. It is, at present, impossible to foresee the precise duration of our military operations in Northern Afghanistan; and we consider that our troops should in any case visit Ghazni and the Hindu-Kush boundaries of the Kabul province before permanently withdrawing from the country. But, subject only to the demarcation of boundaries which cannot yet be undertaken, we recognize no serious impediment to the early application to Kandahar and Herat of the principles discussed in paras. 7 and 8 of our present letter.

'We have, &c.,	
(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from the SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th January 1880, to VICEROY.
(Extract.)

OUR intention to protect Shere Ali in the Governorship of Kandahar may be communicated to him.

No. 5.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 11th February 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

RUMOUR from Turkestan that Abdul Rahman has crossed the Amu and occupied Ghor, that Sultan Murad Khan has joined him, and that troops sent by Gholam Hyder to oppose him have gone over to him.

No. 6.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

ST. JOHN has brought here friendly letter from Sirdar Sher Ali. St. John returns to Kandahar immediately to assume separate political charge on Stewart's departure for Ghuznee. It seems advisable he should take reply from Viceroy to Sher Ali, communicating informally to Sirdar the substance of arrangements proposed regarding Kandahar, mentioning also railway, light subsidy towards cost of troops, and British control of external relations. Sirdar now has verbal assurances only. No objection on his part anticipated.

No. 7.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 4th March 1880, to VICEROY.

Yours, yesterday. Your proposals as to Sher Ali approved.

No. 8.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 14th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

NECESSARY to find, without delay, some Native authority to which we can restore Northern Afghanistan, without risk of immediate anarchy, on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and, if possible, earlier. No prospect of finding in country any man strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him throne of Afghanistan, as sole means of saving country from anarchy.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 15th March 1880, to VICEROY. (Extract.)

Yours, yesterday. Assuming that Abdur Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that he would be contented with Northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to support him at Kabul.

No. 10.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Griffin reaches Kabul on 20th, and will lose no time in endeavouring to ascertain precise whereabouts of Abdur Rahman, but I have now received authentic intelligence that the Sirdar is in Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived there from Badakshan, where he defeated the Mir Shahzada Hassan, who has fled to Mustoj.

No. 11.

No. 81 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 31st March 1880.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 4th March, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers

regarding the recognition of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th February 1880.

From SIR D. STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

FORMAL orders from Commander-in-Chief for advance to Ghazni under my personal command received. Hope to be in position to move by 20th March. I beg to reiterate request for instructions ratifying continuance of political relations here. Sirdar is as yet uninformed of my projected departure, and will naturally be anxious about future arrangements. The transition should be therefore so managed as to be as little abrupt as possible. I consider that he should be informed at an early date of proposed movement and political arrangements. If these are to be left to me, I will at once submit details for approbation, but would first ask name of the officer appointed to command Bombay troops, which I understand are to remain under my general control even after I leave Kandahar. Also Euan Smith having arrived, is St. John at liberty to leave?

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, No. 593 E.P., dated 12th February 1880. (Extract.)

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

YOURS 11th. Please submit detailed proposals for political arrangements at Kandahar, including terms of future relations with Sirdar, assistance he may need, and territory to be placed under his government. St. John should remain for the present transition. Name of officer to command troops will follow.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 68 G., dated Kandahar, 16th February 1880.

From Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN compliance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 12th instant, I have the honour to submit proposals, detailed as much as possible under the circumstances, for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

The subject naturally divides itself under two heads—the extent and nature of the authority to be enjoyed by Sirdar Shir Ali Khan, and of the control to be exercised over his rule by the representative of the Government of India; secondly, the machinery for carrying out that control.

2. The minimum boundaries of the State over which the independent authority of the Sirdar is to be acknowledged have already been practically fixed, and include the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi with possibly that part of Afghan Seistan watered only by the Helmund; the district of Kelat-i-Ghilzai separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, separated about nine years ago; and the district of Farah originally belonging to Herat, but which has formed a separate province since the capture of that city by the Amir of Kabul in 1863.

3. Our limited knowledge of the topography of these countries renders it impossible to define with sufficient accuracy the boundaries of the State formed by the aggregation of these provinces and districts, but a cutting herewith enclosed from the latest

map issued by the Survey Department shows its extent and approximate limits. In general terms they would include the whole basin of the Helmund as low down as Rudbar, with the exception of the upper valleys of those of its tributaries which rise in the independent and Hazara and Pathan countries, and of the valley of the Tarnak beyond the Kelat-i-Ghilzai district. North of the Helmund the new State would include the lower part of the valleys of the Har-rub and Farah-rub, and to the south so much of the desert round the dependent principality of Kharan as intervenes between Persian and Biluch territory. This is at present quite indefinable. Azad Khan of Kharan in correspondence which is now in my hands declares his independence of, and contempt for, the Khan of Kelat, and acknowledges himself a vassal of Kandahar, which vassalage has, I believe, been recognized by Her Majesty's Government. If this be the case, the southern frontier of Afghanistan is very incorrectly shown in the Surveyor-General's map attached. But the question of the sovereignty over the desert south of the Helmund is a matter of very minor importance as regards Kandahar. The only object of the Khan of Kharan in declaring himself a subject of Afghanistan was to free himself from dependence on his two immediate neighbours, Persia and Kelat. Whether Kharan remains with or is separated from Kandahar will, I believe, be a matter of indifference to Sirdar Shir Ali Khan.

4. Supposing Kharan and the adjacent desert to remain attached to Kandahar, the State thus formed would be shown in the map by an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated or indeed cultivable. The number of inhabitants I am inclined to place somewhere between half a million and a million, three-fourths of them being Duranis, according to their own account, the only true Afghans.

5. The revenue for the next year (1880-81) has been estimated by Major St. John at 20½ lakhs, a total which will be largely increased by settled government, and still more by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar.

6. The above is a brief definition of the State over which the tide of affairs has unexpectedly called Sirdar Shir Ali Khan to rule.

7. As regards the measure of authority to be allowed to him, I have no hesitation in recommending that this should be as ample as possible. The only limitations I would recommend being placed on his authority are that foreign relations should be wholly conducted through the representative of Her Majesty's Government, with the possible exception of any Native State which may be formed at Kabul; that his military force should be limited in numbers and at the disposal of the Government of India for the defence of Kandahar against external enemies; and that commercial relations must be the subject of mutual agreement at stated intervals.

8. In all other matters, the Sirdar for whom I would suggest *Wali* as a suitable title, should be entirely free from control; but, for the support of the British force it would be necessary to keep in his country or on its borders, he should contribute a certain fixed amount of coin or grain, preferably the latter.

9. For telegraph and railway construction and maintenance it would be impossible to insist on any contribution now, but this question like that of commerce may be specially excepted from any treaty as subjects for future agreement.

10. The question of the location of a force above the Passes is not one for full discussion in this letter, but I am of opinion that it will be advisable to continue the location of the main cantonment in or about Kandahar instead of shifting it to Pishin. But I think that the Sirdar will never feel himself independent, or be looked on as independent by his people, with British soldiers in his citadel, or within a stone's throw of his gates; and I therefore consider that the British garrison should, as soon as circumstances permit, be established at some distance from the capital, and that the position of the troops should be *mutatis mutandis* that of the garrison of Secunderabad in the Deccan.

11. I am not yet prepared to give a decided opinion as to the best site for a cantonment. More detailed surveys of the country are required, and the settlement of the railway question and other points must be awaited. But the locality fixed on should, I think, be not less than five or more than twenty miles from the city.

12. As regards political control, I think that the safest plan will be to follow the ordinary precedent by keeping the political and military authority in separate hands,

except on those special occasions when important military operations are in actual progress. From certain points of view it would no doubt be convenient to entrust both duties to the same individual, and officers are, no doubt, to be found equally competent for both. But in practice it might, I feel sure, be productive of gross evils if our political relations with the country were to fall into the management of any officer who might chance to fall into the military command.

13. This part of the question is one that requires most careful consideration. The maintenance of satisfactory relations with the ruler of Kandahar and the attitude of the Afghan authorities towards the British officers entrusted with the conduct of affairs in Southern Afghanistan will, in a very great measure, depend on the personal qualifications of the officer who may be appointed by Government to hold chief political authority in that quarter. In my opinion the strongest Political officer in Government service should be selected for this important duty; he should be made Resident and Agent, Governor-General, in Southern Afghanistan; his authority should extend to Biluchistan, and the general conduct of the affairs of that Agency should be placed entirely under his control, the appointment of Agent, Governor-General, in Biluchistan being thus no longer rendered necessary. These measures would, in my opinion, be productive of great advantages to the public interests, but it is of the last importance that the officer selected for this duty should be thoroughly well qualified to deal with the Afghan authorities, whether as regards his knowledge of the Persian language, his political experience or his capabilities for obtaining and retaining the friendship, confidence, and respect of those with whom he has to deal.

14. The measures proposed above must of course be considered as furnishing merely a general outline of the course that, in my opinion, should be followed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to Southern Afghanistan and the Kandahar Sirdar; and the details of such measures will have to be very carefully considered, if once the general basis be approved. Colonel St. John, who leaves for Calcutta this day, is in full possession of the ideas and wishes of Sirdar Shir Ali Khan as to the future of this part of the country, and having my full confidence is also well acquainted with my own views on the subject. These views I have commissioned him to submit fully for the consideration of the Government of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR SHERE ALI to the address of His EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, 5th Rabi-ul-Awal 1297 II., corresponding with the 16th February 1880.

After compliments. As at this auspicious time my illustrious and kind friend, Colonel St. John, is about to go and wait upon your Excellency, I thought it expedient to bring my sincerity to the notice of your Excellency through this letter. I hope that after Colonel St. John has seen your Excellency he will mention before your Excellency all that I have represented to him regarding my goodwill and firm devotion (to the British Government).

As General Sir D. Stewart has been very kind to appoint me, on behalf of the British Government, to the Governorship of Kandahar and its dependencies, I beg to offer my grateful thanks to the Government of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, and to your Excellency for this great kindness. It is incumbent on me to thank also General Sir D. Stewart, Colonel St. John, and their subordinate officers, before your Excellency, for their kindness and help, especially for those of the last-named officer and his subordinates which have secured peace and tranquillity to the people of the province, who feel themselves grateful for the kindnesses of the British Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

To His Highness SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

Fort William, 13th March 1880.

It has given me much pleasure to read the expressions of friendship contained in your Highness' letter, and I have to assure you that your Highness' honourable and

straightforward conduct is fully appreciated, and will always be remembered by the British Government. It is a source of congratulation both for England and for the Durani nation that one of the descendants of Payindah Khan has continued in the straight part of rectitude, and has not wandered into the waterless desert of dishonour and faithlessness.

For good service and faithful conduct reward is justly due, and it is also incumbent on those to whom God has given high birth and capacity for government that they should not shrink from the duty imposed on them. Therefore I have great pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to recognize your Highness as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. For the consolidation of your power, and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's Empire, it is necessary that a force of Her Imperial troops remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It will therefore be right and proper that a certain portion of the grain revenue of the State, to be fixed hereafter by mutual agreement, should be allotted yearly towards the provision of supplies for these troops. It is also expedient that a special officer of rank shall be deputed to reside in the cantonment as a medium of friendly communication, and to conduct the relations of the British Government with the States upon the frontiers of your Highness' territory. Upon this understanding the government will remain entirely in the hands of your Highness under the protection of the great Government of England.

At a future time it may be necessary to draw up a formal record of the terms upon which your Highness has entered into possession of your country, but this must be postponed until the affairs of other parts of Afghanistan shall have been settled, when the respective interests of British India and Kandahar will have become more fully known.

Your Highness is doubtless aware that Her Majesty's Government has constructed a railway to Sibi to be continued to Kandahar. No greater benefit could be bestowed on the country, since by the commercial advantages and general facilities of friendly intercourse that will thus be secured, the prosperity of the Durani people, and their close connection with the great and powerful British Government, will, if it please God, become firmly established.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

(Signed) LYTON,
Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

No. 1093 E.P., dated Fort William, 23rd March 1880.

From H. M. DURAND, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter No. 68 G., dated 16th February 1880, submitting proposals for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

2. In reply, I am to forward, for your information, copy of a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the address of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, dated 13th March 1880, that Her Majesty the Queen Empress has been pleased to recognise the Sirdar as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. The original of this letter has been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel O. St. John, C.S.I., for delivery to the Sirdar.

3. I am to add that the several measures proposed in your letter under reply will be considered in detail hereafter.

No. 12.

No. 90 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th April 1880.

WE have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, which will serve to show the present situation of affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The policy we are endeavouring to carry out is summed up in the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch. In pursuance of this policy, we have, as already reported, recognized Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar. The letter to the Sirdar, a copy of which was submitted with our Despatch of the 31st March, has not yet been formally presented to him, but Colonel St. John, to whose care it was entrusted, reports the Sirdar has been informed of its purport, and Her Majesty's Government is now pledged to support him as ruler of the province. He has expressed his readiness to accept the position, and has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required to consolidate or extend his rule in the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. The separation of Kandahar from Kabul is therefore an accomplished fact, and the independence of Sher Ali Khan has been solemnly guaranteed.

3. In Kabul no final arrangement has yet been made. The disturbed state of the country and the difficulty of finding among the principal Barakzai Sirdars a man of any capacity or influence has obliged us to defer the recognition of a Chief. But after careful consideration we have arrived at the conclusion that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, whose presence in Afghan Turkestan is now beyond doubt, would, if willing to accept the province of Kabul without Herat or Kandahar, be more likely than any other member of the family to prove a successful ruler; and we are now endeavouring to enter into communication with him.

4. As regards Herat, it is unnecessary for us to enter into any detailed examination of the state of affairs. It will be seen from Colonel St. John's telegram of the 6th April, a copy of which is enclosed, that Sirdar Ayub Khan is apparently trying to secure our acknowledgment of his title. No communication will be made to him unless he puts forward a clear expression of his wishes.

5. The nature of the future Government of Herat does not, in our opinion, press for settlement. But we consider that the means of influencing Herat from Kandahar will be secured to us by the railway, which will, we hope, be completed early next year as far as Kandahar.

6. In the meantime General Stewart has been directed to march to Ghazni, with the object of breaking any opposition he may find there, and opening direct communication with Sir F. Roberts. This measure was, in our opinion, necessary to overawe opposition and convince the populations concerned that we are in a position to dictate on our own terms the settlement of the questions we are dealing with. We do not, however, desire that Sir D. Stewart's force should remain for long in Ghazni, and arrangements will be made to enable him to leave the place as soon as all opposition is at an end.

7. The movements of our troops in Afghanistan have been guided by the principle that we do not advance to any point of which we are not prepared to retain military occupation as long as our presence there may be demanded by the political situation; and this principle is not departed from in the proposed march to Ghazni. For this march is not an advance, but merely a lateral movement along the direct line connecting General Stewart at Kandahar with General Roberts at Kabul; and the evacuation of Ghazni will not involve any retreat, as the Bengal troops, of which General Stewart's division is composed, can, when at Ghazni, either march to Kabul and thence re-enter India by the Khyber, or return to India, direct by the Kuram

route, as may be found most expedient on their arrival at Ghazni, by which time the political situation will be further developed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

MINUTE by the VICEROY, dated 30th March 1880.

ANNEXED is a copy of a telegram from General Sir D. Stewart, dated 29th instant in reply to one sent to him by the Military Department.

I am at a loss to understand why Sir D. Stewart has not received the programme for field operations now being commenced.

It is essential that he should be at once fully informed of the entire plan of operations, and of the political objects desired by the Government of India.

The latter may be thus summed up. The Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps are being taken for this purpose.

Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection. But it is not desirable to spread our troops over a large tract of country, or to send small columns to any place where they would encounter opposition, and increase the hostile feeling against us. All that is necessary from the political point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul. This he can do either by the direct route, or by Kushi, as he may think to be most expedient, under such conditions as may exist when he is at Ghazni.

It is not desirable that Sir D. Stewart's troops should remain for long at Ghazni; and it is, therefore, necessary that all military dispositions should be made with a view to enabling him to leave Ghazni as soon as he has put down any open opposition that he may find there.

It is very desirable that the conduct of operations in Afghanistan should, as soon as possible, be brought under one head. Sir D. Stewart should, therefore, assume the supreme command as soon as he is in direct communication with Kabul. In the meantime he should be daily kept informed, both by the Foreign Department and the Military Department, of all news received from Kabul, or from any part of the Khyber or Kuram lines of communication, so that he may be constantly and fully made aware of the exact state of the situation at all points.

This Minute, together with the annexure, should be at once communicated *in extenso* by clear the line telegraph to the Commander-in-Chief; and his Excellency should be requested to state at once by telegraph to Secretary to Government, Military Department, what instructions should, under these conditions, be sent to Generals Sir F. Roberts and Sir D. Stewart.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th March 1880, from General Sir D. M. STEWART, Kandahar, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

I AM not in possession of the orders of Government; nor have I received the programme for field operations now being commenced, but I would point out that I am carrying forward from hence supplies for two months, and that I shall not require to draw more European supplies from India by Kabul or Kuram until the end of May. If it is intended that the division under my command move forward beyond Ghazni towards Kuram, supplies should be collected at some place in Kuram, where the troops under my command may pass the remainder of the hot weather. By the information which I have received, no opposition is likely to be encountered at Ghazni, which may not be easily overcome by the troops with which I am advancing. The movement of a column from Kabul to meet the division under

my command will, in my opinion, increase the strain upon the country which the demands of this division for native supplies must entail. The collections of tribesmen under Muhammad Jan and Muskh-i-Alam have already drawn largely upon the supplies which are procurable in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and the uncertainty which prevails throughout the country has doubtless prevented large arrears from being cultivated this spring. It is only with difficulty that sufficient transport has been obtained to allow of the division under my command being moved with full equipment, and I am calculating on replacing casualties amongst baggage animals by purchases made at Ghazni. I submit for consideration that it is very desirable that no movement of troops belonging to Kabul or Kuram command should be made in advance of Kushi. I have this morning received a telegram from Sir F. Roberts that he only proposes to supply for my division at Ghazni, tea, sugar, and possibly rum, and that for all other supplies I must depend upon the country. I hope it will be understood that I do not require any supplies to be advanced from Kabul to meet me; and that, if orders are given for my division to remain at Ghazni, I would at once establish communication with Kabul or Kurum, as may be desired, sending my own transport to bring forward necessary supplies. I make this statement, not with a view of disturbing any approved plan of operations, but in order that there may be no misconception regarding the difficulty of feeding a large force at Ghazni during the present season.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th April 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

SIRDAR ABDUL SALAM, who came from Herat in December last as Envoy from Ayub and returned in January, has sent his confidential servant to me with a letter reporting arrival of Persian Commissioner. He offers to be medium of communication with Ayub in our interests, and asks for confidential agent to be sent to him at Herat, or letter declaring that the English Government wish to have friendship and services of Ayub. He hints that Ayub is hesitating between Persia and England, but inclines to latter. Messenger reports that Persian Commissioner left two days before he did, while letter speaks of him as still there. He says Ayub is practically in hands of Kabuli troops, who for two months would not let him leave his house. Object of letter appears to be acknowledgment of Ayub's title to Herat, overtures to Persia having finally failed. I presume letter may be answered in accordance with previous communications, namely, that Ayub can do as he likes; that we want nothing from him; and that if he wants anything from us he should express his wishes.

No. 12A.

No. 5, S. P. C., dated Kabul, 15th April 1880.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding at Kabul. (Extract.)

A durbar was held at 4 o'clock on Tuesday the 13th instant, which was attended by all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and Maliks of Kabul and its neighbourhood, many of the Hazaras, and of the trading classes; a large number of British officers in Kabul were also present. The proceedings were opened by a short speech from Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, a copy of which is herewith forwarded, and were concluded by an address in which I endeavoured to explain both to the Sirdars and people generally, and to the delegates from Maidan, what were the general intentions of the Government, and specially with reference to the representations which had been put forward: a copy of the paper of requests of the Ghazni party with the address has been already forwarded to you. That portion of the Government programme to which I did not allude in the speech was the separation of Herat from Northern Afghanistan, for the reason that I had understood from the Government of India that no final arrangements had been made with regard to Herat, and that its future disposal was consequently still uncertain. Such being the case, and as there was no special

necessity for declaring the policy of Government on this point, I considered it would be more convenient to the Government were any distinct declaration of its intention to separate Western Afghanistan from Kabul deferred.

The effect of the Durbar has been reported from many quarters to have been good, although a large number of representatives are undoubtedly much disappointed that the return of Ameer Yakub Khan has been categorically refused to them. Still all are satisfied that some definite reply has been given.

The allusion in the speech to the Government being the friend, and not the enemy, of Islam; to the large Muhammadan population which lived in perfect liberty under the British rule in India; and to the fact that the Government has several times interposed, at great cost in money and men, to preserve the integrity of the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey, has been welcomed and largely discussed in the mosques and elsewhere.

PAPERS REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE.

Translation of a document brought before the Chief Political Officer on the
11th April 1880.

We, the undersigned, as representatives of the tribes of Afghanistan, send the following representations to the British Government:—

I. Friendship between the people of Afghanistan and the great British Government should be re-established, as of former years, inasmuch as in this way the interests and welfare of both parties would, God willing, be secured.

II. Our King and Ruler should be released and restored to his former power; and we, the tribesmen, guarantee that, by the blessing of God, he will maintain a lasting and sincere friendship towards the British Government, and that both parties will have identical interests.

III. The British Agent, whoever he may be, should be of the Muhammadan religion, while all British troops should be withdrawn from our country.

IV. The kingdom of Afghanistan should be restored in its entirety to its King and Ruler. In this way it will be able to cope with its foreign enemies.

V. The British Government should furnish such assistance to the King and Ruler of Afghanistan as it may think best for the interests of both parties.

VI. Immediate assistance should be given to the Ameer, seeing that the country has been desolated and nothing of value is left, as the British authorities are themselves thoroughly aware.

We hope that the great British Government will grant these the expressed wishes of the tribes of Afghanistan, as they consult the interests of both parties. All of us have come to the British authorities to ask that we and our sovereign may be forgiven; our wishes are set forth in the paragraphs above.

Dated Friday, 29th Rabi-ul-Sani 1297 (9th April 1880).

Names sealed and signed.

1. Muhammad Alim.	8. Abdul Ghafur.
2. Muhammad Jan.	9. Shah Muhammad.
3. Muhammad Sarwar.	10. Muhammad Afzal.
4. Ghulam Haidar.	11. Sultan Muhammad.
5. Muhammad Hasan.	12. Lal Muhammad.
6. Abdul Karim.	13. Ghulam Haidar.
7. Muhammad Tahir.	

Suliman Khels,	15 in number.
Andaris,	8 „ „
Zurmat Ahmadzais,	17 „ „
Wardaks,	17 „ „
Logaris and Khanwaris,	15 „ „
Ahmadzais,	46 „ „
Tajiks,	5 „ „
Tajiks of Ghazni,	9 „ „
Maidan people,	14 „ „
Mangals and Totakhels,	43 „ „

Speech delivered by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., &c.,
in Durbar, at Kabul, on the 13th April 1880.

Sirdars and Maliks,—I am very glad to receive you here to-day in durbar, especially those who, through the good offices of my friend, the Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, have been induced to come to Kabul, and make their wishes known to me. I trust that this durbar is the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to enter into such arrangements with the people of Afghanistan as will ensure an honourable peace, and a lasting friendship between them and the British. Some of you, I understand, hesitated to accompany the Mustaufi, fearing that your treatment and reception by us might not be such as he had promised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need never have any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word of a British Officer. The British do not say one thing and do another. You who have come in have been honourably treated, and after this durbar is over you are all at liberty to depart. I trust that when you leave Kabul you will carry away with you a more friendly feeling towards us than some of you have hitherto entertained, and that those of your party who are still holding aloof will be wise enough to follow the good example you have set them, and will accept our invitation and come to Kabul.

Mr. Griffin, the Chief Political Officer in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, with whom you have already become acquainted, will now, on the part of the Government of India, answer the requests you have made.

Speech by the Chief Political Officer.

Sirdars, Khans, and Maliks of Kabul,—It has been my wish for some time past to meet you all in durbar and explain to you collectively and publicly, as I have already done privately, the intention of the British Government with regard to the settlement of Afghanistan. This is a favourable opportunity when replies have to be given to the requests of certain Chiefs and Maliks of the neighbourhood of Ghazni, who have been long hostile, but who have, at last, listened to the advice of Mustaufi Habibulla, whom General Sir F. Roberts had sent to reassure them, and have deputed many of their number to place their requests respectfully before the Government. It is to be regretted that the more important of the leaders have not come in person; when the Government promised a safe-conduct there was no reason, for even those who had been most opposed to it, to fear for their lives or liberty. The British Government bears no ill-will to those who have fought fairly against it, and those of the representatives who have come to Kabul are free to leave when they wish, and during their stay will be treated as friends and guests. But those Chiefs who have remained behind at Maidan must not think that their signatures on the paper of requests will be considered as equivalent to their presence; the more so as we know the reason that some of them have not come is that they have secretly abandoned the cause they profess to support, and have made promises to others. When you return to Maidan, ask General Ghulam Haidar and Muhammad Jan when they are going to desert you.

Maliks of Ghazni, Maidan, and Loghar, and Chiefs of the Ghilzai, Wardak, and other tribes in their neighbourhood, I have met you more than once in private interviews, and have discussed with you in a friendly way your requests, and I now only wish to say publicly, and for the information of the Sirdars and people of the city and neighbourhood of Kabul, whom it concerns as closely as it does you, what I have already said to you.

You have first asked that the former friendship between the Government of the Queen-Empress of Hindustan should be restored, that Ameer Yakub Khan should be released and reinstated, and that the British armies should retire from Afghanistan.

In reply, I would first remind you that the breach in mutual friendship was made by Ameer Shere Ali Khan. The British Government not only always desired, and still desires, friendship with Afghanistan, but will not appoint any one as Ameer who does not profess friendship, nor will allow him to continue Ameer unless he plainly shows himself the friend of the friends of the British Government and the enemy of its enemies.

For this reason the Viceroy has decided that Muhammad Yakub Khan shall not return to Afghanistan. You know whether he observed the promises that he made to the British Government. You know that he rewarded those who had opposed us in the first campaign; while those who had assisted us he turned out of their lands and appointments. You have told me privately that if Yakub be not allowed to

return, you are willing to accept as Ameer any one whom the Government may choose to select. This expression of the wish of a large number of respectable Maliks will be, at the proper time, laid before His Excellency the Viceroy, together with that of others who may wish to support the candidature of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Hashim Khan, Sirdar Musa Khan, Sirdar Ayub Khan, or any other member of the ruling family who may be approved by a large number of the people. The Government has no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and will occupy no more of it than may be necessary for the safety of its own frontiers. But the province of Kandahar will not remain united with Kabul, but will be placed under the independent rule of a Barakzai prince. For the administration of those provinces that remain attached to Kabul, the Government is anxious to appoint an Ameer who shall be strong to govern his people and steadfast in his friendship to the British. And if only these qualifications be secured, the Government is willing and anxious to recognize the wish of the Afghan people and the tribal Chiefs, and to nominate the Ameer of their choice. But no decision can be given at present. You, who have assembled here, represent but a small part of the people, and it is necessary to ascertain the views and wishes of many others, Chiefs and Sirdars, who are absent from Kabul. But your votes in favour of Yakub Khan's immediate family will be remembered and considered if, until the decision of the Government be given, you absolutely abstain from all hostile action. Otherwise, you must not expect that the Government will consider him likely to be a friendly Ameer whose friends are its persistent enemies.

The armies of the Queen-Empress will withdraw from Afghanistan when the Government considers that the proper time has come. As they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they will not withdraw at your request. When the country is again peaceful, and when a friendly Ameer has been selected, the Government has no wish to remain in Afghanistan. The army came to Kabul to inflict punishment for the murder of its Envoy in time of peace, which some of you have called a regretted accident, but which the British Government considers an atrocious crime, and it will remain until some satisfactory settlement can be made. You have been told that an army from Kandahar is now marching on Ghazni, while another from Bombay has taken its place at Kandahar. A third army is in Kuram, a fourth at Kabul, and a fifth at Jellalabad, the Khaibar and Peshawar.

The General has ordered a strong force to march from Kabul to-morrow towards Maidan to co-operate with the Kandahar army. If you are wise you will do everything to assist this force, which is not sent against you, nor will it molest you if only the conduct of the people is friendly. If, on the contrary, you listen to leaders who only deceive you for their own advantage, and commit and excite hostility against the Government, then punishment will quickly and certainly follow. The Khagiani tribes, three weeks ago, attacked a British post near Gundamak at night. They have since had to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000, and five of their towers have been blown up. The Hizarak people have been committing outrages on the road, and carrying off men and cattle. A large force has been sent by the General into Hizarak, and a fine of Rs. 15,000 has been imposed. The Government is quite willing to be friends with you, and to treat you as friends, but it is also resolved to be obeyed so long as its armies are in the country, and to punish severely any open opposition. You have a proverb that force and money are the only powers in Afghanistan. It is for you to choose which you wish. The Government intends to keep the sword for its enemies, and the money for its friends, and, if you are wise, you will count yourselves as our friends. Those people deceive you who preach jihad, and say that the English are the enemies of Islam. In India fifty millions of Muhammadans enjoy, under the Government of the Queen, greater liberty and happiness and security than in any country in the world; and it is the British Government which has many times, by great expenditure of men and treasure, guarded and preserved the Empire of the Sultan of Turkey against his enemies. The Government is the friend and protector of Islam, and not its destroyer.

As to your other requests for the appointment of a Muhammadan Agent at Kabul, and the grant of assistance in money and material to the new Ameer, I can only say that these requests have been made by you in ignorance, for they are matters which will be decided by the Government of India with the Chief whom they agree to appoint as Ameer. It is not fitting for small persons to discuss them. Of this only be assured, that he whom the Viceroy of India may select will be supported by the Government in every possible way so long as he shows friendly intentions towards it.

No. 13.

No. 93 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 27th April 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Official Journal of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force for the week ending the 21st March 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSTON.
 „ A. R. THOMPSON.
 „ A. FRASER.

Enclosure in No. 13.

MEMORANDUM, No. 132, dated Kandahar, 25th March 1880.

From Major C. B. EUAN SMITH, C.S.I., Political Officer, Kandahar Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to enclose copy of Official Journal from 15th to 21st instant, inclusive.

Official Journal, Head-quarters, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, Political Department. (Extract.)

Monday, 15th March.—In the afternoon the General received the principal Mullas and Kowanins of the city and surrounding villages in Durbar. They were twenty-nine in number, and had come in consequence of Sir Donald Stewart's late letter to the Sirdar, to inform him that they had all taken an oath on the Koran, to the effect that they would at once deliver up to justice any individual whom they might hear of that was an ill-wisher to the British Government, and intending to do mischief to the troops here in garrison. After the General had heard their statement, he informed them that he wished to say a few words to them, representing as they did the better educated and more sensible classes, and having, as he was aware, a considerable influence either for good or evil on their compatriots. He then briefly recapitulated the circumstances under which, and the reasons for which, the English had first entered Afghanistan, had a second time re-occupied it, and subsequently raised Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to govern in Kandahar. He informed them plainly that as long as Sirdar Sher Ali pursued the same loyal course towards the British Government that he had hitherto followed, he would be supported fully by the English. He pointed out that, in placing Sirdar Sher Ali Khan in power, a Chief of one of the best known families in Afghanistan, and in bestowing on him, as the Government had done, money, arms, guns and ammunition, the Government of India had afforded the most signal proof of their desire and intention to leave Afghanistan to be governed by the Afghans themselves, to abstain from any unnecessary interference whatever in the internal affairs of the country, and to render independent at the earliest possible date the Sirdar on whom the government of the Kandahar province had been bestowed, and who would certainly be assisted in rendering his rule stable and independent. There was no chance of Kandahar again falling under the authority of a supreme ruler in Kabul. Kandahar would for the future stand by itself, and the moment the Sirdar

should inform Sir Donald Stewart that he considered his power sufficiently consolidated to take charge of the city, the General would be quite prepared to make it over to him.

Sir Donald Stewart said that he considered it necessary to make these remarks, as he believed that there was an erroneous impression abroad as to the future of the Kandahar State. The regular official notification of the decision and intentions of the Government would of course be made in the usual manner to the Sirdar at the fitting time, but the people might rest assured that the policy of Government was that now explained to them.

He then proceeded to inform the Mullas that these remarks were necessary to elucidate what he intended to say to them with regard to the late fanatical and cowardly attacks on the lives of defenceless officers and men of the Kandahar Field Force. The audience were well aware that such attacks were contrary to the laws of all religions. There was no justification for them whatever in the Muhammadan religion, but, nevertheless, it could not be doubted that the miserable men who lost their lives in this shameful way were instigated and encouraged in their attempts by the direct action of the Mullas, who made use of their influence in this disgraceful manner. Sir Donald Stewart pointed out the futility of these attempts, which, moreover, served no purpose; in no instance had the fanatics been successful in taking life, and in every case they had lost their own. The attempts were therefore foolish as well as criminal. He was aware that some of these attempts were due to the instigation of enemies of the Sirdar, who hoped that occurrences of this nature might embarrass the friendly relations at present existing between the Sirdar and the British Government. The people might rest assured that such would not be the case. He, Sir Donald Stewart, had accurate knowledge of what went on in the city, and in the assemblies, at which sedition was often talked and preached, but, knowing how much of this sedition was due to the desire of self-display, he had up to the present refrained from taking notice of it. He warned the Mullas, however, that his patience would not always be so great. They were perfectly well aware of the advantages which had accrued to the inhabitants of Kandahar from the English occupation, and no one knew better than themselves how much they owed in the way of security to life and property, and absolute immunity from oppression, to the consideration and forbearance with which they had been treated. In return for this, however, the lives of defenceless and unsuspecting soldiers were continually being attempted by men who were incited thereto by fanatical teaching. Once for all, Sir Donald Stewart informed the Mullas and Kowans that he was determined that, if these attempts were persisted in, he would mark his sense of their character by measures that would be exceedingly unpleasant to the whole community, and that would ensure the severe punishment of all who were in any way connected with the wretched individuals who were made the tools of designing men not less guilty than themselves.

The entire assemblage listened to the remarks of General Stewart with profound attention. At the close, one of them acted as spokesman, and most emphatically denounced the fanatical ghazi attempts that had occurred, declaring they were acts contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet, and which were due to the teachings of ignorant men, who could not be classed as Mullas, or expounders of religion. On behalf of those present, the speaker represented the deep sense of gratitude and acknowledgment felt by all for the policy which had been pursued towards the people of Kandahar by General Stewart, contrasting the quiet reigning here with the anarchy and fighting in the north; and he concluded by once more assuring Sir Donald Stewart that they would to the utmost of their power aid in the apprehension of all ill-wishers of the British Government, while they would one and all give security for the good behaviour of the talibs attending their respective mosques.

The General then dismissed the assemblage, informing them of his own approaching departure, and stating that the policy inaugurated by him under the orders of Government would certainly be continued by his successor as long as the people behaved with loyalty to the Sirdar and the Government.

No. 14.

No. 104 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 4th May 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of telegrams from and to the Chief Political Officer at Kabul, regarding the correspondence between the British authorities at Kabul and Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

2. We also enclose copy of a letter* to Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer at Kabul, transmitting the views of the Government of India on the situation of affairs in Kabul, and conveying instructions for his guidance in his communications with the Sirdar.

* No. 1491 E.P., dated 27th April 1880.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAYNES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.
"	A. FRASER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 22nd April 1880, from MR. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN
SECRETARY, Simla.

THE messenger, Sarwar Khan, whom I sent to Kunduz, returned last night. His lengthy statement will be sent by post. The letter of Sirdar Abdul Rahman in reply to mine is as follows—literal translation :—

Whereas at this happy time I have received the kind letter of the British officers, who called me to mind, wrote in a spirit of justice and friendship, to inquire what I wish in Afghanistan. My honoured friends, the servants of the great British Government, know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the kingdom of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of return to my native land. When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribe, I proposed to re-enter Afghanistan, but as it was not fated then, I turned to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since after he had left you he listened to the advice of every interested person and raised fools to power until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, were so managed that it was bright like day. In consequence of that Afghanistan was disgraced before all States and ruined; now therefore that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: as long as your empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace, and that these two States should find us true and faithful; that we should have rest and peace between them, for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce. And we hope of your friendship that assistance and sympathy with the people of Afghanistan, you will permanently establish them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my wish. For the rest, it is yours to decide.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd April 1880, from Mr. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. (Extract.)

MUMAMMAD Sarwar Khan, our agent, left Kabul on 2nd and reached Kunduz on 10th; warmly received by Sirdar Abdul Rahman; gave letter and message.* Sirdar said he was delighted at message; desired nothing more than to be servant of Government. He has written to his friends not to oppose the English and ruin themselves; better days were in store for Afghanistan. After five days agent was given Sirdar's reply in presence of four confidential officers, and verbal message as follows:—

It is quite true that for three generations the English have systematically befriended Afghanistan, and that they have never done me any injury. I am anxious to know the nature of the friendship they now desire. Instead of sending agents I would much prefer, if invited, going to Charikar myself, accompanied by some 500 sowars, and there discuss matters with the English officers in person. If this is approved of, the two or three men, Wali Muhammad Khan and Hashim, now in power, should be set aside and opportunity afforded me to show what I can do in the interests of peace. For 12 years I have been a guest of the Russians, have received many favours from them. I should not like to have conditions imposed upon me which should discredit me with them, or make me appear ungrateful. If the English desire to place me in power they should arrange for the removal of my enemies and make me secure before withdrawing from the country. I shall ever try to be the friend of both powers, and desire nothing more than to be considered the friend of the English, and to secure for my country the royal immunity from foreign interference as is enjoyed by Persia. Sirdar said that he did not write first, because he had no reliable messenger; he shall continue at Kunduz till he receives reply; would come to Charikar in 20 days from messenger leaving Kabul. Sirdar, in answer to agent, said Russia had refused him permission to try his fortune in Afghanistan, and removed him to Tashkend. When telegraphic news reached of Yakub's deportation, General Kaufmann was at Orenberg. General's Secretary sent for him, told him that news, and gave him liberty to go to Turkestan. Sirdar took time to reflect three days after secretary urged him to go. He consented to receive loan of 5,000 Bokhara tillas, and present of 200 breech-loaders and ammunition. Sirdar has eaten Russian salt, and does not wish to quarrel with Russia, but if made Amir will live at peace. Left Tashkend with 100 followers, viâ Oratipa, Hissar, Kolab, crossing Oxus at Rustac. Sirdar has at Kunduz four infantry, two cavalry regiments, two batteries. Since he left, his family have been moved from Kokand to Tashkend, and his full allowances granted them.

General Roberts and I think and recommend as follows:—It is clear that Sirdar was sent by Russia, or that he does not want to quarrel with them. Nevertheless, he does not appear less eligible than when selected by Government, but more so. He is doubtless anxious to come to terms with English. An interview with him is essential.

* The letter was as follows:—

TO SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

After compliments. — It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan."

To Sarwar Khan, the bearer, full and explicit verbal instructions were given. He was directed to inform the Sirdar that the British Government having occupied Kabul, the capital of the Afghan Government, and he, a distinguished member of the late ruling family, having entered Turkistan and occupied places there by force of arms, it was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and if actuated by friendly or hostile feelings towards the British Government. That the Sirdar's long residence in Russia, and his notoriously close relations with that Power, might render him, to a certain extent, an object of suspicion, were it not that he had no quarrel with the British, who entertained no hostile feelings towards him. That the British Government were able to benefit him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and that, if he followed the dictates of wisdom and self-interest, he would at once open a friendly correspondence with the British officers in Kabul. That his opportunity had now come; and that the British Government were disposed to treat him with every consideration, and to consider most favourably any representations that he might have to urge. That on receipt of the letter, he would, if he consulted his own interests, send a reply to the letter by the hand of a respectable and trusted agent, and, later, repair himself to Kabul, where he would be honourably received. The British Government had no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established at Kabul; and consequently the present communication was made solely in his own interests, and not in those of the British Government.

It might be at Mootya, or Charikar, as proposed, but probably unnecessary. We would send two or three men of position, one being native official of government, to Sirdar, definitely offering him Amirship with the conditions regarding Kandahar, friendship, frontier, and foreign relations. If he accepts our proposal, to come to Kabul under safe conduct, and discuss all details. He will almost certainly come. The alternative of meeting at Charikar can be reserved, as possibly he will refuse to come to Kabul, or accept conditions without discussion.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, No. 1460 E.P., dated 25th April 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul.

YOUR telegrams, 22nd, 23rd, transmitting Abdul Rahman's letter with remarks and proposals are received, and instructions issue to you on Monday by letter and telegraph. Meanwhile suspend further proceedings and negotiations, informing Abdul Rahman, if necessary, that his letter is under consideration here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

No. 1491 E.P., dated Simla, 27th April 1880, from A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Kabul.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Governor General has received and considered in Council your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by you from Sirdar Abdul Rahman on the 21st instant, together with a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts and yourself.

2. In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this important communication, the Government of India considers it expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto been acting in Northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of affairs in that country.

3. The single object to which, as you are well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited, is the security of the north-west frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently subsidized, and otherwise assisted, the Amirs of Kabul. It has also, more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their kingdom.

4. Regulating on this principle, and limiting to this object, the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security of our frontier as much as possible independent of such conditions.

5. This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Russian alliance proposed by Russia in contemplation of a rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan power; and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him on conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any Afghan prince.

6. When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well defined and plainly avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character.

7. These two objects have been attained—the first, by the capture of Kabul, and the punishment of the crime committed there; the second, by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

8. Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements with the rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them, which was nevertheless a thoroughly friendly one, and no less conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formerly applied. Our advanced frontier positions at Kandahar and Kurram have materially diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India; and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

9. Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and, secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country.

10. The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated the 30th ultimo, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that “the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps” (continued His Excellency) “are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection.” * * * “For this all that is necessary from the political point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.” The military operations thus defined have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni.

11. With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.

12. The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.

13. What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is the desire it expresses for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint protection of the British and Russian empires. This suggestion, which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message, cannot be entertained or discussed.

14. As already stated, the primary object and declared determination of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times, and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent security

of Her Majesty's Indian empire. As such, it has hitherto been firmly maintained by successive Governors General of India under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that "Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence."

15. It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain territories as constituting a neutral zone between their respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally determined by mutual agreement; and in 1876 the Russian Government formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that "while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no practical result."

16. The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these engagements was again distinctly affirmed, on behalf of the Queen's Government, by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you should take occasion to inform Abdul Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian empires are matters which the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with the Sirdar. The Afghan States and tribes are too contiguous with India, whose north-western frontier they surround, for the Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized influence over those tribes and States.

17. The Governor General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded by the Government of India. So long as the rulers of Kabul were amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these principles, and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne. This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to impose on any ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring empire, is entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose such conditions on a prince who has received hospitality and protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that, in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdul Rahman to conditions which "might make him appear ungrateful" to those "whose salt he has eaten," the Governor General in Council recognizes a sentiment altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with the sincerity of his professed good will toward ourselves.

18. These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to the question asked by Abdul Rahman, as to the "nature of our friendship," and its "conditions." The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own. The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by Abdul Rahman that, between the British and Russian empires, his "tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace." We do not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as "entirely beyond the sphere of its action." The injury to Afghan commerce caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We have no concessions to ask or make; and the Sirdar will therefore perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain between him and us.

19. On this point your reply to Abdul Rahman cannot be too explicit. Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan the hostility and treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplors had compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements of a material and permanent character for the better protection of our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill will, of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars, that it is probably well known to Abdul Rahman. But, in order that our present intercourse and future relation with the Sirdar may be perfectly clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires to fill, the Governor General in Council authorizes you, if necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the districts assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul power.

20. As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British Government as the ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of the native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British Government, which has promised him the support of a British garrison, so long as he requires such support. The Governor General in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdul Rahman will readily recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or elsewhere, have proved themselves active and loyal adherents. Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge them. Similarly, if the next Kabul ruler reintroduces into his Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however, cannot occur, if the sentiments of Abdul Rahman are such as he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and administrative arrangements already completed by us for the permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of negotiation or discussion with Abdul Rahman or any other claimant to the throne of Kabul.

21. To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these completed arrangements, the Governor General in Council cannot authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to Abdul Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, with whose present views in regard to this important question the Government of India is not yet acquainted.

22. Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure was determined on by the Government of India long before the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the government of the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by the hostility, and is not therefore conditional on the good will, of any Afghan power.

23. The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal advantage of Abdul Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general interests of the Afghan people. For this reason, it is desirable that you should inform Abdul Rahman of our intention to evacuate Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must, however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have served and aided the British Government during our occupation of those territories.

24. For this purpose, it appears to the Governor General in Council desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the undisturbed establishment of his future government.

25. The Governor General in Council has, however, no desire to press this suggestion should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence at Kabul previous to the withdrawal of our troops, for the purpose of personal conference with the British authorities, might have the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his position in the eyes of his future subjects. The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own judgment and inclination. But Abdul Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present, in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family of Yakub Khan has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the Sirdar's authority, if he is not personally present to assert it.

26. It should on both sides be remembered and understood that it is not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people an unpopular ruler, or to interfere uninvited in the administration of a friendly one. If Abdul Rahman proves able and disposed to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact. Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government of the country from which our forces will, in any case, be withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither need, nor wish, to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes, his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship with the British Government.

27 The present statement of the views and intentions of His Excellency the Governor General in Council respecting Abdul Rahman will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures; and it will now be your duty to convey to Abdul Rahman, without any avoidable delay, the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give full expression to the spirit of candour and good will in which these communications have been received and are reciprocated. But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar and the Government of India.

28. In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul. In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military authority on the spot.

No. 14A.

No. 10 S.P.C., dated Kabul, May 8, 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Afghanistan.

The only other point which remains for decision is the time for evacuating the country. This is governed by two considerations; firstly, how our occupation of Kabul will affect the new Amir; and secondly, whether the supplies available for the army will allow a prolonged occupation.

It will probably, on political grounds, be advisable to withdraw from the capital as soon after the installation of the new Amir as possible. The presence of British troops will not add to the security or popularity of the Chief, when he has once established himself. But whether military exigencies will permit our armies to withdraw to Ali Kheyl, Shalozan, Gandamak, and the slopes of the Sufeid Koh in the Shinwari and Khugiani country, I am unable to say. Their stay or march must in a great measure depend on the supplies procurable in Kabul. My information, which is gathered from many reliable sources, leads me to doubt whether it will be possible to support so large a force as is now in the neighbourhood of Kabul, without importation from India. The Kabul, Logar, Maidan, and Wardak villages are those alone on which we can rely, and even here armed bands of insurgents only too often close the roads

the moment our troops are withdrawn. These valleys although fertile are of but small area; and many of the villages, according to the revenue returns, only produce sufficient grain for their own consumption. The season, moreover, is not a favourable one; and while the outturn will be fair on irrigated lands, those dependent on rainfall will have a poor crop. These valleys have already been drained of their food stocks, and Kohistan, which has not yet been visited by our troops, has still been harried by bands of Ghazis, who have lived at free quarters in the villages. Nor is Kohistan a grain country. Its chief produce is from its vineyards, orchards, and gardens, and it pays its revenue in cash, and not in grain.

The question of supplies, as regulating the date of the evacuation of Kabul, is one which is engaging the attention of the military authorities, but its bearing on the political situation is so close that it could not with propriety be omitted from the present memorandum.

No. 15.

No. 23.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF
INDIA IN COUNCIL.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, 21st May 1880.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their most anxious consideration the state of affairs in Afghanistan resulting from the war entered upon in the autumn of 1878, the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879, the murder of the British Envoy at Kabul, and the military operations which were renewed with the object of punishing that outrage.

2. According to the latest information at my disposal, the Kabul, Kandahar, and Kurram forces absorb fully 55,000 men, of whom about 16,000 are Europeans. This is exclusive of about 13,500 men on the Punjab frontier, and is also exclusive of a force of more than 14,000 men in Sind and in the Bengal Presidency, who are held in readiness for service in Afghanistan.

3. It is evident that the employment of such a large portion of the Army of India beyond our frontier, while a further considerable force is held in readiness for service, entails a heavy financial burthen on the resources of India, and that the prolonged employment of our troops under such conditions must, especially in the case of the Native regiments, before long very seriously interfere with their efficiency.

4. Already, I have been informed by your Excellency's predecessor that it is most difficult to obtain recruits in India, a difficulty which arises in the main from the extreme dislike of the Native soldier to prolonged service in Afghanistan, and although costly and inconvenient measures have been adopted in order to stimulate enlistment, I am not yet informed that these measures have been attended with success. The continued stoppage of the usual furlough given to the Native troops serving in Afghanistan and the possible extension of a similar deprivation to those in British India itself, in consequence of the heavy duties entailed on them in the absence of a large part of the army, cannot but have a bad effect, and I conceive that, with a force of some 76 Native regiments on or beyond our frontier, it will be very difficult to devise any scheme for their relief.

5. Although our armies have encountered during the last campaign some severe opposition, yet, owing to the conspicuous gallantry and devotion of Her Majesty's troops, both European and Native, on all occasions, the superiority of our arms has been unquestionably established and maintained. Nevertheless, the result, even from a military point of view, is far from satisfactory.

6. The Army in Afghanistan holds positions at Kabul and in its neighbourhood, at Kandahar, with an outpost at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and in the Kurram valley, besides guarding the lines of communication between these places and our frontier. I trust that these lines of communication are now secure from any serious danger, but, up to a recent date, they have not been exempt from annoyance and some loss of life on all three routes; while beyond the positions actually occupied by our troops we have for the most part established no control. The Government which previously existed has been destroyed, and no authority exists in the country except that of independent

Chiefs over the various tribes. No security can, therefore, be felt that a renewed combination of these tribes against us may not recur at any moment, and that we may not be again compelled to defend positions which we hold.

7. To attempt to occupy the whole country and to reduce it to submission and order would probably require a much larger force even than that which we have now in Afghanistan, and such order as might even then be established would have no prospect of permanence, beyond the period of our occupation. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider what progress has yet been made towards the conclusion of arrangements which offer any hope of re-establishing a settled Government and which may enable us to withdraw from the country.

8. On referring to the correspondence which has passed between the Government of India and my predecessor, I find that in a Despatch, dated 7th January last, No. 3, Lord Lytton's Government explained as fully, I presume, as was then possible the policy which it was at that time desired to adopt. Its main features were—(1) avoidance of territorial annexation or further assumption by the Indian Government of administrative responsibilities in respect of Afghanistan, and (2) acceptance of the "disintegration of the kingdom of the late Amir Shere Ali Khan as a basis for the "political reconstitution of the country." In the opinion of Lord Lytton's Government events, on the one hand, had shown the sufficiency of the military frontier secured by the Treaty of Gandamak, and, on the other hand, had demonstrated that the reconstruction of the Afghan kingdom under a single ruler was not practically possible, even were it politically desirable. They accordingly contemplated a provisional occupation of Herat and Seistan by Persia; the establishment of the province of Kandahar as a separate State under an hereditary ruler selected from among the representatives of the old governing families, to be supported by a British garrison at or near the capital; and a similar arrangement in regard to Kabul to which the Oxus provinces might remain, under certain conditions, nominally subject.

9. But while such were the views entertained by the Government of India in January last, it does not appear that, except in the case of Kandahar, any substantial approach to a definitive settlement in accordance with them has been made since that date. The negotiations which were in progress with Persia in reference to Herat and Seistan led to no result, and have been suspended. At Kabul, Sirdar Wali Mahomed has been placed in charge of the city and adjacent districts, but, by general consent, he would be wholly powerless to assert his authority even in the capital without the support of a British garrison, while no other of the Sirdars now on the spot offers better promises of success as an independent ruler, and the result of communications which have been opened with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, at present in Afghan Turkestan, is quite uncertain.

10. Turning to the measures which have been actually adopted in reference to Kandahar, Her Majesty's Government find that the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has been informed in a letter from the late Viceroy, under date the 13th March, which was formally presented to him on the 11th instant, in the presence of a large assemblage, that the Queen has been pleased to recognize him as independent ruler of the province, according to limits to be hereafter defined, but that, for the consolidation of his power and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's empire, it is necessary that a force of British troops should remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It appears also, from the Secret Letter of the Government of your Excellency's predecessor, No. 90, dated the 7th April last, that the Sirdar has expressed his readiness to accept the position proposed to him, and that he has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required.

11. Thus it appears that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.

12. I proceed to consider the question how far it is necessary to acquiesce in the continuance of this position of affairs. The first object which Her Majesty's Government desires to accomplish is the speedy withdrawal of the greater part of the troops now employed in Afghanistan, and the ultimate withdrawal of the whole from positions beyond our own frontier. But they also desire, if it be still possible, to see the

restoration on our north-western frontier of a friendly State capable of maintaining its own independence, and of administering its own affairs without the military support of the British Government. The engagements which have been contracted in the name of the Queen with Sher Ali Khan, or with any other Afghan Chief, must of course be scrupulously respected, and it is essential that, as a preliminary to any change of policy, your Excellency in Council should satisfy yourself of the exact nature of those engagements, and how far they preclude the substitution of some other arrangement if thought desirable.

13. With regard to the measures which have been taken at Kandahar, I find that so recently as the 16th February last Sher Ali expressed his willingness, if not his desire, to retire on a pension from the Indian Government; and, although he has since accepted the proposed arrangements, there is nothing on record to prove that his wishes in this respect are changed. Again, the boundaries of the State are not even approximately defined in Sir D. Stewart's letter of the 16th February, and it does not appear that any communication on the subject has since been made to Sher Ali. The location of the British force to be maintained at Kandahar has not been decided, and upon this point an important difference of opinion exists between Sir D. Stewart and Sher Ali, the General considering that the troops should be at least five miles from the city, whilst the Sirdar wishes that on no account should they be removed to any distance. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy to be paid for the support of the garrison has not been fixed, and Sher Ali has expressed doubts whether he can maintain himself if such subsidy be insisted on.

14. It is possible that a further discussion of the points alluded to in the preceding paragraph may afford an opening for reconsideration of the whole question, if it is thought desirable. The papers, moreover, contain various indications that the Sirdar distrusts his ability to maintain his position at all except by our direct military support. How far the terms of the late Viceroy's letter, and of the assurances subsequently given, constitute a pledge of such support which could not now be withdrawn without breach of faith, is a question upon which it will be for your Excellency in Council to satisfy yourself as soon as possible.

15. With regard to Kabul, the invitation which has been addressed to Abdul Rahman appears to be of a vague character, and no engagements can yet have been entered into with him which practically commit the British Government to his support. In this quarter, therefore, as I have already observed, Her Majesty's Government is free to adopt whatever line of policy may ultimately be deemed best suited to attain the objects which the Government of India have professedly had in view, namely, the restoration of order in Afghanistan, and the peace and security of the British frontier.

16. The withdrawal of the troops cannot, under any circumstances, be immediate, and may probably, upon sanitary grounds alone, require to be postponed until the month of November. The experience of last year has shown the suffering to which an army is liable in traversing the passes at an unfavourable season, and very strong reasons would be required to justify the exposure to heat and epidemic disease of troops who have already been engaged for a lengthened period in service of a trying and difficult character.

17. Her Majesty's Government, moreover, fully recognize that a too hasty withdrawal, either from Kabul or Kandahar, would probably lead to a renewal of disturbances and to prolonged civil war. For the disastrous consequences to the Afghan people the British Government could not be held altogether free from responsibility, while protracted anarchy in Afghanistan would probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions, and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies, which it is essential to avoid. An indispensable preliminary, also, to withdrawal, is the dispersion of any considerable hostile forces in the field which might attack and harass the troops on their march. It would not be consistent with the honour of the British arms, that Her Majesty's forces on their return to India should be exposed to insult, or that the least ground should be afforded either to the Afghans or the people of British India to regard the movement as otherwise than voluntary, and as having been decided on as a consequence of the cessation of all serious opposition. It will further be necessary to take every precaution that the tribes and Chiefs who have assisted us shall not be exposed to injury in consequence of their friendly conduct.

18. Subject, however, to the foregoing considerations, the desire of Her Majesty's Government is, as I have already stated, that Afghan territory should be evacuated

whenever it appears possible to entertain the hope that the prospect of a stable Government has been secured. The interval which must elapse before the withdrawal of our troops can be commenced will enable your Excellency in Council to form a judgment and to report fully to Her Majesty's Government as to the manner in which this object may best be attained.

19. The arguments in favour of the subdivision of the Afghan kingdom appear to be twofold. It is, in the first place, held to be impossible to find any Chief sufficiently strong to rule the whole country, but upon this point the information in my possession does not enable me to form a confident opinion.

20. The second argument is of a different kind. In the opinion of those who have been most in favour of a policy of active interference in Afghanistan, it is on the line of Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat, that it is most necessary that our strategic position should be secured. There are few who apprehend any danger or attach much importance to the line of approach to India which lies through Kabul and the Khyber Pass. It was therefore with the Amir of Afghanistan in his capacity of Ruler of Kandahar and of Southern and Western Afghanistan that it has been thought necessary to attempt to improve our relations; and whatever importance may in future be attached by the Government of India to the political condition of that territory, it is thought that it may be better that we should have to deal with the ruler of it alone, and not necessarily be involved in interference with the internal affairs of Central, Northern, and Eastern Afghanistan. Should the result of the consideration which your Excellency in Council will give to the question induce you to regard as sound the view above set forth, it might, perhaps, be feasible to effect an earlier retirement from Kabul and the neighbouring district than from Western Afghanistan. In such a case, assuming the communications which have been addressed to Abdul Rahman to be responded to by him in a satisfactory manner, the object would be to establish that Sirdar at Kabul with as little direct assistance from Her Majesty's agents or troops as possible, and to give him to understand that he must rely on his own resources.

21. It would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government be undesirable to embarrass him, and to commit ourselves to the possible necessity of further interference, by insisting on his receiving a British Resident. On the other hand a Native envoy would probably be of assistance to him in maintaining his authority, and would supply the Indian Government with all necessary information.

22. But although these arguments may be urged in favour of the establishment of separate kingdoms of Kabul and Kandahar, considerations in my opinion of not less weight point to a different conclusion. It is the strong opinion of experienced men that a permanent peace cannot be established in Afghanistan under such an arrangement. It is argued that, from the character of its population, the fertility of its soil, and its military position, Kandahar is the most important province of the country, that without it no strong and independent kingdom of Afghanistan can exist, and that no ruler of Kabul will acquiesce in its exclusion from his dominions. Sirdar Sher Ali is aware of this, and also that he cannot by himself hold his province against the war-like tribes on his frontier. It must, therefore, be regarded as almost certain that a policy of separation will be found to involve the necessity of affording permanent military support to the ruler of Kandahar, a liability to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the greatest objection.

23. In the event of it appearing compatible with engagements which have been entered into, and desirable from the point of view of policy, to revert to the idea of the reconstruction of the kingdom of Afghanistan as a whole, and should the negotiations with Abdul Rahman fail to lead to any satisfactory result, it may become necessary for your Excellency carefully to reconsider the position of Yakub Khan, and the facts which have been ascertained with regard to his conduct in Kabul in September last. I am aware that your Excellency's predecessor held a strong opinion that his treachery or incapacity had been so conclusively proved that his restoration had become impossible, and I am far from asserting that this may not be the case. I am also aware that the Government of your Excellency's predecessor had formally decided that the abdication of Yakub Khan is to be treated as irrevocable, that this decision has been communicated to the Government at home, and has been approved, and I understand that it has been announced at Kabul that his return would never be permitted.

24. These circumstances undoubtedly constitute grave, and, possibly, insuperable obstacles to the acceptance of Yakub Khan as a candidate for the throne of Afghan-

istan; but he appears to have a strong party in the country, and if it should be found that, as the heir of the late ruler, he would command more support than any other candidate, and that there is no conclusive proof against him of complicity in the murder of Sir L. Cavagnari and his escort, I am of opinion that his claims, or those of his son, Musa Khan, should not be held to be absolutely excluded.

25. It is probable that, in the negotiations between your Excellency's Govern-

* "The Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Amir's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Amir, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to that Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Amir as an independent ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories, but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should their endeavours to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Amir that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. The British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."

ment and the candidate who may be accepted as the ruler of Kabul, your Excellency will be asked how far you are prepared to give assurances of support against external attack, such as were so anxiously desired by the late Amir Shere Ali. Her Majesty's Government are prepared to renew the assurances which were offered in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, as quoted in the margin,* to the effect that, upon certain conditions, he might rely on the support of the British Government against unprovoked aggression; but they are unable in any degree to extend them, or to assume

undefined liabilities in regard to the foreign policy of a Government the character of which must necessarily be at present so uncertain.

26. The future of Herat presents perhaps greater difficulty than any other part of the Afghan question. The arrangement proposed with Persia, as I have already stated, has been suspended, and the negotiations will probably not be renewed. The most desirable solution would undoubtedly be that the city and dependent territory should continue to form part of an united kingdom of Afghanistan. Indeed, the position of Herat constitutes one of the most serious objections to the disintegration of Afghanistan. It would be difficult for the ruler of either Kandahar or Kabul, as detached provinces, to establish his authority over it, and, in the event of an independent Sirdar assuming power at Herat, it would be practically almost impossible for the British Government to exercise any control or influence over his policy.

27. It will be necessary for your Excellency to consider carefully with your military advisers the expediency of maintaining the advanced military positions on the North-West frontier which have been acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. The necessity of retaining the posts in the district of Pishin will be materially affected by the policy which may be decided on with reference to Kandahar, and it is probable that, for the present at all events, the maintenance of them will be desirable; but the value of the positions now held in the Kurram and Khyber districts appears to be open to the greatest doubt. A large force is now locked up in the Kurram valley with little or no military advantage, and the military occupation of the Khyber pass can probably not be permanently maintained except by the employment of a considerable force, at much risk to the health and efficiency of the troops and with little compensating profit. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that your decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

28. I have not attempted in the preceding observations to define for the guidance of your Excellency in Council a fixed policy which would admit of no modification. The position of affairs in Afghanistan is still involved in so much uncertainty and obscurity that Her Majesty's Government can as yet do little more than commit them to the judgment of your Excellency in Council, in the full confidence that your Excellency is generally acquainted with, and concurs in, the policy which they desire to pursue, with a view to the restoration of peace, the relief of the present heavy strain upon the resources of India, and the permanent security of the frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 16.

No. 131 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Diaries of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, for the period from the 8th to 21st May 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ A. CLARKE.
 „ J. STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ RIVERS THOMPSON.
 „ J. GIBBS.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MEMORANDUM, No. 204, dated Kandahar, 19th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.B., C.S.I., Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to forward copy of Diary of the Kandahar Residency from the 8th to the 14th May 1880. Extract.—

May 11th.—This morning at 7.30 the Viceroy's letter and gifts were formally presented to the Wali; Lieutenant-General Primrose, commanding the Kandahar force, was kind enough to be present with his staff. Brigadier-General Brooke, the heads of the different departments, and the Officer commanding the citadel, were also present by invitation. The limited space in the Wali's house prevented a larger party being asked. A guard of honour of the 66th Regiment, under Captain McMath, with the band and the regimental colours, were drawn up in the courtyard, and half a battery of artillery in the square in front of the citadel. In the Wali's house we found a numerous assemblage, consisting of his brothers, Sirdars Hussain Khan and Nur Muhammad Khan, his young sons and nephews, the kazi and principal mullas, the leading merchants, a large number of tribal Chiefs and maliks, and others. After tea had been handed round, I addressed the Wali in Persian, as follows :—

“ His Excellency the Viceroy has ordered me to deliver to your Highness this letter in answer to that sent to His Excellency by my hand. He has also desired me to request your acceptance of these gifts as a token of the great regard and esteem he has for your Highness.”

The Wali expressed his profound gratitude, and asked that Mirza Hasan Ali Khan might read the translation of the letter aloud. The

At His Highness' request, I said that, although not mentioned in the letter, it was intended that His Highness should have the right of coining money and having the Khutbeh read in his own name.

reading of the letter was interrupted and followed by many exclamations of approval, particularly by the mullas. I then asked the Wali's permission to say a few words to those present, and on his begging me to do so, spoke as follows, in

Persian :—

“ Ulema, Sirdars, Khans, and others here present, you have seen by the letter which has just been read what great kindness the British Government, which all over the world is the support of Islam, has extended to the people of Kandahar and the Durani nation. You have also seen how peace and prosperity have been brought by us to Kandahar, and how different is its condition now from what it was two

years ago. In order that this condition of peace and prosperity may continue, and that it may not return to its former state of poverty and wretchedness, the Government of England has decided to restore it to its ancient independence under the most worthy and capable descendant of its former Governors, the Sirdars of Kandahar, whose rule only ceased 25 years ago. Under the just Government of Wali Sher Ali Khan, and under the protection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, remain for ever free from foreign oppression, and will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity that will be the envy of the whole of Islam."

The Wali made a short speech in reply, expressive of his own unworthiness and his gratitude to the English Government. The Viceroy's presents were then brought forward and uncovered. The first, consisting of a sword mounted on blue velvet and silver, with a heavy gold embroidered belt, was buckled round the Wali's waist by General Primrose, on which His Highness said that he trusted he might have an opportunity of showing his readiness to draw it in the cause of the British Government. I then placed a diamond-studded repeater watch and gold chain round His Highness' neck; and presented him with the rest of the gifts, consisting of a large silver salver, a silver ewer and basin, a clock, and several pieces of silk and velvet. The guard of honour then presented arms, and a salute of 21 guns was fired by the artillery. His Highness the Wali then received the congratulations of all present; and the kazi and mullas offered a prayer, in Pushtu, expressive of thanks to God, and exhortation to the Wali to govern justly. To this he replied in the same language, exhorting them also to do their duty in keeping the people in the right way. Sweetmeats were then handed round, and we took our leave. Intelligence reached me the next morning that, after leaving the assembly, the Wali retired into his Andarum, where he took off his dress of ceremony, and, after placing a black rag (expressive of humility) on his head, offered up open prayers to God for having elevated him to so exalted a position, vowing at the same time to be faithful to the British Government, which had so honoured him. This produced an outburst of wrath from his niece, daughter of Khushdil Khan, his eldest brother, and from one of Mihrdil Khan's (his father's) widows, who abused him for joining the infidels, and for daring to compare himself with his ancestors. The Wali's favourite wife (a daughter of Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, Tallai) took his part, and there was a violent quarrel.

No. 17.

No. 134 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan, of Kandahar, to the Viceroy, in answer to the Earl of Lytton's letter to him, dated 13th March, which was delivered by Colonel St. John on the 11th May 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. CLARKE.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" J. GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

No. 208, dated Kandahar, 20th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy in answer to that delivered by me to His Highness on the 11th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, dated 9th Jamadi-us-Sani (19th May 1880).

After compliments.—I beg to represent that your Excellency's very kind letter, together with the honours and presents which your Excellency was most graciously pleased to send, has reached me and caused me much pleasure; that on Friday, the 1st Jamadi-us-Sani (11th May 1880), I was invested with the honours which your Excellency had kindly sent me by my kind friend Colonel St. John. Both he and General Primrose have treated me with every mark of honour and respect, and the contents of your Excellency's letter afforded me the greatest joy and delight.

I feel extremely thankful to Her Imperial Majesty the Queen of England and the Empress of India for Her Majesty's unbounded favour in having recognized me (the sincere well-wisher of Her Majesty's Government) as the absolute Governor and the independent ruler (Wali) of the principality of Kandahar and its dependencies. For this favour of Her Majesty's illustrious Government I can make no return, but beg to express my most sincere gratitude to Her Majesty.

God willing, so long as I live, I shall not fail to fulfil, as far as lies in my power, the requirements of sincere friendship and devotion, inasmuch as Her Imperial Majesty has been so kind as not to withhold from me (the worthless one) anything which is likely to add to my strength or to put my affairs in order.

I am exceedingly glad to learn that a British force will remain in Kandahar for the security and protection of the frontier of Her Majesty's dominions, as the presence of troops here will ensure safety to the frontier. But in reality all the hardships of the journey, &c., to which the British troops are exposed, are for the sake of protecting my country and strengthening my position. With regard to the point that a certain quantity of the Government share in the grain produce of the country should be supplied to the British troops for provisions, I beg to state that this whole country, with all its resources, is the property and at the disposal of the British Government. Whether there be any excess of grain beyond my own wants or not, I will not fail to provide the fixed quantity for the imperial troops in the same way as I supplied to them what they required last year, a fact of which General Stewart and Colonel St. John are aware. Please God, I will endeavour to act in future as I have acted in the past. I am also exceedingly pleased to learn that a British officer of rank will be located here for the purpose of conveying the friendly communications and wishes of the British Government. I hope that, by the grace of God and the good will and kindness of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, all the affairs of this country will be properly arranged and will improve greatly, the interests of this State being identical with those of the British Government. With respect to the extension of the railway to Kandahar, to which your Excellency was pleased to allude, I beg to say that the construction of railways in every country has been the cause of its advancement, as the people derive a great many advantages from them. In fact, there would be nothing so beneficial as the construction of a railway to Kandahar, as it will afford every facility for traffic, &c. I am exceedingly pleased to hear of this proposal. Please God, the good wishes and favours of the British Government towards myself and the people of this country will continue for ever. I feel highly indebted and thankful to all the British officers who were here before, as well as to those who are here at present, especially to Colonel St. John, who pays great attention to me, and is a well wisher of his own Government and a very kind friend of mine.

Usual ending.

No. 18.

No. 164 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* this day addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. Stewart, Kabul, conveying to him instructions for concluding the political arrangements preliminary to the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul.

* No. 2431 E. P.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 2431 E. P.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

Foreign Department (Political).

SIR,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

THE latest reports from Kabul of the movements of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan show that he has now arrived in Kohistan, and that he may be expected very shortly to proceed towards Kabul. So far as his wishes and intentions can be judged from his recent actions and letters, there is fair ground for supposing that he has fully apprehended the nature and objects of the invitation sent to him in April last, and that his inclinations, as well as his needs and interests, are bringing him toward an arrangement with the British Government. It has, therefore, become expedient that you and Mr. Griffin should be furnished with instructions empowering you to conclude the political arrangements which must precede your departure from Kabul, since the evacuation of the city by our troops cannot, in any event, be much longer delayed.

2. In their correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the Government of India have throughout held steadily to two cardinal points. In the first place, it has been declared from the beginning, and throughout maintained, that our measures for withdrawing our troops from Northern Afghanistan are in no essential degree dependent upon the result of our correspondence with the Sirdar. In the instructions transmitted by my letter of the 27th April, regarding the terms of our communications with Abdul Rahman, it was laid down that our evacuation of Kabul cannot constitute any subject for proposals in Mr. Griffin's correspondence with the Sirdar. Nevertheless, since the Government were willing to carry out this evacuation in the manner most conducive to Abdul Rahman's interests, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform the Sirdar of our intention to quit the place, and of our desire, in the interests of order and the restoration of tranquillity to the country, to transfer the government to him. In my letter of the 20th May to Mr. Griffin the same policy was adhered to, and it was said that we could not materially alter our plans for evacuation upon considerations affecting a new Amir. On the 15th May, also, I telegraphed to Mr. Griffin that he should bear steadily in mind that our policy of withdrawing from Kabul is in no way dependent on establishing a friendly Amir, or on an adjustment of friendly relations, however desirable, with any Kabul ruler. The early retirement of our forces was held to be the main object of all political and military measures, an object to which the establishment of a settled Government at Kabul must, in the case of emergency, be subordinated.

3. In the second place, it was decided, in authorizing correspondence with Abdul Rahman, that this correspondence must not take the form of negotiations, in the sense of proposing or entertaining conditions, or of discussing a bargain. The suggestion that conditions should be offered to the Sirdar was definitely negated; and the scope of the instructions given regarding this correspondence was carefully limited to authorizing an unconditional invitation and offer. The Government informed the Sirdar that if he came to Kabul upon a friendly understanding he should be recognized as Amir, and assisted to establish himself before the departure of our troops. Subsequently, upon your special recommendation, the Sirdar received a distinct statement of the views and intentions of the British Government upon certain additional points. But this statement, although of high importance to the Sirdar, was given him unconditionally; and while it conveys a declaration of the policy and intentions of Government, the Sirdar's assent has been neither asked nor expected.

4. In regard, therefore, to the plan of early withdrawal of our troops from Kabul, and to the continuance of our correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the lines of instruction originally traced have been substantially adhered to. You are thus free, as matters now stand, to complete the arrangements, political and military, preliminary to the retirement of the British forces, while, as Abdul Rahman has accepted your invitation to Kabul, the time may have arrived for the fulfilment of our offers to him of recognition and assistance. Upon these points I am now to convey to you instructions in continuation and expansion of the orders already telegraphed. The Government of India agree with the opinion of yourself and Mr. Griffin that it will probably be advisable that the Sirdar should not enter Kabul immediately, but that he should remain for the present within a distance convenient for intercourse and for personal conference, if necessary, upon the arrangements for his assumption of authority. First, then, in regard to the Sirdar's recognition as Amir (which, as well as any subsequent arrangement with him, is, of course, dependent upon your being satisfied that he is dealing with us in good faith, and in a friendly spirit), he will be recognized under the title of Amir of Kabul; and whenever the announcement shall have been publicly made, it should be understood as entitling him, thereafter, to your full countenance and political support, but not to any co-operation by British troops in his measures for establishing his authority. It will consequently be your duty to discountenance and discourage all claims of candidates and combinations of parties adverse to or inconsistent with the recognition of Abdul Rahman's Amirship.

5. You have been already instructed that, for the purpose of establishing the Sirdar at Kabul, he may be provided with some artillery, and with money sufficient to meet his immediate wants. The precise number of guns to be given, and their calibre, must be left to your judgment, upon consideration of the Amir's position at Kabul, and of his own resources; the general view of the Government being that the guns should be serviceable, and sufficient to strengthen effectively his occupation of the city. In regard to money, it is important to place the Amir beyond the necessity of levying exactions upon the country, in order to collect funds for the maintenance of the troops he may require, and for the payment of his officials; and your disbursements to him will be proportioned, within a maximum of ten lacs of rupees, to your estimate of his actual wants at the time. But the Sirdar should understand that we can engage ourselves to no regular subsidy or continuous supply of either arms or money, and that, after he has taken possession of his capital, he must rely for holding it upon his own resources.

6. It would be manifestly premature at present to discuss the question whether any formal engagement should hereafter be made with the Amir's Government, before the Sirdar has established himself at Kabul, or has shown what disposition towards the British Government, or capacity for rule, he may possess. Nevertheless, since the point has been raised, and since it has been argued that the Amir may have some claim to be admitted into some such engagement, it may be well that you should receive explicit instructions on the matter. The Government of India, I am to say, see no reason for diverging from the line of policy which has, from the beginning of these transactions with the Sirdar, positively excluded any question of a treaty with him. It is true that in transmitting to the Sirdar the replies of the Government to certain questions regarding his future position, Mr. Griffin added, under authority, that if the Sirdar desired these matters to be stated in formal writing, he should first accept or refuse our invitation to Kabul. This formal statement, if he asks for it (but

not otherwise), can now be given to him; and I am accordingly to enclose a letter which may be delivered, after the Sirdar's recognition, to him as Amir. But it appears to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that it would be highly inadvisable to enter into any other engagement at the present time. The actual state of Afghanistan would render futile any attempt to introduce regular diplomatic relations with its ruler; and all questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governments must necessarily be postponed until some settled and responsible administration shall have been consolidated in North Afghanistan. This is the explanation which, if any reference is made to the question of a treaty, may be given to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

7. It will be necessary, before evacuating Kabul, to determine what measures are possible for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted us there from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct. Upon the subject of individuals who may claim our protection, and may not desire to remain in Afghanistan, you will receive a separate letter. You will, however, probably see fit to address some admonition to Abdul Rahman, intimating that, if he seeks to retain our good will, he can give no better proof of his friendly disposition than by his behaviour towards those in whom the British Government is interested. But experience has shown the inutility of making, in favour of individuals, precise stipulations which can easily be evaded, and can very rarely be enforced; while the case of tribes, who, like the Hazaras, may have compromised themselves by taking part against the Afghans in the recent disturbances, must be reserved for separate consideration.

8. The foregoing instructions will have conveyed to you the views of the Government of India on such questions as may be expected to arise in concluding the transfer of the Kabul Government to Sirdar Abdul Rahman. When in the opening of the present year it was determined to withdraw the British troops from North Afghanistan in the autumn, the Government of India considered that an invitation to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan to assume the Amirship afforded the best prospect of replacing the country under some settled and durable rule. As the Sirdar has accepted this invitation, the most desirable issue for the present situation in Kabul lies, beyond doubt, in the direction of concluding arrangements with him. Nevertheless, in the present unstable position of affairs in North Afghanistan, where the course of events is still liable to sudden changes, it is necessary to provide against the contingency of a failure to bring the correspondence with the Sirdar to a satisfactory termination. Your instructions are that if a breach with Abdul Rahman occurs, you can assemble the leaders of the party which would restore Sher Ali's family to power, offer to recognize any *de facto* Government they may be able to establish, and transfer Kabul to that Government. Moreover, you have been empowered, in the case of rupture with the Sirdar, to use all practical means, in the interval before your complete evacuation of Kabul, to communicate with the leaders of any substantial party in the country, who may be able to organize some administration at Kabul capable of discharging the functions of a Government. With this object you will proceed to notify to the Sirdars and to other representatives of the wishes and feelings of the people round Kabul, with whom it may be possible for you to communicate, that your correspondence with Abdul Rahman is at an end, and that the British Government wishes them to undertake the organization of some ruling authority. You would explain that, if no attempts are made on their part, or with their collusion, to embarrass the movement of your troops, their endeavours to restore order will be supported by your influence, so long as you remain at Kabul, and that if they succeed in setting up a Government *de facto*, you will recognize it by transferring the capital to its charge. But you are not authorized to make any further offers of assistance or specific support; and the Government of India must reserve full discretion to act, upon all ulterior questions, according to the future course of events in Afghanistan.

9. On the other hand, while the Government of India do not disguise their reluctance to leave Kabul unprotected and to relinquish as unsuccessful their endeavours to promote the restoration of order under some recognized ruler, it would be in the highest degree imprudent to allow your arrangements for the withdrawal of your troops to be materially delayed or deranged. In the eventuality contemplated it is probable that considerable confusion will prevail in the country, and it might take a long time to bring together the leading men of the alternative party. The prospect of any stable Government being formed within the short period to which your stay can in any case be limited, is uncertain; and in a former letter I have pointed out the need of great

caution in taking steps which might implicate us unprofitably, and, possibly, against the wishes of the country, in struggles among equally matched factions. Subject, therefore, to the foregoing general instructions and limitations, the Government desire to leave you free to use your own discretion as to the measures to be adopted under the circumstances for the establishment of a *de facto* Government in Kabul.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

To His Highness Sirdar ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

After compliments.

July 1880.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has proceeded toward Kabul, in accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and people from the establishment of a settled government under your Highness's authority, the British Government recognizes your Highness as Amir of Kabul.

I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to inform your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal government of the territories in the possession of your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be advisable that a Muhammedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Kabul.

Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government with regard to the position of the ruler at Kabul in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on record for your Highness' information. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by foreign powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that your Highness can have no political relations with any foreign power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary, in repelling it; provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.

I have, &c.,
(Signed)

No. 19.

No. 166 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 27th July 1880.

WE have already reported to your Lordship by telegraph that a durbar was held at Kabul on the 22nd July, in which Sir Donald Stewart publicly and formally recognized Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul.

2. In order to explain clearly the motives and considerations by which we have been actuated in countenancing Abdul Rahman's accession to the vacant rulership at Kabul, it is necessary to give some connected account of the course of affairs in,

Northern Afghanistan, and to define the objects toward which the policy of the Government of India has, during the last few months, been directed.

3. Our Despatch of the 7th April last, upon the situation at that date in Afghanistan, referred to a Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General (the Earl of Lytton) as summing up the policy which the Government of India were then endeavouring to carry out. The Minute stated that the Government were anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond the frontier settled by the Treaty of Gandamak, excepting Kandahar, and that it was desirable, in order that this might be done, to find a ruler for Kabul. Upon this latter point our Despatch reported, more specifically, the conclusion of the Government of India that Sirdar Abdul Rahman, who was known to have entered Afghan Turkistan, would, if he agreed to certain territorial limitations, be more likely than any other of his family to prove a successful ruler. The Sirdar had given, indirectly, some hints that he desired an opening for correspondence with the English, and friendly messages had been sent to him in return; so that there was reason to expect before long some definite overtures on his part. In April last, therefore, the settled policy adopted by the Government of India was to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible from the interior of North Afghanistan, and to open correspondence with Sirdar Abdul Rahman, with the view of facilitating by a friendly understanding his assumption of authority at Kabul.

4. It should be here mentioned that at the end of March a letter had been sent by the British authorities at Kabul to Abdul Rahman, whose presence and movements beyond the Hindu Kush could not in any case be ignored, stating simply that the bearer was authorized to transmit to Kabul any representations the Sirdar might be inclined to make regarding his object in entering Afghanistan. The messenger was empowered also to let the Sirdar understand that the British Government was favourably disposed toward him, and to afford him every opening for a friendly correspondence. This letter elicited a very friendly, though guarded, reply. The Sirdar expressed in very general terms his hope of obtaining power, and said that he greatly desired the friendship of the English and their assistance in restoring peace and order to Afghanistan. At the same time he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for the hospitality which he had received placed him in some doubt as to the terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him. He added, in a verbal message, that he was ready to cross the Hindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers. The receipt of this answer made it necessary to settle carefully the basis upon which the communications, thus initiated, were to be continued, and to define precisely the scope and nature of the arrangements which the British Government might be prepared to conclude with the Sirdar.

5. Accordingly the Government of India, after a very careful survey of the situation, addressed* to Mr. Lepel Griffin at Kabul a full exposition of the policy which was to govern all our relations with the Sirdar, with explicit instructions regarding the language to be held in corresponding with him. In regard to the policy, its main lines and objects, as already determined, were described as follows:—"Our only reasons" (it was said) "for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan, have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country."

"The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated 30th March, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that 'the Government is 'anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points 'beyond those to be occupied under the treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. 'In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will 'be separated from Kandahar. Steps' (continued His Excellency) 'are being taken 'for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of 'strength in Afghanistan, as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will 'overawe disaffection.' * * * 'For this, all that is necessary from the political 'point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition 'he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication 'with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined have 'been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni."

“ With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.”

“ The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.”

6. This being the policy and plan of operations of the Government of India, it appeared to the Governor General in Council that to attach any conditions to the proposals which might be addressed to Abdul Rahman, or to enter into any negotiations with him upon the subject, would be unnecessary and inconsistent with the views and course of action laid down. For, in the first place, the Government of India require from the Sirdar no pledges, concessions, or reciprocal engagements. Our invitation to him was given, not as a preliminary to forming an alliance with the Kabul ruler, or that his consent to our political arrangements might be secured; but chiefly in order that, by transferring the administration to a competent ruler, we might be spared the necessity of leaving something like anarchy behind us whenever our troops should have been withdrawn. In the second place, it seemed that any negotiation with Abdul Rahman must in all probability raise some very embarrassing points, and would be very likely to involve us in a protracted discussion, which might entail delay and affect our plans for the withdrawal of our troops. And finally, the Sirdar's capabilities and disposition were little known, while he was obviously in no position to become responsible for the execution of regular political engagements.

7. Mr. Griffin was therefore directed to reply to the Sirdar, by letter and through his confidential agents, expressing satisfaction at the friendly sentiments which the Sirdar's letter contained, and concurring heartily with his desire for peace and the restoration of order. The political arrangements in South Afghanistan were to be communicated to him, and he was to be informed that we had settled to withdraw our troops from Kabul in a few months. It was to be explained to him that we desired, before leaving, to make over Kabul and its provinces to a capable and friendly ruler, whose accession would be in accordance with the wishes and usages of the country, and who would be able to maintain his authority and restore order. That, with this view we were ready to transfer the Government to him and to recognize him as ruler of the State, and further to afford him facilities and even support in reorganizing the administration and establishing himself at the capital. If (it was said) in future Abdul Rahman should prove by his conduct his friendship towards us, and his confidence in us, such behaviour would be fully reciprocated, very much to his advantage; and it was added that his behaviour towards those who have assisted and have been in close intercourse with British officers in Afghanistan would be taken as a test of the sincerity of his desire to acquire and retain our friendship.

8. Upon this basis, therefore, and subject to the limitations above defined, our political officers at Kabul were authorized to proceed with the correspondence with Abdul Rahman.

9. The mission which conveyed Mr. Griffin's reply, stating formally the views of the Government, and inviting the Sirdar to Kabul, was received by Abdul Rahman at Khanabad with much courtesy, and the whole matter was repeatedly discussed at different interviews. It soon became apparent that the Sirdar's needs and interests made an understanding with the English at Kabul of great importance to him, and that he was by no means indisposed to accept the invitation. But the reports of his conversation with the mission indicated some impression on his part that the British Government contemplated a treaty with him, and it was natural that he should show his desire in any case to obtain some information regarding the extent of territory which would be recognized as his dominion, and generally as to the nature of his political relations and responsibilities as ruler of Kabul. The Sirdar's statement upon these points to the members of the mission proved that until his doubts and uncertainty in these points should have been set at rest, he was unwilling to compromise

himself by moving towards Kabul. After consultation with the Sirdars and officers, he made in durbar the following declaration :—

“When the British Government tell me what are to be the boundaries of Afghanistan, will Kandahar, as of old, be left in my kingdom or not ?

“Will an European Envoy and a Government (British) force remain within the borders of Afghanistan, after friendship is made between the two parties, or not ?

“What enemy of the British Government shall I be expected to repel, and what manner of assistance will Government wish me to give ?

“And what benefits will the Government undertake to confer on me and my countrymen ?

“These are matters which I must place before the Chiefs of my country, and in concert with them I will, having ascertained how far I can do so, undertake such terms of a treaty as I can accept and carry out. For this purpose, as soon as I am informed on these points, I will at once go to Kabul ; and, in order to get a reply quickly, I will at once post mounted couriers at various places on the road. I will also issue a proclamation to my countrymen, directing them to assemble within their own bounds, and to abstain from advancing against the British army, or provoking hostilities. I will send back one of you two with a written reply to the letter sent to me by the British Government, If I receive an answer in accordance with my wishes, and those of my countrymen, I will then set out from here to Kabul. Otherwise, should the conditions be such as I cannot undertake and accept, I will consider carefully whether to go to Kabul and discuss them.”

10. The mission sent to Kabul their report of Abdul Rahman's requests and wishes, adding that his real intentions would be made known by the written reply which the Sirdar was sending. This report was forwarded to us by Mr. Griffin, with a strong expression of his opinion that the Sirdar would not be satisfied without precise information as to the limits of his dominions and the responsibilities which he might incur by dealing with us. The Sirdar's own reply followed on the 2nd of June. It contained merely general expressions of friendship and hope for support, but the Sirdar mentioned that Ibrahim Khan, who took the letter, would add some verbal explanations. The account, however, of the state of affairs at Khanabad and of the Sirdar's disposition, given by the two British agents on their return to Kabul with this reply, appears to have convinced our political officers that the Sirdar had been merely temporizing. They, recommended, therefore, that an ultimatum should be addressed to him, stating plainly his position in certain particulars regarding which the Sirdar was believed to require a clear understanding with the British Government. But the Government of India decided that, since a reply on these points might involve questions of decisive importance to our future course of action in North Afghanistan, it would be right to await, before answering the telegram, the arrival of the present Viceroy at Simla.

11. In the meantime it had become known throughout North Afghanistan that the British Government was in communication with Abdul Rahman Khan. The general uncertainty as to the result of this correspondence, the rumours prevalent regarding the Sirdar's real disposition and plans, and the jealousies of opposing factions, caused much fermentation among the people ; while this uneasiness was increased and extended by letters, purporting to emanate from the Sirdar, and bidding the tribes to be armed and ready, which circulated through the country. Some of these letters were intercepted and brought to Kabul, and the Sirdar was simultaneously reported to be in close correspondence with Muhammad Jan, who was undoubtedly engaged in levying forces against us. These reports, and the spread of excitement throughout the country, suggested to our chief military and political officers grave doubts as to the good faith of the Sirdar, and it became necessary to consider very seriously the expediency of continuing with him amicable communications which General Stewart and Mr. Griffin were disposed to abandon.

12. Upon this situation of affairs, which for the moment assumed a critical aspect, the Government of India, after the present Viceroy's arrival, deliberated carefully. The question to be determined was whether, at this stage of the correspondence with Abdul Rahman, having regard to what had actually passed between him and our representatives at Kabul, to the Sirdar's public acts and letters, to his position in Afghan Turkistan, and to our declared intention of speedily withdrawing our troops from Kabul, we should undertake the responsibility of breaking off the correspondence. It appeared to us to be very probable that Abdul Rahman might be endeavouring

to bring pressure to bear upon the British Government, and at the same time to strengthen himself independently by encouraging the fanatic spirit of the people, and by summoning them to be ready to join his standard. It was manifestly his interest, particularly as our intention to withdraw early from Kabul was no secret, to gain over as many adherents as possible, and in prosecuting these intrigues and combinations he incurred great risk of setting in motion forces which he might be unable to control, and of provoking, intentionally or otherwise, collision with the British troops, or at any rate of straining his relations with us beyond the point up to which they could be prudently maintained. On the other hand, we were without actual evidence that the Sirdar was deceiving us, and that he had secretly resolved not only to refuse our invitation, but to engage in hostilities against us. On the whole, therefore, we resolved that, finding no distinct proof of the Sirdar's duplicity, and taking into account the known difficulties of his position, the fair and politic course of action before finally closing, as we had been advised to do, our correspondence with him, would be to send him plain replies upon the points to which he evidently attached particular importance. There was no reason why these replies should be withheld, while to break off communications abruptly, leaving his questions unanswered, might have afforded the Sirdar some pretext for declaring the British Government responsible for this unsatisfactory conclusion. We therefore telegraphed to Kabul precise instructions on the points reported to be essential, and we desired a letter to be written, in pursuance of these instructions, to Abdul Rahman. The messenger taking this letter was ordered to request an answer within four days of its receipt by the Sirdar, and to set out on his return to Kabul, with or without an answer, on the fifth day.

13. A copy of this letter, dated 14th June, is already in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. It contains a statement of the views which we entertain with respect to the position which the ruler of Kabul holds in relation to foreign powers, and it explains to what extent, and under what circumstances, the British Government would be prepared to afford support to the new Amir against external attack. In regard to territorial limits, the letter bars discussion on certain points settled or held in reserve, but expresses the willingness of the British Government that over the rest of Afghanistan the Sirdar shall re-establish the authority exercised by previous rulers of his family. He is further informed that there is no wish to station English Residents within his territories. In conclusion, he is told that, if he desires a more formal record of these matters, he must first accept the invitation sent him by the British authorities, must proceed toward Kabul, and must state his propositions for ulterior arrangements.

14. On the day after this letter had been despatched, a letter from the Sirdar, dated 9th June, reached Kabul, in which he announced that, after settling all his affairs, he would start in the direction of Kabul. To this Mr. Griffin replied expressing pleasure at this intelligence, but pointing out that the Sirdar's exhortations to the chiefs to collect their men and be ready for action had caused much excitement, and requesting him to use his authority to dissolve and repress these gatherings.

15. The Sirdar replied within the prescribed period of four days to Mr. Griffin's letter of the 14th June, which had reached him on the 20th at Khanabad. In his answer, received at Kabul on the 26th June, he declared that the communications made to him regarding his future position as ruler of Kabul was in all respects satisfactory. He intimated that he had addressed the Afghan Chiefs in the same sense, and he stated that he would himself very shortly reach Parwan, on the southern slope of the Hindu Kúsh mountains. But, simultancously, a secret message was received from a confidential and trustworthy source, implying strong distrust of Abdul Rahman's sincerity, while it was observed that both in the Sirdar's letter to Mr. Griffin, and in his address to the chiefs, that portion which alluded to the territorial reservations was certainly worded ambiguously. These indications, and the disturbed aspect of affairs round Kabul, increased the strong misgivings entertained by our political officers as to the Sirdar's real intentions, and strengthened their belief that he might be only protracting the correspondence in order to gain an advantageous position for further demands, and possibly for eventual hostility. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin represented to the Government of India, for the second time, their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdul Rahman, the imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the necessity, in this critical situation, of breaking off with Abdul Rahman, and adopting other means for establishing a government in Kabul before our evacuation.

16. We have already, in our Despatch of the 6th July, submitted to your Lordship a full statement of the difficult case which was thus again placed before us for decision upon the issue whether the correspondence with Abdul Rahman should or should not be closed, and we have explained at length the grounds upon which our decision was framed. These grounds, stated briefly, were that, as a rupture with Abdul Rahman appeared to us hardly justifiable, we preferred holding on our course, at the risk of some disadvantage or embarrassment, to incurring, by a sudden premature change, any possible imputation on our good faith and firmness of purpose. We considered, moreover, that, as matters stood then, an arrangement with Abdul Rahman offered the most advisable solution, while we doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement. The subsequent course of events has as yet given us no reason to regret our determination not to pronounce for the rupture, nor has Sir D. Stewart been compelled to use the authority, vested in him conditionally by our final instructions, to break off, in certain circumstances, the negotiations with Abdul Rahman.

17. Rissaldar Afzul Khan, who had remained at Khanabad after the return of the other two members of the mission originally sent from Kabul to Abdul Rahman, arrived at Kabul on the 3rd July. He brought a reply to Mr. Griffin's letter requiring the Sirdar to use his authority to repress tribal gatherings, in which Abdul Rahman pleaded the weakness of his authority, and represented that by ordering the clansmen to disperse he should only alienate all his supporters. We suggested to Sir D. Stewart that, if these excuses seemed to him reasonable, he might consider the expediency of not pressing too closely upon Abdul Rahman the final requisition that he should disperse the gatherings in Kohistan. The general situation was described by Mr. Lepel Griffin on the 7th July :—

"The position of affairs, so far as the probabilities of a settlement with Abdul Rahman, as desired by the Government of India, are concerned, appear far more favourable than they did last week. The firm and decided tone in which the Sirdar has been addressed, the precision and definiteness of the conditions which have been laid down as necessary for his acceptance, have had the anticipated effect. Abdul Rahman has seen that we have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, that trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intends coming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to accept our terms rather than dictate his own."

18. On the 10th July Abdul Rahman's answer to Mr. Griffin's final letter, desiring him to proceed at once to Kabul, and to take measures for controlling the tribal gatherings, was received at Kabul. Its purport was to adjourn any specific reply until he should have arrived in Kohistan, and as there was at the moment no sign of growing hostility against us, while the country was outwardly quiet, Sir D. Stewart determined that the Sirdar need not be hurried in his compliance with our requisitions. A deputation of influential persons, friendly to British interests, was sent to meet the Sirdar, and was very courteously received by him at Tutandara. He wrote again to Mr. Griffin, explaining that he was detained for a few days at that place; but on the 20th he reached Charikar. A large number of leading chiefs and other influential personages, including Mushk-i-Alam, and some of the principal Ghilzai and Wardak Chiefs, have signified their adherence to his cause, or their acquiescence in his recognition, and many have gone to meet him at Charikar. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin considered that, under these circumstances, it was advisable that the Sirdar's public recognition as Amir should no longer be deferred; and the Sirdar himself, who was consulted, expressed much satisfaction at the proposal. On the 22nd, accordingly, a durbar was held attended by a large number of chiefs and influential personages, and by a deputation representing the Sirdar; when Abdul Rahman was formally and publicly recognized, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, as Amir of Kabul.

19. In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to place before Her Majesty's Government a general summary of the proceedings which have been taken since April last, to accomplish that part of the policy which related to the establishment, before the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul, of a government in North Afghanistan. Our detailed instructions to Sir D. Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which his occupation of the city should terminate, were transmitted to your Lordship in our Despatch of the 20th July; and they need not be here recapitulated. In those instructions it was necessary to provide, not only for the contingency of Abdul Rahman's final recognition, and of his peaceful accession to the Amirship on the basis of a friendly understanding with the British Government, but

also for the possibility of an interruption or breach of that understanding. To this latter case we need not now more specifically allude, except to observe that Sir D. Stewart's instructions for dealing with that eventuality left much, within certain limits, to his discretion, and that he was enjoined to use all practical means for establishing some *de facto* government before his departure. But all his measures for this object were to be subject to military considerations; nor could they be permitted materially to delay or derange his operations for the withdrawal of the British troops.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

CORRESPONDENCE with SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN referred to in the foregoing Despatch.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to MR. GRIFFIN, 15th April 1880.

WHEREAS at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great (British) Government know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia night and day I have cherished the hope of re-visiting my native land. When the late Amir Shere Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated (that I should do so) then, I went to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms, and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested (dishonest) person, and raised fools to power, until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these:—That as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them (England and Russia), for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people.

This is my wish; for the rest it is yours to decide.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 30th April 1880.

On the 21st April I received your friendly letter from Kunduz, and understood its contents, together with the messages which you sent by Muhammad Sarwar. Both were submitted by telegram for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India at Simla, and I am now commanded by him to reply to your letter to the following effect.

The friendly sentiments which you have expressed are cordially reciprocated, and the British Government has only one object in its communications with you, namely, to restore peace to Afghanistan, and friendly relations between that country and itself. For this it is believed that the time is opportune. An army marching from Kandahar has just occupied Ghazni and is now pursuing its march to Kabul; while the Wardaks, who have opposed the march of a brigade sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar army, have been defeated with heavy loss.

The British Government does not desire to annex Afghanistan, and will withdraw its armies from Kabul so soon as it has established an Amir who is willing to live in peace and friendship with the Government.

This you are ready to do, and consequently the Viceroy and Governor General, believing you to be the most capable of the Barakzai family and most approved by the people of Afghanistan, offers you the Amirship, and will assist you to establish yourself, and supply your immediate wants.

What you have said regarding Russia has been fully understood, and the Government appreciates your sentiments towards those from whom you have so long experienced hospitality. But on this point no difficulty need arise, for with regard to your future relations with Russia, the Government desires nothing different from what has already been agreed upon between that country and Her Majesty's Government.

It is of great importance for you to take action at once ; should you accept this friendly offer of the Government, you will do well to come to Kabul without delay, where you are assured of honourable reception and personal safety. But at no place but Kabul can final arrangements be satisfactorily and quickly made.

This letter, in duplicate, is taken by Wazirzada Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, a trusted official of the British Government, who will explain other matters by word of mouth, and by Sirdar Sher Muhammad Khan, who is well known to you, and who is a well-wisher of the British Government and of Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 16th May 1880.

BE it known to your friendly mind that I have received by the hands of Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan and Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan and Sher Muhammad Khan the kind letter which you wrote to confirm our friendship, to show your sympathy with the sorrow of Afghanistan, to exalt me amongst my peers, and to honour Afghanistan with the friendship of the British Government. My heart is filled with joy and with boundless hope for your kindness. You were good enough to write I should proceed to Kabul without delay. My friend, I had and still have great hope from the British Government, and your friendship has justified and equalled my expectations. You know well the nature of the people of Afghanistan. The word of one man can effect nothing until they feel that I speak for their good. For this reason I explained some matters to the Sirdars, of which they have informed you by letter, and I have now sent Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan to you, who will tell you what he has heard and seen. For the rest, I pray to God for your honour that you may work for the honour of myself and nation and for their prosperity. I trust in God that this people and I may some day unite to do you service, although the British Government has no need of it, but occasions of necessity may yet arise in this world. I hope the British Government will strengthen my position (literally reputation) amongst my people, that I may be enabled to keep my faith and my word, for a faithful ally alone is useful. Lastly, I pray for your health and honour. May God preserve you.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 14th June 1880.

My friend, I have received your letter of the 16th May by the hand of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, who arrived at Kabul on the 23rd May, and have fully understood its friendly sentiments and the desire which it expresses for a cordial understanding between the British Government and yourself. This letter, together with the memorandum of the members of the mission, which was shown to you before despatch, and which mentioned certain matters regarding which you desired further information, has been laid before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India ; and I am now commanded to convey to you the replies of the Government of India to the questions which you have asked.

Firstly. With regard to the position of the ruler of Kabul to foreign Powers, since the British Government admit no right of interference by foreign Powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign Power except the English ; and if any such foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.

Secondly. With regard to limits of territory, I am directed to say that the whole province of Kandahar has been placed under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi, which are retained in British possession. Consequently the Government is not able to enter into any negotiations with you on these points, nor in respect to arrangements with regard to the North-Western Frontier, which were concluded with the ex-Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan. With these reservations the British Government are willing that you should establish over Afghanistan—including Herat, the possession of which cannot be guaranteed to you, though Government are not disposed to hinder measures which you may take to obtain possession of it—as complete and extensive authority as has been hitherto exercised by any Amir of your family. The British Government desires to exercise no interference in your internal government of these territories, nor will you be required to admit an English Resident anywhere ; although, for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse between two contiguous States, it may be advisable to station, by agreement, a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government at Kabul.

If you should, after clearly understanding the wishes and intentions of the British Government, as stated in former letters and now further explained, desire these matters to be stated in a formal writing, it is necessary that you should first intimate plainly your acceptance or refusal of the invitation

of the British Government, and should state your proposals for carrying into effect friendly arrangements.

Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan has been ordered to leave Khanabad within five days after receipt of this letter, as it is necessary to understand from him, by word of mouth, the position of affairs, and your wishes and sentiments. Should your reply be sent by his hand, it will prevent delay and accelerate the conclusion of final arrangements, and consequently the Government trusts that you will be able to make use of his agency.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr GRIFFIN, 9th June 1880.

TO-DAY, the 1st Rajab, 1297 A. H. (9th June) I write to you. Yesterday I received a letter from Muhammad Sarwar Khan (Purwani). He writes that the people of Tagao have collected, and considers precautions are necessary to prevent their increasing the present agitation. Sayad Ghous-ud-din, my servant, has verbally represented to me that you had desired to know "How it was that I did not come quickly, as the time for doing so was opportune?" The receipt of the letter (from Muhammad Sarwar) and your verbal message have decided me. I will, after settling all my affairs, start for that direction, as reported to you in the letter from Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan. I pray to God for the enlargement of the friendship between us.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 15th June 1880.

MY friend. The receipt of your friendly letter of the 1st Rajab, corresponding with the 9th June, has caused me the greatest pleasure, as also to hear of your decision to proceed, without delay, in this direction. Yesterday, by the hand of swift messengers, a letter was despatched to your address, under cover of a letter to Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, Sirdar Bahadoor, containing the replies of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to those inquiries which you had some time back made as to the limits of the territories of the Amir who would be acceptable to the British Government, and as to his relations with foreign powers. I now only write to express to you the friendly sentiments of Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding Her Majesty's forces in Afghanistan, and of myself. I have also to thank you for the letter of Sarwar Khan, Purwani, and for the copy of the letter addressed by you to the Chiefs and Elders of Tagao. In this letter there is nothing calling for objection, but I desire in all friendliness to point out to you that your exhortation to the Chiefs to be active in the matter of collecting their men, remaining equipped, ready and prepared for service, will be and has been misunderstood by the Chiefs and people.

In proof of this, I enclose, for your information, copy of a letter of General Muhammad Jan to the Maliks of Maidan, forwarding to them your letter to the same Maliks, which is also herewith enclosed. You will observe that Muhammad Jan is summoning the tribes with hostile intentions to the British Government.

I also forward, for your information, copy of a letter of General Nizam-ud-din Khan, of an objectionable nature, together with one of Sirdar Ishak Khan, and one or two others of many that have reached me, from which you will see that your friendly disposition towards the British Government is not shared by those who write in your name. Should those persons, who by thus writing seriously injure you, cause an assemblage of large bodies of armed men in the neighbourhood of Kabul, these will undoubtedly be attacked and defeated, and a friendly arrangement will become more difficult. It will therefore be true wisdom on your part to at once address all those Chiefs or tribes, to whom you may have sent letters which have been thus misunderstood, and peremptorily order them to withdraw their people to their respective districts. If this be at once done, there can be no doubt but that friendship between the British Government and yourself will speedily be cemented; otherwise difficulties will certainly arise.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 22nd June 1880.

THE kind letter, sent by the hand of Taj Muhammad Khan, telling me of your welfare and friendship, arrived on the 11th Rajab (20th June), and caused me great pleasure. What was the wish and object of myself and people, you yourself have kindly granted.

Regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan which were settled by treaty with my most noble and respected grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad, these you have granted to me. And the Envoy which you have appointed in Afghanistan you have dispensed with, but what you have left to (be settled according to) my wish is, that I may keep a Mussulman Ambassador, if I please. This was my desire and that of my people, and this you have kindly granted.

About my friendly relations and communication with foreign powers, you have written that I should not have any without advice and consultation with you (the British). You should consider well that if I have the friendship of a great Government like yours, how can I communicate with another power without advice from and consultation with you? I agree to this also.

You have also kindly written that should any unwarranted (improper) attack be made by any other power on Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford me assistance; and you will not permit any other person to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted.

As to what you have written about Herat. Herat is at present in the possession of my cousin. So long as he does not oppose me, and remains friendly with me, it is better that I should leave my cousin in Herat, rather than any other man. Should he oppose me, and not listen to my words (advice) or those of my people, I will afterwards let you know. Everything shall be done as we both deem it expedient and advisable.

All the kindness you have shown is for my welfare and that of my people, how should I not accept it? You have shown very great kindness to me and my people.

I have written and sent letters containing full particulars to all the tribes of Afghanistan, and I have given copies of these papers to Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, for transmission to you; and I have also communicated verbally to Afzal Khan certain matters.

Three days after this I will give him leave to start. Consider me also, the slave of the threshold of God, as having already arrived at Parwan.

Send me back a verbal reply by Muhammad Afzal Khan, so that he may reach me on the road wherever I may be. Dated 13th Rajab.

(P.S.—In Abdul Rahman's own hand.)

I have signed this, and sealed this envelope with wax.

In this letter, and the former letters, all is written by the same hand, and there is no alteration (erasure) anywhere.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 24th June 1880.

THE friendly letter which you sent by the hand of Sayad Ghous-ud-din has reached me. Enclosed in it were the following letters. One from Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan, dated three months back; two letters from General Najm-ud-din Khan, who has been dismissed; one letter from Ghulam Hydar, dated a month and a half ago; and one letter of Muhammad Jan Khan, Wardak, and copy of a letter which I had sent to Mir Bacha Khan. I read these letters and understood their contents.

My friend, you know well the character of the people of Afghanistan. What shall I write about it? Further, you wrote that I should send orders to the tribes to dismiss their gatherings, lest something untoward should happen. If they disperse their gatherings, friendship will speedily be attainable. My friend, you yourself understand best the management of Afghanistan. I have passed these last 11 years of my life in Samarkand; and of all those who were alive in my time, not one in ten remains. The whole affairs of Afghanistan have gone to ruin; and now all the men who have appeared on the scene are youths, who do not obey their own fathers and mothers. How then will they listen to my words? Nevertheless, as was suitable to the time, I have before this written to all the tribes letters enjoining peace, and have sent copies to you. These will doubtless have been perused and fully understood by you. I cannot apply a forcible remedy. Accordingly, I have written to explain the state of affairs to you. Former rulers in spite of having exercised power and authority during several years were unable to effect this. I, who have only arrived a few days ago, have succeeded so far that I am obeyed, though empty-handed, by people who have never thought of entering into friendly relations with you, but who, their hearts being little by little reassured, are now beginning to give utterance to friendly words. If I should all at once order them to disperse to their homes, they would be estranged from me also, and the whole arrangement will fall through. For this reason I am unable to order them.

Further, with regard to Kandahar, I have already told Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, and also Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, how Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari has done me mortal injury with the Russian Government. He will have explained this to you. I have again talked to Sirdar Afzal Khan on the subject; he will lay my representation before you.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 2nd July 1880.

I HAVE received with much pleasure your friendly letter of 22nd June, which has been forwarded by telegraph to Simla, and laid before his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

As you have desired a reply, I am directed to inform you that the Government of India are rejoiced that the friendly explanations which have been furnished to you have fulfilled your wishes, and that you appreciate the objects of the Government.

With regard to your reference to the resignation to you of Afghanistan up to the limits which were settled of old by treaty with your renowned grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, the Government is not sure what treaty is alluded to by you. But the Government assume that you fully understand the statement in my former letter regarding reservations of territory.

You have written that Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan will explain certain matters verbally. Be assured that these will receive immediate consideration.

With regard to your statement that you will shortly reach Parwan, I am commanded to state that in the present state of affairs it is necessary that you should, without delay at Parwan, proceed at once towards Kabul, with such moderate force only as may be sufficient for your protection, in order that remaining arrangements may be definitely concluded.

You have already written to the tribes to do nothing improper to excite the distrust of the English, and you should now take effective steps to insure immediate obedience to these orders; and especially the gathering of large bodies of armed men in Kohistan must be prevented by you.

These are the points on which his Excellency the Viceroy has directed a further communication to be made to you.

Accept the assurance of my high regard and consideration.

SIRDAR ABDUL KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 6th July 1880.

Your kind and honour-conferring favour of the 20th (evidently a mistake for 2nd) July reached me to-day, Monday, (mistake for Tuesday) 27th Rajab 1297, the 6th of June (July?) at Khinjan. I was glad to learn of your keeping well.

Respecting your kind request that I should make for Kabul, my kind friend, you will fully understand that in case I omit in the first instance to consult the people of Afghanistan, their minds will be estranged from me. Having arrived in Kohistan and explained to the tribes their interests, (I) will be able to come, having secured the consent of the nation.

Respecting the people of Kohistan, they are armed and seated in their homes. In this matter what can I say to them and such outside Baam as Tagawis and Nigrabis, who having come with their collections have all returned to their homes. After I have been some time in Kohistan, the Kohistanis will have been conciliated.

I look upon you as my kind patron. May you keep well.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 8th July 1880.

I RECEIVED your friendly letter of the 3rd July, from Kinjan, with much pleasure, and am rejoiced that you have reached so far in safety. I trust that nothing will now delay your arrival at Charikar at Istalif, on your way towards Kabul, as it is for the advantage of yourself and of the British Government to complete friendly arrangements as speedily as possible.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 16th July 1880.

At this happy time, your kind letter, dated the 6th day of the month of Barat sent by the hand of Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan and Abdul Rahman, Khan-i-Mulla, has been delivered by them to me. I am extremely pleased to hear the news of your welfare, and to learn of your good health. Further, you were pleased to ask me to leave for Charikar, or Istalif, or Kabul. My friend, before I came to Kohistan, I wrote to all the tribes far and near, that in accordance with the desire both of the British Government and of themselves, I was coming to Kohistan; and that in consultation with them (the tribes), I would make arrangements (with the Government). Therefore, when I arrived at Tutandarra, I despatched letters to the leaders of all these tribes by the hands of swift horsemen, asking them to come to me soon. If God please, they will arrive here in five or six days. After I have once seen them and have freed myself from the responsibility of my former promises, which I wrote to them, to consult them, I will leave for Charikar without delay, and there, or at Istalif, I will await your favours.

Your letter to my uncle, Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, sent by the hand of Syud Ghous-ud-din, contained expressions of favour towards me, and I am pleased to learn this. If I live, please God, I will show such friendship as may be suitable for me to show such a great Government, so that I may get a good name in other States, with my own nation, and with the British Government. Further, until we see each other, please remember me. I wish you from God to be kind to me. May you enjoy good health.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 16th July 1880.

Your friendly letter by the hand of Mir Agha Sahibzada has been received by me, and its contents understood. I offer you my congratulations on your safe arrival in Kohistan, and trust that further good fortune may await you. Mir Agha has further verbally expressed your strong desire of friendship with the British Government. Be assured your desire is reciprocated by the Government, which only wishes the good of you and of the people of Afghanistan.

General Sir Donald Stewart, whose letter of congratulation is herewith forwarded, will make arrangements for the withdrawal of the army at an early date. In order to secure this, it is desirable that the personal interviews regarding which you have written should take place as soon as possible. We think that some place in the neighbourhood of Zimma would be suitable; but should any place nearer Kabul on the direct road from Farza to Kabul suit you, this would be preferable.

Kindly intimate your wishes in this matter, and the place that would be convenient to you. There everything that you desire to discuss can be considered; and, if God will, a speedy and satisfactory settlement can be made. This will be far better than sending a British officer to Charikar, as it would not be expedient to send him without a strong escort of Her Majesty's troops, and you know well, my friend, that this would cause excitement among those who are ill-disposed.

I have invited Sirda Musa Jan to come to Kabul; should he do so, he would either accompany his family to India, or would otherwise be free to go where he wished. This invitation is only with the object of preventing disturbances and opposition in the direction of Ghazni.

I have the greatest desire for a personal meeting with you. God willing, this will not be delayed. Do not delay to send me assurances of your good health, and of your wishes with regard to the time and place of interview. With high sentiments of regard, &c.

No. 62 S.P.C., dated Kabul, 4th August 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in North Afghanistan.

1. I have kept the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department so fully and frequently informed of everything connected with the situation at Kabul, and the intentions, action, and prospects of Abdul Rahman Khan, that it is unnecessary, in the present letter, to do more than allude to the circumstances under which you fully concurred in the desirability of acting on the discretion granted by the Supreme Government, and publicly acknowledging the Sirdar as Amir of Kabul. He had, indeed, fulfilled those conditions which the Government had prescribed as essential to such public recognition. He had left Turkistan, at the invitation of the Government, with a portion of his army; he had crossed the Hindu Kush and had marched, contrary to his own intention, but in accordance with the wishes expressed by the British representatives at Kabul, to Charikar, where he had been enthusiastically received by a large number of Chiefs and people. He had publicly, privately, by letters, circulars, and in public speeches in his daily durbars, declared his firm intention of making friendly arrangements with the British Government; he had discouraged the assembly of armed men; had allayed the fanaticism which his previous letters had excited, and had acted in such a manner as to prove his sincerity and good faith. Such being the state of the case, delay in his public recognition by the Government would have been productive of harm. It might be urged that it would have been wiser to delay his public recognition until he had come into the British camp at Kabul; but this criticism would have been uninformed. In the first place, the suspicion, which Abdul Rahman certainly felt when overtures were first made to him, had not disappeared at the time of his arrival in Kohistan, while that of the people was as active as ever. They feared greatly, and he in a less degree, that our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent, and that, had he come straight into Kabul, he would have been arrested, and deported to British India. Foolish as such a fear may seem, it was nevertheless general, and the Afghan nature is suspicious beyond all others. I do not believe that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan would either himself have ventured, or been by his army and the Chiefs permitted, to have entered Kabul or the British camp, or to have marched from Kohistan to hold interviews with the British officers, unless he had been first acknowledged by the Government as Amir.

2. The expressed opinion of Mushki Alam was further entitled to consideration. He wrote from Maidan, and his letter was sealed by many of the principal Chiefs, such as Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, Abdul Ghafur, Akhundzada of Laugar, and some thirty-five men of more or less note, to say that he and all there assembled were ready to accept as Amir whomever the British Government might select, whether Yakub Khan, or Abdul Rahman, or Ayub Khan; but that in the interests of the country and the Government it was essential to at once declare the choice of Government, as there was no other way of bringing to an end the period of uncertainty, and of re-assuring the people. The durbar of recognition was accordingly held, with reasonable but not excessive display, and the intentions of the Government were fully explained to the people. The name of the new Amir recited in the Khutba and public prayers on the following day was received with general enthusiasm, and although there is a very powerful and numerous party who are opposed to Amir Abdul Rahman, yet a very large number of Chiefs and people have joined him and have promised him their support.

3. The public recognition has had a most beneficial effect upon the quiet of the country. All districts in the neighbourhood of Kabul have remained absolutely undisturbed, if petty raids by Safi and Khairo Khel robbers be set aside, and the roads have been opened for trade in all directions to a greater extent than I have known since I have been in Kabul. The recognition of Abdul Rahman was, moreover, specially well timed, as considered in connection with the defeat which General Burrows has met on the Helmund. The unfortunate results of this military disaster can hardly be predicted as yet with any certainty; but the decision of the Government to send a powerful division from here to Kandahar, *via* Ghazni, will, more than any other measure which could have been adopted, minimize and, perhaps altogether,

neutralize its injurious effects. Had the public recognition of Abdul Rahman been delayed till after the defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' brigade was generally known, it might have been difficult or impossible to have made it at all; and the interviews with the Amir would not have been unattended with danger, as his camp is filled with Chiefs and people who had for long been openly and fiercely hostile to us, and who would have been only too glad of an opportunity to compromise him.

4. The news of the Kandahar defeat impelled us to hasten arrangements with the Amir and dispose of the matters for discussion in as few interviews as possible. A meeting was accordingly arranged at Zimma, about sixteen miles north of Kabul, and some six miles from Killa Haji, where General Gough's brigade was encamped, the camp of the Amir being pitched some miles to the north at Ak Serai. On the 31st ultimo, I proceeded to the place appointed, with a strong cavalry escort, composed of a squadron of the 9th Lancers, and another of the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry. The durbar tent was pitched on a hill affording a good out-look on all sides. And His Highness was accompanied by only two or three hundred horse and a few infantry, while a large number of followers, estimated at from three to four thousand, accompanied him to within half a mile of the place of meeting, and remained there till proceedings had terminated.

5. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank, courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who were present at the interview was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of all the Barakzai Sirdars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were characterized by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government, and although his expectations were, as might have been anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous insistence, and the result of the interviews may be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.

6. Before taking leave of His Highness at the last interview, I again expressed my hope that he would be able the next day to come into the British camp and meet General Sir D. Stewart in Durbar; but the Amir said that a large number of the people with him were opposed to this, and that he feared it could not be. I, however, left Mr. Christie to see if this interview could not be quietly arranged without unduly pressing the Amir, who seemed himself sincerely anxious to meet our wishes. His Highness returned to Ak Serai and had a long and somewhat stormy meeting with the Chiefs. The Maidans, Kohistanis, and Kohdamanis were in favour of his visiting the British camp; but the Ghilzai Chiefs, Asmatulla Khan of Jokan, Mazulla Khan of Hizarak, Bahram Khan of Lughman, and Badshah Khan of Logar, all men who have been fighting against us, vehemently opposed it, and swore, by their faith, they would leave him if he persisted. Nevertheless the Amir determined to come, telling the Chiefs that the durbar tents were pitched on the Koh-Daman side of the pass, while he really intended to come into the British camp. He also sent me a private note, written with his own hand, to the following effect:—"If you really wish me to come to you, irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What can I do? I am most anxious to meet you."

7. After explaining to you the state of the case, you were strongly of opinion that it would be impolitic to hold the durbar, as instead of strengthening the Amir, as was intended, it would evidently have the opposite effect. The durbar was consequently abandoned, and the following day we returned to Kabul.

8. There is no advantage in writing at great length on the present situation and the probabilities of the future,—firstly, as a few days will show how affairs will tend, and, secondly, that the numberless arrangements, consequent on the immediate march of the army to Gandamak and Kandahar, leave me little time for writing as carefully as I could wish. I would merely observe that I believe Abdul Rahman Khan is sincerely anxious for friendship with the Government, and that, if he can maintain his position, he will hereafter prove a valuable ally. But there is necessarily much anxiety for the immediate present. He is weak, in that he has little money, and

many of the Chiefs are opposed to him, or have only joined him as the best thing to do under the circumstances. They are ready to leave him for Ayub Khan, should he come in this direction. I have not yet heard what effect the Kandahar news, exaggerated as a matter of course, has had in the Amir's camp. The people were riotous enough there before; it was only after great difficulty His Highness could obtain their consent to our interview, and they only half believe that we will really evacuate Kabul.

9. It is not impossible that difficulties may arise before we leave Kabul, and that the people with the Amir may get out of hand and compromise him fatally. Everything possible is being done to keep the people quiet, and it is probable that there will be no opposition whatever to our retirement. But of course we must be prepared for any fortune. The Kandahar news has greatly excited the city, and all the bad characters are ready for mischief.

10. As to money, I have already made over to him one lac, and on the day of our departure I will give him four lacs more. It would be most inadvisable to give him too much before we leave Kabul, as his troops would not be more amenable to discipline, but less so, at the unusual sight of a large sum of money in their master's possession. The remainder of the grant must be paid at Jellalabad.

To secure the unopposed march of the divisions to Ghazni and Gandamak, the Amir has been requested to send an energetic Sirdar to accompany General Roberts' force, and to nominate a Governor who would be left at Ghazni when the division moved from there. The son of Mushk-i-Alam has been asked to accompany this division with some of the Andari, Wardak, and Taraki Maliks. There may be no fighting north of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, but nothing can be confidently predicted. With regard to the Gandamak division, the Amir has been urged to keep the Ghilzai leaders in his camp. If this be successfully done, there can be no serious resistance, though the Khairo Khels and Maruf Khel robbers will doubtless be ready for mischief, as indeed they have been ever since our occupation of Kabul.

No. 21.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 5th August 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

STEWART telegraphs 5th. All our objects here have been attained, and nothing remains to be done but to hand over Kabul to the Amir, who is naturally anxious to establish himself in his capital and bring his government into working order.

Politically, withdrawal now will be well-timed, and it happens that we shall leave Kabul on the day fixed for that purpose two months ago. The state of affairs at Kandahar, moreover, renders it highly necessary that we should avail ourselves of present opportunity, whilst country here is quiet and free from complications. Ends.

We are of opinion that Stewart's proposal to evacuate Kabul must be approved. I entirely agree with him as to the political importance of seizing present opportunity; if we let this slip, the situation may change, and we may be unable to withdraw without serious embarrassment. Evacuation would take place on 11th and 12th. Reply as soon as possible as final orders must issue at once.

No. 22.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th August 1880, to VICEROY.

YOUR Lordship's telegram 5th. I entirely approve evacuation of Kabul.

No. 23.

No. 191 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 24th August 1880.

IN our Despatches of the 20th and 27th July last, we reported to your Lordship the instructions that had been issued to Sir Donald Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which the occupation of Kabul, by the British troops under his command, should terminate, and also the proceedings that had been taken, up to the date of the latter Despatch, for placing the government at Kabul in the hands of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. It had been understood that, whatever might be the result of these proceedings, Sir D. Stewart's operations for the withdrawal of his troops would not be materially delayed or deranged; but this point has been placed beyond question by Sirdar Abdul Rahman's undisturbed accession to power at Kabul.

2. The news of the reverse suffered by a British brigade on the Helmund has not, as yet, outwardly affected the political situation in North Afghanistan. A strong division under Sir Frederick Roberts has left for Kandahar, but we decided that it was not desirable, either upon political or upon military grounds, to change our settled purpose of withdrawing all our troops from Kabul. In a telegram, dated 5th August, we transmitted to your Lordship Sir D. Stewart's urgent recommendation that the evacuation should proceed, and the reasons, with which we concurred, upon which he argued against any alteration of our plans for operating the withdrawal. Accordingly, immediately after the march of Sir Frederick Roberts' division for Kandahar, the rest of the Kabul field force left Kabul on the direct route for India, and Sir D. Stewart's head-quarters have already reached Jellalabad without opposition or interruption of any kind.

3. We have now the honour to enclose, with this Despatch, copy of a letter,* in which Sir D. Stewart strenuously advocates, and supports by reasons of much cogency, the entire withdrawal of our troops from North Afghanistan. Having regard to these strong representations of the General in chief command (with which the Chief Political Officer concurs), and upon a careful survey of the military and political considerations involved, we have determined, after consultation with the chief medical authorities, that the Kabul field force shall be withdrawn continuously, on its present line of retirement, until all the troops shall have passed the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak, in 1879. The posts at Lundi Kotal and in the Khyber Pass will for the present continue to be held by our troops, since the whole question of maintaining our advanced military positions on the north-west frontier is necessarily reserved for future determination and report.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" WHITLEY STOKES.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

From Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 415, dated Kabul, 10th August 1880). (Extract.)

IN accordance with instructions which have been conveyed to me, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign

Department, the reasons which appear to me of sufficient weight and urgency to determine the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces from Northern Afghanistan with as little delay as possible. These reasons are military, sanitary, and political; and from whatever point of view the question is regarded the conclusion appears to me the same.

2. The sanitary question is one of primary importance, as it would not be justifiable, except for urgent military reasons, to move troops under conditions dangerous to their health or life, and it has to be considered whether their march towards India during the hot season of the year will be as injurious to them as their continued maintenance at Gandamak, and on the line of communication between it and Peshawar. I do not hesitate to express my conviction—a conviction in which I am supported by the best medical advice at my disposal—that an early withdrawal would be more advantageous to the troops than their remaining in Afghanistan. I do not under-estimate the inconvenience of a march during the hot season; but it is not necessarily prejudicial to health or dangerous to life if the season be, as fortunately this year it has so far been, free from severe epidemic disease. The last reports received from the Punjab show that province to be almost entirely free of cholera, and, although there have been severe outbreaks at some of the north-west stations, yet these have been of short duration, and the disease has not shown a disposition to spread over an extended area.

3. Troops on active service in Afghanistan and India must occasionally be exposed to some risk and inconvenience from the climate. But the withdrawal being necessary on military and political grounds, there is no such sanitary risk in the withdrawal as to cause its postponement until a cooler season. In many ways I am disposed to think that the troops will be healthier withdrawn than remaining for the rest of the hot weather in Afghanistan. The climate of Kabul may no doubt be favourably compared with that of many Indian stations, but during the last two or three months sickness has been greatly on the increase, and a very large number of invalids have been sent to India. The cantonment and its surroundings have been polluted by the long-continued presence of so large a body of troops, camp followers, and animals; and it will be obvious to the Government of India that, in spite of all possible precautions, there are neither appliances nor staff to carry out those efficient sanitary measures which can alone ensure the health and safety of a large resident population.

4. At the stations along the road, more cramped for space and with a worse climate, that of Jellalabad, Pesh Bolak, and Dacca being hardly cooler than the plains of India, the sanitary conditions are still more unfavourable; and in these, as in Kabul, the causes of sickness must be held to be the same, and the activity of these must continue and not diminish. Indeed, the exposure of marching to India is no more than that to which the troops are now constantly exposed in their harassing convoy duty, while their tents are a poor substitute for barracks. On sanitary grounds, therefore, and in the interest of the health of the troops, I am strongly of opinion that no delay in the withdrawal from Afghanistan should be sanctioned.

5. The political question covers much of the ground which is occupied by that portion of the subject which is purely military, and may be conveniently discussed next. But here no lengthened remarks appear to me to be required. I firmly believe, and the Political Department at Kabul is entirely in accord with me, that on political grounds it is most expedient to withdraw from Northern Afghanistan as quickly as possible. If His Highness the Amir had felt himself so insecure as to have urgently requested us to remain and garrison for him, for a time, the eastern districts of Afghanistan, then it would have been for the Government of India in the Foreign Department to decide whether this, under the circumstances of the case, was expedient or possible. But he has made no such request. On the contrary, he has expressed his strong wish that the withdrawal from Gandamak should not be postponed or delayed. He feels that, once established in his capital, he will be stronger and not weaker by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces. The people will then associate his accession to power with the retirement of the invading army, and this will confer upon him some additional popularity.

6. As the Amir, then, desires the withdrawal of the troops, the question can be regarded from a more general point of view, and here there can be no doubt it is politically expedient to leave the country at a time when it is altogether tranquil, and when our withdrawal will probably be unaccompanied by any hostile manifestations. This state of affairs has been brought about by much labour, and by the concurrence of many fortunate circumstances; although the reverse which our arms have

experienced in Kandahar threatened for a time to shake severely the arrangements which had been all but completed at Kabul. It is of the highest political importance to withdraw while the tribes are peaceful, if not friendly, and, were we to delay, the temper of the people might and probably would change; and our retirement, though not less secure, would undoubtedly be less dignified.

7. The military question is, as before noted, in a great measure identical with the political, as it is obviously important that the troops on their retirement should not be harassed along difficult mountain roads and passes by a hostile population. Although the army which I have the honour to command is equal to any task which may be imposed upon it, yet such a harassed retreat would not improve either its credit or its *morale*.

8. I may here mention, though the details of the scheme will be communicated to the Government of India by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I propose that the force retire from Gandamak by brigades to Dacca, from which place they will file through the Khaibar by detachments of from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 regiments, as there is not accommodation in the Pass for large bodies of troops. The retirement will thus be slow from Dacca.

It is further my intention to leave a brigade of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery in the Khaibar (the main body at Lundi Kotal and a regiment of Infantry at Ali Masjid), until the Government has decided what is to be done in the matter of Pass arrangements.

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd September 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

The Jajis of Upper Kurram being inclined to place themselves under Amir of Kabul, we decided in Council to-day, in accordance with advice of chief military and political officers in Kurram, to inform Abdul Rahman that he might take over those tribes and the Hariob District, but that he must not touch the independence of the Turis.

No. 25.

No. 208 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 14th September 1880.

IN your Despatch of the 21st May last,* on the state of affairs in Afghanistan,

* No. 23, paragraph 27.

your Lordship observed that it would be necessary for us to consider carefully the expediency of maintaining

the advanced military positions on the north-west frontier which were acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. And the Despatch also intimated that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that our decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

2. This question, accordingly, we have examined carefully from the point of view indicated by Her Majesty's Government. It will be remembered that since September 1879, and indeed (with a brief interval in 1879) since they were first taken up in 1878, the positions in the Khyber pass and the Kurram valley have been held as important points upon actual or possible lines of communication with the army at Kabul. By the withdrawal of our force from Kabul, and by its retirement within the line of frontier acquired under the Gandamak Treaty, these posts have now again become advanced frontier positions; so that the ground is cleared and the time has arrived for considering the necessity of maintaining them permanently in that character. Upon this subject we have had the advantage of consulting all those among our chief military

and political officers who, by their personal knowledge of the Khyber and Kurram districts, and by their general experience of the north-west frontier, are best qualified to advise. We forward papers containing the more important opinions and information thus collected; and we also take this opportunity of enclosing two Minutes recorded by the late Viceroy (the Earl of Lytton) upon the comparative value of the Kurram and the Khyber routes. We have now the honour to report to your Lordship our decision regarding the permanent maintenance of these military positions, with a brief explanation of the grounds upon which we have proceeded, and of the subsidiary arrangements that it has been necessary to make in consequence of this decision with certain tribes in the Khyber and in the Kurram valley.

3. The question of retaining our military positions in the Khyber Pass, at Lundi Kotal, and Ali Masjid, offers little or no room for discussion. On the one hand, the expediency of keeping open this difficult and important pass, so far as may be necessary to prevent its being held and fortified against us by regular troops, and to maintain it as a tolerably safe and uninterrupted thoroughfare for commerce between Afghanistan and India, is very generally admitted. On the other hand, from whatever side the subject is considered, there is an entire concurrence of opinions, on political as well as on military grounds, against garrisoning the pass with British troops; nor, indeed, has it ever been proposed to do so as a permanent military arrangement. The extreme unhealthiness of the stations in the pass, the discontent which its regular occupation by our forces would excite among the tribes, and the strong political reasons in favour of placing the road under their independent charge, are considerations which have always militated forcibly against keeping the Khyber in our own possession; while to contest this conclusion no single argument has, so far as we know, been adduced. It has already been observed that since our troops first entered the pass in 1878, the positions have been held almost entirely for the protection of communications with an army in front of them; and we consider that with the retirement of that army their object and value have disappeared. Nevertheless, there are obvious reasons why the pass should not be abruptly evacuated, before the existing arrangement with the tribes for its independent charge and management shall have been revised and consolidated, or until our future relations with them shall have been thoroughly made known and understood. There are also various matters of detail connected with the recent operations, such as the disposal of the fortifications and other buildings in the pass belonging to the British Government, which require some little time for proper regulation. But when these affairs are satisfactorily terminated, we intend that our present garrisons in the pass shall withdraw across the frontier of British India.

4. We propose that the immediate management of our future relations with the Khyber tribes shall remain in the hands of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, by whom these affairs have been administered, during a period of difficulty and occasional anxiety, with skill and success. We enclose copy of instructions issued to the Punjab Government for summoning the representatives of the tribes, and for ascertaining what modifications in the present arrangements have been rendered practicable by the cessation of our military operations in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of our troops from the pass. There may probably be material reduction in the Jezailchi Corps that has been entertained for the duties of escort and convoy; and questions may arise regarding the taking of tolls, and as to the compensation to be fixed in lieu of their collection by the tribes, with other similar points which will need careful examination by the local authorities on the spot.

5. Your Lordship will observe that our instructions to the Punjab Government desire that the representatives of the Khyber tribes be informed that their independence is, as heretofore, recognized, and that the conditions of our arrangements with them will be that the pass shall remain under their independent and exclusive charge, and shall be kept by them open and free from interference. We have said, moreover, that so long as these conditions are fulfilled, it is not our desire to station any troops in the pass; but we shall also, if necessary, take care to make it plainly understood that no other regular troops will be permitted, without the consent of the British Government, to occupy posts in the Khyber. This arrangement will be most congenial to the traditions and wishes of the Afridis themselves, who prefer to be left undisturbed in their own country, acknowledging obligations of service and duties only to those with whom they have made engagements, and from whom they receive the customary allowances.

6. In the Kurram district our chief military position, to which all other posts, in front or in the rear, are subsidiary, is the Peiwar Kotal. The question of the strategical value of this position, and of the expediency of holding it permanently with a

strong garrison, has been very thoroughly debated. The arguments used and the opinions elicited will be found stated at length in the papers accompanying this Despatch, and they may be summed up as representing an almost unanimous verdict against our permanent retention of any military positions in the Kurram district. It is true that Sir Frederick Roberts' judgment against holding the Kurram presupposes, to some degree, the maintenance of a base of operations within South Afghanistan, which is a matter that lies beyond the limits of the question discussed in this Despatch. But his main argument is directed toward proving the inutility of holding positions on the Kurram line by showing that, in any future war in Afghanistan, we ought to remain on the defensive on our North-West frontier, and that our most effective line of advance against an enemy in the interior of the country would be from the southward, while, apart from strategical considerations of this general nature, the special weight of his reasoning on military, political, and financial grounds bears decidedly against our maintaining garrisons on the Kurram headlands.

7. We have therefore determined that our troops may leave the Kurram district as soon as this can be conveniently arranged. But the military evacuation of Kurram inevitably raises questions, connected with our relations to the tribes of the valley, that are not altogether free from difficulty. For whereas in the Khyber the tribes have been always treated as independent, and our dealings with them have concerned only the passes which traverse their territory, the whole Kurram district, including the Hariob tract beyond the Peiwar Kotal, has been more or less in our possession since the beginning of 1879, so that our relations with the people, especially in the lower valley which we have administered, have naturally taken a character corresponding to the belief that our tenure of the country might be expected to last for some time. There can be no doubt that the Turi tribe, inhabiting the greater part of the cultivated valley from the eastern slopes of Peiwar Kotal south-eastward toward the Indian border, have received from our officers repeated assurances that they will not be replaced, without their consent, under the power of the Barakzai dynasty at Kabul. It is equally certain that, relying on these pledges, they have conducted themselves in a friendly and loyal manner toward us during our occupation of their country, rendering us help in various ways, and abstaining from all attempts to molest our troops. As Mussulmans of the Shiah sect, they are to some extent isolated among the neighbouring Sunni tribes, while they have little sympathy with the Barakzai rulers, to whom they voluntarily submitted themselves only some 15 years ago, and under whose dominion they are said to be decidedly unwilling to return. They have, in fact, claimed from us the fulfilment of our pledges that they shall not pass again under a Barakzai ruler, and to this extent their claim upon us appears incontestable.

8. In this state of affairs, although under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government our decision regarding the permanent tenure of the military positions in Kurram would not be affected by the announcements that have been made to the Turis, we felt bound to take measures to prevent the withdrawal of our troops being followed by the reoccupation of the Lower Kurram valley by the Amir's officials, against the will of the Turi tribe. Whether the territory thus set apart should be placed under a separate Governor, nominated and upheld by the British Government, was a point on which some difference of opinion existed among the local political authorities. The difficulties which such an arrangement would entail are obvious, for it is very questionable whether a Sirdar, whoever he might be, appointed by and holding from our Government, could govern without our strong military support. His subordination to our authority would render us responsible for his acts; the Kabul Government and the neighbouring tribes might foment troubles and intrigues against him, and he might find himself in the position of a representative of our dominion, without the strength and order which are its chief advantages to the people. Against these objections were to be set the drawbacks to leaving the district altogether without a government. On the whole, however, since it appeared to be the conviction among those best acquainted with the wishes of the Turis that they themselves are anxious to be left to manage their own affairs, we have finally resolved to recognize the tribe's independence, and to undertake that it shall be maintained against any interference from Kabul, without attempting to select for them a Governor, or to impose a government upon them against their expressed will. General Watson has accordingly been authorized to announce to them their future status, and to warn them that they must avoid disputes with the Kabul Government, and must comply with the wishes of the British Government in matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier. The question of their future self-government has not, however, been finally and unalterably decided,

for Major-General Watson, our chief Political Officer in the Kurram, has been empowered to take any further steps that he may judge necessary to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis. Any practicable arrangement that may be acceptable to a substantial majority of the tribe, and that is not incompatible with the early withdrawal of the British troops, will be carefully considered by the Government of India.

9. With the Jaji tribe inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal, our connection has been much slighter, and of a different nature. They were indeed informed, in the earlier period of our occupation of the Shuturgardan line, that the Hariob had passed under British jurisdiction, and this tract has since been more or less under our control. But any obligations that the announcements made to them might have been supposed to involve, have been cancelled by the subsequent turbulence and hostility of the Jajis, who took active parts in the attacks made on Ali Khel and upon our communications beyond the Peiwar Kotal in the autumn and early winter of 1879. Moreover, while they have shown no inclination whatever to appeal to their former relations with us, or to claim our intervention on their behalf as against the Amir Abdul Rahman, there have been strong indications that they seek neither our patronage nor our protection, but, on the contrary, are content to return again into their former state of semi-allegiance to Kabul. Upon these considerations, the advisability of permitting the Amir to resume authority in the Hariob was pressed upon the Government of India by the political officers on the spot, who urge that, as the Jajis, when left to themselves, will certainly revert to Kabul, it will be in accordance with good policy that they should do so with our consent and sanction. This view we have accepted, and the requisite communications have been sent to the deputies whom the Amir has sent across the Shuturgardan, with orders to make territorial arrangements with our officers, and to settle any question regarding the future border or the control of the tribes. The opportunity has been taken to inform His Highness the Amir that the independence of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley has been recognized, and His Highness has been reminded that, in the correspondence with him regarding the establishment of his authority in Afghanistan, the districts assigned in 1879 to the British Government by the ex-Amir Yakub Khan were expressly excluded from discussion.

10. We enclose copies of the orders that have been issued for the completion of these political arrangements, and we trust that our proceedings, which appear to us to be in accordance with the general lines of policy marked out for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May last, will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

11. Our late colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, who was a member of our Government when these arrangements were under discussion, wishes us to state that, while agreeing with the measures proposed, and thus consenting to give up the command over Kabul which the Khyber positions in his opinion possess, he considers that such a measure only renders it still more incumbent on us not to relax our hold on Kandahar, nor to abandon the strategical advantages which he believes its occupation affords. He desires it therefore to be understood that any change in respect to our tenure of Kandahar would materially alter the conditions of the discussion, and the state of affairs with which the present Despatch deals, and that it would therefore set him free to reconsider altogether his opinion on the subject. Sir Edwin Johnson considers that this view is supported by the recorded opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch.

12. We enclose copies of three separate Minutes recorded by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, upon the main questions dealt with in this Despatch. The Hon. Whitley Stokes concurs in one of these Minutes.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

MINUTE by the VICEROY (LORD LYTTON) on the Comparative Value of the Khyber and Kurram Lines. (Extract.)

1. IN all probability one of the first questions which the Government of India will have to settle in connection with the close of the Afghan campaign is, whether such funds as may be available for either purpose shall be devoted to the improvement and development of the Khyber, or to those of the Kurram, line of communication with North Afghanistan.

2. So far as I can judge, the present preponderance of opinion on the part of our higher military and political authorities is in favour of treating the Khyber as our main permanent line of advance towards Kabul, and either abandoning or leaving unimproved our present advanced position in the Kurram. As, however, I do not share that opinion, I write the present Minute; not with any wish to prejudge a question which cannot be satisfactorily decided without very careful reference to financial and engineering, as well as political and military considerations, but for the purpose of placing on record the reasons which induce me to attach very great political importance to the permanent maintenance of a commanding military position in the Kurram, and to contemplate with aversion and mistrust any permanent military expenditure upon the Khyber.

3. In the first place, I observe that all those who advocate, whether on political or military grounds, the virtual projection of our frontier along the Khyber line towards Kabul, have hitherto assumed, as a *sine quâ non* condition of the advantages they ascribe to it, the extension of this line considerably beyond the point to which our hold of it was distinctly limited by the Treaty of Gandamak. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, for instance, and Mr. Lepel Griffin, so far as their views have been made known to me, lay great stress on the value of a military cantonment and political officer at Jellalabad, as a means partly of protecting Kunar and other petty States, and partly of strengthening and superintending in the direction of Badakshan those British interests which are at present confided to the management of our Political Officer at Gilgit.

4. Now, the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Gandamak were fixed with great deliberation, after lengthened reflection, and frequent consultation with the highest military, political, and financial authorities. All the arguments for and against the annexation or permanent military occupation of Jellalabad were fully examined and discussed in a conference held by me at Lahore, and attended by Sir Robert Egerton, Sir Louis Cavagnari, Sir Edwin Johnson, and Sir John Strachey; and the suggestion in favour of extending our frontier, or our frontier liabilities, along the Khyber line, in any sense other than that which is implied by the assertion of our right and intention to deal directly with the Pass tribes, instead of assigning to the Amirs of Kabul a responsibility, which experience had proved our complete inability to enforce, for the good behaviour of those tribes, was then unanimously rejected. The reasons for this decision I need not now recapitulate, but they have, in my own judgment, at least, been strongly confirmed by subsequent events. In any case, however, the soundness of those reasons has been virtually reaffirmed by the Government of India in framing the programme of present and future Afghan policy, which was submitted by it last winter to the Secretary of State. From that programme we unanimously and distinctly excluded any alteration or extension of the territorial settlement fixed by the Gandamak Treaty, except in so far as regards the arrangements subsequently carried out for the permanent severance of the Kandahar province from the jurisdiction of the Kabul power, and its guaranteed protection by the British Government. This decision was approved by Her Majesty's late Government. It is, I venture to think, unlikely to be upset by Her Majesty's present Government in favour of extended political or military liabilities; and it has up to the present moment governed every instruction issued to our political authorities at Kabul for the guidance of their relations, on behalf of this Government, with the various aspirants to the vacant Amirship of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

5. In view of all these facts it seems to me perfectly clear that the Government of India is practically precluded from even discussing the views which I understand to be held by the Punjab Government, and urged by some of our own political and military officers, in favour of extending our Khyber frontier in any sense or form beyond Lundi Kotal, the point to which its recognized extension was formally limited by the terms of the Treaty of Gandamak.

6. But, even were it otherwise, even were the Government of India equally free to contemplate the extension of its Khyber frontier beyond that point, I am still most

strongly of opinion that any such arrangement is altogether inexpedient. The following are, briefly stated, the main grounds on which I base this conclusion.

7. Although we hold (and, in my opinion, rightly) that our arrangements in regard to Kandahar, coupled with the advanced frontier positions secured to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, suffice for the practical protection of our frontier interests from relapse into their previous condition of dependence on the good or ill will, the strength or weakness, of the Kabul Power, it is, nevertheless, *cætaris paribus*, a thing obviously to be desired that our permanent relations with the future representatives of that Power should be, so far as possible, of an amicable character, and free from all avoidable causes for mutual mistrust. Now, whether the next ruler of Kabul be Abdul Rahman or any other Sirdar, it cannot be reasonably expected that he will submit without reluctance and regret to the loss of the Kandahar province; involving, as it does, a limitation of his power and resources which the Government of India, deems indispensable for the protection of interests otherwise liable to serious injury from the unfriendly employment of that power and those resources. There are, however, numerous reasons why the Kandahar arrangement, regarded as the result of two wars ostentatiously provoked by the action of the Kabul Power, which throughout the course of them has been defeated in every engagement, cannot constitute any legitimate grievance on the part of that Power. It is but recently that the rulers of Kabul acquired possession of Kandahar by conspiracy and violence. Their authority has always been repugnant to the inhabitants of the province, whose local Government has welcomed its release from an uncongenial yoke. Between the Kandaharis and the Kabulis there is the strongest possible antipathy. But Jellalabad has never before been independent of the Kabul Power. On the contrary, it represents all that remains to that Power, in the direction of British India, of territory once belonging to Afghanistan, and now belonging to us. It lies close to the very capital of the country; and, from every point of view, it naturally coheres with the provinces of Kabul Proper. If an ambitious Amir could dream of, and plot for, Russian aid towards the pre-conquest of Peshawur, can we reasonably expect that even the most unambitious of his successors will view with indifference the loss of Jellalabad? And, if we take from the next ruler of Kabul, Kandahar with one hand, and Jellalabad with the other, can we hope that his subsequent relations with us will not be animated by a sentiment of chronic resentment, and a strong desire to seize the first favourable opportunity for reversing the basis on which we have settled them?

8. What are the alleged political advantages to be set off against this obvious consideration? If the management of our north-west frontier were to remain permanently in the hands of the Punjab Government, the retention of Jellalabad would doubtless enable that Government to extend a strong local influence over the petty chieftoms of Kunar, Dir, Swat, Bajour, &c. But for the attainment of that object, the Punjab Government would probably require frequent support from the resources at the disposal of the Supreme Government; and, although I do not say that the creation of a fringe of small States east of the Khyber, under British influence and protection, would be without political advantage to the security of our frontier, I must say that it seems to me extremely undesirable to furnish any local Government with the inducement or the power to involve the resources of the empire in the prosecution beyond its frontier of a policy not completely under the control of the Supreme Government of the empire. Her Majesty's late Government has, however, acquiesced in my strong recommendation that the political and military management of the frontier be withdrawn from the Punjab Government and placed under the undivided authority of the Government of India. If this arrangement be adopted, the Government of India will, I doubt not, reflect very seriously before it embarks upon a policy certain to bring it into increasingly close contact with fresh tribes and numerous petty Chiefs, all impecunious, greedy, and untrustworthy. As regards the alleged value of Jellalabad as a fulcrum for political influence in Badakshan, I do not underrate the political importance which Badakshan is likely to assume in the development of events which must be foreseen. But it seems to me that we have certainly no sufficient evidence of the alleged political value of Jellalabad to justify our retention of that place on any political grounds, considering the strong probability that our presence there would prove a constant stumbling block in our relations with the future rulers of Kabul.

9. It remains to consider the military and financial conditions of a permanent occupation of Jellalabad. It is notoriously impossible to keep troops in this city, owing to its extreme unhealthiness during the hot season. We should therefore be obliged to construct and maintain at a considerable distance from our present frontier two large cantonments; a winter one at Jellalabad, and a summer one at Gandamak, or along

the slopes of the Safed Koh. For their security, I gather from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and all the military authorities hitherto consulted that it would be necessary to connect them by a line of military posts with their base at Peshawur; and possibly even to strengthen the permanent garrison of that unhealthy place, which on every other account it seems to me most desirable to reduce.

10. In consequence, however, of the almost deadly unhealthiness of the Khyber in summer, and the known repugnance with which permanent or prolonged service on that line is contemplated by our Native troops, it would probably be impossible to serve the line thus extended without some special system of frequent reliefs, or special recruitment of local levies. I need hardly point out that the financial conditions of such an arrangement would be very onerous.

11. On general grounds, therefore, I am of opinion that the extension of our Khyber line beyond Lundi Kotal would be inexpedient, not to say impracticable, even were the Government of India free to adopt such a measure. But, as I have already shown, the Government of India is not free to adopt it. And therefore the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram lines must be considered only in strict reference to the permanent limits assigned to each by the Treaty of Gandamak.

12. Under these conditions, I would almost say, *cadit quaestio*. For the superior advantages of a military position at the Peiwar, as compared with those of a military position at Lundi Kotal, appear to me incontestible.

13. It must be remembered that the reason why we dispense with treaty engagements, European Agents, and other guarantees for the future good behaviour of the Amirs of Kabul, is that our present frontier positions, if properly utilized, will enable us promptly and easily to punish their bad behaviour when necessary; and that their knowledge of this fact constitutes the best guarantee we can have for the regulation of their conduct in accordance with it. Placed between permanent British garrisons at Kandahar and the headlands of the Kurram, the Kabul Power cannot misbehave with impunity: and, so long as we virtually command possession of the Shuturgardan when required, we shall be at all times, except during a few months of the year, within five days' easy march of Kabul.

14. But, it is urged, access to Kabul by the Kurram is closed during the winter months by snow on the Shuturgardan; whereas during that season the Khyber is open. True. But military operations in Afghanistan are notoriously impossible during the winter months. Throughout the whole of the past winter General Roberts with a strong force, well supplied and equipped, has been unable to move out of Kabul, or undertake active operations in the field. If during this comparatively short period of the year, a military advance upon Kabul should at any time be absolutely or urgently requisite, the Khyber will of course be still, as heretofore, available for that purpose; nor can any money spent on the improvement of this route up to Lundi Kotal render it very much more available for such a purpose than it is already. But during the whole of the fighting season which covers the greater part of the year, while the Kurram route is open and perfectly healthy, the Khyber route is so unhealthy as to be practically useless for military purposes. At no time between spring and autumn can we employ this pass for the withdrawal or reinforcement of troops in Afghanistan,

15. I sincerely hope that the Government of India will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the Khyber. I feel little doubt that such a course would tend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of troops would be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die like flies. We should probably lose more men during peace time every year, in the Khyber, than we have yet lost in any single engagement beyond it. I believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, will prove the best guardians of the Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it open for us if we make it worth their while to do so.

16. All that is known of the climate of the Kurram completely justifies the opinion expressed by General Fraser that "we shall find there sites for military stations "rivalling Simla in regard to healthiness." And I entirely agree with him that such an advantage can scarcely be overrated. The rapidity and vigour of General Roberts' masterly march upon Kabul was in no small degree attributable to the splendidly healthy condition of the troops after a summer passed in the Kurram. Peshawur is in summer a perfect fever pit; and I should rejoice to see its permanent garrison reduced to a minimum.

17. Finally, it is as yet by no means certain that the Kurram would, even in the depth of winter, cease to be available for an advance upon Kabul, owing to the obstruction of the Shuturgardan. There is much reason to believe that the Shuturgardan is turned by an easy route, along which a strong force starting from the

Kurram could reach either Kabul or Ghazni without difficulty. Complete information on this very important point is greatly to be desired.

18. I should much like to see a cheap surface narrow gauge railway carried as far as possible towards the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. But I purposely refrain from discussing in this Minute all questions relating to the construction of railways, tramways, or improved military roads, through the Khyber and Kurram Valleys. On these questions a considerable amount of useful information will be found in the Public Works Department of the Government of India, with valuable notes upon it by General Fraser, General Trevor, and Mr. Molesworth. But all such questions can be more profitably considered after the close of the present war. Further information will probably be required to enable the Government of India to come to a sound conclusion upon them; but their treatment must obviously depend to a great extent upon a final decision of the preliminary question whether it is to the Khyber or the Kurram route that the Government of India attaches most political importance.

19. I wish this Minute to be circulated, and then placed on record in the Political Department.

LYTTON.

Simla, 20th May 1880.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25. (Extract).

MINUTE by the Viceroy (Lord Lytton).

1. In connection with my Minute of 20th ultimo on the subject of the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram as permanent lines of communication with Afghanistan, I wish in the present Minute to add a few observations.

2. This question was, many months ago, commended by me to the attention of Generals Stewart and Roberts, from whom, I have no doubt, the Government of India will, in due course of time, receive official statements of their opinion, and who should, I consider, be consulted before the Government commits itself to any final decision on the subject. A confidential official report for record in the Foreign Department is, I know, being prepared by General Roberts; and although that report has not been yet officially received, my private correspondence with General Roberts has sufficiently acquainted me with the views which it will probably embody, to justify the opinions which I now wish to place on record in regard thereto.

3. Broadly speaking, the conclusion arrived at by General Roberts is that it is not worth while to keep up either the Khyber or Kurram. He considers that the importance of each will be practically superseded by the maintenance of a permanent British garrison at Kandahar. The Khyber he condemns on precisely the same grounds as those I have previously indicated. The political and military advantages I myself attach to the Kurram, he admits; the first wholly, the second with some qualification. But he, nevertheless, condemns the Kurram on financial grounds, and these, as stated by him, are certainly very strong, much stronger than I had previously realized. They unquestionably demand the most serious consideration, and I am not sure that they are not conclusive in favour of the military abandonment of the Kurram. But I wish to point out that what we have to guard against is, not the military, but the political action of Russia in Afghanistan. We must take it for certain, I think, that wherever the failure of British influence leaves a political vacuum in that country, Russian influence will speedily fill it, and we have still to guard, most vigilantly, against the professedly spontaneous hostile or insulting action of the Kabul power itself, if it again becomes the puppet of Russia's unavowed diplomacy. Now, as we cannot avert such a contingency, either by treaty engagements with a new Amir, or by keeping an agent at his court, or by reliance on his gratitude for any subsidy, or other assistance we may give him, it is, in my judgment, absolutely indispensable that, at the close of a war so serious and costly as that of the last two years, we should leave ourselves permanently in a position to punish promptly, easily, efficaciously, and inexpensively any outrage or insult on the part of the Kabul power, which a great Government, especially a Government in such a position as that of the Government of India, could not leave unpunished without damaging its reputation, and weakening the foundations of its security. It is, moreover, to a wholesome and very real knowledge, on the part of future Amirs of Kabul, that we have retained in our hands the permanent, practical means of inflicting such punishment, that we must look mainly to our future exemption from the necessity of inflicting it. Now, Kandahar, though a position of the greatest importance as regards Western Afghanistan, does not, so far

as I can see, furnish us with any fulcrum from which we could, in case of need, deal a rapid and decisive blow at Kabul, without entangling ourselves in lengthened operations, or requiring any large force for that purpose. The Kurram does all this for us, at least so it seems to me; but, as I said before, against the political advantages must be weighed the heavy cost of its permanent military occupation. I would certainly, in no case, restore an inch of it to the Kabul Power; but, on the whole, I am inclined to think that the best way of treating it would be to keep no troops in it, no cantonment, but to place it under the government of some Sirdar selected and protected by us, retaining, in our arrangements with him, the right of sending troops into it whenever we require to do so, and leaving him in undisturbed possession of the entire revenue and administration of the district. So far as I can at present perceive, no small ruler placed by us in such a position could have any possible inducement to intrigue against us with the Kabul Power, from which he would have nothing to gain. On the contrary, that power would be, I should think, a constant bugbear to him, and he would fear to be absorbed by it if he forfeited our protection. If there is, amongst the present Kabul claimants to protection, any Chief or Sirdar sufficiently intelligent and suitable for such a position, this arrangement would, perhaps, enable us to satisfy, with advantage to ourselves, an otherwise inconvenient claim. As for the Khyber, nothing on earth would induce me to keep troops in such a fever trap, or to spend money upon it, and the permanent extension of our Khyber line to Gandamak, either in a military or a political sense, appears to me quite out of the question. In saying this, however, I wish it to be understood that I by no means advocate, or contemplate, the relinquishment of our present hold upon the Khyber. My view is that such a hold over the pass, which it is, I think, essential to retain, can be sufficiently secured by proper arrangements with the Pass tribes, if the authority of the Kabul Power over those tribes be excluded as it now is, and that the Pass should be held for us by Jezzailchis, not by British troops, European or Native.

4. As regards the Kurram line, it is certainly true, as pointed out by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that General Roberts, when advancing upon Kabul by this line, was obliged to cut himself off from his base of operations, and that, until that base was transferred to the Khyber, his force was virtually acting as a flying column. It must be remembered, however, that he could not, by any other line, have struck an equally rapid blow at Kabul, at a time when the Amir and his councillors were confidently reckoning on the assumed inability of any British force to march upon their capital for six months. The considerations urged by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and which I do not underrate, in favour of abandoning the Kurram, as a permanent military line, appear to me to point very strongly to the expediency of the arrangement I have suggested, viz., that the occupation of the Kurram on our behalf should be entrusted to some friendly chief independent of the Kabul power. All these matters must now, however, be settled by Lord Ripon, whom I expect at Simla on the 7th or 8th instant.

5. To be circulated, recorded in Political Department, and submitted, together with my previous minute on the same subject, to the Secretary of State, and to my successor.

(Signed) LYTON.

Simla, 5th June 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 25.

From Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., Commanding 1st and 2nd Divisions, Northern Afghanistan Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 11 K.-L., dated Kabul, 29th May 1880.)

WITH reference to the wish expressed by you when at Kabul last March, I have prepared a memorandum regarding the best line of communication connecting India with Afghanistan; I now beg to submit the same for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. His Lordship will observe that, while I advocate the exclusion of Afghan control over the whole of the country acquired by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, I am in favour of the withdrawal of our troops to the limits of the frontier held by us previous to the present campaign, excepting in the direction of Kandahar.

3. My reasons for this are explained at considerable length in the memorandum; they are, briefly, as follows:—

- I. The altered conditions of Northern Afghanistan since operations commenced, consequent on the overthrow of the Amīr's power.
- II. The announced intention to maintain a British garrison permanently at Kandahar.

4. We are thus committed to communication with Kandahar being ensured, and are, in my opinion, relieved from the necessity of incurring military responsibility in the direction of the Khyber or Kurram.

MEMORANDUM by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan, dated Kabul, 12th May 1880.

THE question as to which is to be the permanent line of communication between the frontier of India and North-East Afghanistan, is one of such importance that I feel it needs no apology on my part for bringing it to the early consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

2. It will, I think, be admitted that we are not justified in maintaining two separate lines of communication. Their existence causes a drain on our resources which the Indian army is ill calculated to meet. I will therefore place before His Excellency what appear to me to be the relative advantages and disadvantages of the routes to Kabul *viâ* Kohat and Kurram, and by Peshawar and Gandamak.

3. Rawalpindi may be looked upon as a common starting point for both, and the distances to Kabul *viâ* Kohat and Peshawar respectively are as follows:—

	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Kohat - - - - -	106
„ Kohat to Thull - - - - -	66
„ Thull to Kuram - - - - -	50
„ Kuram to Kushi (<i>viâ</i> Shutargardan) - - - - -	67
„ Kushi to Kabul - - - - -	43
Total - - - - -	332
	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Peshawar - - - - -	101
„ Peshawar to Jamrud - - - - -	10
„ Jamrud to Jellalabad - - - - -	66
„ Jellalabad to Gandamak - - - - -	30
„ Gandamak to Kabul (<i>viâ</i> Lataband) - - - - -	58
Total - - - - -	265

4. It will be seen from this table of distances that the route *viâ* Peshawar is about 67 miles shorter than that by Kohat. There will doubtless be a rail as far as Jamrud (beyond which point Engineers have decided that a line could only be laid at prohibitive rates), and therefore, from that place to Kabul, 154 miles, the ordinary route march would be followed.

5. From Rawalpindi to Kohat a line of railway may perhaps also be laid at some future time; and there are no physical reasons why this line should not be prolonged to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. The terminal station on this line would then be about 93 miles from Kabul. Showing a gain of quite 60 miles over the Khyber line. Of this distance, that section which lies between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi (which includes the Shutargardan Pass) alone presents any difficulty to the construction of an easy road.

6. I propose to consider these two routes separately, and balance as carefully as I can their respective merits and drawbacks. It would be as well, perhaps, that I should here note the number of men and guns now employed in keeping open communications along these lines. Between Kohat and Ali Khel, 19 guns, 829 cavalry, and 5,313 infantry are engaged; and between Jamrud and Butkhak (the post next to Kabul) there are 34 guns, 2,134 cavalry, and 15,545 infantry.

Kurram could never probably do with less, and at least as many more men would be required to maintain the safety of the communications between Ali Khel and Kabul.

7. The advantages of the Kurram route, with which I will first deal, are—

I.—If a line of rail is constructed to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, there would remain but 90 miles between it and Kabul.

II.—At the Peiwar Kotal, Ali Khel, and on the table-land of the Hariah which lies between these places, any number of troops could be located in a climate admirably suited to Europeans.

III.—The only period during which the Shutargardan Pass is closed to the passage of troops is from the middle of December to the end of March, and though it is of course objectionable to have an army practically cut off from Kabul for from three and a half to four months, still it must be remembered that during this period the plains of Kabul are more or less covered with snow, and that this season of the year would certainly not be selected for military operations in Afghanistan except under very pressing circumstances. But I think I may safely assert that, even in the depth of winter, were a move necessary, an enterprising commander could cross the Shutargardan. Practically, therefore, troops quartered in the upper portion of the Kurram Valley are capable of being pushed on to Kabul all the year round.

IV.—Kushi once reached, the force enters the rich and fertile valley of the Logar, where supplies are immediately procurable.

V.—From Kushi, Kabul is approached by the least defensible and least difficult line; the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, within five miles of Kabul, being the only point at which an effective stand could be made, and even if this position were held, there would be no difficulty in turning it by following the Indiki route and passing across the Chardeh Valley to either the Deh-i-Mozang gorge or the Kotal-i-Nanuchi.

VI.—As far as Thull the road runs through British territory, and from Thull to the Peiwar Kotal the country of the Turis is traversed. This tribe have been most friendly all along, and, being Shiah, would not easily be induced to combine with the fanatical Afghan Sunnis against us.

From the Peiwar Kotal to Dreikula (eight miles beyond Ali Khel) the route lies through the country of the Jajis, a people not well disposed to us, but whose villages and crops are so completely at our mercy that they could never exhibit open hostility.

Beyond Dreikula the country is absolutely uninhabited; and, though Jajis, Mongals, and Ghilzais can undoubtedly collect there in considerable numbers to oppose the advance of a force both in the Hazardarakht defile and on the slopes of the Shutargardan, still what has been done before can be accomplished again, and the difficulties to be overcome are certainly not greater than must be looked for and encountered on entering any mountainous district with hostile intent.

8. The disadvantages of this line are as follows:—

I.—From Rawalpindi to Kohat the country is sparsely cultivated and inhabited; from Kohat to Thull this remark applies with even greater force; whilst from Thull to Kushi no supplies whatever are procurable to meet the requirements of an Anglo-Indian army. This difficulty would, in a great measure, disappear with the construction of a railway, and the further the line could be pushed the better. The nearest point whence a fair amount of supplies could be drawn is the Kuttak country, and the next district is Bunnu, famous for its grain-crops; but good roads, assistance in carriage (for local transport is scarce), and safe communications are needed before this source could be thoroughly utilized. Large quantities of ghee can be brought down from Tusafzai, but such articles as dhal and rice would have to be drawn from more distant districts of the Punjab.

II.—Viewed from a sanitary point, the prospect of an occupation of the Kurram Valley is not cheering. During the past eighteen months it has proved very unhealthy to Native troops, more especially at Thull and Balesh Khel, while throughout the valley pneumonia and fever have been very prevalent.

III.—The physical difficulties of the road between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi are certainly far greater than any which present themselves on the Khyber route. Doubtless in time they could be materially lessened, and at no very considerable outlay; but the construction of a really good cart road between the points indicated would be a matter of great difficulty and vast expense.

IV.—From a political stand-point this route possesses no marked advantages. It is, as it were, but a by-road to Kabul or Ghazni, and its possession does not place us in a position of vantage with regard to the tribes whose districts it skirts.

9. I will now deal with the Peshawar-Gandamak route. Its advantages are—

I.—The total distance from Rawalpindi to Kabul is 67 miles shorter than by the Kurram line.

II.—It is never rendered impassable by snow. In the depth of winter the Lataband Kotal is not closed for more than a couple of days at a time.

III.—A good cart road might be made from Jamrud (where the railway will end) to Kabul.

IV. The road leads *via* Jellalabad through the country of the important eastern Ghilzais, and is a direct line of communication with Badakshan and the western confines of Kashmir, the command of which routes some few years hence may be of considerable importance to us.

V.—It enables us to get behind the Mohmands, Bajouris, Swatis, and Afridis; and, lastly, it is the old historical road to India by which former invasions have swept, and the great commercial highway between Hindustan and Central Asia, along which trade has passed for centuries, and from which nothing will divert it.

10. The disadvantages of this line are—

I.—The great heat in the summer months, which renders it most unhealthy from Jamrud to Gandamak, and to a great extent closes it at the very period most suited for military operations in Afghanistan.

II.—The almost entire absence of supplies between Gandamak and Butkhak, and the fact that the road traverses for its entire length a country inhabited by warlike and fanatical tribes who possess both the will and the means to give considerable trouble in the event of an organized and combined disturbance.

III.—The very large force required to keep open communications, and the numerous defiles and positions ready made for defensive action.

11. Comparing, then, the two routes from a military and sanitary point of view, I think there can be little or no doubt that the Kurram line possesses most advantages, provided that the troops are located principally at the upper end of the valley, that is, at Peiwar Kotal, Shalozan, and the Hariab. But for political and commercial reasons there can be no question as to the Khyber line being preferable; indeed, I am of opinion that, for political reasons alone, it is a point of paramount importance to hold it, if communication with Kabul is to be kept open at all.

12. I now approach a subject the importance of which I do not underrate, viz., whether any necessity will really exist for the maintenance of a road from the north-western frontier of India to Kabul after the retirement of our force from Afghanistan has been effected.

The Afghanistan of to-day is very different from the Afghanistan which existed at the time that the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Ruled by a strong Amir, possessed of a large standing army, and equipped with a numerous artillery and vast munitions of war, Afghanistan was a power which it became absolutely necessary for India to have access to and some control over. Kabul, the seat of government, had become a huge arsenal and barrack, and it was inexpedient that her ruler should be permitted to hold direct communication with Russia, receiving a Russian whilst declining a British Envoy, and neglecting all offers of friendly intercourse with India.

Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and, though no doubt still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India.

13. The occupation of Kabul in October 1879 revealed to us much valuable information concerning the offensive power which the Amir possessed in his army, his well-stocked arsenal, and his skilful artisans. With such means at his disposal for good or evil, it is easy to foresee what serious complications might at any time have arisen were he assisted by Russia either with men, money, or officers.

14. This unmasking of the Amir's considerable warlike preparations, hitherto carefully concealed from us, is surely in itself a sufficient justification of the line of action taken by the Indian Government when it declared war against Afghanistan in 1878. Moreover, these revelations prove the wisdom of that portion of the Gandamak Treaty which insisted on the rectification of our own frontier and the location of British troops in the Khyber and Kurram. So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill-disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital.

15. Were the Afghan nation in the same condition now that it was a year, or even less, ago, no one thoroughly conversant with the policy of the north-west frontier of India would hesitate to recommend that either the Kurram or Khyber, or both routes, should be held in such strength as would admit of a considerable force being moved

rapidly on Kabul. But, as I have stated above, these conditions are quite altered, and it is open to consideration whether there is any real necessity for us now to incur the expense and responsibility of occupying with troops either the Kurram or Khyber line.

16. The first point to decide is, what probable use in the future would be made of these routes, and to what extent would they contribute to the security of our Indian empire, considered either in an offensive or a defensive sense.

17. This is a point, however, which cannot be decided, or even fairly discussed, without, at the same time, carefully considering a route which is now, I venture to think, of even more importance than either the Khyber or Kurram. I mean the line *viâ* Sukkur, Jacobabad, and the Bolan to Kandahar and Western Afghanistan.

Kandahar, where we can, if we so desire, permanently station a garrison of British troops, is being rapidly brought into communication with the main railway system of India, and will soon be (as regards time) within a comparatively short journey of the rising and important seaport of Karachi. This port must inevitably be the base of all military operations undertaken in the direction of Kandahar-Herat, which line, unless I am much mistaken, will henceforth be the theatre of any war carried on by us against the Afghans or Russians in Central Asia.

The Kandahar-Herat line certainly presents to us fewer difficulties than any other line, and, with the completion of the railway to Kandahar, that place would be our starting-point. Thence Herat is distant only 350 or 400 miles according as the northern or southern route is adopted. The road is quite practicable for wheeled guns, and for some part of the way a fair amount of grain and forage is procurable.

18. It is of course impossible to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but, looking to the altered conditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously contemplated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch from India to Persia or Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that it is by this line that all offensive operations on our part could most advantageously be carried on.

19. We have learnt by experience what a very considerable force is required to occupy Kabul and to maintain our communications with India by the Khyber route. There is no denying the fact that, if the ruler of Kabul should at any future time be assisted by Russian officers, the army of 25,000 men which we now find it necessary to employ on the Khyber line alone would have to be very considerably increased. Nor do I think that, even if the Afghans themselves were on our side, we could deal as effectually with Russia in Eastern as in Western Afghanistan.

20. I may briefly summarize these remarks by expressing it as my opinion that, in future, considering the very altered circumstances under which the Afghan nation now exists, we should make up our minds to refuse our right and act offensively from our left; in other words, that we should decide to remain merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. We have neither sufficient men nor material to warrant our operating on more than one line.

To what extent those offensive measures might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan, and the valley of the Helmand. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on. If this point be admitted, it only remains for us to consider to what extent communication should be maintained between the north-west frontier of India and Kabul.

My own opinion, which I offer with considerable diffidence, is that the Kurram line should be given up altogether, and that the responsibilities which we ought to incur on the Khyber route should be limited to such as would ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we have given to the rulers of Lalpura and Kuner.

21. Viewing Kabul in the altered and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and knowing

(as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can again at any time make ourselves masters of Kabul by either of the two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber.

We are now also fully aware of the extraordinary difficulties which Russia would have to encounter were she at any time to advance upon India *via* Kabul, and to how great an extent we could injure and harass her by raising the tribes along the line of communications which it would be necessary for her to maintain, or by taking the initiative from our advanced, yet secure, base at Kandahar. The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber Pass.

22. On political grounds it would probably be necessary for us to have control of the Khyber, or perhaps as far as Lundi Kotal, Pesh Bolak, or any other selected place. To secure this I would make use of Hazara or Afridi levies, but I would strongly deprecate the employment of any regular troops beyond Peshawur.

It seems to me very unlikely that we shall for many years to come enter sufficiently far into the hills to the south and west of the Khyber to enable us to find a suitable and healthy cantonment for British and Native troops; and as it is scarcely possible to continue the occupation of such stations as Jamrud, Ali Musjid, or even Lundi Kotal, without a greater exposure of life and health than the result warrants, my recommendation is to withdraw our troops altogether from the Khyber, and to place them in such situations *cis*-Indus as will ensure our having a healthy and serviceable force, fit to take the field at any time of the year.

23. To attain this result, I would go as far as to withdrawing all, or nearly all, the European troops from Peshawur, and reducing the garrison to the lowest possible strength.

The present seems to me to be a most favourable opportunity for carrying out this project, which has long been considered and recommended by many who know the Peshawur valley well. We have humbled Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the Amir of Kabul. We have taught the Afghans and the tribes between Kabul and India that we accept no denial, that we can go where we will, that it is possible for us, whenever we may so desire, to advance rapidly on Kabul, and, what is even more important, to remain there as long as we wish. This was deemed impossible by all the tribes, even as far down as the Afridis, and it was implicitly believed that the inclemency of the winter, backed up by a powerful combination of the Afghans, must result in our destruction. The reduction of the garrison at Peshawur would not, therefore, now be attributed to either fear or weakness; it would be regarded as part of the general scheme determined upon by us after the total overthrow of the Afghan power.

So long as our troops are located in the Khyber, a large garrison must be maintained at Peshawur. The occupation of these places cannot but be expensive, and will make the military service of Government distasteful to the classes from which the Native army is recruited. This is a most serious matter, and ought not to be dealt with theoretically; only persons who live amongst soldiers know the effect of quartering them in unhealthy places.

24. When Afghanistan was governed by an able man like Sher Ali, who, whatever the cause, had become bitterly hostile to the British Government, and had under him an army of at least 50,000 men in fair order, with some 300 guns and any amount of ammunition, Peshawur was a place of great importance. Nor was it possible to ignore the Khyber when there was an Afghan garrison in Ali Masjid, and when the Afridis were, as they said, weighing in the balance the fortunes of the British Government and of the ruler of Kabul. But, as I have already explained, this state of affairs has passed away. The Afghans are no longer a united nation; their army has been defeated and dispersed, and most of their guns are in our possession.

25. If I am right in supposing that our next struggle will be on the Kandahar line, it would be very inconvenient to have 10,000 or 12,000 troops locked up in the Khyber and at Peshawur. An advance, or even a demonstration, through the Khyber would be of very doubtful advantage, and we should certainly not create difficulties for ourselves at such a time by stirring up the tribes that live near the Kabul river.

It must also be remembered that, if the commencement of a third campaign finds us in military occupation of the Khyber, we shall not then be able to retire from it. We must either give it up at the close of this campaign, or continue to hold it at all hazards. What would be an act of prudence, wisdom, and moderation at a time when we are successful, would certainly be considered by the tribes on our border as an act of weakness if undertaken at the commencement of a war.

26. The political authorities, I understand, agree that arrangements might be made with the Afridis to hold the Khyber with levies, and that the greater portion of the Peshawur garrison might be withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus, and stationed on the high land to the south of the trunk road, near the line of railway, and probably not far from Campbellpore.

Such a disposition, provided we have a proper system of transport, would make us far stronger for offensive purposes than we have been hitherto. The garrison of Peshawur has only been formidable on paper: the unhealthiness of the place, and the necessity of providing for the safety of a straggling cantonment close to the hills, have on many occasions proved this.

27. I have had five years' experience of Peshawur, and can therefore bear reliable testimony to its unhealthiness; and it is a fact that, on visiting the station in the autumn of 1878, and again in 1879, I found the troops so sickly that it was with difficulty the ordinary guards could be relieved. I have also observed that regiments which have come on service, after having been quartered at Peshawur for some time, are invariably more sickly than corps from other cantonments.

28. Troops stationed at Campbellpore would have the following advantages over the Peshawur garrison:—

- (1) They would have healthy quarters.
- (2) They would not be harassed by excessive sentry duty.
- (3) They could march in any direction at a few hours' notice, without having to leave strong detachments to guard their cantonments.

The completion of the railway to Peshawur, perhaps even to Jamrud; the bridging of the Indus at or near Attock; and the maintenance of a sufficient number of transport animals with the troops at Campbellpore, are necessary conditions of the proposed changes.

29. While I strongly advocate the complete withdrawal of troops from the Kuram valley, I must here record my earnest hope that this district will, under no circumstances, be again restored to the Duranis. On behalf of the Government of India, the Turis were distinctly informed by me that this should never happen.

No better arrangement could, I think, be made than to confer the district of Kuram upon some Native gentleman of approved loyalty, such as, for instance, Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan, K.C.S.I. It would be practically held in our interests, and would be a fitting reward for a border chieftain whose family have faithfully and devotedly served the British Government upwards of thirty years.

30. The district of Khost might be made over in life-jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, who, joining me in the Kuram Valley early in 1879, has, it may be said, thrown in his lot with us, and it is very doubtful whether he would be able to stay in Kabul after our departure.

The Sirdar and Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan are fast friends, and would doubtless be able to afford each other mutual assistance and protection while ruling the adjoining districts of Kuram and Khost.

I am inclined to think that it would be better to include the Jaji country with Khost, and make it over in jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan. It would prevent the important position of the Pciwar Kotal falling into the possession of the ruler of Kabul, and would keep the Kabul authorities away from the neighbourhood of Kuram.

31. As to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. None of the leading nobles or Sirdars of Afghanistan that I have come across have sufficient power or influence to hold their own, without such a measure of support as I am convinced no British Government would be willing to promise or supply. Abdul Rahman alone amongst them will probably be able to do so; even he would certainly be dependent on our

Government for considerable monetary aid at the first start, but, if the accounts of him are to be believed, he is the one man in the country capable of ruling it and firmly establishing his power.

32. No other arrangements appearing practicable, I would recommend that Herat and Turkistan should be comprised in the principality of Kabul. In fact, with the exception of Kandahar (on which I maintain our grasp should never be loosened), the Kurram valley, the Khyber Pass, and the proposed life-interest of Wali Muhammad in Khost, Kabul would retain all her original possessions.

33. In venturing thus freely to express my views as to the relations which we should entertain in future towards Afghanistan, I trust I shall not be considered inconsistent in advocating a policy so opposed to that which I, for one, have hitherto held advisable, and to enforce which the Government of India have deemed it necessary to incur a long and expensive war.

I would ask His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General to bear in mind that no one has been a more zealous supporter of the present policy, and that no one has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan, than I have. The objects of this policy have, I consider, been most thoroughly attained. Nearly a year's residence at Kabul has convinced me of the truth of this, and manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian empire.

34. The state of affairs which brought about the Treaty of Gandamak has completely changed. In place of our being obliged to occupy the advanced strategic positions secured to us by that treaty, and which the safety of our Indian empire forced us to hold as long as Kabul was the centre of a great political and military power, we can now afford to withdraw our troops within our original frontier. We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself.

35. It may not be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us.

Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime.

The military occupation of Kandahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance; even there we should make our presence but little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province.

36. If the present negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, I should hamper him with the fewest possible conditions; if they fail, I would be inclined to let the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan please themselves about an Amir. In course of time some strong man would win his way to power, and meanwhile it would be wiser not to force a ruler upon them. Any nominee of ours would certainly not be acceptable, and in all probability would not be able to hold his own after our departure.

37. Under any circumstances I am strongly in favour of not remaining at Kabul after the great heat of the Indian summer has passed and travelling through the Khyber is possible. If we cannot settle matters with the Afghans at this season of the year, when everything is in our favour, we shall certainly not be able to do so in the winter, when the difficulties of an occupation are immeasurably increased.

38. Moreover, I cannot too strongly urge upon the consideration of the Government of India the desirability of not leaving the Native portion of the army in the field after the ensuing autumn. Many of the regiments will then have been on service since October 1878; they have done admirably,—indeed, I doubt if at any former period the Native army has ever behaved more loyally or gallantly; all ranks are in good heart, and will cheerfully carry out any work they may be called upon to perform. There is, however, a limit beyond which it would be impolitic to require them to remain away from India. This limit I place at two years.

It would be found difficult, if not impracticable, to relieve the troops now on service. All the Goorkhas, and nearly all the Punjab corps, are in the first line. This is another strong argument in favour of an early withdrawal.

39. On their return to India I earnestly hope that Native officers and men will have every facility afforded them of visiting their homes, and be treated liberally in every respect. They deserve all that the Government can do for them, and, though a

prolonged absence from India has already affected recruiting, I feel sure that the men have only to show themselves in their districts for recruits to come forward in sufficient numbers. After two years' rest the Native army should be even better than it is now. I confidently predict that this will be the case, and that it will be fit and willing for another campaign, if required.

40. I trust I may be excused for broaching a subject somewhat foreign to the original purport of this paper, but the fact is that the condition, welfare, and loyalty of the Native army must always be important factors in determining questions of Indian foreign policy.

Enclosure 4 in No. 25.

MEMORANDUM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN submitting my views on Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum of the 29th May, on the subject of the lines of communication connecting India with Afghanistan, it seems necessary at the outset to explain that I do not propose to enter into a detailed criticism of General Roberts' paper, with the drift of which I heartily agree.

Though some difference of opinion may be allowed in the arguments set up in General Roberts' Memorandum, they are sufficiently strong to satisfy my mind that the political and military necessities of our frontier do not, under existing circumstances, require us to maintain garrisons either in Kurram or the Khyber.

We do not require any greater facilities for the invasion of Afghanistan than are secured to us by our position in the south, and our control of the Khyber in the north; and the objections put forward by General Roberts to the permanent location of the troops either in Kurram or the Khyber seem to me to be absolutely conclusive, whether viewed from the stand-points of strategy, policy, or economy.

I also concur with General Roberts in thinking that our frontier would, in reality, be stronger if the moveable troops maintained for its security were quartered in healthy positions on the eastern side of the Indus, from which they could at any time be withdrawn without inconvenience, instead of being quartered, as they now are, trans-Indus, in advanced and unhealthy stations, which are strong only in name.

As Peshawur will probably be the terminus of the railway now in progress, it will not be possible to denude it entirely of its European garrison, but the general idea suggested in this paper can, I think, be consistently maintained by completing the entrenched position, commenced at that station some twelve or thirteen years ago, to such extent as may be considered necessary for a garrison that can hold its own for a time.

The entrenchment should be strong, but need not be extensive, as it could be reinforced at the shortest notice, and when the railway has been completed, the European garrison holding it might be relieved every two or three months.

This memorandum is submitted in accordance with Foreign Office telegram of the 28th ultimo.

Enclosure 5 in No. 25.

NOTE by the Honourable SIR R. E. EGERTON, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, upon SIR F. ROBERTS' Memorandum, dated Kabul, 12th May 1880, on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan.

IN this Memorandum Sir F. Roberts has examined, not only the question of the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan, but he has also made proposals regarding the future military position which we should take up on the North-West frontier of India, which require some examination, as they involve many and weighty matters to which it appears that sufficient consideration has not been given.

2. In the conclusion stated in paragraph 11 of the Memorandum, that the route *viâ* Peshawur and the Khyber to Kabul is superior to that *viâ* Kurram and Shutargardan Pass, I entirely concur.

3. My opinion on this point was expressed in my letter in the Foreign Department, No. 868 C., dated 18th September 1879; and for the reasons therein stated, to which I adhere, I have no doubt whatever that the route *viâ* Khyber and Jellalabad is the best of the northern routes into Afghanistan. It is the main trade route; it is free from snow in winter, and is open at all seasons.

4. Peshawur, which has been and will always be the base of operations of any army advancing to Kabul, is 154 miles from that place; while, on the Kurram line, Rawal Pindi, which is 332 miles from Kabul, must be the permanent base, if this line is adopted.

5. Considering both the distance and the physical difficulties of each of these routes, I submit that the Khyber route is far the best.

6. Sir F. Roberts next reviews the question of the line of frontier which it is necessary for us to hold when we retire from Kabul.

7. He advocates* the retention of Kandahar, and considers that, if we hold Kandahar and complete the railway to that place, we may give up the Kurram line altogether, and incur only such responsibilities on the Khyber line as may be necessary to ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we may have given to the rulers of Kunar and Lalpura.

* Paras. 17, 20.

8. In this view he proposes to make over Kurram and Khost to Native Chiefs, and to withdraw all regular troops from places to the west of Peshawur on the Khyber line, holding the Khyber Pass and any selected place to the west of it with levies. He would also reduce the garrison of Peshawur to the lowest possible strength, and would withdraw all, or nearly all, European troops from Peshawur to more healthy stations east of the Indus.

9. I agree in all that General Roberts says regarding the importance of Kandahar and the necessity for holding it.

Kurram, if we are to give up the route through this valley to Kabul, is not a desirable possession. The revenue derivable from it is small and insignificant. The territory from Thal up to the Peiwar Kotal, which is all that need be held for any purpose, is a narrow slip, a few miles wide and about 65 miles long, exposed on both sides to incursions from independent tribes. There is no object in holding it except to secure a road, or to redeem pledges made to the people. We have made a distinct promise to the inhabitants that they shall not be replaced under Kabul; and I think this promise should be fulfilled. I see no objection to making over Kurram to a Native Chief who is well disposed to us, provided he can hold his own there without our help.

10. If, as I think probable, our nominee requires military force to assist him in holding the territory, we had better hold Kurram ourselves and reward the Chief in some other way. If Khost cannot be held by our nominee, I would abandon it. We are under no pledge to its people, and need not have any scruples about giving it up.

11. I am inclined to think that Khost and Kurram together would not be too large a territory for one man to hold; and if Sirdar Wali Muhammad is detached from Kabul influence, and made dependent upon us, both Kurram and Khost may be granted to him without violating our promise to the people of Kurram. There is this advantage in making over Khost to some friendly Chief, that we should thereby save Kurram from predatory attacks from the south from Wazirs and Dauris, which our experience of the last year leads us to think may be frequent. If we were under no pledges to the people, I would give up Kurram altogether; but if we are obliged by our promises to detach it from Kabul, no better plan than granting it with Khost to a friendly Chief can be followed. A plan for annexing Kurram and placing it under the Punjab as a frontier district is under consideration, but it is, I think, more advisable to make that territory over to a Native Chief, or to abandon it entirely, than to add it permanently to this province.

12. On the Khyber side the necessity of keeping the road open, and our promises and engagements to the Khyber Afridis, to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura, and to the Syud Badshah of Kunar, and also the security of the Peshawur valley, have to be

considered in determining what extent of territory we should hold, and what should be the strength and composition of the Peshawur garrison.

13. General Roberts argues that, as we have nothing to fear from Kabul, and as any attack upon India from the north will be made along the Kandahar line, and not from the Kabul direction, it will be embarrassing to have troops locked up at Peshawur. We should take the present opportunity to reduce the Peshawur garrison, and withdraw all, or nearly all, our European troops to the healthy stations east of the Indus, holding the Khyber with levies and taking as little territory beyond the actual pass as possible.

14. If the engagements we have made with the Syud Badshah of Kunar do not require us to protect him against Kabul, one reason for holding territory beyond the end of the Khyber is removed, but if we are pledged to protect him, we must take up a position which will enable us to fulfil our promise, as we have reason to know from past experience that no treaty engagements will prevent the ruler of Kabul from injuring and oppressing those Chiefs and people who have been friendly to us when they come again into his power. Should our engagements with Kunar oblige us to take territory as far as Jellalabad, we must hold the line with troops. Should our promise to Kunar not necessitate so large an annexation, we have still to consider what is necessary to enable us to fulfil our engagements to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura. This Chief, Muhammad Akbar Khan, has received distinct assurances from the Political Officer, under the sanction of the Government of India, that he will be maintained in his possessions, notwithstanding any change in the Government of Kabul. These promises were given when Muhammad Akbar's cousin, Muhammad Sadik Khan, who was Yakub Khan's nominee and cousin, turned against us in December 1879.

15. In order to protect the Lalpura Chief, it is necessary that we should have an open road through the Khyber as far as Dakka. I think that the Khyber may be held by levies raised as at present almost entirely from the Afridi tribes under the command of a British officer, provided that there is a force at Peshawur strong enough to hold that place and to keep up a moveable column properly equipped with transport, ready to operate on the border when required.

I would deprecate reducing the Peshawur garrison below the strength necessary to effect this object at all seasons. It is not necessary to keep a large force of Europeans at Peshawur, where they are extremely unhealthy. The garrison may be composed of Native troops. It is true that Native troops have hitherto been as sickly as European at Peshawur, but this is owing, I believe, in both cases, to the system of reliefs, which supplies the garrison with fresh men who have not time to become acclimatized. If the Native garrison of Peshawur were composed of local regiments, like those of the Punjab Frontier Force, I believe that the inefficiency arising from sickness would, in a great measure, disappear.

16. The danger of attack at Peshawur and along that frontier arises not so much from Kabul as from the independent tribes on the border, to whose attacks the Peshawur frontier is eminently exposed.

17. Although the military power of the ruler of Kabul has been broken, the danger from the tribes still remains and must not be overlooked. For some time to come the excitement, which our operations in Afghanistan have caused amongst the border tribes, will continue, and our retirement from that country will efface the impression caused by our successful advance, and will make the tribes more inclined for mischief than before.

18. I consider, therefore, that the garrison of Peshawur must not be weakened in numbers to much below the strength at which it stood before the Afghan war began. The number of European soldiers should be reduced, but the number should be replaced by Native troops, and I think the Peshawur Native garrison should be composed of local regiments which might, if necessary, form part of the Punjab Frontier Force. There was never anything in the position of Peshawur itself, in the nature of its border, and in the character of the tribes of independent Pathans, whose incursions have to be resisted, to distinguish Peshawur from other districts on the frontier. The sole difference lay in the proximity of Kabul and of the troops of that power. Now that the Kabul army has been disorganized, there is less reason than ever for maintaining at Peshawur a force differing from the Punjab Frontier Force, which, from being constantly changed, suffers so greatly from sickness.

19. I cannot recommend that the Peshawur garrison, whatever may be its composition, be placed within a fortified enclosure. Mobility and vigilance are most

important qualities for a force employed in border duties, and these are not promoted by accustoming the troops to live inside fortifications.

20. There is one thing which is apparent in the Memorandum of General Roberts,* and that is, the desire to move the army out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible. No doubt this is desirable for many reasons,

* Para. 38.

if we do not intend to remain in the country ; but I deprecate any display of eagerness to leave, because such display is sure to make the enemy anxious to delay and baffle us. It is by no means certain that the settlement which we now hope to make in Afghanistan is so final and complete that we shall not have to return to that country. It will be fortunate if the proposed settlement is made quickly, and our troops are able to withdraw from the country by the autumn. But should anything detain them, it may be necessary to relieve them, and I think it worth while to mention here that it is not so impracticable to relieve the Native troops of the force as it at first sight may seem.

21. I say this with much diffidence, and venture to put the following scheme forward, as a suggestion for relieving the Native Infantry and Cavalry. It has been proposed by Colonel Black, Secretary to this Government in the Military Department. The plan involves the abandonment of the Kurram line, which I think advisable in any case, if the occupation is prolonged. The Kurram force has done nothing since the Zaimusht expedition to coerce the Wazirs, who have given so much trouble on the south. It is unable to occupy the Shuturgardan and to co-operate with the army from Kabul ; it has shown itself powerless to operate against other tribes, which have continually molested the line of communications. It is absolutely useless in its present position, and I can see no necessity to retain it in Kurram.

22. The scheme shows that the divisions in the front can be relieved, except the Artillery.

23. I trust that it will not be necessary to keep the troops in Afghanistan ; but, if it is, I think the force can be relieved in the manner indicated. I may remark that it is only recently that the urgent necessity for relieving the regiments on service has become apparent. A few months ago, when I wished to relieve the 5th Punjab Infantry, the measure was not allowed by the military authorities, though the regiment had been on service almost continuously since October 1877.

24. I think it necessary to put forward my views of the possibility of relieving the army in Afghanistan, as it seems to me of much importance that the Government of India should not have its hand forced by the supposed necessity of withdrawing our army immediately, for reasons connected with the discipline and organization of that army. If such a view is entertained, we may possibly be induced, or think ourselves compelled by the exigencies of the case, to accept a hasty and partial adjustment of affairs, which will not last and will lead to fresh difficulties.

25. It follows from what I have said above, that I recommend the completion of the railway line to Peshawar as soon as possible. That line is necessary for the safety of our north-west frontier, whatever turn affairs in Afghanistan may take. The line from Rawul Pindi to Kohat will not, so far as I can foresee, be of much use for military purposes. A good road from Rawal Pindi to Thal, fit for wheeled traffic, will be sufficient for the wants of that line. For the portion of road between Rawul Pindi and Kohat, a line of road fit for carts, running through the Kohat Pass, may in time be substituted.

26. This last-named line will not exceed 42 miles in length, as against 106 miles from Rawul Pindi to Kohat. The Adam Khel Afridis are under obligations to permit the construction of the road from Peshawur to Kohat, through their territory. This line is one of much importance for controlling this division of the Afridi tribe, and for enabling us to enter their country, and also that of the Khyber Afridis, when we please.

27. I need hardly say that I concur heartily in all that General Roberts says regarding the good service performed by the Native troops of the Indian Army, and that I agree thoroughly in the opinion that they are deserving of every indulgence which can be granted to them on their return.

28. I have no doubt that their merits and deserts are fully appreciated by the Government of India.

21st July 1880.

(Signed) R. G. E.

Annexure A.

NOTE by Colonel S. BLACK, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, on the manner of effecting a relief of Native Cavalry and Infantry Regiments now in the front line at Kabul.

I HAVE in a former note stated how we could relieve the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, and I may as well repeat it here.

Cavalry.

4th Punjab Cavalry is the only regiment available to take the place of the Guides, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 2nd Punjab Cavalry, so that, in this arm, the Generals in the front must consent to reduced numbers. I think this can be managed without incurring risk, as cavalry is not the arm required in Northern Afghanistan.

Infantry.

We have 5 regiments in the front, and these I would relieve as follows:—3 regiments in the autumn, and 2 in the spring.

Guides should be relieved by 1st Sikhs	-	-	} 1st relief in autumn.
5th Punjab Infantry should be relieved by 6th Punjab Infantry	-	-	
5th Goorkhas should be relieved by 4th Sikhs	-	-	
3rd Sikhs should be relieved by 4th Punjab Infantry	-	-	} 2nd relief in autumn.
2nd Sikhs should be relieved by 3rd Punjab Infantry	-	-	

But the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief are more difficult to replace.

I would, however, recommend withdrawal from the Kurram Valley, and this would give us 3 cavalry and 6 infantry regiments to take the places of regiments required for the relief of the front line.

In the front line there are 7 regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry. I would relieve 6 of the cavalry and the whole of the infantry (*see* Tables A and B).

The notes made on these Tables explain that we require (supposing 6 cavalry regiments will suffice for front line in Northern Afghanistan):—

In Cavalry.

4 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
1 regiment of the Punjab Frontier Force.

In Infantry.

8 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force.

A.

Cavalry, Native.

Front line:—

3rd B. C.	-	-	} 7 regiments, of which	} 13 regiments on service. By giving up Kurram, 10 would remain on service. But relief required only	
17th B. C.	-	-			} 4 belong to Punjab
3rd P. C.	-	-			
Guides	-	-	} All, except 3rd P. C., should be relieved.		
19th B. C.	-	-			
1st P. C.	-	-			
2nd P. C.	-	-			

On communications:—

4th B. C.	-	-	} 3 regiments
5th B. C.	-	-	
C. I. H.	-	-	

In Kurram:—

1st B. C.	-	-	} 3 regiments
13th B. C.	-	-	
18th B. C.	-	-	

In India :—

2nd B. C.	-	-	} 13 regiments.
6th B. C.	-	-	
7th B. C.	-	-	
8th B. C.	-	-	
9th B. C.	-	-	
10th B. C.	-	-	
11th B. C.	-	-	
12th B. C.	-	-	
14th B. C.	-	-	
15th B. C.	-	-	
16th B. C.	-	-	
4th P. C.	-	-	}
5th P. C.	-	-	

Total - 26 regiments, including Central India Horse.

In effecting the relief, I should propose to reduce the 7 regiments in front line to 6. The 3rd Punjab Cavalry should stand fast.

The 3 regiments on communications should go to the front, and the following 5 corps might be taken (2 for the front line and 3 for communications) :—

2nd Bengal Cavalry.
6th ditto.
9th ditto.
16th ditto.
4th Punjab Cavalry.

We should then have 9 regiments on service; front line and communications.

I would bring the Kurram force back to India, and this would give, in India, 17 regiments.

B.

Native Infantry.

In front line, Kabul, 16 regiments :—

5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force, viz., Guides, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Sikhs, and 5th Goorkhas.
3 Goorkha regiments, viz., 2nd, 3rd, and 4th.
8 Native Infantry regiments, chiefly Punjabis.

16 regiments. Of these, 13 regiments should be relieved.

(The 3rd Sikhs, the 2nd Sikhs, and a Goorkha regiment might remain another year.)

On communications :—

8th N. I.	-	-	} 13 regiments. These should take the front line.
9th N. I.	-	-	
16th N. I.	-	-	
22nd N. I.	-	-	
27th N. I.	-	-	
30th N. I.	-	-	
31st N. I.	-	-	
32nd N. I.	-	-	
41st N. I.	-	-	
1st Goorkhas	-	-	
1st Madras	-	-	}
4th ditto	-	-	
15th ditto	-	-	

In Kurram :—

5th N. I.	-	-	} 6 regiments. I would withdraw these regiments to India.
13th N. I.	-	-	
20th N. I.	-	-	
21st N. I.	-	-	
29th N. I.	-	-	
Deoli Infantry	-	-	

In India.

1st N. I., Peshawur*	-	<p>If we withdraw from Kurram, we should get back 6 regiments, so that in effecting the relief of the 13 regiments in the front line, we should get back to India $13+6=19$ regiments.</p> <p>Amongst these, there are some good regiments. We can give 5 excellent regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force to take the place of 5 to be relieved, provided the relief is effected in autumn and in spring. This would require only 8 regiments from the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief, and I should take those marked.*</p>
2nd N. I., Cawnpore	-	
4th N. I., Ferozepore*	-	
10th N. I., Cachar	-	
12th N. I., Agra*	-	
17th N. I., Morar	-	
26th N. I., Jhelum*	-	
34th N. I., Cachar	-	
36th N. I., Barrackpore	-	
38th N. I., Meerut*	-	
40th N. I., Gorackpur	-	
43rd N. I., Assam	-	
1st Sikhs, Kohat	-	
1st P. I., Edwardesabad	-	
3rd P. I., Dera Ismail Khan	-	
6th P. I., Murdan	-	
6th N. I., Peshawur	-	
3rd N. I., Dinapore	-	
7th N. I., Lucknow*	-	
11th N. I., Rawul Pindi and Kohat.	-	
14th N. I., Amballa*	-	
18th N. I., Buxar	-	
33rd N. I., Delhi*	-	
35th N. I., Allahabad	-	
37th N. I., Bareilly	-	
39th N. I., Nowshera	-	
42nd N. I., Assam	-	
44th N. I., Assam	-	
4th Sikhs, Dera Ismail Khan	-	
2nd P. I., Abbottabad	-	
4th P. I., Edwardesabad	-	

Enclosure 6 in No. 25.

LINES of COMMUNICATION between India and Afghanistan.

HAVING been invited to record my opinion on a Memorandum written by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., on the above subject, and agreeing, for the most part, in that distinguished officer's views, I have only, as briefly as I can, to state the points on which I dissent from those views, and my reasons for doing so.

1st point. General Roberts does not, to my mind, give a sufficiently decided preference to the Khyber over the Kurram route, viewed as lines of advance for our troops.

2ndly. That he has not taken into calculation the relative value of these routes, as "Keys of India."

3rdly. He states that the power of Sher Ali has been broken, the Afghan nation humbled, and that therefore we have no more to fear from Afghanistan as a military power.

4th. That we may therefore now withdraw our troops, not only from the Khyber and Kurram, but also, with the exception of a small garrison, from Peshawur itself.

1st point. It is freely admitted on all sides that we cannot afford to keep up both routes in time of war, the one requiring, in round numbers, 15,000 and the other 12,000 troops to do so, and balancing the arguments in favour of each General Roberts says that, "from a military and sanitary point of view, the Kurram line possesses most advantages, but for political and commercial reasons the Khyber is preferable."

I am bound to challenge the military advantages of the Kurram route, because I consider that, owing to the height of the Shuturgardan and the extreme cold in winter

between that pass and the Peiwar Kotal, *it is no use at all as a single route*, and can never be looked upon but as an alternative summer route in case we should at any time have a very large army in Afghanistan and found it necessary to relieve the pressure on the Khyber line. General Roberts says (para. 7, Section III., of his memorandum), "An army in Kurram is practically cut off from Kabul for from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 months in the year;" but he concludes by saying that "practically troops can be pushed on to Kabul all the year round."

Now I have heard this latter assertion made by other distinguished officers; and I should be sorry to allow such an opinion to be placed on record unchallenged.

A selected band of Europeans without animals or camp followers might perform such a feat at certain times, but nothing in the shape of an Anglo-Indian army could attempt it in winter. We must remember that from the eastern side of the Peiwar Kotal to the western side of the Shutargardan is 45 miles of uninterrupted snow with the thermometer often below zero in the day time,—through this snow Native troops, camp followers, mules, and doolie-bearers would not struggle more than 8 or 10 miles a day,—they would therefore have to encamp three, if not four, nights in the snow, devoid of shelter, forage, or firewood; and, even if the weather overhead were fine, I am sure that the number that would die of cold or be crippled by frost-bite would completely destroy the force. I say that not practically only, but *positively*, this route is closed in ordinary winters for many weeks, in severe ones for many months. It is true that snow in the plains around Kabul prevents military operations being carried on in the winter months; but if we had any troops in Kabul in the winter, neither letters nor telegrams could reach them were the Kurram their only line of communication.

Passing from the cold to the heat, General Roberts lays much stress (Section 10) on the great heat between Jamrud and Gandamak. I am inclined to think that from Kohat to Kurram it is, though not quite so bad, yet nearly equal in temperature. Last year our troops, marching down the Khyber in June, suffered terribly. Our troops did not march down from Kurram; but the Punjab contingents did, suffered much from heat, and lost 50 sepoy from cholera. On the Bolan line I suppose the heat to be greater than on either Khyber or Kurram and to last much longer in the year.

Railways.—It is said that a railway through the Khyber can only be laid at a prohibitive cost, whereas a rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal could easily be made and land the troops within 93 miles of Kabul, but I have not heard that the cost of a line, which, passing through the Khyber, would land troops 93 miles from Kabul, has been estimated for, this would be only 61 miles from Peshawur as against 134 miles from Kohat to Peiwar Kotal, the one rail being capable of extension to Kabul, the other absolutely incapable of extension, save by works such as are seen on the Alps.

For these reasons alone I am of opinion that there can be no comparison between the two routes, and if one is to be selected it must be the Khyber.

The 2nd point is the relative value of these routes to an invading army, in other words, as "the Keys of India."

I cannot speak particularly on the different defensive positions on the Khyber line. I have heard that there are many good ones, and Lundi Kotal among the best.

On the Kurram line there are four; 1st, the crest of the Shutargardan, too far from our base, and to hold which permanently would be tantamount to holding Kabul; 2ndly, Ali Khel, a very strong position, but according to modern strategists at the wrong end of the long defile in its front; 3rdly, Peiwar Kotal, strong towards the east, but very weak, almost useless, towards the west; 4thly, Thull, a position of great natural strength, completely commanding the Kurram route and holding Daour and Khost in check. Should an invading army ever attempt to enter India by the Kurram, I consider that Thull would be the place to meet him. It is not likely, however, that any strategist invading India from his base (as it must be) at Kabul would attempt to operate on a line 226 miles long while we held a parallel one only 164. There need be little fear of an invasion by the Kurram line.

3rd point. The military power of Sher Ali was built up in a dozen years, doubtless much by our aid, but should Abdul Rahman prove as able a ruler as Sher Ali, he may follow his example with equal success, and he will not have far to look for assistance; and if we withdraw our attention entirely from Kabul and the Khyber, the task will be all the easier to him.

4th point. I deprecate any withdrawal of troops from Peshawur, or any lessening

of our communications with, or influence over, the Afridi or Mohmand tribes. We have not got very far in this direction in the last 30 years; but it is absolutely necessary that we should go on increasing what we have gained, and the withdrawal of our troops or any portion of them from Peshawur will be a retrograde step.

The Afghan, either as an individual or a nation, is never humbled, and he is not humbled now. Twelve months hence it will be the boast of Kabul and the Khyber that the British were forced out of the country which they could take but could not hold. General Roberts, looking forward to future military operations in Afghanistan, thinks that Kandahar will be the chief scene and theatre of war; but the enemy may have something to say to this. Our troops at Kandahar might be held in check, and at all events, so distant a base in a foreign country as Kandahar would be a bad one to operate against Kabul; for history teaches us that an army invading India by the Khyber would bring all the tribes on its flank with it to the plunder of the plains; and we could not hope for a moment to raise them against a foe which could offer them such glorious loot. When that day comes, Afridis and Mohmands must be under our thumb, or we shall indeed have cause to rue it. The Khyber Pass has been a bugbear to us for 40 years. We have "laid the ghost" now, and we must make the pass our own. A railway at Peshawur will give us opportunities for relieving our troops rapidly and saving them to a great extent from the effects of the climate; but if we wish our political officers to increase their influence over Mohmands and Afridis, our troops must be seen on the spot.

I trust that General Roberts' valuable remarks on the Native army will be allowed full weight. It must be remembered that to a mercenary and Asiatic army the invasion of a foreign country conveys the idea of plunder and rapine; that under our civilized rule such expectations are seldom realized; and if long absence from home is coupled with this disappointment, service in Afghanistan can never be anything but unpopular.

(Singed)

J. WATSON, Major-General,

Commanding Kurram Force.

24th July 1880.

Enclosure 7 in No. 25.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Simla. Dated Peiwar Kotal, 10th August 1880.

GENERAL WATSON's telegram No. 1 of yesterday will have given you the pith of the information asked for in your demi-official of the 1st instant. What Sir F. Roberts' declarations to the Jajis at his Ali-Khel Durbar amounted to I have not been able exactly to ascertain,* beyond the fact that he is believed to have told the Jajis that they would always remain our subjects.

2. So far the Jajis have said nothing to me (or as far as I can learn to either of the Native Assistants here and at Starkili) about any promises or declarations, and I think this abstention from any reference to what was said is very significant: in fact they have never thrown in their lot with us, or looked forward to our permanently occupying their country as the Turis had. From the fact of their being "Sunnis" too, there is naturally a sympathy and fellow-feeling between them and the surrounding tribes and also with the Kabul Government which could not exist with the "Shiah" Turis; and they are all the more ready to revert to Durani rule as Abdul Rahman has no quarrel with them,† and they can come under his rule with a "clean sheet," so to speak.

* As I never had a copy of his speech, nor does Christie appear to have one.

† As has (?) Yakub Khan (or even his brother Ayub), who, if in power, would retaliate on the Jajis for their plundering the Kabul troops after their defeat on the Peiwar Kotal.

3. A continuance of our rule would of course mean more money-making, redemption of mortgages, clearing off debts, and the purchase of many luxuries (including fresh matrimonial engagements), security of life and property, and exemption from the inevitable "squeezing" which will follow on the advent of a "Durani Hakim;" but these advantages, substantial as they are, are no doubt more than counterbalanced by

the satisfaction of being rid of the infidel invader and finding themselves once more under a ruler, who, in spite of his rapacity and licentiousness, is after all one of their own race and religion; one under whose sway they are more at liberty to carry out, in such

‡ Giving up a murderer to be killed in cold blood by the relatives of the victim.
§ Reprisal.

matters as revenge for murder, reprisal for raids and settlement of cases, their own time-honored customs of "Kisas,"‡ "baramta"§ and ordeal by fire or water, and last, not least, one who is

always open to bribes.

4. Moreover, the Jajis have always felt the taunts of their independent neighbours and co-religionists at their want of enterprise in not combining with them against the "Feringhee," and making at least one effort, as all the other tribes have done, to rid themselves of the foreign yoke, and it would be a relief to find this source of reproach removed.

5. As regards *our* interests in the matter, my own views are as follows:—That whatever we do with Kurram,* it is not worth our while, and would be a mistake, to attempt

* See paragraph 7.

to retain any hold over the Hariob. The proximity to, and sympathy with, the warlike tribes under the direct rule of Kabul (through whom it is approachable, by a Durani army, by the three highroads of the Tikrai, Shuturgardan and Spega passes); its inaccessibility to us, especially in winter, its distance from our furthest outpost (presumably Thal) and consequent difficulty of supporting a governor or reinforcing our troops; its inability to supply the wants of a force occupying it; and the source of irritation which its retention would certainly be to the Kabul Government—all combine to render it, to my mind, a very useless and undesirable acquisition.

6. Should it be necessary at any time to advance on Kabul again,† and were it decided to take this route, the forcing of the Peiwar Kotal and Shuturgardan would, with our present knowledge of the country, be by no means the formidable task presented to us in December 1878, and I think it likely enough that the Jajis, having learnt by experience the futility of resistance, and knowing the wealth which we bring into the country, would make a virtue of necessity and allow the passage of our troops readily enough after an empty show of fighting.

* Such a contingency, considering the uncertainty of Kabul politics, is always possible.

7. As to Kurram, I suppose it is only a choice of giving them as Governor one of our own men, or some Kabul Sirdar whom we may wish to reward.‡ Military occupation of the valley does not appear to be contemplated, nor would I advise it myself under present conditions, which it is pretty generally admitted involve a waste of troops and money. But it might, and I think in time would, repay the cost of occupation by appropriating the whole of the revenue (of which none should be ceded to Kabul), both of Kurram and if possible of Khost. The latter is undoubtedly a fertile province, and its resources could in time be developed to our advantage, if we occupied Kurram; but on this head Christie, when you see him, will be able to give you better information than I can.

† From all I can learn Wali Muhammad Khan is loathed by the Turis and would very likely be assassinated. The post might be a fitting reward for Sir Ghulam Hossein Khan, who must know so much of Afghan politics, and would in point of loyalty and trustworthiness be worth a hundred Wali Muhammads.

8. About the result of possible occupation of Ghazni by Ayub Khan and declaration of his independence, there is no doubt it would rally the Yakub party, and Abdul Rahman's power of opposing him would probably depend mainly on the support, moral or material, that we could afford him. The causes of the contending parties would be espoused and fought out, I think, by the tribes lying between Ghazni and Kabul; and the Jajis, who are well off that line of country would have but little to say to the struggle, merely throwing in their lot with the side which promised to be victorious, though they would prefer to see Abdul Rahman win.

9. There is nothing else in connection with the subject that I can think of at present: but will write if I do.

Enclosure 8 in No. 25.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Commanding Kurram Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Shalozan, 13th August 1880.)

YOUR telegram, as per margin, reached me on the 11th instant, and I directed Major Conolly to send in his opinion on the subject referred to, and I now proceed to offer mine.

"Your opinion with Conolly's, as to possible arrangements with the Turis, wanted soon."

2. A residence of nearly two years in the Kurram valley has convinced me that, from any point of view, the country is absolutely worthless to the British Government, and it only remains to get rid of it in such a manner as, while keeping it independent of the Kabul Government, we may ourselves be called upon to interfere as little as possible in its concerns. We are to a certain extent bound, I believe, by some more or less positive promises to the Turis, not to restore them to the Government of Kabul, and to do our best for their future welfare.

3. The present feeling of the people is that they would wish to remain entirely under our rule, but they have tasted nothing but the sweets of our rule, and I doubt if, after a little experience of regular British Government, they would not become restless and give us great trouble.

4. The Turis are divided into so many factions that any kind of independence or self-government would be impossible. During the greater part of Amir Dost Mahomed's reign there was no Governor in Kurram. An army visited it every two or three years to collect the revenue. I have heard that during those years the state of Kurram was a very unenviable one.

5. The valley should be given in free jagir to some one who, 1st, understands the art of governing Afghans; 2ndly, who has wealth and influence enough to raise some levies, and assert his power to govern; and, 3rdly, whose interests are bound up with the British Government, and who is not likely to court the friendship or suffer the interference of the Kabul Government. The Government of India knows best where such a man is to be found. The only one I know of is Sirdar Wali Muhammad.

6. On the 31st July I telegraphed as per margin. Further conversations with the Turis leads me to suppose that this feeling is not by any means universal, though strong in that faction which is united with the Tirah Syuds.

"Turis believe that they are to be made over to Wali Muhammad, and are much excited against him."

7. Sirdar Wali Muhammad, as the nominee of the British Government, and to a certain extent responsible to it, would be a very different man to Wali Muhammad, the Government deputed from Kabul, against whom was no appeal, and whose tenure of office being uncertain and expensive, was bound to squeeze the people to the utmost. He had no interest in the welfare of the country, no inducement to withhold his exactions. The Government may, however, have better men for the jagir. I know of none at present. Khost should go with Kurram, and in time a small independent State might be formed, which the Kabul Government would fear to touch, but which could be conquered and annexed, if necessary, by a single division of the frontier army.

8. I agree with Mr. Christie in his views generally, but I cannot believe with him that the Turis could be left without a Governor, to manage for themselves. Their management would be disastrous; they would soon come entirely under the influence of Kabul.

9. With Major Conolly's views regarding the Hariob I concur, but I cannot agree with him regarding Kurram, "that military occupation could ever, in any period of time, become remunerative," nor that his scheme for taking hostages from surrounding tribes for the safety of a paid Governor of our own could ever be carried out.

10. If the Hariob be restored to Kabul, and Kurram and Khost given to a jaghirdar of our own, the Peiwar Kotal should be considered neutral ground, and no customs or taxes taken on either side. The rights of wood and grass should be with the Paiwar Mangals, the Kabul rule extending only over Zubburdust Killa and Goondy Kheyl.

Enclosure 9 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Khyber line, dated
27th August 1880.

As we are to hold no advanced position beyond the Khyber, such as Safed Sang with the line of the Surkhab for instance, I do not think the Khyber alone worth holding by means of a considerable garrison located between Jamrud and Lundi Kotal.

The object to be attained is, therefore, an arrangement with the Afridis, under which they shall hold for us, and strictly in our interests, the line of the Khyber. The Shinwaris and Mohmunds being dealt with in like manner wherever the road touches their territory. If this can be arrived at in the manner suggested by Colonel Waterfield, through the intervention of Jirgahs and Maliks, so much the better.

As regards the posts to be left to the Afridis, I would suggest that Ali Musjid should be thoroughly dismantled. It would only be useful to those who would hold the pass against us. The Afridis could make no military use of it as a work. The buildings, not part and parcel of the fortifications, which could be used as dwellings, I would leave to them, also those on the bluff (51st hill) and near the river. The towers, such as that at Kalu Khusutia, might be left standing, but Fort Maude and Mackeson's work (improved) should be destroyed, as these works command important points on the road, and, like Ali Musjid, could only be used to our detriment. If required at any future time, we can easily reconstruct them.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

27th August 1880.

Enclosure 10 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to General J. WATSON, Kurram.

You are instructed to assemble the maliks, or representatives, of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley, on this side of the Peiwar Kotal, and to declare to them that the British Government understands they desire their country to be made independent; that, consequently, the British Government recognizes their independence, and will maintain it, if necessary, against any interference from the Kabul Government; that no Governor will be appointed by us, but that they will be left free to make their own arrangements for the management of their country and for its protection against neighbouring independent tribes. They must be warned to be careful to do nothing that might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachment, and they must comply with the wishes of the British Government in regard to matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier.

In regard to the Jajis, if our intentions are asked, you should reply that we do not desire to retain any authority over them after the withdrawal of our troops, but that if they wish to be independent of Kabul we are willing to recognize their independence, although we can undertake no obligation to maintain it, and have no intention to interfere in their affairs.

Enclosure 11 in No. 25.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the OFFICIATING SECRETARY
to the GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

Foreign Department.
Political.

SIR,

Simla, the 31st August 1880.

THE orders under which the Kabul Field Force is now being withdrawn from North Afghanistan, instruct the military authorities to retain for the present the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass. It has now become necessary to

determine without delay our permanent political relations for the future with the tribes immediately connected with the Pass; and upon this subject I am to communicate to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor the decision of the Government of India.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has resolved that the arrangements with the Khyber tribes for keeping open the Pass, and the maintenance of their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, shall be continued. With this object it is of importance to assemble as speedily as possible, at Peshawur, the representatives of the tribes, to inform them that their independence is, as heretofore, recognised, and to explain to them that the Government intend to maintain in force, subject to such modification as events and circumstances may require, the existing arrangements with the tribes for holding charge of the Khyber Pass, and for keeping it open and free of interference. In consideration of their proper performance of these duties, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber; although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. If, after the withdrawal of our troops, it is still found advisable, for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass, to retain some of the Jezailchis, or to keep up any similar levies, there will be no objection to this arrangement or to any other measure of the kind that may be found, upon discussion, to be just and reasonable. It may be explained to the tribes, that although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the Pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khyber, so long as the Pass is kept open, under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government.

3. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council considers that it is very important to make known to the tribes, as soon as possible, the intentions of the Government of India. I am therefore to request that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor may have the goodness to cause the necessary preliminary instructions for carrying into effect these arrangements to be issued, by telegram, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. His Excellency in Council is fully aware that the completion of our permanent arrangements for the Khyber may be a work of some political difficulty, which will require careful and deliberate handling; since the experiment of inducing the tribes to combine upon systematic engagements for the independent management of the Pass has never yet been thoroughly tested. Various material questions of detail will come up for consideration,—such as whether our officers should collect the transit dues for which compensation is to be paid, and, if so, at what place; in what way we should, after withdrawal of our troops, dispose of the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber belonging to the British Government; whether, and under what conditions, a British officer should occasionally visit the tribal levies and posts in the Pass; and up to what limit westward we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road. In regard to this last mentioned question, I am to observe that the western limit of the Khyber Pass was carefully demarcated, for the purpose of determining the range of independent tribal responsibility, in a Memorandum by Major Cavagnari, dated 1st July 1879; and that the Government of India have no intention of extending the present arrangements for protection of the road beyond the limit therein laid down; while it may be worth considering whether Lundikhana should be permanently included. But upon these and all other subsidiary points, which do not at this moment seem to need immediate decision, His Excellency in Council will await the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor.

5. In regard to our relations with the Mohmand tribe immediately adjoining the British border, and with the Khan of Lalpura, any necessary instructions will be communicated separately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 12 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Kurram Valley.

1. PARAGRAPHS 2 to 13 of this Minute were recorded as a memorandum on the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram lines, under date the 2nd of June 1880. I now convert that paper into a Minute, offering some further remarks on the question more immediately before us.

2. Regarding the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram routes, I hold the opinion expressed in my Minute of the 25th August 1879, on frontier communications. Further, in this opinion I find myself fortified by the events, then undreamt of, but which have occurred since.

3. In paragraphs* 6, 7, and 8 of that Minute I attempted to show under what conditions a column

* "6. The Shuturgardan must ever be considered a bad line of military communications. From Habib Killa, upwards, the road passes through a difficult country over the Peiwar Kotal (8,500 feet) onward to the narrow defile of Ilazar Darakat, attaining on the crest of the Shuturgardan an elevation of 11,200 feet. The descent to Dobundi and Kushi is extremely difficult and steep; for wheeled carriages it is impracticable, and it would take a vast expenditure of money to make it passible. The variation of altitude in the short distance which separates Habib Killa from Kushi is surely in itself prohibitory of all thought of a railway beyond Kurram.

"7. The above features indicate enormous difficulties for those who may have to provide such continued transport of munitions of war and food supply, as the advance of an army by this route would imply.

"8. Unless a transport train far more extensive and more efficiently organized than any we have seen in the last campaign, were available for him, a commander who would advance to Kabul by this line would find enormous difficulties in his way, for, having expended the limited number of days' supply he could hope to carry with him, he must, of necessity, become dependent on the means of some other column operating either by the Ghazni or by the Jellalabad road. This would have been General Roberts' condition had he been called upon to advance in March or April last. With a thoroughly friendly Afghanistan, and with supplies prepared at Kabul, such a movement might be made by the line on to the Bamian Pass, as would prohibit the use of it to troops advancing from the Oxus. The base in Kurram must be abandoned, and the operation becomes more that of a flying column than that of an army acting on an independent and an assured line of communications.

operating from Kurram towards Kabul would have found itself, had we been called upon to advance by that line in March or April 1879.

4. In September—October 1879, General Roberts was called upon to advance upon Kabul over the Shuturgardan, and his operations have been carried out under the exact

conditions anticipated by me, as applying to the preceding campaign. For as he passed over the Shuturgardan, and advanced towards Kabul, his communications could not be maintained, and the posts established on the Shuturgardan were attacked by Ghilzais and others, as was that at Ali Khel subsequently,

5. Sir F. Robert's communications were re-established temporarily by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, sent back from Kabul, by which means the last of the troops destined for the column and the last convoy were enabled to join the Kabul force. Since that, there has been no communication by the Kurram line, and the supply of the Kabul force has been entirely dependent on local resources, or on the Khyber line. Sir F. Roberts' force in fact became a flying column without any assured communications with India, until the Khyber was opened.

6. I do not in any way wish to detract from the value of a strong force located in the Kurram valley as a means of controlling Kabul. By such a force at a most critical period, we were enabled to take Kabul by a *coup de main*, and to maintain ourselves there until the Khyber route was opened. Since that time we have had in Kurram a large force, which has virtually been in a *cul de sac*, contributing in no sense towards the success of the main operations in the neighbourhood of Ghazni and Kabul. As yet we know, of a certainty, of no outlet by which we may be enabled to turn the Shuturgardan. There are reports of two passes giving out by Girdez and Kosein, but how far these may prove more practicable than the Shuturgardan, exploration alone will show; moreover, they are in Khost, and not available unless we occupy that province.

7. The line of communication between Kohat and Kurram is essentially weak, requiring strong posts at short intervals, and even these subject to continual raids, and a large number of troops is required to meet these demands. So much is this the case that Major-General Watson, with a force of 8,000 men under his command, cannot hold his communications and, at the same time, operate even with a light column, upon the crest of the Shuturgardan. The whole line is menaced by hostile and predatory tribes, so situated as to be able to bring pressure to bear with effect on almost any point of it they may desire. The Kurram river, fordable at almost any part, gives them facility for their guerilla operations.

8. I agree with His Excellency the Viceroy* in thinking that a light rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal would vastly improve the state of things in Kurram, but, even with that aid, a good and safe communication with Kabul open all the year round remains, according to our knowledge of to-day, unattained.

* The Earl of Lytton.

9. I cannot affirm that the valley of Kurram affords altogether healthy sites for the occupation of troops, the lower part of the valley is distinctly unhealthy, both for Europeans and Natives; Thull, an obligatory post, is especially so. The Peiwar Kotal gives every promise of affording healthy sites for stations.

10. I quite admit that the Khyber has many drawbacks; no place in Kurram is so unhealthy as Ali Masjid has been found to be; Lundi Kotal is not as favourable to health as we expected to find it; Jellalabad would probably be totally unsuited for troops in the hot weather. Gandamak and the slopes of the Safed Koh would, no doubt, afford sites equally good with those to be found on the Peiwar Kotal, but we shall probably not be allowed to occupy these, however desirable it might be from a military point of view.

11. Whatever our frontier of the future may be, there can be but little doubt that the problem we had to solve last September will be presented afresh some day to our successors, and I am inclined to think that it will be found then, as we have found it in our day, that whatever may be done from the Kurram line, in the first instance, the Khyber will be the main line of operations in the end, for, with all its drawbacks, it has the merit of being open all the year round and available for wheeled traffic.

12. On these grounds I think it necessary to maintain a strong position in advance of the Khyber. If we can trust the Khyber section of the road to tribal guards it will greatly lighten our task.

13. I propose to raise the question of the readjustment of the Peshawur cantonment and garrison on the selection of a site for the railway station. This is a most important element in the defence of the place, and I think the matter should be referred to the Permanent Defence Committee.

14. Perhaps the value of our early operations in Kurram (great as it really was) was somewhat overrated, as balanced with that assigned to the capture of Ali Masjid and our subsequent advance on Dakka and Jellalabad; and a somewhat fictitious value may for a time have been assigned to this route, as a line of operations against Kabul. But, in considering the question of the final withdrawal from Kurram, and our assumption of the responsibility of maintaining the independence of the Turi tribes, I wish to point out the two salient military features which have given value to the hold we have maintained of the valley. First, the power of delivering a sudden blow to Kabul. Secondly, the strong and dominating position afforded to those who hold the Peiwar Kotal.

15. The first has stood us in good stead in the early days of the second phase of the Afghan War, when General Roberts was enabled to capture Kabul almost by a *coup de main*. But, as a line of military communications, experience has condemned it, and I abandon it as such without the slightest regret.

16. The second point affects our recognition of the independence of the Turis, and our determination to maintain it under certain conditions.

17. I am not sure that in order to carry out this guarantee it may not be necessary to maintain a force, for a time at least, in the neighbourhood of Thull, for otherwise nature seems to me to decree that the Turis should fall under the government of the power which holds military possession of the Peiwar Kotal.

18. The garrison of the Kotal would naturally draw its supplies from the valley, and in the valley the garrison would naturally seek a winter residence.

19. To garrison the Kotal merely for the purpose of assuring the independence of the Turis would be an intolerable burden to us, as it would entail the same long line of communications which we have found to be so onerous throughout the operations in the two phases of the war, and so wasteful of human and animal life.

20. The day will probably come when the Turis, influenced by the close relations which must spring up between them and the garrison of the Peiwar Kotal, will gravitate towards Kabul, as the Jajis have already done. Their relations with those

who hold the Peiwar must of necessity be far more intimate than any we could establish or maintain with them from Thull, Kohat, or Bunnu, in spite of religious animosities, or the recollection of the previous grinding oppression of the Barakzaies.

21. I would repeat here what I have often previously affirmed, that Kurram without Khost could give us but an unsatisfactory frontier at best.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

Simla, 7th September 1880.

Enclosure 13 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th September 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Major-General WATSON, Kurram.

IN regard to a Governor, we are quite willing to consider any proposal that is practicable, acceptable to majority of tribe, and consistent with withdrawal of our troops from valley before long. If you wish to submit such proposal, you have discretion to postpone the announcement ordered by my telegram, 28th August, which need not, in any case, be formal proclamation, but should be communicated to Turis after discussion and explanation. Reply early as to postponement.

Enclosure 14 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

11th September 1880. Your telegram of 7th September. I have not yet issued formal proclamation to Turis, but have assured them of the Government guarantee to maintain their independence of Kabul. There is no one here who could be made Governor of the district, but the Punjab Government must know of many men fit for it. Meanwhile, I am endeavouring to ascertain if, by any arrangement, the Turis could carry on without a head of some kind.

Enclosure 15 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

I SHOULD, with Sir F. Roberts, wish to assert that my view of the propriety of the withdrawal from Kabul and from Gandamak is based on the supposition that Kandahar will be held in force. This is the keystone of the whole military situation as modified by our withdrawal from Kabul.

To insure an effective advance from the southward against an enemy in the interior of the country, as contemplated in this despatch, the retention of Kandahar is a necessity.

Further, it appears to me that to ensure the acquisition of some knowledge of the Amir's foreign relations, over which we have so recently asserted some power of control, and to give us some real power of influencing them, we must hold Kandahar.

If we decide all the points referred to in this despatch, without reference to Kandahar, we may some day be told that, when we were engaged in the settlement of our relations with Afghanistan, there was no evidence of our having considered Kandahar of any value.

10th September 1880.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

I CONCUR in the above Minute.

18th September 1880.

(Signed) W. STOKES.

No. 26.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 40.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 30th September 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 191, dated the 24th August last, reporting the evacuation of the city of Kabul by Her Majesty's forces, and your decision to withdraw the British troops from Northern Afghanistan to the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. Of both these measures I have already expressed to your Excellency by telegraph the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government. At the close of the month of July, the political and military situation at Kabul was highly favourable to that early withdrawal from the city and neighbouring districts for which arrangements had been for some time in preparation. In spite of excitement amongst the tribes, which naturally followed from a protracted political crisis, the military supremacy of the British Government was complete and unchallenged; while Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, who, at the close of negotiations, in regard to which I shall address you hereafter, had been recognized as Amir of Kabul, was awaiting our retirement to enter the capital and assume the administration. The decision of your Excellency in Council, under these circumstances, not to delay the movement in consequence of the reverse which was suffered near Kandahar on the 27th July, has been completely justified by the event, the march of the army having, as Her Majesty's Government learned with great satisfaction from your Excellency's telegrams, been accomplished without opposition or untoward incident of any kind.

3. The further question whether the army should be halted for a time at Gandamak, or be at once withdrawn within the Indian frontier, was one which your Excellency in Council properly referred to the judgment of the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces in Northern Afghanistan. The reasons, stated by Sir D. Stewart in his letter of 10th August, in favour of a continuous withdrawal of the troops, were extremely cogent; and as it appeared that the character of the season was such as to render delay above the passes unnecessary, and even inexpedient, on sanitary grounds, your Excellency in Council was at liberty to allow their full weight to the political and military considerations advanced by the General in support of the course which he recommended. Her Majesty's Government have not yet received details of the movement, but, from the tenour of the telegraphic reports, they trust they may infer that it has been effected with no less success than was the march to Gandamak, and without grave sickness amongst the troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 27.

No. 225 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 19th October 1880.

WITH our Secret Despatch, No. 164, dated the 20th July 1880, we forwarded the draft of a letter which Sir D. Stewart had been authorized to deliver to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan after his recognition as Amir, if he should ask for a formal written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position.

2. We have now the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Mr. Griffin, reporting the delivery to the Amir of a translation of this paper.

* No. 440, dated 4th October 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ D. M. STEWART.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 27.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., late Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 440, dated Simla, 4th October 1880.)

YOUR confidential letter, No. 2431 E.P., dated the 20th July 1880, forwarded a draft Memorandum, containing a recognition by the British Government of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, to be presented to His Highness if he appeared anxious to obtain a formal document of this nature.

2. I think it necessary to report, even though late, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, that at the first interview which I had with the Amir at Zimma, His Highness pressed so earnestly for some agreement on the part of the British Government that I considered myself justified, in accordance with the instructions contained in the letter above quoted, to deliver to him a translation of the paper therewith received, duly sealed with the seal of the representative of the British Government in Kabul.

3. This document was intended to form the subject of further discussion with the Amir after he should have perused it at his leisure; but His Highness was apparently satisfied with the paper as it stood, and suggested no alterations, which, in any case, would have been out of place, seeing that the document was not an agreement between two States, but merely a memorandum of obligation granted to the Amir by the British Government.

No. 28.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 45.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 11th November 1880.

IN my Despatch of 21st May, I drew your Excellency's attention to the measures which had been taken by the Government of your predecessor for providing a Government for Kandahar and the adjacent province. I informed your Excellency that while Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of some arguments in favour of the subdivision or disintegration of the kingdom of Afghanistan as established under the rule of the late Amir, Shere Ali, and his father, Dost Mahomed, they also recognize the objections to that policy, and I especially pointed out to your Excellency that it seemed likely to entail the necessity of a permanent military occupation of Kandahar by a British force, a measure to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the strongest objection. Holding these opinions, I requested your Excellency carefully to examine the nature and extent of the engagements which had been entered into with the Wali, Sher Ali Khan, with the view of enabling Her Majesty's Government to determine how far they were of a permanently binding character, or how far it might be possible, consistently with a strict adherence to pledges and engagements to which the honour of Her Majesty had been committed, to reconsider the policy which had been adopted. The events which almost immediately followed your Excellency's assumption of the Government dispensed with the necessity of any detailed inquiry into the engagements which had been entered into with Shere Ali Khan, into the sense in which he regarded them, or into his capacity to maintain himself, with or without our assistance, in the position in which we had placed him.

2. The advance of Ayub Khan from Herat, and the arrival of his advanced guard on the border of the province of Kandahar, were sufficient to detach from their allegiance almost the whole of the Wali's troops, and to cause serious symptoms of disaffection in several districts of the country. The Wali himself, who is described as having been "much depressed," took refuge with the British force, and, neither during the operations which preceded the reverse sustained at Maiwand, nor during the siege of Kandahar, nor in the subsequent movements which led to the complete defeat and dispersion of Ayub Khan's army, has he been able to take any part whatever, or to give the slightest assistance to the British troops. It does not appear in the least probable that his position, difficult as it has been from the outset, as a mere nominee of the Indian Government, and fatally weakened as it must have been by the events of July and August, and his complete helplessness and inaction during that period, can ever be re-established; or that, if restored to the Government, he can ever become anything more than a nominal ruler, absolutely dependent on the support of the British troops. I do not conceive that it can possibly be held that we are any longer bound by any promises of support which have been given to the Wali, or that either our own interests or those of the inhabitants of the country can be served, by the restoration of a Government which possesses no element of strength or permanence. The time appears, therefore, to have arrived when it is possible for the Government to consider the question of the future government of Kandahar, without any reference to arrangements which have already failed, under circumstances which do not invite a repetition of the experiment.

3. Her Majesty's Government see no reason to change the opinion expressed in the Despatch to which I have referred, that any measure which would make necessary a permanent military occupation of Kandahar would be considered by them as open to the gravest objection. I am aware that there are many persons, whose opinion is entitled to much respect, who consider that the events to which I have referred, instead of affording to us a most favourable opportunity of relieving ourselves from onerous and unnecessary engagements, only prove the necessity of adopting as a permanent and settled policy, a measure which was only an incident, possibly temporary in its character, in the arrangement adopted by your predecessor, viz., the military occupation of Kandahar.

4. The arguments on which that opinion is formed are in the main those which have been urged, and which have been controverted, for more than forty years, ever since the question of our relations with Afghanistan have assumed a prominent position in Indian politics. I will not attempt in this Despatch either to repeat them or to summarize them. They have been stated with so much ability and force in numerous State papers that it is impossible to add anything to what has already been said. The question is one on which those who are responsible for the government of India must form their own judgment upon two absolutely conflicting lines of policy, between which there is no room for compromise. It is not contended that there is now, more than in the past, anything in our relations with the tribes on our frontier, or the more powerful tribes which inhabit Kandahar and the surrounding province, which makes it necessary for us to establish a military post or a military protectorate at Kandahar. It is as a measure of defence against some power far more formidable than any Afghan race that the extension of our military frontier is recommended; and it is both as to the existence of such a danger, and as to the expediency of this mode of resisting it, if it does exist, that it is deprecated.

5. Her Majesty's Government, sharing the opinions of some of the most eminent Indian statesmen of past and present times, and, up to a very recent date, of every Minister of the Crown responsible for Indian policy, consider that there exists no such danger or apprehension of danger to the security of India from possible foreign invasion as would justify the Government in taking measures which must certainly lead immediately to very heavy additions to their large military expenditure, which will cause a constant strain on the organization of the Native Army, and which will almost certainly involve us in future complications and difficulties, the nature of which it is easy to anticipate, though their exact form cannot be predicted. They are of opinion that recent experience has done nothing to strengthen the arguments of those who desire, as a military measure, to advance the Indian frontier, and much to verify the forebodings of those who were opposed to that policy. The advances of the Russian frontier which have taken place in recent years were foreseen, and their influence upon our position in India was deliberately considered, by Lord Lawrence

and other Indian statesmen, on whose advice the Home Government repeatedly declined to permit itself to be committed to a policy of military extension. Those advances, although they have been continuous and steady, have not been effected without great difficulties, both of a military and administrative character. They have secured to Russia no position of formidable strength; they have added nothing to her military resources; and they have been and are still attended by all the disadvantages which had been anticipated, as the result of an indefinite extension of her military position in an unproductive region inhabited by uncivilized and hostile tribes.

6. Her Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the mere fact of the existence of Russian military positions some hundred miles nearer to the North-Western frontier of India constitutes in itself any cause for anxiety, or for apprehending the possibility of an invasion of India from that quarter. On the other hand, the consequences of any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan have been precisely those which had been foreseen and apprehended by the opponents of this policy. It has been proved that there existed no organized military power in Afghanistan which could resist the advance of the British army, or prevent the occupation of any position in that country. But the difficulties of permanent occupation, or of supporting by a military force any Government imposed on the people by the British power, have been exemplified to the fullest extent. The large force which recently occupied Kabul and the neighbouring country, and the line of communication through the Khyber Pass, was found to be barely sufficient to enforce the administration of a temporary government over a comparatively small portion of the country. The experiment of supporting a Native Government by military assistance at Kandahar has been found to entail equally onerous sacrifices, and it has been, in fact, so far discredited that most of those who still desire the maintenance of direct British influence in that quarter openly advocate its annexation and administration by the Government of India. It must be remembered, when the annexation of Kandahar is advocated on account of its strategic importance, that it is not merely a question of the occupation of that position. The boundaries of the province over which it was intended Sher Ali should rule have never been defined, but it is clear that the extent of territory which must be governed by any authority which may be established at Kandahar must be very large. Unless the districts which extend in one direction towards the dominions of the Amir of Kabul, and in others towards Persia and Herat, be reduced under some settled form of Government, the power which occupies Kandahar must be involved in continual embarrassments and complications on every side. The occupation of Kandahar, would, therefore, certainly involve the administration and the military occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the one side, Farah on the other, and an undefined territory in the direction of Herat.

Your Excellency's military advisers would be able to form a more precise estimate of the force which would be required permanently to hold these positions, with their lines of communication, and to provide an adequate reserve; but I conceive that recent events have proved that it would not be safe to estimate that less than 20,000 men would be required for this purpose.

7. But it is not only on the ground of its risk and costliness that Her Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to this policy. The expedition against the late Amir Sher Ali was undertaken with the object of punishing an act committed by him, which was held to be of an unfriendly and even insulting character. It was expressly declared that the British Government had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. It is true that the Afghans have, notwithstanding these assurances, resisted the advance of our forces, and, in accordance with their semi-barbarous character, have frequently committed acts of cruelty and treachery totally inconsistent with the usages of civilized nations in war, even in the defence of their own country. But Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that such acts,—acts which must have been anticipated when the invasion was undertaken,—release them from the declarations which were made. They hold that nothing but the most imperative necessity of self-preservation would justify them after such declarations in the annexation, against the will of the people, of Afghan territory. Attempts have been made to prove that the rule of the British Government would be willingly accepted by the inhabitants of Kandahar; but it is admitted by almost all those who are most competent to form an opinion, that the mass of the inhabitants of the territory which it would be necessary to annex would be bitterly opposed to the loss of their independence, and to the Government of a power alien in race and religion.

8. Apprehensions are entertained by some that the retirement from Kandahar would be regarded by the people of Afghanistan and of India as a confession of weakness, and such a result may be one of the inevitable results of a policy which Her Majesty's present advisers have from the outset deplored. But in their opinion, the moral effect of a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and a striking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of India that the British Government have no desire for further annexation of territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect in removing the apprehensions and strengthening the attachment of our Native allies throughout India and on our frontiers.

9. Others, again, who have never shared the apprehensions which are entertained as to the military weakness of the Indian frontier, who would have done everything in their power to avert the late war, and who perhaps even now do not attach a high importance to the position of Kandahar, nevertheless deprecate its abandonment, because its possession or military occupation might satisfy those who are now disposed to apprehend danger from foreign invasion, and might prevent the recurrence of popular excitement on this subject both in India and at home. The Government are convinced of the grave evils which result from this cause, and from its tendency to distract the minds of those who are engaged in the administration of the Government of India from the important questions of internal policy, of finance, of the construction of necessary public works, and, above all, of the agrarian condition of the people, which are so closely connected with the prosperity, and even the security, of our Indian empire. Nor can they feel any confidence that the experience which has been gained during the last two years will have any more lasting effect than that which had been acquired 40 years ago, or that a similar combination of circumstances may not again lead the Government of India into a similar policy and be attended with similar results. Any means, therefore, which could reasonably be expected to lay to rest these apprehensions would have a great attraction for Her Majesty's Government.

10. But they cannot believe that the measure which is now advocated would really satisfy the demands of those who propose it. They are inclined rather to believe that it would only be the first step towards still more extensive enterprise. In the Despatch of your predecessor's Government of the 7th July 1879, they said, in discussing the question of the retention of Kandahar, "The local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence, much more extensive than any we now require or have ever contemplated." Whether this be an accurate statement of the strategic value of Kandahar or not, it cannot, I think, be doubted that its acquisition as a permanent military post would quickly be followed by fresh apprehensions as to its security, and further demands for the completion of a system of defence of which it would be represented to constitute only a part.

11. Although Her Majesty's Government have been influenced in the decision at which they have arrived, mainly by considerations of a broad political character, they are not insensible to the weight of the military opinions which attach great importance to the value of Kandahar as a strategic position. For the reasons I have indicated they do not consider the question of the military defence of the frontier against invasion by a formidable power, as an urgent one, but admitting its possible importance at some future time, they are of opinion that the military occupation of Kandahar, should it ever become necessary for the defence of the Indian empire, would be far more advantageously undertaken when an advance of some hostile power should have made it clear that not only the safety of India but the independence of Afghanistan is threatened. Whatever strategic advantages may be looked for from the occupation of Kandahar, they must be immensely increased by its occupation with the assent and good will of the Afghan people, as a measure needful, not only for the defence of our own dominions, but for the protection of their independence. If the Afghans have ever been disposed to look with more friendship on either their Russian or Persian than their British neighbour, it is not an unnatural result of the fear for the loss of their freedom which our past policy has been calculated to inspire. There is nothing in the character of the Afghan people which would lead to the belief that they would welcome invasion or subjection by any power whatever, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government not unreasonable to hope that a policy of complete withdrawal from Afghan territory, coupled with a steady abstinence from interference in their internal affairs, adopted after the signal vindication of our military superiority, will, if

publicly announced and steadily adhered to, have the effect of converting these semi-civilized but brave tribes into useful allies of the British power.

12. These are some of the considerations by which Her Majesty's Government desire that your Excellency in Council should be guided in the policy now to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan. They regret that it has not hitherto appeared possible to withdraw the troops immediately from Kandahar, not only because the occupation must involve the continuance of a heavy military expenditure, but because they apprehend that, so long as it is maintained, local disturbances or renewed hostile combinations may make ultimate retirement more difficult than it would have been during the present temporary condition of tranquillity which has followed the total defeat of Ayub Khan.

They, however, desire that your Excellency should steadily keep in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion.

They recognize that it is as desirable in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan to assist, if this be found possible in a limited time, in the establishment of some settled Government in the place of that which has been destroyed by the events of the recent campaign.

The restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan under a powerful ruler would be the arrangement which Her Majesty's Government would prefer, as offering the best guarantees for permanence, and for the avoidance of internal dissensions. That solution would also probably be the only one which would enable the Amir of Kabul to establish his authority at Herat, and thus prevent the constant intrigues and conflicts for the possession of that place which, in the present disorganized condition of Afghanistan, appear inevitable. But it appears doubtful whether the position of Abdul Rahman is yet sufficiently established to enable him to assume the government of Kandahar, nor do I possess sufficient information to be able to judge whether the people of that province are prepared generally to accept his authority.

13. If it should appear impossible at present to reunite Afghanistan under the rule of the Amir Abdul Rahman, an endeavour should be made to ascertain under what form, temporary or permanent, and under which of the Sirdars, provision may be made for the restoration of Native government. In any event, Her Majesty's Government consider it essential that, as in the case of Kabul, having assisted in the establishment of that form of government which appears to offer the best prospects of permanence, and to be most in conformity with the wishes of the people, the Government of India should make it clearly understood that the future ruler should be left to rely on his own resources, and that it is not their intention to interfere further in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of Her Majesty's forces beyond the frontier.

14. The mission of Mr. Lyall to Kandahar, and the information which your Excellency has at your disposal, will enable you to form a more accurate judgment on the details of the policy to be adopted than can possibly be in my power. These, as well as the time for the final withdrawal of the troops from Afghan territory, Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to the decision of your Excellency in Council; but I have felt it my duty to place on record, for the information of your Excellency, in the plainest and strongest terms, the opinions which they entertain on the important question at issue, and the expression of the disapprobation with which they would view any measure involving the permanent occupation of Kandahar by British troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 29.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, dated 12th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

WALL sent to Lyall, Kandahar, following letter, addressed to Viceroy. *Abbreviation begins.* I have understood from conversations here that arrangements for affairs of this country, after recent events, are still undetermined, and may require some time for settlement. The British Government is, of course, entitled to act upon its own interests. I agree, under any circumstances, with any views British Government may entertain regarding future arrangements, but from my knowledge of the people I fear lest, during present uncertainty, they may do evil which may, by displeasing British Government, ruin me; therefore, with permission of Government, I, with

family, will proceed to Kurrachee, which also is British territory. If, in future arrangements, my services are required, I shall be ready there, but if other arrangements are made British Government can act as it pleases. I shall be always its sincere friend.
Letter ends.

No. 30.

No. 233 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 16th November 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 208, dated the 14th September 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the papers noted in the accompanying abstract of contents, regarding the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) J. STRACHEY.
„ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, No. 3299 E.-P., dated 1st October 1880.

From OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan.

MILITARY Department represent importance of very early evacuation of Kuram Valley in connection with question of supplying winter clothing for troops. What is your opinion as to earliest date on which movement could begin consistently with due regard for our political interests and obligations? Is there any present likelihood of the Turis coming to a settlement, and if not, do you see any strong objection to retirement of our troops before definite arrangements have been made for government of tribe?

Please answer very early.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM dated 2nd October 1880.

From GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan, to FOREIGN UNDER-SECRETARY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of yesterday. I know of no reason for keeping troops any longer in Kuram. I understand that we have no political interest in the valley, and with regard to our obligations to the Turis, as Government declines to give them a Governor, and they cannot elect one for themselves, I will divide the country into districts under leading maliks, giving each set one of our forts for their protection. Districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will all unite to resist a common enemy. I will now issue the Proclamation forwarded under your telegram of 28th August. Can you send me some printed copies? Turis attach great importance to this, and if widely circulated, the Kabul Government will know that we are in earnest. These arrangements can be made in a few days.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October 1880.

From OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Lieutenant Governor's Camp, Punjab.

It has been determined, on military grounds, to evacuate Kurram with the least possible delay. Announcement will be made to Turis that we recognize their inde-

pendence, and will maintain it against Kabul. No Governor will be appointed, and they will be left to make their own arrangements for internal administration and protection against neighbouring independent tribes. Evacuation expected to begin 15th. Amir has been told he can have Khost. Please arrange with Watson for any necessary rectification of boundaries.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October, 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I HELD a durbar this afternoon, and read Government Proclamation to Turis. We have united the hitherto hostile factions under their respective leaders, Badshah Gul and Mir Muhammad Khan, and, by the voice of the people, these two men are appointed to administer the general affairs of the country. Arrangements for local and district management progressing. Full report will be shortly submitted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Shalozan. (No. 3338 E. P., dated Simla, 7th October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 2nd October, regarding the proposed evacuation of the Kurram valley.

2. As there is no prospect of the Turi tribe electing a Governor, you propose to divide the Turi country into districts under leading maliks. These districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will unite against a common enemy. The necessary arrangements can, you think, be made in a few days, and you therefore see no reason for prolonging the military occupation of the valley.

3. I am to say that the Governor General in Council, under the circumstances stated in your communications, accepts your proposals, and that the troops under your command will very shortly be withdrawn to the British border. In the meantime it is desirable that you should assemble the representatives of the Turi tribe, and announce to them the final intentions of the British Government regarding their future position. It is unnecessary to give you detailed instructions upon this point, as the enclosed copies of a proclamation to the Turis, which are sent at your request, sufficiently indicate the views of Government. But I am to observe that the Governor General in Council would be disposed to issue no written proclamation on the subject if it were not for the fact that you appear to consider the measure an important one; and you are authorized, if you think there would be no serious objection, to retain the written proclamation now sent you, substituting for it a verbal announcement to the Turi Maliks. This matter the Governor General in Council leaves to your discretion.

4. In conclusion, I am to say that the Turis should be warned to do nothing which might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachments.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

PROCLAMATION issued to the MALIKS and PEOPLE of the TURI TRIBE in Kurram.

I, Major-General John Watson, commanding the British troops in the Kurram valley, am instructed to announce to the maliks and people of the Turi tribe that the British Government intends to withdraw its forces very shortly across the border.

Under these circumstances, it has become necessary to make some arrangement for the future administration of the district, and the matter has been considered with an earnest desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the people. The British Government understands that the Turi tribe desire their country to be made independent. Consequently, I have now to announce that the British Government recognizes their independence, and, so long as the Turis desire it, will regard their country as having no connection with the Amir of Kabul.

Regarding the internal administration of the district and its protection against neighbouring independent tribes, the British Government does not wish to interfere, and the Turis will be left free to make their own arrangements. In this matter also the British Government believes that it is consulting the interests of the tribe.

In return for its recognition and support the British Government requires that the Turi tribe shall conform in all respects to any advice which may be given them at any time on behalf of that Government.

JOHN WATSON, Major-General.

Enclosure 7 in No. 30.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 1508, dated Lahore, 6th October 1880.)

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3198 P., dated 18th September, asking for the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor on the proposal to place a Governor over the Turis of the Kurram valley.

2. The Lieutenant Governor understands that the Government is under a pledge to protect the Turis from interference from Kabul, but not to preserve them from internal dissensions, nor to protect them from predatory tribes in their vicinity. Sir Robert Egerton considers that one of the main objects to be kept in view is to avoid holding Kurram with a military force. If a Governor is nominated by the British Government, it is more than probable that at no distant period of time we shall be called upon to support him against his own people, or against his neighbours, or the Kabul Government. It is certain that no Punjab chief or noble would accept the governorship, unless he were assured that the Government was prepared to render him substantial support in such contingencies. Without such a guarantee the Lieutenant Governor does not know of any one to whom it would be possible to make over the governorship with any hope of success. Even if any chief or Native gentleman of distinction were induced to accept the offer, on the understanding that he must stand or fall on his own responsibility and on his own resources, it would be hardly possible, on the grounds of friendship, to refuse assistance to him, if he became hard pressed. For these reasons, Sir Robert Egerton considers it unadvisable to appoint a Governor at all. His Honour would give the Turis their independence, making them understand plainly that interference from Kabul is the only contingency under which the British Government is prepared to render them assistance. We should thus incur liability only in one event, instead of three, any one of which might occur if a Governor were appointed.

3. In expressing this opinion, Sir Robert Egerton is well aware that the position of the Turis is one of some difficulty. They are surrounded by tribes who are independent, and some of whom are only too ready to harass them; but it is by no means certain that they cannot create a good government of their own if they desire to do so; and, at all events, it will be quite possible, if at any future time necessity arises for forcible interference in their affairs, to render such support as circumstances may indicate, without, in the first instance, committing the Government to a policy which would most probably render such interference obligatory.

4. The Lieutenant Governor has omitted the consideration of another alternative which has been discussed in previous correspondence, namely, to include the Kurram valley in British territory, and bring it under British administration, because he understands that the only proposal under consideration is to appoint a Governor over the Turis. For the reasons above stated, the Lieutenant Governor is unable to recommend such an appointment being made.

Enclosure 8 in No. 30.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Kurram, 14th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to enclose a detailed report of the final arrangements made with the Turi and Bungesh tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

1. My first proposal, to divide the country into districts, as telegraphed on the 2nd October, met with many difficulties, and finding, on the 7th October, that the exertions of Mr. Anderson and Shahzada Sultan Jan to unite the two factions under their two heads had been very successful, and that the scheme appeared to be the best suited to the requirements of the people, I ratified in durbar the election of Muhammad Nur Khan and Badshah Gul to be the leaders and rulers of the whole community.

2. I impressed upon them that they were not to consider themselves as in any way owners of the country, but as the nominees of the people, as administrators of the public money, and guardians of the public weal; that they were not to interfere in any village matters, which would, as heretofore, be managed by the village elders after the laws and customs of their fathers.

3. They have been advanced the sum of two thousand rupees to commence the enrolment of a levy for the protection of the forts and posts along the line of road, and I have asked permission by telegraph to make this sum five thousand before I leave.

4. A few Enfield rifles, matchlocks, and ammunition captured from the Afghans at Peirwur Kotal will also be made over to them.

5. How long the arrangement may exist it is impossible to say, for the Turis are Afghans, but the chief danger of a rupture is, as Mr. Anderson points out, to be looked for from the secret intrigues of the Amir of Kabul's agents in the Hariob and Khost.

6. I do not say that the Amir himself will authorize such proceedings, but his agents, who long for a residence in Kurram, with all its opportunities for enriching themselves, will leave no stone unturned to embroil the Turis with the British Government, and I think that the Government of India might well address a letter to His Highness, calling upon him to warn his agents to desist from all interference with the Turis. These latter I have cautioned never to give the Amir any excuse for interfering, and pointed out that, to avoid this, they must be extremely careful to grant no shelter or protection to fugitives from the Hariob or Khost.

7. The Chukmunis, who are Sunnis, I do not consider to come within the scope of General Roberts' promises of independence, and their behaviour last year in giving passage to the Munguls to attack our position at Ali Kheyl, although punished afterwards by a fine of Rs. 5,000, would release us from any obligations if we had any. Their Governor, Shere Mahomed, a Khuttuck exile, who has hitherto received a salary of Rs. 250 a month from us, will cease to receive it when we leave, and is, I believe, already making his arrangements with Kabul.

8. Several influential maliks will accompany me to Thal, where I hope that the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat will meet us, and if any further points for discussion or settlement arise, they can be dealt with there.

Enclosure 9 in No. 30.

From H. A. ANDERSON, Esq., Assistant Political Officer, Kurram, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram. (No. 716 O., dated Kurram, 15th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the measures adopted to effect the settlement of the affairs of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India.

The policy of the Government as regards the future of the Kurram valley is set forth in the proclamation telegraphed to you on the 28th August, which was announced to the people of the valley in the durbar held by you on the 7th instant. So far as the administration of the country was concerned, the proclamation announced that the Government of India was not prepared to provide the valley with a Governor. Immediately, however, you informed me that the Government of India had authorized you to submit any practicable scheme for the appointment of a Governor. And subsequent to these instructions the Government of India intimated that it would have no objection to recognizing a Governor elected by the Turis and Bangashis, whether himself an inhabitant of the valley or a stranger.

As you are aware, I have throughout been of opinion that the future welfare of this valley and of its inhabitants would be best secured by the appointment of a Governor

nominated by the Government of India. And I have submitted to you evidence showing that a very large number of the influential men of the valley desired this arrangement. As, however, this course has not been approved by the Government of India, it is unnecessary to discuss it further here.

I propose to explain at some length the reasons which have led me to come to the conclusion that the proposal to leave the choice of an individual Governor to the people of the valley themselves was absolutely impracticable.

The Turi tribe consists of five sections,—

- (1.) The Hamza Kheyl.
- (2.) The Mastu Kheyl.
- (3.) The Dapurzai.
- (4.) The Ghundi Kheyl.
- (5.) The Alizai.

The Bangash of the valley in point of numbers and importance rank with each of these sections, and may for convenience sake be classed with them as a sixth section; while, however, the sectional divisions of the tribe are scrupulously maintained and respected, and their existence cannot be disregarded in any matter concerning the tribe, still it cannot be too strongly insisted, that by far the most potent factor in all matters concerning the tribe as a whole is that of faction. The Turi tribe in this characteristic resembles most of the Pathan tribes of the frontier; and as it was the policy of the Durani rulers to administer by fomenting factious differences, the faction spirit moving the Turis is perhaps keener than elsewhere. I mention this to show that this peculiarity to which I attribute so much working power is not confined to a tribe with whom we have a limited acquaintance, but is also shared by tribes with whom we have long been familiar. I believe that the experience of frontier officers and the records of the offices of frontier districts will confirm what I advance regarding the potency of faction in determining the action of most Pathan tribes. The inhabitants of the Kurram valley are divided into two factions—the Dravandi and the Myan Sayad, popularly characterized as the Sust and Tuig Gundis. The adherents of the former are distinguished as being the disciples of the local Sayads, the adherents of the latter as being disciples of the Shiah Sayads of Torah. It would be out of place here to analyze the effects of this element of discord on the sectional and tribal relations of the people; and I must ask that the assumption be granted that the effects are most potent. But I would point attention to the fact that, in almost every collection of hamlets which constitute a Kurram village, there are representatives of each faction. It may be inferred from this that the village, the section and the tribe are one and all penetrated by the spirit of faction.

It may be gathered from the above description of the state of parties in the Kurram valley that unity in any important matter, such as that of the election of a tribal Governor, was not to be looked for. In accordance with your instructions, however, both personally and through my Native assistant, Shahzada Sultan Jan, I ascertained the wishes of the people as regards this question.

The result of my inquiries showed that the notion of electing an individual resident of the valley as a Governor was not entertained by any one. Such a course was considered as beyond the range of the possible. On the other hand, I found that the names of four persons, not permanent residents of the valley, were in people's mouths. Some people named my Native assistant Shahzada Sultan Jan, and as he is singularly popular in the valley, he might have found some supporters, but he could by no means have secured the votes of a majority. This he acknowledged himself, and at the same time he knew that without assistance from Government he would be unable to undertake the governorship and maintain his position. Further, he had no wish to accept the post and would have refused it if offered to him. My tahsildar here, Akbar Khan, son of Mahomed Amir Khan of the Kohat district, and my Superintendent of Settlement, Mirza Sultan Hasan, were, I believe, at one time anxious to accept the governorship, and so became talked about; but I ascertained that neither commanded general appreciation. The fourth proposal was that the leading Sayad of Torah should be elected Governor. Whatever approval this proposal may have received among the Turis of the Sayad's own faction, it was obvious that it would meet with a corresponding degree of disapproval from the Turis of the opposing faction, and events justified this conclusion. As, therefore, I was compelled to dismiss the proposal that the Turis should elect a man from among themselves to rule their tribe as impracticable, so was I compelled to conclude that the nomination of any of

the strangers named above would be unpopular with the majority of the tribe, and their election would be of no effect.

It will be clearly seen, I trust, from what I have written above, that I endeavoured to give effect to the instructions of the Government of India, sanctioning the election of a Governor by the people of the Kurram valley, but that this course was unsuited to the constitution of the tribe, and could not be adopted under its existing condition. While I was engaged in ascertaining the wishes of the people of this valley, I was informed that the two leading and most influential men of each faction, namely, Sayad Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, were quietly and with united aim consulting with the influential representatives of each tribe with the view of organizing a form of government of a popular nature, in case the Government of India did not deem it advisable to appoint a Governor for the valley. This project was secretly announced to you in a petition, which I submitted to you together with a petition from a very large number of the representatives of the tribe, asking that Government would give them a Governor.

When it was definitely announced that the Government were not prepared to nominate and appoint a Governor in accordance with your instructions, I had it announced throughout the valley that the time was now come for the whole tribe to arrange for its future administration, and every one was invited to come and give expression to his wishes. For three or four days a very large, in fact complete, tribal council was assembled at Kurram, and debated on the policy to be adopted. The results of those debates are contained in the two petitions sealed by the complete body of representatives of every tribe of the valley, forming Annexure No. I. to this Report.

The petitions, it will be noted, are two in number,—one on behalf of each faction—but are identical in wording. They express the unanimous agreement of the people of the valley to carry on their affairs, both internal and external, by means of their general tribal council under the leadership of the heads of their factions, Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan; and they contain the further expressions of the intention of the people to contribute one rupee per jarib of cultivated land to defray the expenses necessarily incurred in maintaining the arrangements proposed to be instituted for the government of the tribe.

As soon as I had ascertained that the tribe was unanimous in preferring this solution of the difficult question of providing for the government of the valley, I communicated the fact to you, and expressed the opinion that the arrangements now proposed should be adopted, and I further recommended that no time should be lost in holding a public durbar for the purpose of finally announcing the orders of Government regarding the future of the valley, and to announce that the arrangements now proposed by the people themselves for their own government were acceptable to Government, and would be recognized by the Government of India. You instructed me accordingly to announce throughout the valley that you would hold a public durbar on the 7th October; and at the same time you directed me to elicit from the representatives of the tribes in more detail the arrangements which they proposed to make for the maintenance of the forts and Government buildings in the valley, and for the distribution among themselves of the duties of internal government and external defence. These details, so far as could be ascertained, are contained in the papers forming Annexure No. II. to this Report.

In the afternoon of the 7th October you opened the durbar, which was attended by representatives from every part of the valley and of every section. After you had explained the orders of Government to the assembled crowd, the Proclamation of Government was read out to them in Persian and in Pushtu. This was followed by the presentation to you by representatives of the two factions of the two petitions containing the proposals of the people for their government.

Those who had attached their seals to these petitions were then questioned as to whether they agreed to the contents; and generally the whole of the assemblage were invited to express their assent or dissent. I think that you were satisfied that, with the exception of Sayad Hanif, an influential Sayad of Kurman, and his nephew Shah Hasan, who were discontented with the preference given to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, the whole assemblage expressed its acquiescence in the scheme of Government contained in the petition. In accordance with this expression of acquiescence you intimated that their proposal was acceptable to Government. A choga and lungi were then delivered to representatives of each faction, who were directed to deliver them to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, respectively, as an intimation that they were accepted by their factions as the leading men, through

whose leadership the affairs of the tribe were to be managed through the tribal Jirgah. The assemblage was then dismissed, and the durbar broke up.

It will, I think, be hardly necessary to adduce argument to show that the scheme of self-administration thus adopted by the tribe of its own free will is the best that could have been adopted under existing circumstances. The fact that the tribe was unanimous in proposing and accepting the arrangement furnishes justification for its being accepted by the Government of India. However, I may express the opinion that, looking at the existing state of the Turi tribe, as described in a previous part of the report, the arrangement is the one of all others possible under the instructions of the Government of India which commends itself to me as being best adapted to secure the welfare of the tribe in the new state of independence into which it will pass on the evacuation of the country by the British troops.

While, however, the general arrangement may meet with approval, exception may be taken to the fact that the details of the scheme of administration are not filled in. The scheme provides generally for matters concerning the tribe as a whole, but it does not provide for matters of local and petty interests, and the other influential men of the valley who may be expected to take part in the public concern are not named nor assigned a place. The answer to this is that, like other Pathan tribes, the Turis have their own customary law, civil and criminal, and their own tribunals, the council of elders and the respected Sayads for the decision of all minor matters. And further, the Turis resemble other Pathans in this respect, that no one can bear to see his neighbour placed higher than himself. Acting on these considerations, I have deemed it unnecessary to attempt to formulate what is already familiar to the people, and unadvisable to particularize where the effect could only be to produce dissension. While, however, I believe that the explanation tendered above will be considered as satisfactory, I feel that you will require a special explanation of the reasons which have prevented me from carrying into effect, according to my original proposal, the portion of the scheme of administration which contemplated a division of the valley into districts for the purposes of internal administration. I was led to believe at one time that it would be possible, to a certain extent, to introduce this division. I hoped that, taking the forts as a basis, it would be possible to assign one to each tribe or locality, and that a certain number of the leading men of the tribe or locality might be specially named and appointed custodians of the fort with certain jurisdiction attaching to the office. I found out, however, on inquiring further into the question, that the latter portion of this plan was impracticable, as there were too many claimants, and that any attempt to select individuals would produce dissensions of the most bitter kind. I found a further objection in the fact that no one of the Turi section inhabits any one district of the valley. A portion of each section holds lands and villages in each district. The sections are broken up and scattered to an extraordinary extent throughout the length and breadth of the country. This being so, it is obvious that any district now constituted as such would of necessity be controlled by representatives of each tribe. To organize an entirely new district administration out of such sectionally heterogeneous materials was impracticable. While, however, I have to confess that I erred on this matter, I think that the scheme for the maintenance of a garrison for each fort, to be furnished by the locality which is approved by the tribe, will, if carried out, prove a source of great strength to the tribe as a whole, and will be considered satisfactory. I have devoted a great deal of trouble to this portion of the scheme. It will be difficult, for the tribesmen suddenly made independent, to realize the value of combining for the purpose of maintaining the forts. They have been accustomed, while under the Durani Government, to attack and burn the Government forts at each change of ruler. They have no taste of service away from their homes, and they look upon their villages as their natural forts. While, therefore, on paper, the maintenance of the forts is provided for, and the influential men of the valley appreciate their value, I am bound to state my opinion that they will have great difficulties to face in carrying out their present proposals. I consider, however, that the matter is extremely important for the welfare of the people, and have given all assistance in my power towards the enlisting of tribal levies. The hands of the leading maliks, however, would be materially strengthened by a present of money to accelerate their enlistment. All the sections are prepared to furnish the complement allotted to them; but it will be difficult to retain the services of the men supplied without some remuneration. In time, no doubt, if all goes well, and the tribesmen contribute to the general fund, it will be possible to enlist regular garrisons. The difficulty is to start the special arrangements before the general scheme of Government has been set to work.

I need not give at length here the strength of the garrison proposed for the forts, nor the other details contained in Annexure No. II. to this Report. The arrangements proposed, if carried out in their entirety, are excellent. Before concluding this report, I would desire to offer a few remarks on the probable results of the arrangements for the future independent government of the valley which I have described.

The success of any arrangements for the self-government of a Pathan tribe, such as the Turis are, suddenly made independent, cannot be predicted absolutely. The tendency of a tribe, under such circumstances, is to break loose from the control of those who would, under ordinary circumstances, exercise restraint on its members. Old animosities and feuds between individuals and between tribes have to be settled, and not without blood-shedding, to be followed by retaliation. Persons who, under the former *régime*, acquired influence and popularity, provoke aggression, and strangers who acquired land under the protection of foreign rulers invite attack. There is a general tendency of the strong to be aggressive, so that the weak are compelled to form new alliances and enlist under new factions. In fact, a general social ferment has to be expected, and a general straining of old social safeguards has to be anticipated.

To a large extent, the Turi tribe may be expected to exhibit these symptoms. There are ancient feuds, such as that between the villages of Malana and Zeran, between the Maddi Khel Norad, sub-section of the Hamza Khel, and the Sunni Bangash of Haji Khel, and there are a hundred and one well known family feuds of tribal note which will surely burst out now. There are also foreign settlers in the land who, unless they pay heavily for support, will be expelled. But the Turis live in the midst of an almost unbroken circle of hostile tribes, whose hostility is heightened by differences of religious belief. For tribal safety, union is absolutely necessary; and it may be hoped that the danger from without will serve to extinguish minor differences within, and will tend to encourage a state of order. The arrangements now to be adopted furnish few novelties, and the tribe should find no insuperable difficulty in setting them to work. The scheme of administration is of their own choice, and is well adapted for the existing conditions of the tribe and the characters of the people. Further, though one or two of the influential men may from time to time have shown signs of a leaning to the Kabul Government, the body of the people, the "Kishars," who have grown rich and powerful during our occupation, while the former respectabilities and influential men have been standing still, are heart and soul determined to maintain the state of independency and self-government now set on foot.

As far as the tribe is concerned, and so far as we conceive its relation with the tribes encircling it, there is some hope that the arrangement now set on foot will work well and will last some time. The great dangers to which the independent welfare of the tribe is now exposed are two, first, insidious interferences from Kabul, and secondly, the treachery of the leading men of the valley. Both these dangers must be faced, for they are certain. Ever since the Amir's deputies have occupied the Hariob, they have spared no effort to embroil the Turis with us, and have sedulously promoted the Amir's interests throughout the valley, though without great success. The Turi maliks drew stipends under the Kabul Governor, and were flattered and honoured when necessary at the expense of the common people. Under the new arrangement they are placed on an equality, and will regret the fleshpots of the Durani. The Turis, however, are a strong, self-dependent, vigorous race, well prepared to face future pent from their numerous enemies, as they know that the Government of India has guaranteed them against encroachments of the Kabul Government. For the time being this assurance seems to have bound them together. When the British forces evacuate the valley, some internal disturbances and bloodshed may be expected, and I cannot confidently give the assurance that the settlement now made will stand in its integrity.

Much will depend on the maintenance of the cordiality now professed to exist between Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, and much will depend on the manner in which they discharge their trust to the tribe. If only they will honestly work in concert for the interests of the tribe, if they will work through the other head and influential men of the sections, and not attempt to act independently of them, the valley should soon enjoy tranquillity. Whether or not at a later stage external intrigue and internal treachery may not disturb the present agreement, it is difficult to say. It is quite possible that this will happen, but if it should happen under existing arrangements, the tribe will have to accept the blame, for the Government of India

has treated it with kindness and consideration. The tribe desires independence at present, and has agreed to a form of self government of its own choice. It has received all possible assistance towards setting the desired form of government on foot. It alone must be held responsible if its own approved institution fails through the incapacity of those subject to it bear the self-imposed burden.

Annexure No. I.

TRANSLATION of the Petitions presented on behalf of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley at the public durbar held on the 7th October 1880, by Major-General JOHN WATSON, C.B., V.C.

INASMUCH as strong enmity and hatred exists between us and the Duranis owing to their tyranny, so that if our flesh and bones and their flesh and bones were boiled together in one pot, the water would not unite ; therefore we have always desired to be freed from the oppression of the Duranis and enjoy repose.

By the kindness of Government we have been delivered from this tyranny, and have recently lived in peace and comfort. As regards the future we have previously made two petitions to the Government: First, we asked that we should be freed from the Durani's rule; and, secondly, we asked that the Government would give us a sanad. We still desire that a Governor be granted to us by the Government; but as there appears to be delay in granting us a Governor, therefore, because we are two factions, one Drewandi, of which the head is Sayad Badshah Gul, and the other Myan, of which the head is Mahomed Nur Khan, therefore, we two factions agreeing together have this confident hope and desire that we shall, with greater unanimity than any other frontier tribes can show, by means of general tribal jirga under the leadership of Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan by paying as revenue one rupee per jarib, defray the expenses of these two leading men, the malikana of maliks, and other necessary expenses of administration, and shall provide for the maintenance of internal order and the means of internal defence to the common advantage and peace.

For these reasons, in accordance with the desire of our hearts, approving the arrangements of a tribal jirga as given above, we petition accepting all responsibility, that Government will approve our request and will acknowledge the two men we have chosen as our leaders. Whatever kindness is shown to them will be shown to the tribe.

Annexure No. II.

ARRANGEMENTS contemplated by the Turi and Bangash Tribes of the Kurram Valley for Tribal Defence and for the Maintenance of Garrisons in the Forts of the Valley.

I.—EACH of the six tribes will furnish 100 men, in all 600 men, to be employed for service. For each body of 100 men a Sadbashi will be appointed on Rs. 30 per mensem, and 10 Dabashi to receive Rs. 12 per mensem. Each private will receive Rs. 6 per mensem. Each tribe will be responsible for supplying its own complement.

II.—*The Shalozan Fort and Cantonment.*—Only the Kara Kheyl or southern fort will be maintained in it, composed as follows:—

10 men of the Kara Kheyl, subjection of the Gundi Kheyl.
30 men of the Bangash of Shalozan.

40

The land now occupied by the cantonments will be cultivated, as the land is well watered and valuable.

III.—Habib Killa shall be knocked down, as it cannot be occupied. The three Turi tribes of the Peiwar, Dapurzai, Ghundi Kheyl, and Alizai will provide a complement

of 30 men to garrison the road towers on the Peiwar road. Each tribe will supply 10 men.

IV.—A garrison of 10 men will be provided for Kharlasi, as it is exposed to the attack of enemies. The garrison will be supplied from the people of Kharlasi.

V.—*The Kurram Forts and Cantonments.*—The lines and northern fort will be knocked down after two months have elapsed, and the land will be cultivated by the landowners. The southern fort, the dāk bungalow, and the baradari of Wali Mahomed Khan will be occupied. A garrison of 300 men, 100 Mastu Kheyl, 100 Dapurzi, 100 Bangash, will be maintained.

VI.—*The Vangyan Fort.*—This fort belongs to Wali Mahomed Khan. If the Ghundi Kheyl, who are the proprietors of the land, buy it from him, they shall hold the fort. If it remains unsold, the people of Bangyan will hold it.

VI.—*Ibrahimzai Fort.*—The people of the Ibrahimzai village will leave it and occupy the fort.

VIII.—*Balesh Kheyl.*—The new fort will be occupied by a garrison of 200 men of the neighbourhood to protect the neighbouring villages against the Massozais. The old fort will be occupied, if possible, by the neighbouring villages.

IX.—The Shinak Gor will be occupied by the villages of Shinak.

X.—The Alizai fort will similarly be occupied by the five Alizai villages.

XI.—To maintain these levies and these garrisons a portion of the revenue paid by the people will be set aside. Muafidars will enjoy their former privilege of exemption, and the bhalsa lands will pay revenue at the ordinary rate of one rupee per jarib.

Enclosure 10 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th October 1880.

From General WATSON, B. Kheyl, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KURRAM evacuated this morning. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., commanding Kurram Field Force. (No. 3526 E/P., dated 3rd November 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 14th October 1880, with enclosure, reporting the fiscal arrangements made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

2. In reply, I am to say that your proceedings in connection with the settlement are approved by the Government of India.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have accepted Wali's proposal, and promised liberal provision.

No. 32.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 46.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 19th November 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 208, dated the 14th of September last, reporting the decision at which you have

arrived in regard to the maintenance of the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass and the Kurram valley, which have been held since the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. As regards the Khyber, your Excellency in Council has decided to recognize the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the pass, and to make such arrangements with their representatives as shall ensure that the road is kept open and free from interference. When these arrangements are concluded, the garrisons now in the pass will be withdrawn, but its occupation by Afghan regular troops, without the consent of the British Government, will not be permitted.

3. Similarly, it has been determined that the British forces shall leave the Kurram district so soon as certain questions connected with the future political position of the Turi tribe, occupying the Lower Valley from the eastern slopes of the Peiwar Kotal, have been arranged. You have already intimated to the Amir of Kabul that, while the independence of that tribe will be maintained against any interference, in accordance with positive assurances given to it by representatives of the Indian Government, you are ready to allow the Jajis, who inhabit the country beyond the Kotal, to pass under his jurisdiction; and you have authorized Major-General Watson, your Chief Political Officer in Kurram, to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis in respect to their future self-government, in view to some practicable settlement which may be satisfactory to a substantial majority of the tribe, and compatible with the early withdrawal of the troops.

4. The arrangements above summarized have been determined on by your Excellency in Council after receiving the opinions of the political and military officers who, during recent operations, have gained personal experience of the localities in question. As regards the Kurram district, your policy has necessarily been influenced by consideration of "the repeated assurances received by the Turi tribe from your officers that they "will not be replaced without their consent under the power of the Barakzai dynasty "at Kabul." Similar promises had been given to the Jaji tribe, inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal; but, as explained in the 9th paragraph of your Despatch, you have not thought yourselves at present under any obligation to guarantee the independence of that tribe, which appears content to revert to its former state of subordination to Kabul.

5. Accepting and adopting the reasons you have assigned, Her Majesty's Government assent to your proceedings, as reported in your present Despatch, and leave the details of the arrangements with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency in Council. They will, however, be glad to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the territories of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 33.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

SEE my telegram 17th November. Following, dated 29th, from St. John,—
 "Viceroy's letter delivered to Sirdar Shere Ali this afternoon. He cheerfully
 "acquiesces in decision, chooses Karachi as place of residence, and will leave as soon
 "as arrangements for his journey can be made."

No. 34.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING, dated 30th, received from Colonel St. John.—"30th November. Sirdar
 "Shere Ali Khan this morning read the Viceroy's letter in public, and announced his
 "approaching departure to India, fixing date at 12 days hence."

No. 35.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 48.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 3rd December 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 225, dated the 19th October, reporting the delivery to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, after his recognition as Amir of Kabul, of a written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position; and I propose now, in pursuance of the intention intimated in my Despatch of the 30th of September last, to offer such observations as appear to be called for, on the negotiations of which the incident now reported may be regarded as the conclusion.

2. When in the spring of this year the early evacuation of Kabul by the British forces was resolved upon, and it became advisable to find some Native authority competent to assume the administration of Northern Afghanistan, the claims and qualifications of Sirdar Abdul Rahman necessarily forced themselves upon the attention of the Government. The arrival of the Sirdar in Balkh, and the establishment of his authority in that province, were events which could not be disregarded. As one of the senior grandsons of Dost Mahomed, and a chief who had shown capacity in the troubled times which followed the succession of the late Amir Shere Ali, he was believed to have a strong party amongst the Afghans, and a variety of considerations pointed to the establishment of friendly relations with him, as likely to be advantageous to British interests.

3. The communications with the Sirdar which were authorized by your Excellency's predecessor in Council had not, at the date when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office, led to any definite result; but the Native gentlemen who had been sent to his camp in order to ascertain his views and intentions had been received with courtesy, and there appeared to be a fair prospect of arriving eventually at a satisfactory understanding with him.

4. Such being the case, Her Majesty's Government had no desire to deviate from the policy which had received the approval of their predecessors; and they deemed it only necessary to impress upon your Excellency in Council* that, assuming a satisfactory result of the negotiations with the Sirdar, it was desirable that his authority should be established with as little assistance as possible from Her Majesty's agents or troops, and that he should be left after his accession to power to rely upon his own resources. Whilst, however, Her Majesty's Government were unable to undertake liabilities on behalf of a future Afghan Government, the character of which would necessarily, for some time to come, be uncertain, they authorized the renewal to Abdul Rahman Khan of those assurances of support against unprovoked external attack which had been given in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to Shere Ali, as well as an intimation that his reception of a British Resident would not be required.

5. Although during the progress of the negotiations with the Sirdar he gave cause on more than one occasion for mistrust of his sincerity, your Excellency in Council exercised a wise discretion in placing a liberal interpretation on his acts, and in hesitating to accept the unfavourable view of his intentions which his conduct at one time was calculated to inspire. I have already intimated to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of your proceedings in this respect, and I may therefore pass to a review of the instructions furnished on the 20th of July last to Sir D. Stewart, under which the Sirdar was finally recognized as Amir of Kabul.

6. These instructions, while clearly expressing the views of the Government of India on the various questions which might be expected to be raised by the Sirdar, duly provided against the contingency of failure to arrive at an understanding with him. You reminded Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin that the Government of India had from the first decided that the assumption of power at Kabul by Abdul Rahman was not to be made a matter of negotiation or bargain with the Sirdar, and that their arrangements for withdrawal from Northern Afghanistan were to be completed without reference to the result of the correspondence with him. In the event of the Sirdar manifesting good faith and a friendly spirit, you authorized his recognition under the title of Amir of Kabul, and the subsequent extension to him of full countenance and political support, but not of co-operation of British troops in the establishment of

his authority. Whilst you were willing to provide him with some artillery, and with sufficient money to meet his immediate wants, he was to be made to understand not only that the Government of India could not engage to furnish him with any regular subsidy or continuous supply of either money or arms, but that after he had taken possession of the capital he was to rely for holding it on his own resources. The necessity before evacuating Kabul of ensuring, as far as practicable, the protection from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct, of the tribes and individuals who had assisted the British cause, was duly impressed upon Sir D. Stewart, and you instructed him to address a fitting admonition on this subject to the Sirdar.

7. Whilst adhering to the line of policy which had from the beginning of the correspondence excluded any question of a treaty, you furnished Sir D. Stewart with a formal statement embodying the views of the Government of India as to the future position of the Sirdar, which might be delivered to him, if necessary. This document, which I now learn has been presented, assures the Sirdar of the desire of the British Government not to interfere in the internal government of the territories in his possession, nor to require an English Resident to be stationed anywhere within them. It further provides for ordinary friendly intercourse between the two Governments by the residence at Kabul, under agreement, of a Mahomedan Agent of the British Government. It defines plainly what must be the position of the ruler of Kabul in relation to foreign powers other than the British Government, declaring that since that Government admits of no right of interference by such powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of that country, it is obvious that the Amir can have no political relations with any foreign power, except with the British Government. It promises him, finally, assistance to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government to be necessary in repelling unprovoked aggression on his dominions, on the understanding that His Highness follows unreservedly the advice of that Government in regard to his external relations.

8. These instructions, and the subsequent proceedings of your Excellency in Council, meet with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. Although, as was natural, the expectations of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan on many points proved to be larger than your Government was prepared to satisfy, he has obtained all the present assistance that he could reasonably have hoped for. The consideration of so serious a question as that of entering into treaty relations with the Sirdar, cannot with prudence be taken up, until he has to some extent consolidated his administration in Northern Afghanistan, and manifested, more plainly than has yet been possible, his real disposition towards the British Government. Meanwhile, it is satisfactory to find that the Amir in his conversations with Mr. Lepel Griffin did not urge with any discourteous insistence wishes which could not at present be gratified, and that before the British forces withdrew from Kabul he expressed his obligation to the British Government for the favour it had shown to him. It having been determined that no treaty should be contracted with Abdul Rahman, no positive engagement could be taken from him for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted the British authorities during recent events. But Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that the Amir has shown every disposition to treat well those in this category who have remained behind at Kabul, and that your Excellency's Government have been able to offer, within Indian limits, an asylum and a proper provision to others who deemed themselves too much compromised so to remain with safety.

9. Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to take an exaggerated view of the advantage to British interests of the recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, nor to anticipate in too sanguine a spirit the course which events may take in Northern Afghanistan. But they consider that there are reasonable grounds for expecting satisfactory results from the policy which has been pursued. Peace has, at any rate, been restored at Kabul, and the greater portion of the British army operating beyond your North-Western frontier has been enabled to return to India. It is not to be expected that the Amir should establish undisputed authority over the country without difficulty, delay, and perhaps disturbance. But Her Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the ability of Abdul Rahman, and the countenance which has been accorded to him by the Government of India, may, in course of time, ensure his success as a ruler, and enable him to maintain and strengthen, as time goes on, peaceful and amicable relations between the two Governments. Her Majesty's Government cannot but think that the deputation to Kabul of a Native representative

of your Government would be conducive to this end, and they will be glad to hear that you have been able to carry out this measure at an early date.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 36.

To HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 53.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 17th December 1880.

I HAVE received and considered the letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 233, of the 16th ultimo, reporting the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of Kuram for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from that valley.

2. My despatch of the 19th ultimo will have already conveyed to Your Excellency in Council the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the preliminary measures initiated by you in this matter. It is only necessary, therefore, on the present occasion, to record their approval of your further proceedings as now reported.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

His Excellency the Most Honourable
the Governor General of India in Council.

No. 37.

From PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, Calcutta, 29th December 1880, to
SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIRDAR SHERE ALI KHAN has arrived at Kurrachee.

Suitable arrangements, with which he expresses himself quite satisfied, have been made.

LONDON :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

No. 79 of 1878.*

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 9th September 1878.

IN our letter of the 19th August, we reported to your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August, in consequence of the death of the Heir-Apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawar about the 16th instant.

2. We inclose copy of our Resolution formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him, on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India, have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

3. We also inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Minute recorded by the Viceroy upon the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia, upon the course of events in those regions which has brought about the present important conjuncture of affairs, and upon the various possible solutions of the problem which is now before the British Government. In general accordance with that part of the Viceroy's Minute which has special reference to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul, the instructions to our Envoy have been framed, after careful deliberation over the actual situation, and after examining the measures and lines of policy best calculated to secure a durable and satisfactory settlement of our relations with Afghanistan. It is to be understood that the remainder of the Minute expresses only the personal views of the Viceroy.

4. These instructions [which are contained in a letter to Sir Neville Chamberlain, of which a copy is inclosed] may be summarized as follows:—We have directed our Envoy to ascertain what misunderstandings exist between the British Government and the Amir, and to endeavour to clear them up. If these misunderstandings cannot be removed, or if the Amir is unmistakeably and of set purpose unfriendly, the Envoy will return. If the Amir is found to be not ill-disposed, the Envoy will intimate that the British Government are prepared to place their political connexions with Kabul upon an improved footing; and that there are two essential conditions of an alliance. The first is the withdrawal of any Russian Agency that may be still in Afghanistan, and the complete exclusion, henceforward, of Russian Agents from His Highness' dominions: and the second condition is the establishment within the Amir's territories of English officers accredited to him by our Government. Upon this basis, if it is accepted, the Envoy may concede to the Amir a subsidy; a promise to recognize the successor whom His Highness may formally name in his lifetime; and also an engagement on the part of the British Government to defend the Amir's present territories, if Russia, or any State under Russian influence, attempts to take possession of any part of them.

5. It will be understood by your Lordship that these terms represent the extreme limit up to which we have authorised our Envoy to grant concessions to the Amir; and that he is not instructed to offer or agree to make them in their entirety, unless he judges this to be necessary. Upon such points, and in the whole conduct of the negotiations, we have intrusted a very wide discretion to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who possesses our full confidence, and who is peculiarly qualified for this important Mission by his long

* NOTE.—Extract of this despatch, with the enclosures referred to in paras. 2 and 6, was published in the papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan which were presented to Parliament in November 1878.

experience of the Afghan border, by his personal acquaintance, in former days, with the Amir Sher Ali, and by his distinguished reputation upon our North-West Frontier.

6. A copy of the letter from the Viceroy, which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir, is also inclosed.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

MINUTE BY THE VICEROY (LORD LYTTON).

A mission, under the charge of General Sir Neville Chamberlain, is about to proceed to Cabul to confer with the Ameer; thus affording us our first, and possibly last, opportunity of entering into personal explanations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, in his own capital, regarding the relations between his country and the British Empire.

Resulting, as this mission does, from Russia's recent action in Central Asia, it cannot but raise the whole question of the relative positions of Russia and England in those regions, and may not improbably lead to a final settlement of that long vexed question. It is, therefore, desirable that we should very carefully examine, in the light of recent events and disclosures, the problem of our future in Asia; with a view to arriving at such broad and definite lines of policy as may serve to guide our Envoys in their difficult task, and to direct our efforts for the consolidation of our dominion and due influence in the East.

In the present Minute I shall endeavour first, to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, and show how it has arisen; and then, to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves:—

Progress of England and Russia in the East.

1. At the beginning of last century Russia's most advanced posts, at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, were nearly 2,500 miles distant from the insignificant British settlements in India. Our only rivals there were the French. The advance of Russia southwards seemed practically bounded by the vast and almost impassable deserts of the Kirghiz Steppes. For a century past her progress and conquests had been entirely in an easterly direction; and no one could at that time foresee that England and Russia would ever come into collision in Asia.

2. About 1730, Russia commenced the absorption of the hordes of the Kirghiz Steppes, and the gradual occupation of those arid deserts,—a task which occupied her for more than a hundred years; and her outposts began to draw nearer to India. England, meanwhile, had not been idle. Bengal had been conquered, or ceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay become an important settlement; and at the close of last century less than 2,000 miles intervened between English and Russian possessions.

3. In the beginning of this century the more rapid progress was made on our side. While Russia was laboriously crossing the great Desert, and slowly consolidating her power in the Kirghiz Steppes, England was advancing with great strides over India. The North-Western Provinces, the Carnatic, the territories of the Peishwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively came under our rule; and by 1850 we had extended our dominion to the foot of the mountains beyond the Indus. Thus, during the first half of this century, the distance between the outposts of England and Russia had been reduced, almost entirely by advances on our side, from 2,000 to less than 1,000 miles.

4. In 1854–56, the Crimean War temporarily checked the designs of Russia in Europe; but this seems rather to have stimulated her progress in Asia. The great Desert once crossed, Russia found herself in presence of fertile and settled countries, whose provinces fell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen under ours. Twenty-five years have not yet elapsed since that war; and, during this period, the

distance between England and Russia in the East has been reduced, this time entirely by advances on Russia's side, from 1,000 to less than 400 miles.

5. It might seem unnecessary to recall such well-known facts, were it not that there are those who argue, even now, that there is no imminent risk of contact with Russia in Asia; that we have no reason to anticipate further advance on her part; and that the dread of such advance is groundless, since we are still separated from her by vast distances and almost impassable obstacles. It is, therefore, well to show how little vast distances and impassable obstacles have hitherto stayed the advance of the British and Russian Empires towards each other in the East; and, by measuring the past, to attempt to estimate the probable future, rate of progress.

6. It appears, then, that the approach of the two Powers has, for nearly two centuries, been a steady continuous movement; undiverted by any obstacles, whether purely physical or of human origin,—most rapid on our side during the first half of this century, and recently on the side of Russia—never ceasing, however, but, on the contrary, constantly increasing in rapidity. The progress towards contact made in the first half of this century was greater than during the whole preceding one; and during the last quarter of the century it has been proportionately greater than during the first half century.

7. We have also been told, however, that the further advance of Russia cannot prove formidable, because further advance and conquest means greater weakness. But conquest and extension of dominion do not necessarily weaken a great Power. Is the British Empire less powerful, now that England has extended her rule to Peshawur, 1,500 miles from Bombay and Calcutta, than when she was painfully struggling for a foothold round her factories? Doubtless there is a measure of extension which cannot be passed without danger; but what proof have we that Russia has reached that limit? *Has* Russia been weakened by the extension of her power over 1,000 miles, from Orenburg to the Oxus? On the contrary, all that we know as a fact is that she has put more forces in the field, and shown more energy, in her latest and most distant expeditions in Asia than in any former ones. And I shall, I think, be able to show hereafter that Russia will actually gain in strength by further progress.*

8. We know, then, that the approach of the two great rival Powers in Central Asia has continued uninterruptedly for two centuries, and has made progress at an ever accelerating rate, as if governed by the laws of attraction that rule material bodies. We know that the conditions which govern the relations between civilization and barbarism are unchangeable, and that every cause which has acted in past times to compel the advance of ourselves and of Russia continues to act with undiminished force; and we know that neither Power has yet shown signs of failing strength or vitality. Therefore we can calculate, as certainly as we calculate on the succession of the seasons, that the same causes will continue to act, and to produce the same results; and that within a time which can almost with certainty be computed as less than a generation, and which may prove much shorter, England and Russia will be conterminous in the East. Accepting this as certain and unavoidable, it remains for us now to determine where that contact shall take place.

Present position of Russia and England.

9. Assuming, as we may with certainty, that neither Russia nor England will recede from any position they now occupy, it follows that the line of ultimate contact must be either the present frontier of one of the two countries, or some intermediate line; and these possible lines I will now proceed to examine.

British Frontier.

10. The present north-west frontier of India has been the subject of much discussion, and high authorities have recorded opinions in favour of it. Many of these opinions, however, were given when Russia was 600 miles further distant than she now is, when Afghanistan was looked upon as a certain ally, and when, consequently, the whole

* NOTE.—I am aware that there are those who say that Russia, threatened with bankruptcy and socialism, is now formidable only to herself. I would remind these prophets that precisely the same language was held, with equal plausibility, at the time of the Crimean War; since which time Russia has largely developed her railways and increased her military strength, has carried her armies to the walls of Constantinople, has permanently acquired the most important harbour and fortress in Asia Minor, and has added the Khanates to her conquests in Central Asia—instructive commentaries on the predictions of 20 years ago. I would further remind them that it was not France the prosperous monarchy, but France of the Revolution, bankrupt and socially convulsed, which overran Europe, and crushed every well-established monarchy in turn. It is strange to what little practical purpose history is studied by some of our political prophets.

conditions were different. Had these high authorities lived to this day they would probably have seen reason to modify their opinions, as Lord Napier, the most distinguished living Indian military authority, has done. No one who has studied the question can doubt that a rapid change is taking place in public opinion on the subject,—a change especially remarkable during the time I have been in India. Two years ago the opponents to an occupation of Quetta, or to any extension of our military frontier, were numerous and powerful; now they have dwindled to a comparatively small minority.

11. Our present frontier dates from the annexation of the Punjab. It was not a chosen line, accepted after careful study and with far-seeing prevision; but was adopted because it represented, approximately, the points to which the Sikhs had at that time pushed their power. Had the annexation of the Punjab taken place a little earlier or a little later we should have had a different frontier. It would be strange if a line thus taken by chance should combine more advantages than can be found in any line selected by human ingenuity; and yet that is the contention of some of its advocates.

12. Undoubtedly, at the time, this frontier had much to recommend it. It is natural for a Government, looking to the interests of the moment, to carry its conquests to the foot of a mountain tract, and stop at the point where military operations become more difficult and results less satisfactory. Rich plains are easily overrun and held, and they respond to the benefits conferred by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are difficult to traverse and subdue; and, when subdued, their administration presents a still more ungrateful task. The foot of the hills also offers a well-defined line; whereas once the hills are entered it is difficult to know where to stop. So long, therefore, as we had only the rude hill tribes to consider there was much to be said in favour of the line we found drawn. It was not a strong line, except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the prisoner; and it was not a favourable line, as it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to inroads and insult, while limiting our power of external influence or chastisement. But, on the whole, it might fairly be argued that the inconveniences of advancing beyond it exceeded those of remaining there; and, in that sense, and that sense alone, it was a good line.

13. Regarded, however, as a great strategical line, it is dangerously and fatally defective. The theory of awaiting attack behind a mountain range belongs to the pre-Napoleonic period of military science, and to the time of wars of position, when armies manœuvred opposite each other for months, and the capture of one town was considered a sufficient result of a year's campaign. Napoleon shattered this theory, with many others; and in every instance where such defective strategy has since been adopted it has resulted in utter defeat and ruin. Modern military authorities are agreed that the value of an obstacle, such as a great river, or a mountain range, depends upon the command, on both sides, of the points of passage, and on the power of operating at will on either side of the obstacle. To the combatant who securely holds the passes it is of incalculable value, enabling him to mask his movements, to concentrate his force in safety, and to strike at will; or to hold his adversary in check while maturing his defence or preparing his counterstroke. To him who does not command the passes, it is, on the other hand, a barrier which hampers his movements, and a screen which masks and protects his enemy. Hence the value of the great German fortresses on the Rhine and of the former Austrian fortresses in the Italian Quadrilateral; and hence the value to France of Nice and Savoy, which give her the command of the passes of the Alps.

14. But along our existing frontier every pass is in the hands of tribes independent, if not hostile; and who, if we elect to remain permanently within our present border, must ultimately become allies and subjects of our great rival. And whenever the time of actual collision arrives we should have to choose between forcing passes, defended against us as they have never yet been defended, to seek our adversary in a hostile country, far from our base and from all friendly support; or awaiting him along a frontier line of 1,000 miles, pierced at all points by passes which are open to him, and with a river at our back.

15. It is true that the recent occupation of Quetta has materially improved our position. The command of the southern passes is now in our hands; and from Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles, our frontier is well guarded. While we, securely established at Quetta, can at any moment descend on the plains of Candahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our plains without first besieging and taking Quetta—a task of no slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time—and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. But on the northern, and more directly exposed, portions of our frontier our line is as fatally defective as ever.

16. I conceive, then, that it would be simply suicidal to allow Russia to establish herself peaceably and securely at Cabul, and extend her authority to our present borders and over the passes leading into India. She would gain fresh and almost inexhaustible sources of military strength in the wild warriors who inhabit the countries round Cabul and Herat; and who, in her ranks, would rival the best native troops we have in India. She would add enormously to her prestige, a factor never to be lightly thought of in war, and of almost magic power in Eastern warfare. Her dream of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and of a new and shorter line of communication with her Central Asian possessions, would soon become a reality; and all her present difficulties of distances and communications would disappear. We cannot rely on her friendship; and the rich plains of India might prove a too alluring bait to the occupiers of the barren and profitless mountains of Afghanistan. To attack Russia, securely established in such a position, would be a task that might prove beyond even our military resources; to await her in the plains below would be to court defeat. Russia could offer the plunder of the plains, and the conquest of regions once their own, to the Afghans and hill tribes who join her ranks; we have nothing to offer them in return. Even Lord Lawrence, the great advocate of our present frontier, says, "I feel no shadow of a doubt that if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans, *en masse*, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join it." And though he believes that such hordes would make no impression on the troops we could oppose to them, the conditions would be different were these hordes armed, drilled, and led by European officers, and supported by European troops.

Russian Frontier.

17. The Russian frontier, from the Caspian to the Pamir Steppe, is about 1,200 miles long; 200 miles longer than our north-west frontier. Of this, however, less than half is open to attack, as from the Caspian to Samarcand it is covered by the great Khivan desert. But the fatal defect in this line is its want of inter-communication, and its distance from support. While every part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communication, and most of it much nearer, Tashkend, the centre of Russian power in Turkistan, is more than 1,000 miles from the nearest railway; and many of the frontier posts are 1,500 miles distant from such support.

18. The difficulties attending a military occupation under such conditions are necessarily great: and the entire force that Russia, with her vast military resources, can maintain in Turkistan does not exceed that which we maintain in the Punjab alone. It would be easier for us to collect 100,000 men at any point in our frontier than for Russia to collect 25,000 on hers. This heavy drawback has been long felt, and has led to various schemes for connecting the distant provinces of Turkistan with the centres of Russian power—among which may be mentioned Romanoffsky's Oxus-Caspian Canal, and Aral-Caspian Railway; and a proposed railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, 1,350 miles long.

19. Russian Statesmen and Generals have long perceived that the true base for their Central Asian possessions is on the Caspian. From Samarcand by Tashkend to Orenburg is about 1,500 miles. From Samarcand to the Caspian by Merv is about half that distance; and the disproportion is greater in the case of the Russian stations on the Oxus. It was with a view to opening a new and shorter line of communication with the Khanates that the military settlement of Krasnovodsk was established. Owing to the difficulties of the desert between Krasnovodsk and Khiva this scheme has failed; and, though projects for a railway are still discussed, Russian attention is now mainly directed to a more southern and fertile route along the Persian frontier.

20. In an able paper by Colonel Veniukoff on the Russian position in Central Asia, he indicates a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence northwards to Kunduz and southwards to Shikarpur, as the great natural line of communication between Western Europe and the British and Russian possessions in the East. That Russia accepts this view as regards her possessions we have abundant evidence. The maintenance and increase of her establishments at Krasnovodsk and Chikislar, and her recent advance to Kizil Arvat, can have no object but that of opening communication with Turkistan; and we have already explained the almost overpowering necessity which forces Russia towards Merv, in furtherance of this object.

21. Colonel Veniukoff, in the paper above quoted, further draws attention to the importance to Russia of Badakhshan, and of the minor Usbeg States of And Khui, Sir-i-pul, and Maimena; and to the fatal error which he conceives Russia to have committed in acknowledging the rights of Afghanistan over them. "These small Usbeg

"States," he says, "form the last oases in the southern borders of the Turan Steppe, at the very foot of the Paropamisus. To replace them by any other localities favourable to sedentary life in our future frontier on the south is impossible." "Russia cannot halt in her progressive movement till she encloses on the south the steppes extending to Khorassan and the Hindu-Kush." And of Badakhshan he says, "Without possessing it and colonising it we can never guarantee peace in Turkistan, or even the solidity of our rule there. It occupies the most flourishing district in the basin of the Oxus, and feeds a numerous population," and "without Badakhshan the Russians must consider themselves in Central Asia as guests without any settled habitation, and unable to form one."

22. Nor is this an exaggerated picture of the necessity she is under. Were England securely established at Cabul, with the passes of the Hindu-Kush in her possession, and outposts at Faizabad, Kunduz, Balkh, and Herat; while Russia still occupied her weak and extended line, severed by the Khivan desert from her military establishments on the Caspian, her position would be indeed insecure. Peshawur and Tashkend are about equally distant from the passages of the Oxus; but, while Peshawur is only 150 miles from a railway, and can be rapidly re-inforced by the whole military resources of India, and of England, Tashkend is practically isolated, and can only slowly, and with infinite trouble, receive small re-inforcements from Russia. The result of a contest on the Oxus, under such conditions, cannot be doubted; and the loss of a battle there might entail on Russia the loss of most of her Central Asian possessions.

23. Thus it appears that both Russia and England have, now, weak frontiers, at which they cannot willingly accept contact with a great rival Power; and are both equally urged forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu-Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia. Long continued inaction under such conditions is impossible; and I will now examine the intermediate regions into which both are thus impelled, and where the ultimate boundary line may possibly be found.

Country between British and Russian Frontiers.

24. The wild country intervening between the present Indian and Russian frontiers contains the key to both India and Turkistan. It comprises that great range of mountains which, under various names, extends from Herat in the west, past Cabul, to the extreme northern boundary of Cashmere; and forms the watershed dividing the waters running south towards the Persian Gulf and Indian Seas from those running north into the great inland seas and deserts. Such a vast natural barrier has always a high influence and significance in the ultimate demarcation of empires and of races, beyond its mere strategical value; and I believe it destined to become a great line of national demarcation in the present case.

25. The routes crossing or turning this barrier, and connecting the Asiatic possessions of Russia and England, may be roughly classed in three groups. The first or eastern one comprises those leading from Kashgaria, over the Karakorum and other passes, through Ladak and Cashmere. The second or centre group comprises the roads from Kashgar, Khokand, and the Pamir Steppe by Chitral; from Bokhara and Samarcand by the Bamian and other passes; and from Herat and Merv, by Maimena and the Bamian Pass; all meeting about Cabul and Jellalabad. The third or western group comprises the roads leading from Persia and the Caspian, by Herat or Birjand, on Candahar and the lower Indus.

26. Of these groups, the eastern is the least important, owing to the length and difficulties of the roads, the rugged and inhospitable country they traverse, and their distance from the centre of Russia's power. The centre group comprises the shortest and most direct routes connecting the two countries. The distance between Peshawur and Tashkend, the most important garrisons of India and Turkistan respectively, is little more than half that from the Caspian to the lower Indus; but the roads connecting them cross a double chain of mountains, with difficult passes, before emerging on India. The western group presents the easiest roads and those best adapted for military operations. But they are the longest, and debouch at one end on a desert line backed by a broad river, the Indus, at the other on the Caspian, where Russia has a secure base, and insignificant military settlements only to strike at.

27. We shall not willingly be the aggressors in any contest with Russia. We have no desire to extend our conquests further; and our object being confined to the defence of India, ours will naturally be essentially a defensive policy. But theory and experience alike prove that a strategy purely defensive almost certainly ends in disaster; and if

this principle holds good where an army is defending its own soil, surrounded by a friendly and sympathising people, it applies with tenfold force in India, where we have no such advantages, and where retreat or inaction would probably raise us even more dangerous enemies in rear. When the occasion arises India must be defended by a vigorous offensive; and in choosing our line of contact with Russia, we have to consider what facilities it offers for striking quick and hard, even more than what protection it affords.

28. Bearing this in mind, a study of the map will show the immense importance to us of the triangle formed by Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad, with the possession of the passes over the Hindu-Kush. Defensively, this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, and with its communications unassailable, directly commands the central group of roads, while indirectly threatening both the eastern and western group. Offensively, it gives the power of debouching at will on the plains of the Oxus, and threatens every point of Russia's extended frontier. It is difficult to imagine a more commanding strategical position; and whenever the moment of collision with Russia arrives it must find us in possession of it, as friends and allies of the Afghans if possible, but firmly established there in any case.

Eastern Group of Roads.

29. With this as our great central bastion and line of defence, it remains to determine the flanks and outposts of our position. To the east our line may be easily defined. I cannot anticipate much danger to India from operations undertaken by Russia on this side; and I can hardly conceive any circumstances in which we should wish to engage a force in the long and difficult passes of Cashmere, for the sake of debouching on Kashgar, and striking at Russia in that direction. Except for this purpose there would be little use in holding the northern debouches of the passes; and it would be difficult to cross the ridge and establish ourselves in Sarikol and the valleys leading to Kashgaria without being gradually drawn further into regions where we have no interests to defend. Beyond these mountains we should meet Russia at a disadvantage; while the passes leading into India are so few, so long, and so difficult, that they could easily be stopped if occasion required. From the Karakorum to the Baroghil Passes, therefore, our ultimate boundary should be the great mountain range or watershed; and our officers in Cashmere have accordingly been instructed, whilst endeavouring to extend our influence over the petty chiefdoms along the southern slopes of this ridge, to avoid interference with the tribes beyond it.

Western Group.

30. On the left or western group of roads our position is eminently satisfactory. Our flank is covered by the Arabian Sea and the sandy deserts of Western Beloochistan; while the roads and passes leading into India are commanded by Quetta. From a military point of view, our position here leaves little to be desired, beyond the improvement of our communications between Quetta and the Indus: and though we can never allow Candahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power, and political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy that town, I do not consider that such occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier.

Central Group.

31. But the central group, between the Chitral Valley and Quetta, presents a much more difficult problem. Two lines here naturally suggest themselves—an inner and an outer one; the inner following the Hindu-Kush to the head of the Helmund, and thence down that river to Girishk and Candahar; the outer one following the recognised frontier of Afghanistan along the Oxus from Wakhan to Kojah Saleh, and thence across to Herat and the Persian frontier.

32. Of these, the inner line would probably, from a military point of view, most recommend itself. From the Pamir to the Caspian by this line is 1,200 miles. But the assailable points on this frontier are practically confined to three,—Chitral, Cabul, and Candahar,—of which the two last only are important. The Chitral passes might, perhaps, be best defended by closing the debouches at Chitral or Jellalabad. But the Bamian and Khawak or Panjsher passes are the great high roads between India and Turkistan, and of these it would be necessary to hold the northern debouches to secure the full advantages of the position. Between Cabul and Candahar our information is very imperfect, but the line is not, so far as we know, pierced by any important passes, while on our side

there is good inter-communication, except in the depth of winter, by the Ghuznee and Khelat-i-Ghiltzai Valley. Finally, the communications with all parts of the line are good and well covered.

33. The outer line is 1,700 miles long, and includes Wakhan, Badakhshan, Balkh, and other provinces subject to Afghanistan lying in the basin of the Oxus. It may be necessary on grounds of policy—such as to secure an alliance with Afghanistan—to include these in our sphere; but, militarily and financially, we should suffer by advancing into the valley of the Oxus. We should gain no accession of strength, for the Oxus offers no good military line, and we should be withdrawing further from our base, and increasing the strain on our military and financial resources. These provinces, also belonging to the great basin of the Oxus, are by race and interests more closely allied to Bokhara than to Cabul, and we should there become involved in interests which might make it difficult to stop even at the Oxus.

34. I am aware that great stress has been laid on our retention of Wakhan, through which lies the only high road of commerce between Eastern and Western Central Asia. If we are prepared boldly to cross the great mountain range, occupy the valleys of the Oxus on one side, and of Kashgaria on the other, and contest Central and Northern Asia with Russia, then, undoubtedly, we should never allow Wakhan to pass out of our hands. But if, as I hold, we should in the main confine ourselves to the south of the great mountain range, only occupying such points beyond it as are absolutely necessary for the protection of India, then I think Wakhan should naturally pass into the hands of the Power that spreads over the country north of the mountains. To oppose an obstacle to a trade which we cannot ourselves develop or control, would neither be generous nor wise, and on the other hand, the more we stop Russia's southern advance, the more desirable it seems to be to give her every facility for expanding eastwards.

Herat.

35. The real point of difficulty in the choice of our line—the point where military, political, and financial considerations have to be most carefully weighed—is Herat. The objections to a military occupation of Herat are obvious. It lengthens our communications by 360 miles, and our frontier by 500 miles. To garrison it properly, and hold its long line of communications, would require a considerable increase to our army and to our already heavy military expenditure. It draws us away from a naturally strong and compact line, and creates a weak and exposed salient, with bad communications, one road exposed to Persia, the other to the Turkomans and Russians on the Oxus, and it entails on us the ultimate subjugation and pacification of a wild and unremunerative tract of mountain land, occupied by hitherto unsubdued tribes. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so commanding, and its probable influence on Russian progress in Central Asia so great, that Imperial considerations may well outweigh all such objections.

36. The importance of Herat, both as a fortress and as the capital of Western Afghanistan, long an independent State, is well known. It is also in a peculiar degree associated with our name and reputation in the East. We have made an attack on it a *casus belli* with Persia, and have successfully fought for it; on one occasion it was defended by a British officer. To yield it now to Russia would be to falsify all past policy, to declare wasted the lives and money expended in the Persian war, and to proclaim to the eastern world that, while prepared to fight Persia, we are not prepared to fight Russia, for this point.

37. But Herat has also a special importance from its geographical position. Without acknowledging its right to the title of “key” of India, of which empire it is only a distant and rather inconveniently situated outpost, it is undoubtedly the key to Eastern Persia and Western Afghanistan, and to the roads from the Russian possessions in Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. It is also the centre of the most fertile region, and of some of the most powerful tribes of Afghanistan, and we may well hesitate before surrendering to a rival power such a source of strength.

38. In the natural progress of civilised and civilising powers, which I have already dwelt upon, wherever we leave a vacuum, Russia will assuredly fill it up, and if we leave Herat outside our sphere Russia will sooner or later occupy it, and extend her power southwards through Western Afghanistan and Seistan, and probably to the Persian Gulf. Thus ultimately we should be conterminous with, and enveloped by, Russia along the whole of our frontier from the Pamir Steppe to the Arabian Sea, and the increased military expenditure entailed on us by such contact would fall little short of that entailed by an occupation of Herat.

39. But if we securely hold Herat, I believe its command of position to be so great that it will definitely and finally stop the southern progress of Russia, not only in Afghanistan but in Eastern Persia, and probably divert her expansion permanently eastwards. Our contact with Russia on this side would then be restricted to the space between Herat and the Pamir; an influence equal to or greater than that of Russia might be regained in Persia, and we might watch without anxiety Russia's efforts to open a new line of communication from the Caspian through Merv to Turkistan. The scheme of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence southwards to India, and northwards to Central Asia, would no longer be a mere visionary dream, but an idea which might become an accomplished fact within the next generation, and, instead of a source of danger, might prove an element of stability and of development and commercial prosperity alike to Persia, England, and Russia, in the East. Lastly, our frontier, though in appearance lengthened, would really be shortened, for so long as we hold Herat, our western frontier between that and the sea will never be seriously menaced.

40. To sum up then. As a purely military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the Hindu-Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of the principal passes; and thence southwards by the Helmund, Girishk, and Candahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the moment may compel and justify an extension of our line to the northern frontier of Afghanistan, this would weaken rather than strengthen our general position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from our line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the Hindu-Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western frontier of Afghanistan and Beloochistan to the Arabian Sea.

Present Situation.

41. It will be seen, then, that the Frontier problem which has ever pressed for solution is this:—Granted that Russia and England are steadily drawing nearer to one another in the East; and that there are certain points necessary to the safety of India, which we must secure against absorption by Russia; how can these be secured with least danger, disturbance, responsibilities, and expense?

42. I do not here discuss whether the contact which is ultimately inevitable between Russia and England will be beneficial to us, or the reverse. While, on the one hand, such contact will doubtless tend towards the civilization of Central Asia and the development of commerce, it is equally certain that it will gravely increase our anxieties in India, expose our Empire in the East to the influence of every political disturbance in Europe, and render necessary the maintenance of armaments on a very different footing to that which has hitherto sufficed, and on a scale more proportionate to those of the great European military Powers. But this question seems to me to be outside the actual problem before us; for no one, so far as I know, has ever maintained that we should let Russia touch us at a line of *her* choosing.

43. The solution hitherto sought has been to maintain Afghanistan as a friendly, but independent, State, between Russia and ourselves; guarding those points which we deem necessary to India's security. No one will question the wisdom of the policy, though we may disapprove the system of absolute non-intervention which was thought necessary to give effect to it. The error which vitiated this policy was an assumption that Russia would appear in Afghanistan in the character of an enemy, as an invading and conquering Power; and that if we only held aloof and gave no cause for offence, Afghanistan, when the time came, would certainly throw herself into our arms. Even before landing in India I drew attention to this most dangerous fallacy. I pointed out that Russia was too far-seeing and wary to shipwreck her cause by a wild premature invasion; that she would first appear at Cabul in friendly guise; and that what we had really to fear was the gradual establishment there, by friendly means and by a policy more active than our own, of an influence hostile to us. This is precisely what has happened. While British officers have been rigorously excluded from all parts of Afghanistan, Russian officers have been permitted to visit Maimena and other points on her northern frontier; a Russian mission has been received, and hospitably entertained at Cabul, where it still remains; and proposals have been openly made to the Ameer to receive Russian workmen to aid in the improvement of his manufactures, among which arms and soldiers would doubtless be included. This is the situation with which we have now to deal, and which has forced on us the somewhat undignified course of hurriedly despatching a rival mission, without even waiting to learn how it will be received.

44. So long as the ruler of Afghanistan was, in appearance at least, on good terms with us, and Russia abstained from interference, the system of maintaining an indepen-

dent State as a barrier could be adhered to. But this policy necessarily requires that the intermediate State should be friendly to us, and not subject to the influence of our rival. These conditions being reversed, such a State becomes a source of very real danger, and one of two alternatives is forced on us; an immediate and definite understanding with that State, adverse to a rival, or an immediate and definite understanding with our rival, adverse to that State. Either we must re-establish a preponderating influence in Afghanistan and exclude Russia, or, disregarding Afghanistan, we must endeavour to effect with Russia some mutually satisfactory arrangement by which we shall be secured from the dangers to which our present weak frontier exposes us.

45. There is, indeed, a third course, but it is one which is surrounded with difficulties and dangers, while leading to no practical final solution, and could only be justified were our position here too weak to be defended in any other way. It is to attempt to stay Russia's progress in Asia by making any further advance on her part a *casus belli*. To do so, a definite line must be drawn somewhere—at Kizil Arvat, or Merv, or Herat, or Candahar. But in reality such line would be variable, and dependent on the views and temperament of the Ministry in power; and Russia would thus be ever tempted to trespass. She will doubtless give any required assurances, and a distinct declaration on our part would probably delay her advance for a time. Its immediate effect, therefore, would be to allay alarm, and so defer the measures necessary to our permanent security. But, unless we undertake the control of the countries which we forbid her to meddle with, the position would soon become impossible, and we could hardly avoid ultimately accepting all the responsibilities of a guarantee without securing the advantages we might originally have gained from it. It is also certain that Russia would disregard all her assurances when an opportunity seemed to offer the means of doing so with impunity. One of two results must then follow—either we should have to withdraw from our declarations, and allow Russia to continue an advance, against which her assurances have prevented our properly securing ourselves; or else go to war with her at the time selected by her as most disadvantageous to us.

46. War with Russia is not a thing to be lightly undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an object which might have been attained by other means would be most discreditable to our statesmanship. A British statesman, remembering the American war, and the lasting effect which a few hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of war with Russia in Central Asia has been forced on my mind in the study of the anxious question now under consideration. But the more closely I contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the repugnance with which I regard it—a repugnance amounting almost to horror. In such a war we should doubtless be successful, for we can meet Russia with far superior forces on the Oxus. But it is the consequences of success that we have to consider. We should probably stir up a Mahomedan rising throughout the Khanates, and we can realize the horrors of such a rising if we picture to ourselves another Indian mutiny, in which the mutineers would be supported by a victorious European army. As we advance, and drive the Russians out of Central Asia, and perhaps back to Orenburg, our difficulties and responsibilities would increase. We cannot undertake the whole administration of Central Asia, nor prevent Russia stepping in again to restore order in the countries which, by our withdrawal, we have abandoned to the wildest anarchy. And, when she does this, she will assuredly take signal vengeance on all who sided with us during the war.

47. Nor has such a war ever finally stopped the progress of a great advancing Power. We spent thousands of lives, and 80 millions of money, on the Crimean War; and within 20 years the results of that war have been lost, and the interests for which we then fought have been still more seriously endangered. While, therefore, to secure a peaceful solution, war must always be kept in view as a possible ultimate measure, it is one to be resorted to only when all others have failed; and threats of war held over Russia will only be effective if accompanied by, and subordinate to, not substituted for, such direct action in Afghanistan as I now propose to consider.

48. Of the two courses indicated in para. 44, that of a direct understanding with Afghanistan presents the greatest advantages. It would be in accord with our old policy, and would involve no undignified withdrawal from long asserted positions. It has the advantage of avoiding the delay and complication of European references and diplomacy, and of requiring action in India alone; and it could in all probability be more promptly and effectively carried out than any arrangements requiring negotiation with Russia.

49. If this course be selected, we should, in the first place, endeavour to establish our influence in Afghanistan through the present Ameer. There is no man in Afghanistan

his equal in character and ability. He has firmly established his rule, and secured it by disposing of all who might be dangerous rivals; and no successor could, for many years to come, wield the power that he now wields. Whether we can win him to our side is questionable. He has become estranged; he has learnt thoroughly to mistrust us; and all recent information confirms the belief that, of his two great neighbours, he hates the Russians the least. On the other hand, he knows that we are nearer, and more powerful for good or harm, than is Russia; and that no assistance from her could preserve his country or his throne against us.

50. But, if we wish to bind the Ameer to us, we must appeal to something besides his fears; we must hold out hope of advantage to him as well. He will probably demand a subsidy; though he seems latterly to have extracted from his subjects a revenue sufficient for his wants, and to be comparatively indifferent to money. In the next place, he will require some territorial guarantee. To expect him, for our convenience, to agree to any arrangement by which he might lose part of his territories, would be absurd; nor would it be less manifestly unjust to interfere with his making his own terms with the Russians, and yet not protect him from them. Lastly, he will probably seek some sort of dynastic guarantee. What guarantees to require from the Ameer, and what to grant him, are the points requiring the most careful consideration in framing the instructions for the present mission.

51. In the first place, then, it is evident that we cannot simply return to the *status quo ante*. Neither the withdrawal of the Russian mission, nor any assurances on the part of Russia, will cancel the fact that a Russian mission has been well received at Cabul, after one from us had been refused; and the Russian officers have had full opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Ameer and his councillors distrust and dislike towards England, belief in Russia's power and destiny, and hopes of assistance against us from that country. And, as Russian promises have not kept Russian missions out of Cabul in the past, to accept them as guarantees for the future would be blind folly. Some visible proof of England's supremacy in Afghanistan is, therefore, essential; and the terms which it seems necessary to demand on our part, as the conditions of a friendly alliance with the Ameer, are; 1st, the dismissal of the Russian mission if still at Cabul, and the exclusion of Russian agents from Afghanistan for the future; 2nd, an engagement on the part of the Ameer to enter into no diplomatic relations with foreign Powers without first consulting us; 3rd, the establishment of a British representative at the Ameer's Court, or free access for British missions to Cabul and to the Ameer when considered necessary; 4th, failing the establishment of a permanent mission at Cabul, the location of agents at Balkh and Herat, or at any frontier towns where the presence of such agents may seem necessary to anticipate and frustrate foreign intrigue.

52. The question that then presents itself is, What inducements can we hold out to the Ameer that shall be sufficient, when coupled with his fears, to induce him to accept these terms, and identify his interest with ours? A reasonable subsidy may be granted; but the question of guarantees is more difficult. The objections that exist to giving territorial guarantees have been often and fully urged. By any such guarantee we shall in a manner become conterminous with Russia along the northern border of Afghanistan, and hasten that contact which it is our avowed policy to delay. It will further bind us to the distant and inconvenient line of the Oxus. Many and weighty objections can also be raised to rendering ourselves responsible for the protection of a country over whose administration we have no control; and incurring responsibilities which may ultimately entail interference in, and control over, the interior administration of Afghanistan. But we must keep clearly in view the problem before us; *viz.*, to secure certain points necessary for the safety of India, and to do this with least possible danger, disturbance, or expense? Would a war with Russia, or an internal revolution brought about by us, or an invasion with a view to a forcible occupation of the points we require, attain our end with more certainty and with less danger, disturbance, or expense? Could we, indeed, confidently depend on any of these alternative courses to secure for us all the points we require—Herat for instance?

53. It is true that such territorial guarantee practically hastens contact between England and Russia. But it brings it about under conditions the most favorable to us, and at a line the least favourable to Russia. It is true that it compels us permanently to adopt a line exposed to disadvantages already pointed out; but that line is far more disadvantageous to Russia. It is true that such a guarantee exposes the guarantor to risks and demands which it is difficult fully to measure or foresee; and to guarantee a weak State against a near and overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, as we have done in the case of Belgium and of Asia Minor, is indeed to accept grave responsibilities. But the risks of the guarantee depend on the relative power of the guaranteeing State, and of that against which the

guarantee is directed ; and when the guaranteeing State is relatively powerful, as we should be against Russia on the Oxus, the risks are comparatively slight, because the guarantee is not likely to be defied. Moreover, in the case of Afghanistan, it may well be questioned whether such a guarantee *does* increase our responsibilities. I have already pointed out that to declare a *casus belli* against Russia would involve us in responsibilities still wider, and more dangerous because more vague ; and it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which, if we have made any sort of friendly arrangement with Afghanistan, we could allow Russia to invade its territory. Lastly, it is true that a territorial guarantee will probably entail some ultimate control over the administration of Afghanistan. But it has been already shown that such control *must* be ultimately exercised either by Russia or by England. Unless we are prepared to yield it to Russia, we must be prepared to assume it ourselves ; and there is no way in which it can be more gradually and advantageously introduced.

54. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to give a territorial guarantee to the Ameer if it is pressed for, and if other circumstances, such as the prospects of securing the Ameer's alliance, and of the stability of his throne, make it desirable to enter into close relations with him. Such guarantee will not materially add to our necessary responsibilities regarding Afghanistan ; while it affords the easiest, and only reasonably certain means of securing the positions we require there. The conditions likely to be asked by the Ameer may be inferred from the negotiations of 1873, and seem to be such as we can in the main reasonably assent to, and as would be covered by a guarantee against *annexation*. This, therefore, is the form I conceive our guarantee should take ; being made dependent, of course, on the location of British agents at exposed points of the frontier, and free access to the Ameer.

55. The question of dynastic guarantee is less difficult. We should be prepared to recognize any heir whom the Ameer, with the concurrence of his principal nobles, nominates and proclaims. Further, we should be prepared to acknowledge his succession on the death of the Ameer ; and to continue to him whatever subsidy the Ameer has received so long as he proves himself generally acceptable to the Afghan people, and able to maintain his throne. But we should distinctly decline to enter into any engagement to support him by force of arms. It is probable that the Ameer will seek a promise that we will not interfere in the internal administration of Afghanistan : and this promise would be a sufficient reply to any such proposal on the part of His Highness.

56. But, in thus determining the basis of an acceptable agreement with the Ameer, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the Envoy. He must be careful to make it clear that we do not seek to ally ourselves with the Ameer alone, but with the people of Afghanistan ; and that we will not sacrifice either our interests or those of Afghanistan to the personal interests of the Ameer. He must also assure himself, as far as possible, that the Ameer is in a position to carry out any promises he makes, and that his throne shows such reasonable promises of stability as to make it desirable to enter into close relations with him.

57. If the Ameer proves hopelessly estranged, and we fail in all efforts to win him ; or if the Envoy considers that, from any cause, it is not desirable to involve ourselves in engagements with him, we must take immediate steps to neutralize his hostility, and to secure our interests. The best course then open to us would probably be to aim at dethroning him, and replacing him by a candidate more favourable to ourselves. There seems little doubt that we could easily dethrone him, but the results of such action must be well considered. The candidate whose prospects were fairest, and whose interests seemed most allied with ours—the only candidate who could reasonably hope to succeed to all his father's possessions—has just died. Were Yakub Khan abroad, and could we secure him to our interests, he might prove even a better candidate. But this we have no right to anticipate ; though the Envoy, if opportunity offers, might endeavour to open relations with him. What the result of a free contest for the throne, in present circumstances, would be, may perhaps be guessed. Abdul Rahman, supported by Russian influence, would establish himself in the trans-Hindu-Kush provinces as a feudatory of Russia. Herat would probably fall to Persia ; Candahar and Southern Afghanistan to us ; while Cabul would remain a centre of disturbances, struggles for power, and bigoted fanaticism, hostile and dangerous to all neighbours alike, and ultimately we should be obliged to forcibly pacify and hold it. We should, doubtless, after fighting and much trouble, gain our necessary mountain frontier ; but it is not so certain that we should secure the passes and their debouches, and Herat might be lost to us for ever.

58. Meanwhile, the measures which should be immediately adopted on the failure of our mission are, 1st, an armed occupation of the Koorum valley ; 2nd, the concentra-

tion of a force at Quetta sufficient to threaten Candahar; 3rd, the opening of direct negotiations with the various semi-independent tribes along the border, with a view to detaching them from the Ameer's cause. The occupation of the Koorum would be an easy task. It is a comparatively open and fertile valley, with a peaceful and agricultural population, who have been much oppressed by the Ameer, and have long sought to come under our rule. By this route the Khyber Pass and Jellalabad are turned; and a force located at the head of the valley would equally threaten Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad.

59. As the results of our Khelat policy, the concentration of a force at Quetta can now be effected with the same ease and certainty as at any point in the interior of India, while we should find useful auxiliaries in the Brahuïs, who have already offered to join our standards in the event of a rupture with the Ameer. The Ghilzais, the most important Afghan tribe between Ghuznee and Quetta, have recently sent in a deputation to Quetta, offering their services against the Ameer, and requesting the presence of a British officer; and there can be little doubt that the Khyber tribes, the Kakars, and others would gladly separate themselves from the Ameer, and ally themselves with us. With the high road to Cabul thus open, with the principal cities of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan directly threatened, and the communication between Cabul and Candahar closed by the Ghilzais, the Ameer's power could not stand long. So long as we maintain our threatening position in the Koorum, no candidate hostile to us could establish himself in Cabul; and it is probable that our mere presence there, without further action on our part, would secure the throne for the candidate whom we favour. If we could thereby secure an overwhelming influence at Cabul, giving us at the same time the command of Herat, and of the passes of the Hindu-Kush, while not involving us in responsibilities regarding the Oxus provinces, this would probably be the best solution of all for us. But it may be doubted whether a candidate thus enthroned at Cabul would be able to establish his authority at Herat; where Persia would appear on the scene with decisive effect long before we could approach it. And to recover Herat from Persia, abetted, and perhaps actively aided, by Russia, would be no light task.

60. There still remains the course indicated, of coming to an amicable arrangement with Russia. Russia has before this suggested a partition of Afghanistan; and, whatever views Russian enthusiasts may have on India, there can be little doubt but that she would consent to our occupation of Cabul and Southern Afghanistan, if thereby she could secure the Oxus provinces. That we must offer her some such terms, if the arrangement is to be a pacific and amicable one, is evident; for it is not to be expected that Russia will willingly accept any arrangement so prejudicial to her interests, and incompatible with the realisation of her long cherished hopes, as final and absolute exclusion from the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

61. An arrangement with Russia might be a not undesirable final solution of the Central Asian question, if concluded on the terms already indicated as necessary to our security on this side, viz., the possession by us of the debouches of the Cabul passes, and of Herat. As regards the former, it is probable that Russia, in return for the cession of the Oxus valley, and having regard to the difficulties attending any advance beyond the Hindu-Kush, would accept these conditions; but it is more doubtful whether she would willingly abandon Herat to England, and so finally renounce all hopes of seeing it either in her own hands, or in those of a vassal ally.

62. A most important point to be considered in any such understanding with Russia is, that we must be prepared to act on it immediately. For if, while Russia is left free to advance to the Hindu-Kush, England remains quiet, and content with assurances that the rest of Afghanistan is beyond her sphere of action, we should soon see renewed, and under conditions much more unfavourable to us, the difficulties we are now contending with. Any such treaty with Russia, therefore, must be promptly followed up by the actual and visible occupation of the tract necessary to us. The nature of such occupation would depend on the circumstances under which the agreement with Russia was made, and may be considered later.

63. I conceive, therefore, that our first object should be to use every endeavour to re-establish such relations with the Ameer as will give us due influence in Afghanistan, and for ever exclude Russia therefrom; and that, to effect this, we must appeal both to his fears and to his hopes. Failing in all efforts for this purpose, we shall have to take such steps as may be necessary to protect our own interests, irrespective of his, either by action in Afghanistan, or by direct arrangements with Russia, or both. It remains now to determine the nature of the instructions to be given to the Envoy, and the further measures to be taken, should the mission fail.

Instructions to Envoy.

64. The general character of the instructions to be given to our Envoy may be deduced from what has been said in paras. 51–56. He should, in the first place, condole with the Ameer on his recent heavy loss, and declare the friendly character of the mission, having for its object to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Ameer last conferred personally with the Viceroy. In proof of the friendly character of the mission, he will point to the selection made of an officer personally known to the Ameer, and whose deputation might be supposed to be specially agreeable to him.

65. If the Russian mission is still at Cabul he will insist on its withdrawal, or, at least, on the Ameer requesting it to withdraw, and renouncing all further communication with it, before entering on the immediate subjects of negotiation. To this condition I attach the highest importance. I think it alike inconsistent with the dignity of our Government, with the line hitherto pursued towards Afghanistan, and with the respect due to the high officer selected as our Envoy, that he should appear in the character of a rival suing for the Ameer's favour; nor could I anticipate any satisfactory results from negotiations conducted under such conditions. It is essential that the Ameer should, from the outset, understand that he must make a definite choice in his alliance; and that he will not be again permitted to play off one Power against another, or prolong a chronic state of uneasiness and uncertainty. The Envoy will, therefore, explain to the Ameer the circumstances of the negotiations entered into by us with Russia, on behalf of Afghanistan, in 1869; and the assurances given, and repeatedly renewed, by Russia regarding non-intervention in Afghanistan; and he will demand the dismissal of the Russian mission.

66. If the Ameer hesitates, the Envoy will place very distinctly before His Highness, and before the principal chiefs and councillors of the kingdom, the probable consequences of a refusal. It would, perhaps, be desirable to communicate this representation to the Russian mission also. But he will discuss no other subject with the Ameer: and if, after reasonable time allowed, the Russian mission still remains in communication with the Ameer, and entertained by the Court of Cabul, our mission will withdraw.

67. If the Russian mission has left before the arrival of our Envoy, or withdraws on his representations, he will then proceed to set forth, but in conciliatory tone, the various unfriendly acts of the Ameer, culminating in the reception of a Russian mission after the rejection of ours; and will ask explanations of this last open affront. The refusal to admit Sir D. Forsyth, and the terms in which that refusal was couched, should be especially emphasized.

68. The Ameer's reply to this will probably be a long indictment against England, and a recapitulation of alleged acts of unfriendliness on our part; to which the Envoy can reply that those misunderstandings are entirely due to the policy of seclusion adopted by the Ameer, and might have been avoided by freer intercourse between his Government and ours. If the Ameer endeavours to fix the discussion on those points the Envoy will say that he has not been informed on them, and that his deputation has for its object the *future* relations between the two Powers, and the prevention of such misunderstandings hereafter.

69. In opening the actual negotiations it should be assumed that all past promises or engagements on our part were abrogated by the Peshawur Conference, and the discovery then made of the different and irreconcilable interpretations put on these verbal engagements by the parties to them; as well as by the Ameer's subsequent unfriendly conduct.

70. The conditions which the Ameer will be required to accept as the basis of future amicable relations are broadly—

- 1st.—An engagement not to receive Russian agents, nor to enter into relations with any Powers under the political influence of Russia, without first consulting us.
- 2nd.—Free access for British missions on special and suitable occasions to Cabul, and to the presence of the Ameer.
- 3rd.—The reception of permanent British agents at Herat and Balkh, or at any points which may be exposed to danger from without. Or else the reception of a permanent British agent at Cabul, with free access for British officers, on special and suitable occasions, to Herat, Balkh, or any other exposed points of the Afghan frontier.

The precise terms of all such engagements must, however, be left to the discretion of the Envoy; provided that no arrangement can be accepted as satisfactory which does not exclude the agents of Russia, and give to us a real and visible preponderance, and recognised position of authority, in Afghanistan. The reception of a permanent British

representative at Cabul has not been put prominently forward, because of the repugnance which the Ameer has, on several occasions, shown to such a proposal. But, if the Envoy finds His Highness not unwilling to accede to it, such an arrangement, coupled with the above-mentioned condition of occasional access to the frontier localities, would be preferable to any other, and might be advantageously substituted for Nos. 2 and 3.

In addition to the above, some satisfactory and effective arrangements should be entered into for keeping open the Khyber Pass; either through the agency of the Ameer, or by our personally dealing with the Khyberees, and relieving the Ameer of all responsibility on their behalf.

71. In return the Envoy may promise as follows:—

1st.—An annual subsidy, not, for the present, exceeding in amount twelve lakhs of rupees.

2nd.—The recognition, by the Indian Government, of the heir formally named by the Ameer with the concurrence of his Sirdars; and the continuance to such heir, on succession, of the subsidy granted to the Ameer.

3rd.—A territorial guarantee against *annexation*.

Much must be left to the discretion of the Envoy in regard to these terms also; but the following indication of the views of Government on the subject may serve to guide him in the negotiations.

72. The Government is prepared to recognize the heir of the Ameer's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, and is accepted by the chief nobles of Afghanistan. The Government will formally recognize such heir as successor on the death of the Ameer, and will pay him at once one year's subsidy, to assist him in establishing himself on the throne. But if he proves incapable, and, with these advantages in his favour, cannot maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and it will be pointed out to the Ameer that an armed intervention in favour of any candidate would be inconsistent with these views.

73. The arguments in favour of a territorial guarantee have already been explained. Such guarantee should not be unnecessarily offered by the Envoy; and, if asked for by the Ameer, the Envoy should, in the first place, make him understand that it may entail our exercising a certain control over his foreign policy. But if the Ameer distinctly desires it, it should be frankly and unhesitatingly given; for it is better that it should be refused by the Ameer, on the grounds of the future pretext for interference which it may offer, than that he should be rendered suspicious and distrustful by the provisos under which we endeavour to guard ourselves. The guarantee desired by the Ameer in 1873 was that we should aid him, by arms, money, or troops, to *repel* any invasion of his territory; and this guarantee we may give.

74. It will be evident, however, that this guarantee must directly depend on the admission of officers to the exposed points of the Afghan frontier; and that whatever modifications of the conditions may, in the discretion of the Envoy, be made, these two must stand or fall together. It would perhaps, be to our interest not to ask for an agent at Balkh if the Ameer does not ask for a territorial guarantee; but an agent at Herat is of the highest importance; and some arrangement giving adequate expression to our undisputed influence at Herat must, in any case, be insisted on, whether the territorial guarantee be given or withheld.

75. If the Ameer refers to Quetta, and our action in Beloochistan, he must be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta were stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than 20 years' standing with the Ruler of Khelat, renewed two years' ago; and in pursuance of the policy determined on, in accord with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of the trade of the Bolan Pass. Assurances may further be given him against any hostile intentions in that direction; and the Envoy, if he thinks fit, may inform the Ameer that the mission to Cabul, proposed two years ago and rejected by His Highness, was to explain to the Ameer, beforehand and unreservedly, the nature and objects of our policy in Beloochistan, and its thoroughly friendly and unaggressive character. In fact, the presence of British troops at Quetta, so far from being *intended* as a menace to the Ameer's *real* interests, practically increased our means of assisting His Highness in the defence of those interests against designs on the part of Russia, which, though probably unknown to the Ameer, were not unknown to the Viceroy before that measure was adopted. If, therefore, the presence of British troops at Quetta has been to His Highness a cause of apprehension, this is entirely due to his own conduct in refusing us

the opportunity we sought of removing every cause of apprehension ; and not to any unfriendly or inconsiderate disregard of it on the part of the British Government. Our Envoy, however, must at once disallow, and decline to discuss, any claim advanced by the Ameer to a voice in the affairs of Beloochistan.

76. If the Ameer asks for arms he must be informed that such assistance will be considered in connexion with the arrangements for the defence of his frontiers.

77. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and removing trade restrictions, it will not be desirable to press the Ameer ; though it will be extremely advantageous to secure such concessions if the Ameer seems not unwilling to grant them.

78. Lastly, the Envoy may most emphatically assure the Ameer, and impress on His Highness by every means in his power, that, so long as he proves himself friendly and loyal to us, it is our desire to see him prosperous and independent ; and to promote and confirm his power alike against internal troubles and external dangers.

79. But if it appears that we cannot find, in a friendly alliance with the Ameer, the necessary security for our north-western frontier, we must then be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that frontier independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated ; viz., the advance of a column to the head of the Koorum Valley, and the assembling at Quetta of a force sufficient to threaten, and, if necessary, occupy, Candahar. For the first purpose 4,000 men might suffice, and for the second about 10,000, exclusive of the present garrison of Quetta. Orders have already been issued to detail these forces. But, as it is indispensable, both for the security of the mission, and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is its object, that nothing should now be done which could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction from any active preparations.

80. It will be seen, from what has been already said, as well as from the smallness of the proposed military preparations, that no invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan is contemplated. Such a measure would at once rekindle the animosities of that fanatical people, and probably destroy any party we may now have there, uniting the whole nation against us. It would require military operations on a very different scale from that now contemplated, with a proportionately heavy expenditure ; and it would probably entail a permanent military occupation of the country ;—a step which, however feasible from a military point of view, would involve financial burdens we could hardly bear.

81. Moreover, remembering always the object in view, which is to secure certain points necessary to our safety in India, we must consider whether these points, and Herat especially, *would* be certainly secured by such a measure. If we invade Afghanistan she will immediately throw herself into the arms of Russia ; and even if Russia, unwilling to involve herself at this moment in a great European war, does not assist her, she will certainly assist her with money, arms, officers, and advice. At the Court of Persia, according to the reports of our Minister, Russian influence is paramount, and British influence *nil*. Persia has always coveted Herat, and asserted a claim to it ; and it is more than probable that, if instigated and supported by Russia, she would be prepared to resist our occupation of it by force of arms. It may be doubted whether any force we can put in the field would be strong enough to march from the Indus to Herat, a distance of 750 miles, carrying with it heavy artillery, and all the necessary appurtenances for a difficult siege ; to cover its flanks along the whole of this long and exposed line against the Afghans on one side, and the Persians on the other ; and, finally to undertake, in the presence of an equal or superior Persian force, the siege of an important fortress defended by European arms, officers, and skill.

82. For these reasons I view an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Russia, as a measure which may become unavoidable, and must, therefore, be taken into consideration in our forecast ; but which is only to be resorted to in case of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. Our immediate object should be to apply such pressure only as may be necessary, either to bring the Ameer to a truer sense of his interest, or to dethrone him and give an opportunity to the party which still remains favourable to us at Cabul. And such pressure should be applied in the directions, and in the manner, which seem least likely to bring us into collision with the Afghans, or arouse their fanatical spirit of independence.

83. It is possible that the evidence, which the action proposed in paras. 58-9 would afford the Ameer, of our own earnestness, and of his powerlessness to oppose us, might lead him to re-consider his position and make overtures to us. In that case we should be most favourably placed to dictate our terms. As a preliminary, we should require

the Ameer to come personally to our head-quarters, or into British territory, to negotiate; and we should insist on the retention of a British force in the Koorum Valley. Thus firmly established, in close proximity to his capital, we should be in a position to renew or modify our previous proposals, under conditions far more favourable to us.

84. If the Ameer still remains hostile, we should take no further action against him, beyond entering into negotiations with all the tribes and parties in Afghanistan who are unfriendly to him; and there is little doubt that his kingdom would fall to pieces of itself. Nor could any candidate, hostile to us, maintain himself on the throne of Cabul; which would thus necessarily fall to a successor friendly to us. To such successor we should endeavour, by every means in our power, to secure the whole of Southern and Western Afghanistan; but we should decline to incur any responsibilities for the northern provinces; and we should insist on maintaining our position in the Koorum, and on having representatives at Cabul, Candahar, and Herat.

85. If, in the course of the convulsions which may be expected to precede and follow the fall of the Ameer, Herat should fall into the hands of Persia,—a contingency already indicated as probable, we should then, as the ally of the Ruler of Cabul, insist on its immediate restoration. This, however, is to be attained, not by an expedition marched across the whole breadth of Afghanistan, but by pressure applied to the exposed southern provinces of Persia, as in 1857. Russia cannot there help her; and Persia must either submit to the loss of some of her most important provinces, or resign Herat. Nor could we establish ourselves in Herat under more favourable conditions than those created by a treaty, in which we appear as the friends of Afghanistan, and the recognized liberators and guardians of Herat against Persia.

86. Thus far, I have practically left Russia out of consideration, and considered Afghanistan alone. We must now consider what will probably be Russia's action, and what should be our relations with her. In the first contingency, *viz.*, that our mission succeeds in displacing the Russian mission and securing the cordial alliance of the Ameer, it is not likely that Russia will venture on any direct hostile action. England and Afghanistan united would be far too powerful for Russia on the Oxus, as the latter well knows; and any hostile action on her part would risk the loss of the Khanates and her expulsion from Central Asia. When the treaty has been completed, it might be desirable to communicate it to Russia, and obtain her concurrence in the guarantee undertaken; but rather as a matter of diplomatic courtesy, than for any strength or security we should gain by her concurrence.

87. If the mission fails, and our troops advance to the Koorum, it is probable that Russia's reply will be to advance her columns to the Oxus, and, perhaps, across into Balkh and Badakhshan. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to interpose at once between Cabul and Russia, by seizing the Bamian Pass, but considering the distance of Bamian from Peshawur and Tashkend respectively, I cannot think this point likely to be gravely threatened. On the other hand, I consider it above all things desirable that we should not engage in an open invasion of Afghanistan, and thus give Russia the chance of appearing as her ally and guardian. I conceive, therefore, that we should not attempt any hostile advance on Cabul, but should still confine our action to strengthening our position in the Koorum, and detaching the neighbouring tribes from the cause of the Ameer.

88. The Russian column assembled at Djam can hardly exceed, and probably falls short of, 5,000 men. Such a force could hardly, in any circumstances, dare to push on to Bamian, 500 miles from all possible support, with the probability of there meeting a superior British force. But, even if it does, before it reaches the pass, one of the two contingencies discussed in paras. 83 and 84 will probably have occurred—either the Ameer will have changed his tone, and accepted our alliance; or he will have lost his throne, and been succeeded by a ruler friendly to us. In either case, we shall then be in a position to repel a Russian advance, without involving ourselves in a hostile invasion of Afghanistan.

89. But, in any case, the time will have come for opening negotiations with Russia and determining the future line of demarcation in Central Asia. Russia is not now in a position to contest supremacy with us on the Oxus, unless we commit the fatal mistake of driving Afghanistan bodily into her arms by an invasion. Russia knows this, and knows also that, if once our troops come into collision with hers, our advance is not likely to stop at the Oxus. It will, therefore, in effect remain with us to determine our ultimate boundary; and I would practically draw it at the Hindu-Kush, while requiring, however, the withdrawal of Russian troops behind the Oxus. The terms I would, in this case, offer Russia are the acknowledgment by us of her protectorate over

Bokhara, and all the country north of the Oxus, on the understanding that she acknowledges a similar protectorate on our part over Afghanistan proper; and that the limit of advance for the troops on the two sides should be the Oxus and the Hindu-Kush (including Bamian) respectively—either Power reserving to itself full liberty of action, should the other pass these bounds.

90. There remains the all-important question of Herat—the turning point of all negotiation and all action in Central Asia. It may be doubted whether Russia, weak as she now is in Central Asia, would go to war for Herat, unless with the assured support of Afghanistan, as well as Persia. The arrangement above proposed would still hold out hopes to her of ultimately gaining the line of communication between the Caspian and Turkistan, and the frontier of the Hindu-Kush Mountains—the avowed objects of her Central Asian policy; and it is, therefore, probable that she would not break off negotiations on this point.

91. Lastly, it remains for us to consider the military and financial bearings of the policy now discussed. If the mission succeeds, our frontier will be stronger, and safer, than it has been at any previous time. Russia will have received an open check, and the relations between the Ameer and ourselves will be closer than they have yet been; and this, coupled with our most satisfactory position in Khelat, cannot but re-act favourably throughout the frontier. An agent, with a small escort, will be located at Cabul or Herat, and possibly others at Balkh and Fyzabad, but the cost of such agencies will be small; and no increase of military expenditure need be contemplated in this case.

92. If the mission fails a force will be moved to the head of the Koorum Valley, and that valley occupied: and, whether the Ameer subsequently accepts our alliance, or whether another ruler, under our auspices, succeeds him at Cabul, this force should never be withdrawn. It is probable that 6,000 men will suffice, both to form the necessary cantonment at the head of the valley, and to protect its communications with our present frontier. But, as a force so placed will relieve the pressure on Peshawur, and in other ways strengthen our frontier line, a large part of it might be drawn from Peshawur, and from its support Rawul Pindi; and such occupation need add little, if at all, to the permanent establishment maintained in India.

93. The force to be collected at Quetta, and possibly to move on Candahar, is intended as a demonstration only, and its functions will have ceased when either contingency above discussed has been brought about. The force might consequently be then withdrawn. But the opportunity thus offered should be taken to permanently strengthen our garrison there. This also might be done at little, if any, additional cost, by drawing troops from stations further inland, where their presence is no longer specially required.

94. To advance our garrisons further, and occupy Candahar and Herat, would doubtless entail a large increase of force, and consequently of military expenditure. But I anticipate no necessity for such permanent occupation, even of Candahar, unless we should unfortunately find ourselves embarked in a great war with Afghanistan. This contingency we may reasonably hope to avoid. If, as the result of amicable arrangements with Afghanistan, or with Russia, or with both, we find it necessary to establish ourselves visibly at Herat and the Hindu-Kush passes, we should do so by the location of agencies, with small escorts only, at those points, supported, under certain contingencies, by locally raised corps, paid from British funds. But such local forces should in no case exceed two or three thousand men in all, and being less costly than regular troops, the additional charge would not be great.

95. It is not by a military occupation of Afghanistan that our position there is best won and secured; nor do I conceive that it would be desirable, even if possible, to undertake to garrison Herat for many years to come. Against Persia it is best secured by our known power to invade her southern coasts; against Russia, by the risks which a war would entail on her exposed frontier in Turkistan.

96. I have thus endeavoured to carry out the task I originally set before myself, *viz.*, “to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, showing how it has arisen, and “to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves.” In doing so, I have necessarily looked a long way ahead, and speculated, perhaps rashly, on the future, for many contingencies, not foreseen in this Minute, may and probably will arise. But I conceive that such forecasts, however defective, have their use in guiding our general lines of policy. Above all, I have endeavoured to show that war, whether with Russia or with Afghanistan, would be the most expensive, as it would probably be the least satisfactory and least statesmanlike solution. I recognise fully the necessity that may arise for referring to the arbitration of the sword; but I earnestly hope and trust that

we shall be able to attain by peaceable means a settlement of the questions considered in this Minute, which shall be alike becoming to the dignity of the great British Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to the neighbouring States concerned.

LYTTON.

4-9-78.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

No. 1912P.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA to His Excellency SIR NEVILLE
BOWLES CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

SIR,

Simla, the 7th September 1878.

I AM directed to inclose to your Excellency a copy of a Resolution of the Government of India, appointing you to proceed upon a Special Mission to the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies, as Envoy-Extraordinary on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. The officers who have been attached to your Embassy, and to your personal staff, are named in the Resolution.

2. I am to request that your Excellency will have the goodness to arrange for your departure for Kabul from Peshawar, where the requisite preparations for your equipment and escort will have been made, so soon after the 16th September as may be practicable; and that you will travel to Kabul by the route of the Khaibar Pass and Jelalabad. The Government of India have no information leading to the belief that your journey through Afghanistan may be interrupted or opposed; but it is now many years since English officers have traversed that part of the country; while political exigencies may make it necessary that you should cross the frontier before any formal reply can be received from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter which notified that an Envoy would be sent. And the same exigencies, with the general importance of your Mission, require that your Excellency should reach Kabul speedily. If, therefore, any attempt is made by the local officers or authorities upon the road to delay or dispute your passage, you will be justified in disregarding dilatory excuses, expostulations, or refusals to authorise your advance, made on the pretext that orders are wanting, or are adverse. You will assume the responsibility of overstepping such opposition, and you will continue your march, with your escort, unless you are met by serious resistance. In such a contingency his Excellency the Viceroy leaves everything to your discretion; though if arms are used or any hostile demonstration is made in earnest by persons responsible to the Kabul Government, your Excellency is instructed to return.

3. His Excellency the Viceroy has directed me to communicate to your Excellency the following instructions for your guidance in the exercise, upon your arrival at Kabul, of the full powers with which you have been invested. It is only necessary to trace in outline the general policy of the British Government in regard to the present state of affairs in Afghanistan; and to fix the essential points toward which negotiations, if you enter into any, should be directed. All details, and all questions as to the ways and means toward the accomplishment of the general objects of your Mission, are left entirely to your Excellency's judgment and decision. Very much will obviously depend upon the actual condition of parties and internal politics at Kabul, and upon the position and behaviour of the Amir himself. Upon all these matters the information now before the Government of India is still very imperfect, and it will be part of your Excellency's commission to ascertain fully and precisely how these matters stand.

4. Your Excellency's reception in full durbar by His Highness will afford an opportunity for declaring publicly the friendly character of your Mission, and of announcing that its object is to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Amir conferred personally with the Earl of Mayo at Umballa. In the less formal interviews which may be expected to follow, your Excellency will be able to impress upon the Amir and his Ministers the necessity of bringing to an end these misunderstandings, which are leading to serious political complications, by a frank and outspoken exchange of views. The immediate cause of your Excellency's deputation to Kabul may be stated plainly to be the arrival at the Amir's capital of a Russian Mission, and its reception by His Highness soon after his persistent refusal to receive British officers. According to international usages throughout the world, this must be regarded by the Government of India as an affront, which requires explanation and remedy. The fact

(which must be known to the Amir) that the Russians have entered Afghanistan in open contravention of promises made by their Government to England, gives to their presence at Kabul a specially ambiguous import. In short, your Excellency will show that these proceedings, and the whole course of recent events in Central Asia, in the vicinity of the Afghan frontiers, have materially affected the political situation; insomuch that the British Government is now very closely interested in ascertaining without delay what interpretation is to be placed upon the new aspect of affairs, and what are to be henceforward its relations with the Amir. On recent occasions the conduct and demeanour of the Amir toward this Government have been far from satisfactory; and this latest incident has brought the proceedings of His Highness to a point at which they can be no longer treated by His Excellency the Viceroy with indifference. The highest interests of both countries demand that the question of their future reciprocal relations shall be brought to a definite understanding: and this, it may be said, is the object of your Excellency's Mission.

5. It is possible that the Amir may be found disinclined to explain or to make any conciliatory reply; and that he and his Ministers may assume a tone decisively significant of unfriendly resolutions. Your Excellency may thus be given to understand, or may gather from other quarters, that the Kabul Government is already pledged to a policy adverse to British interests. The Amir, his advisers, and sirdars, should in that case be desired to consider very earnestly the grave consequences which must flow out of a complete and open estrangement and separation of interests between India and Afghanistan. If nevertheless it becomes clear that the Amir has views or engagements incompatible with the revival of satisfactory relations with the British Government, then your Excellency's Mission is terminated, and you will return to India. The test of the Amir's real disposition and intentions will be his agreement or refusal to require any Russian Agency that may at the time be in Afghanistan, to leave his territory.

6. If your Excellency finds that the Amir is disposed to realize the value of a reconciliation with this Government, and the risks of a rupture, and to negotiate for the restoration of political connections; His Highness may then be moved to examine the actual situation in all its bearings, and to appreciate the urgent necessity of some definite and comprehensive arrangement. No arrangement, it may be observed, can be satisfactory, which does not accord to the British Government a recognized position of diplomatic authority in regard to the external relations of Afghanistan, to the exclusion of the political action or influence of Russia in the country. The primary basis, therefore, of an alliance is that the Amir shall engage not to admit within his dominions any Russian envoy or emissary. It will accordingly be an essential preliminary to any negotiations that the Amir shall agree to take such steps as may be necessary for the withdrawal from his capital of any Russian officers or agents actually at Kabul, having due regard to their personal safety and dignity; that he shall desire them to leave his territory, and that, in case of their demur or refusal to comply, he shall break off all communications with them, direct or indirect. And your Excellency is authorised to assure the Amir that in taking this step he may rely upon the support of the British Government, and upon their complete protection of him from any injurious consequences which he may apprehend.

7. The second essential condition is that the Amir shall agree to permit the residence within his dominions of English officers accredited to him by the British Government. Experience has proved that for the prevention of misunderstandings in future, and in order that the British alliance may be recognized and made manifest in an indisputable manner, it is absolutely necessary that the British Government shall be adequately represented within Afghanistan. It would be in accordance with the general diplomatic usage among States, and it would be for several reasons advantageous, if the British representative were stationed at the Amir's capital or head-quarters, where he might have ready access to His Highness as occasion might require. But previous discussions of this point have elicited from the Amir expressions of particular disinclination to an English Resident at Kabul: and if these objections are repeated and adhered to, the alternative of placing agents at Herat and Balkh may be accepted. Under this latter arrangement, however, your Excellency will stipulate for free access to Kabul, and to the Amir's presence, of special Envoys from India, whenever this may be thought necessary by the British Government. If, on the other hand, a Resident is placed at the capital only, he must be at liberty to detach officers to visit any points upon the Afghan frontier at which their temporary presence may be rendered necessary by the condition, at the time, of external affairs. Thus the establishment of a single Resident at the capital will necessitate free access, for specific reasons, to the frontier; while the location of officers upon the frontier will necessitate free access, upon special occasions

to the capital. The precise terms of these arrangements are left to Your Excellency's discretion, upon the understanding that they will provide for the complete exclusion of the Agents of Russia, and for securing to the British Government a real and visible preponderance in Afghanistan, by the establishment of British representatives in the country.

8. If the Amir accepts the foregoing essential conditions of an alliance with the British Government, the principal concessions which Your Excellency is empowered to make in return are as follow :—

- (1) An annual subsidy—not exceeding, for the present, twelve lakhs—may be promised.
- (2) The British Government will undertake to recognize the heir-presumptive to the rulership of Kabul and its dependencies, who shall be formally named, as such, by the Amir Sher Ali during his lifetime. And the subsidy will be continued to the Amir's successor thus recognized, so long as he shall continue to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty of Alliance in its entirety.
- (3) If any attempt be made at any future time, by Russia or by any State under Russian influence, to take possession of any part of the territories now under the acknowledged jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, the British Government engages to join the Amir in defending his territories by force of arms.

9. Here, again, much must be left to the discretion of Your Excellency in regard to the terms and form of these concessions ; but the following indication of the views of the Government of India on the subject may serve to guide you in the negotiations :—

The Government are prepared to recognize the heir of the Amir's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, or to the known rules and principles which have always governed successions in the Amir's dynasty. But if the heir chosen prove, with the advantages of our recognition in his favour, unable to maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State ; and Your Excellency will point out to the Amir that armed intervention in the event of a contest for the rulership, would be inconsistent with these views.

The engagement to defend the Amir's territory should not be unnecessarily offered to him, since a preferable arrangement would be the conclusion of an alliance upon more general terms, so long as the essential conditions already specified are included. If, however, the guarantee is asked for by the Amir, or if Your Excellency judges that to offer it is necessary, Your Excellency will in the first place explain to the Amir that it may unavoidably entail our exercising a certain additional degree of control over his foreign policy. If the Amir still distinctly desires the guarantee, it should be frankly and unreservedly given. But the guarantee must directly depend on, and be linked with, the admission of British officers to reside, as political representatives, either at Kabul or at certain important points upon the Afghan frontier. Of these points Herat is the most important.

10. If the Amir alludes to Quetta, and to our action in Biluchistan, he should be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta have been stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than twenty years' standing, renewed two years ago, with the Khan of Khelat, and in pursuance of the policy adopted, in concert with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of trade. And Your Excellency may see fit to add that one of the objects of the British mission to Kabul which was proposed to, and declined by, the Amir in 1876, was to explain our intentions regarding Biluchistan, and to give the Amir satisfactory assurances on these points, before taking the action of which His Highness is now understood to complain. But it should be intimated that the time for discussion of these affairs is now past.

11. If the Amir asks to be supplied with arms, Your Excellency will reply that the British Government does not consider necessary any separate or immediate stipulation upon this head ; and that the point is reserved as falling within the general question of the military dispositions to be taken for the defence of Afghan territory in case of war.

12. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and of allowing free transit of commerce through the Khaibar Pass, it may not be desirable to press the Amir ; though some agreement for improving the existing state of things would be advantageous, and may be proposed to the Amir if the opportunity appears favourable. The subject may be brought forward in connection with any discussion that may be raised regarding the amount of the annual subsidy.

13. I am directed to send herewith a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the Amir, which I am to request your Excellency to deliver personally. A copy is also inclosed, for your Excellency's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 2.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RECTIFICATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

IN giving an opinion on the question of the rectification of the North-west frontier of India, it is necessary to suppose the existence of some cause demanding such a rectification; it is likewise difficult to make such a subject intelligible without entering into political as well as strategical reasons. In what follows I have, therefore, ventured to deal with the matter from both points of view.

If, for instance, we were in friendly relationship with Afghanistan, and we had merely to guard our frontier from the occasional raids of the independent mountain tribes located in the mountains running parallel to it, then a very limited rectification would, in my opinion, be required either for political or strategical reasons, but recent events which have occurred in Afghanistan have shown beyond the possibility of a doubt that we must be prepared to protect our North-west frontier against a powerful European nation, which unless prevented could place a formidable army, complete in all the scientific warlike appliances of the present day, in a position from which she could make an attack upon our Indian empire.

This position is the valley of Herat; and I think it is now generally admitted that from such a base only could Russia collect an army of sufficient strength to seriously menace our Eastern empire. Such being granted, I consider that any rectification of our North-west frontier must allow of our occupying a position in advance of our present one which would, in case of war, permit of our obtaining possession of Herat before a Russian force could do so.

I do not think, however, that that Power could attempt such an enterprise until she had gained possession of Merv, which, however, may, I think, be anticipated at no distant date both from the direction of the valley of the Attrek and from the Oxus.

I will, therefore, suppose Russia in possession of the Turkoman country, including Merv, and that the rectification of our present North-west frontier is to be based upon that hypothesis. Under such conditions, Russia would be about 220 miles from Herat, which must of course be assumed to be garrisoned by a friendly Afghan force, advised by British officers. We must, therefore, find some good strategical position beyond our present border that would enable us to arrive before that city in time to prevent it from falling into the hands of the above Power in case of sudden war.

Such a position, in my opinion, can only be found at Kandahar, from which we should command strategically and politically the whole of Afghanistan, and the causes which have led to the late complications with that country certainly render such a command essentially necessary to us.

Kandahar possesses all the requirements for forming a strong military position; its situation is easily defensible, it has a plentiful supply of water, the climate is salubrious, and what is of the greatest importance, the inhabitants are less fanatical and hostile to us than are any others to be found in Afghanistan. It further commands all the principal roads leading towards India; it is 350 miles from Herat (by a road along which a carriage has been driven), 230 from Kabul, and about 150 from Quetta. It is also generally understood that there exists no road by which an army could reach Kabul from Merv, except through Herat and Kandahar, or viâ the Oxus and Balkh; the Oxus viâ the latter city is 220 miles distant from Kabul, and the road leads over the Bamian Pass, one of the worst in Afghanistan. A force from Kandahar could, therefore, arrive at Kabul as soon as one from the banks of the Oxus, having a far easier road to march.

Again, a force stationed at Candahar would command the north-west entrance of all the passes leading into British India and situated between the Bolan and the Khyber.

If, therefore, it is admitted for the above principally strategical reasons, that the occupation of Kandahar by a British force is necessary for the future defence of our Indian Empire, the first considerations will be its communication with that country.

Starting from our frontier town of Jacobabad, and passing through the province of Cutch Gundava, we reach at a distance of 90 miles, the town of Dadur, at the southern entrance of the Bolan Pass; the above town it is to be hoped will soon be connected

with Jacobabad by rail. A further distance of about 60 miles brings us to the summit of the Bolan Pass, from whence to Quetta is a distance of about 25 miles, over a level plain. A tramway should at once be constructed across this.

As, in the event of Kandahar being occupied, the position of Quetta would become most important, a strongly entrenched camp should there be formed, containing an arsenal, storehouses, and barracks. Fortunately the configuration of the surrounding country is such that a very little engineering skill would render such a position impregnable. The force stationed here would form the main support of the garrison of Kandahar.

The great deficiency at Quetta is fuel and forage during the winter, but as coal has been found near the Bolan it is to be hoped that it may soon be utilized; as for forage, the only means of meeting the want is to store chopped straw and dried lucerne, and to keep as small a force of cavalry as is possible during the winter months.

From Quetta to Kandahar a good bridged road should be constructed, the distance being about 150 miles, and on it fortified stations for its protection. The Kojuk Pass, over which the road would be carried, is the only physical difficulty to be met with, but is not of a serious nature.

On the whole of this line from Jacobabad to Kandahar, of about 325 miles, it would be necessary to liberally subsidize the tribes for police purposes. From our own border to Quetta there would, I conceive, be no difficulty in doing so, owing to the great foresight of the late General Jacob, and to the admirable system of frontier administration which he established, and which is now showing such favourable results. From Quetta to Kandahar I am less acquainted with the character of the people. I should, however, imagine that a policy of liberality, firmness, and justice would have the same effect upon them as it has had upon the Balooch.

In the above I have sketched briefly the communications between our frontier post of Jacobabad and Kandahar, and which are situated beyond Indian limits. Those within our territory are under as favourable conditions as could be wished. I take for granted that the railway between Sukkur on the Indus, one of the termini of the Indus Valley Railway, and Jacobabad is completed; this will place the latter frontier station in direct railway communication with the seaport of Kurrachee, and as the improvements made in the harbour of that port allow of vessels of a draught of 28 feet crossing the bar, the Indian troop ships would find no difficulty in entering it. Supposing, therefore, that each of these five vessels could convey 1,500 men (infantry), these 7,500 men would be landed at Kurrachee, via the Suez Canal, in about 18 days, from Malta.

From Kurrachee to Dadur, a distance of about 500 miles, ought not to exceed 48 hours in transit; from thence to Quetta would be a march of six days; and on to Kandahar, at an average rate of 10 miles per diem, would take 15 days more; in fact, a regiment leaving Malta ought to arrive in six weeks at Kandahar. Such a rapid means of reinforcement would be of essential service should political circumstances at any time render it unadvisable to weaken the garrison of British troops in India. It must also be borne in mind that the River Indus has a powerful steam flotilla at the disposal of the State, the steamers of which run between Kotree, Sukkur, and Mooltan.

Having thus shown that no very great difficulties are to be encountered in maintaining the communications between Kandahar and British territory, I am most strongly of opinion that no further rectification of the North-west frontier would be required so far as placing any other military posts in advance of that frontier.

Several passes between the Bolan and Khyber are known to debouch into the valley of the Indus, but with the exception of the latter, the exact value of each as a practicable route for an invading army is unknown, but whatever their advantages for such a purpose may be, their north-west entrances are to be found in Afghanistan, and a force stationed at Kandahar, and able to be reinforced to any strength, would command them all. At Peshawur we know that the Khyber is practicable, although an invading army of any strength would find extreme difficulty in debouching; nevertheless, a strongly entrenched camp might here be formed to meet every emergency.

The same precaution might be adopted with reference to the other passes I have mentioned, and the nature of the defences would depend upon the practicability of the passes whose debouchures they would have to guard.

Any attempt to push forward military posts into those passes with a view either to defence, or to overawing the independent mountain tribes, would only, I believe, lead to constant irritation, and to frequent punitive expeditions.

It might be asked, if such is my opinion, why I have advocated the occupation of such a distant post as Kandahar. My reply is that, in addition to political reasons demanding it, the Belooch tribes through which the greater part of our communication

would be are essentially different in character from those on the Punjab frontier. The Belooch, although a Mahomedan, is not a religious fanatic, and he bears no hostile feeling towards Europeans. Further, in dealing with these tribes, we have in the Khan of Khelat a central authority to whom we can look, and to whom all Belooch tribes acknowledge an allegiance. British officers composing the Sind Frontier Force have for years been in the habit of traversing all parts of Beloochistan, either on patrolling duty or in search of sport, and they have never met with anything but kindness at the hands of the inhabitants. An experience of 20 years has, indeed, proved to me that under good management the Belooch can be trusted under any circumstances, their loyalty and devotion having on many occasions been remarkable towards those by whom they have been well treated and in whom they have confidence.

But can such be said of the Patan tribes? They have no acknowledged head; even their tribal chiefs receive only a nominal obedience; they are, as a rule, fanatics in religion, treacherous, revengeful, and totally untrustworthy; they hate all Europeans, and the life of a British officer entering their mountains is as insecure now as it was 30 years ago. Their only virtue is personal courage. Such races are, I consider, one of the best defences that we could have in the rear and flanks of an invading army, while the best plan that we can adopt towards them is to keep them at a distance.

In dealing with the defences of our frontier under any condition, I would urge the absolute necessity of good lateral communications; I look to these as most essential, and I consider it beyond dispute that much of the success of the guarding of the Sind frontier was due to General Jacob's foresight in at once connecting his outposts by good bridged roads, so that the patrols from each post could meet each other at all seasons, as well as allowing of one post supporting the other in cases of emergency.

These frontier roads also exert a considerable moral effect over the robber tribes. Many a party of marauding horsemen has been stopped on coming across a made road; they know that if they cross this well marked line they are committing themselves, and once across they never know when they may not meet with British troops, or whether their retreat may not be cut off. I would therefore consider it an essential condition in the defence of the frontier that a good bridged road of not less than 40 feet in breadth should be constructed the whole length of the border from Jacobabad to Peshawur, and that this road should, if possible, mark the limits of our boundary, and on which our outposts should be built.

I would add it as my opinion that this line of outposts should be entrusted to the charge of the regular army only, and that the Native police should act within this line solely for civil purposes; that what is now called the Native militia should be disbanded; and that all the inhabitants, instead of being permitted to bear arms, should be disarmed and encouraged to turn their energies to agricultural pursuits.

I would likewise do away with all local forces, excepting the Guide Corps, placing the entire frontier under the Commander-in-Chief, and making the whole Native army take its turn of frontier duty; no better school for soldiers could be found, and I see no reason why the whole army should not partake of the advantage of such teaching.

The mountain tribes beyond our outposts should be informed that we had no wish to injure them so long as they left us alone, and that we would allow no armed man to cross our frontier, and that anyone who attempted to do so would be treated as an enemy; unarmed they should be allowed to pass for all purposes, in fact, encouraged to do so.

Such a system would, no doubt, at first be expensive on account of the number of troops it would require to maintain it, but if carried out systematically and with firmness, the cost would in the end, by securing peace, be amply repaid.

In the above remarks, I have not ventured upon any suggestion as to what number of troops would be required to hold Kandahar and its communication with India, because such a question could only be decided by political considerations, and the terms on which we occupied a position in Afghanistan.

Before concluding, I should wish to glance at the political conditions of the occupation I have advocated.

I have hitherto in every way deprecated any interference in the affairs of, or any advance into, Afghanistan, and I should have continued to do so, had not the undisguised hostile action of Russia in that country forced upon me the conviction that the time had come when we must take precautionary measures in some form; but I am still of opinion that the most limited occupation that will meet the circumstances of the case will be the best for all parties.

I have, however, no doubt in my mind that, for the future, we must hold such a position in Afghanistan as will render our influence supreme, and any other power impossible,

and I believe that by such means only can we secure ourselves against Russian intrigue, and prevent the two nations from drifting into war at some future time.

The very fact of taking up such a position as will ensure that supremacy beyond discussion will tend more to prevent the chance of war than anything else.

But to accomplish this, I think all our experience of Asiatics teaches us that we must be amongst the people whom we wish to influence, and that such influence in Afghanistan can no longer be exerted from Calcutta or from Simla.

As an example of this, we may take Beloochistan, conterminous since 1843 with our Sind frontier. Forty years ago, nowhere could a country more unfriendly disposed towards us have been found, as was proved in the conduct of its ruler towards our troops during the last Afghan war.

Yet, at the present moment, it would be difficult to show a country more loyally inclined towards us; and this change has been accomplished gradually and without any show of violence on our part, but, on the contrary, by a policy which, viewed as a whole, has been firm and generous both towards the ruler and the people. There has been no necessity for annexation, although we occupy a military position within the country by right of treaty, but also with the full concurrence of both its ruler and its people.

I see no reason why the application of similar principles should not prove equally successful in Afghanistan.

I consider the annexation of Afghanistan to be quite uncalled for under existing circumstances, and that it should be avoided by every means, both for financial as well as political reasons.

At the same time, it is an essential condition to our holding a position in the country that the ruler and people of the country should be in the most friendly relations with us.

I assume that the time is fast approaching when a ruler of some sort must be found to occupy the throne of Kabul, in which case a treaty, such as that we now possess with Khelat, might form the basis of our new relations with the Afghans.

By a clause in this treaty, we might hold Kandahar as we now do Quetta in Beloochistan, and it is to be hoped that from such a position we may gradually but surely exert such an influence over the whole country as will make the inhabitants our friends.

That considerable difficulties would have to be encountered at first there can be no doubt, but as we have won our position in India by overcoming such difficulties, I see no reason to despair in this case.

I would add, in addition to the political reasons I have already given for advocating the presence of a British force at Kandahar, that the influence exerted by it would not be confined to Afghanistan, but would extend throughout Persia, and materially strengthen our position in that country. All who are acquainted with the subject are well aware that our influence at Teheran has long been waning, not from any dislike to England, but from a feeling that we were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to assist her in case she resisted the demands of Russia.

I have not touched on commercial topics, yet there can be no doubt of their vast importance in the consideration of such a question; the very fact of maintaining a safe line of road direct from Kandahar to the seaport of Kurrachee, free from all vexatious transit duties, will give a great impetus to trade between Europe and Central Asia, and as this trade increases year by year, so will the civilisation of the people amongst whom it spreads.

(Signed) HENRY GREEN, Major-General
(retired).

30th December 1878.

No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON THE STRATEGICAL AND POLITICAL VALUE OF KANDAHAR AS A POSITION.

COVERING as it does the roads from Eastern Persia and Herat, as well as that from Kabul and Ghazni, Kandahar is no doubt a position of much importance. The features of the country in the immediate vicinity of the city are favourable for defence; but its occupation by us would entail the establishment of strong posts on the Helmand and at Khelat-i-Ghilzai *at least*, bringing the intervening districts under our control. Assuming,

however, the retention of the country embraced within the limits here indicated, we do not thereby obtain a satisfactory frontier, because it would be impossible to guard such a long and exposed line without a series of military or police posts as connecting links. While recognising the strategical importance of Kandahar, its occupation now would, in my opinion, be a mistake even from a military point of view, seeing we could at any moment lay our hands on it from our base in Pishin; I am aware that military critics of high authority consider the retention of Kandahar to be essential to the security of our frontier, on the ground apparently that the Afghans might some day construct works at that place, which would neutralise the advantages which our proximity to it would give us; this is, no doubt, a possible contingency, but it does not counterbalance the immediate and very patent disadvantage of a premature occupation, and our engagements with the Afghan State will be on a very unsatisfactory footing, if they do not make due provision to meet contingencies of this character. As a purely military question, therefore, the possession of Kandahar would, in my opinion, place us in a false position, and in point of fact be a source of great weakness to us. The political objections to the retention of Kandahar in opposition to the wishes of the Afghans seem to me to be very strong. For many years our policy in India has ceased to be an aggressive one, and this policy has been avowed in the utterances of Government during the present war; it follows, therefore, that on principle we ought not to annex a rood of land that is not really essential to the security of our frontier; to do otherwise would be to discredit us in the estimation of the world. It has been suggested that we might hold Kandahar by an amicable agreement with the Afghan Government, and if this could be arranged it would be unobjectionable; but I am inclined to think that this is the last thing the Afghans would be disposed to accede to. Though the people of this province profess to be tired of the Barakzai rule it must not be assumed that they are prepared to receive us with favour; so far as I am in a position to judge they detest us cordially, and I am under the impression that our immunity from anything like organised opposition is largely due to the fact that our dealings with the people are taken as an indication that our occupation is a temporary one only. As regards the unpopularity of the Barakzai regime, it should be recollected that the military force employed in the province for many years has been of insignificant strength, a fact that discredits the idea of an oppressive or very obnoxious system of government. It has been further alleged, by high authority, that the occupation of Kandahar would be a final settlement of the frontier question; but if there is one point more than another on which it would be safe to venture a prophesy, it is that circumstances would necessitate further movements at no distant date, until some natural boundary has been reached; indeed, the most fatal of the objections to Kandahar as a frontier is its want of defined and defensible boundaries. By restricting our advance to Pishin we have a strong and, in most respects, a satisfactory frontier, and in that position we can lay our hands on Kandahar at any moment, and this being so, I fail to see why we should anticipate events by undertaking a costly, onerous, and troublesome charge, involving, as it must do, the government of a large province inhabited by a warlike, fanatical, and turbulent population, whose independence it is our interest to support and foster, and whose friendship we should do our utmost to secure.

D. M. STEWART.

Kandahar, 18th April 1879.

No. 4.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLICY TO BE ADOPTED TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.

THE late successes of General Roberts, and the season of the year precluding for some time any more military operations,—the opinion also (which Lord Lytton seems to share) that sufficient retribution has been obtained for the massacre of our Envoy,—all these circumstances seem to show that the time has come when Government should lay down peremptorily to the authorities in India their views as to the sound policy to be adopted towards Afghanistan.

Sir Donald Stewart, writing from the head of his army in Kandahar, puts the question very pithily,—“Now that we have got Afghanistan, what are we to do with it?”

If I were asked for an opinion as to the instructions to be issued to the Indian authorities by the Secretary of State, I should, after having consulted those of my colleagues whom I consider the best authorities on Indian policy, and after refreshing my memory by reperusing all the political records of the last few years, reply as follows :—

Adhere to the main policy announced by Lord Salisbury in February 1876, and abandon all notions of conquest or annexation in Afghanistan; proclaim to the people of Afghanistan at once that the British have no desire or intention to annex any portion of Afghan territory; secure sufficient order in the country to enable the Afghans to replace the present anarchy by order under one ruler or several, as best suits themselves; and promise them all assistance in arms, money, and counsel, on the sole condition that they acknowledge our suzerainty and conduct all their relations with foreign powers through us. These conditions being secured, return to your ancient boundaries in India.

Unfortunately for the interests of India, the Afghan question has become a party one. Without knowing much about the matter, the people of England are divided into two hostile camps, and neither side will listen to any argument, however temperate and however much unbiassed by party views, which at all clashes with those adopted by Government or by the Liberal party.

But there is a more serious difficulty arising out of our Government by party as respects India. In an ordinary Indian case, if Government desires to retrace or remodel its policy, or to check the Indian authorities in any course adopted by them, nothing is so easy. Like despotic Governments elsewhere, it can displace or remove imprudent agents at will, and if the matter should chance to come before Parliament, any Government such as exists now-a-days in England would be able to furnish well reasoned well written justification of their proceedings in a form certain to disarm all criticism. But when once party is seized of an Indian question, it is most difficult for the Government of the day to abandon any iota of the policy they have enunciated, or to surrender any position (however much they may disapprove of it) which their agents in India have taken up.

Nevertheless, it is incumbent on Government and on parties of both sides, when any great crisis occurs, to lay aside all minor questions on which struggles for power usually occur, to accept the past as irrevocable, whether good or bad, and, as wise statesmen, to deal with the present state of things in such manner as shall best secure the welfare of the future.

I think I speak the sense of all Indian politicians when I say that the pending question as to the treatment of Afghanistan does form such a crisis in the history of our Eastern Empire.

When I have said above that Lord Salisbury's main policy of February 1876* ought to be maintained, the expression will, no doubt be cavilled at, for the controversy whether Lord Lawrence's "masterly inactivity," or Sir Bartle Frere's bland but decided intervention† (which latter view seems to have been adopted by Lord Salisbury) is the sound policy has been raging for years, and has called forth volumes, and additional volumes might still be produced in favour of either view.

This policy as to the choice of means is eminently a question for party debate, but it does not affect the more important question of what is to be done now; I, therefore, pass it by without notice. And I contend that an impartial critic now, and history hereafter, will recognise that the main policy of Lord Salisbury, as announced in the Despatch above mentioned, is exactly the same as that of all previous Governments, namely, to maintain an independent and friendly Afghanistan.

If that Despatch is looked through as well as Sir B. Frere's long letter, not a trace will be found of any desire to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan; no indication of an opinion that the existing frontier of India was a weak one, and ought to be extended; on the contrary, as I shall show presently, Lord Salisbury lays down most distinctly in subsequent Despatches,‡ when the fears of his Council had been raised, that the policy of conquest was quite at variance with the instructions to Lord Lytton of Her Majesty's Government.

The fact is, and it cannot be too distinctly noted, that the idea of an extended frontier emanated not from Government, but from the authorities in India, and this idea, it may be clearly established, has led us into all our present troubles, and, if not dis-

* Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

† No. 18, Political Despatch, 29th November 1877, para. 4.

‡ Subsequent Despatches, when the fears of his Council had been raised, that the policy of conquest was quite at variance with the instructions to Lord Lytton of Her Majesty's Government.

† The private letter of Sir B. Frere of 3rd March 1876, subsequently published, setting forth a full scheme of frontier administration, had been (as it states) preceded by others.

tinctly repudiated by the Home Government, may lead us into still greater troubles and perhaps involve our Indian possessions in financial and political ruin.

It is necessary to maintain this view by proofs, and for this purpose it is essential to attend carefully to dates.

Lord Salisbury delivered his celebrated Despatch of February 1876 to Lord Lytton in London, and his Lordship took his seat in Council as Viceroy on 17th April following.

* Notification to Envoy, 5th May 1876.

Command Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

† 7th October 1876. Simla Conferences, *ib.*

A few days after his arrival, he notified* to the Amir his intention to send to him his friend Sir Lewis Pelly as Envoy; the Amir demurred to receiving an Envoy on the well known Afghan objections, which clearly are that the residence of an English functionary would lead, as in India, to the destruction of his power as an independent Prince. But he consented to send an agent to meet the Viceroy's Envoy in India. The Agent accordingly appeared at Simla,† where the Viceroy himself took part in the conference. It was here that Lord Lytton used the famous illustration of the earthen pipkin (which, by the by, he borrowed from Sir B. Frere's private letter, whose expressions as well as whose views appear to have deeply impressed themselves on his Lordship), and the conference ended by the Agent being commissioned to intimate to the Amir the terms of a new treaty, a *sine quâ non* of which was to be the establishment of English Agents in Afghanistan.

The Agent proceeded from Simla to Kabul,‡ and intimated to the Amir the proposals of the Viceroy. The Sirdars at first unanimously rejected the proposal of British Residents. Many durbars (which are quasi privy councils) were held, one of them lasting 16 hours, but ultimately Lord Lytton's Native Agent seems to have talked over the Amir, and he gave his consent to the proposal.§

‡ 26th November 1876. Kabul Discussions, *ib.*

§ 21st December, *ib.*

Assent of Amir to treaty, *ib.*

|| Peshawur Conferences, 8th February 1877.

¶ Despatch of Government of India, para. 36, *ib.* p. 170.

** 30th March 1877, *ib.*, page 222.

The conference and discussion on Lord Lytton's proposed treaty accordingly took place at Peshawur,|| but was broken off by the Viceroy, although it had been reported to his Lordship that the Amir was prepared to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government,¶ and Lord Lytton's native Agent was recalled from Cabul.**

But during the period when all these discussions between the Indian Government and the Amir were proceeding, at Simla, at Cabul, and at Peshawur, Lord Lytton was maturing another scheme, the principle of which had been already sanctioned by the Home Government, for the better administration of the North-western frontier, a line extending for 1,100 miles from Peshawur to Karachi.†† In the course of the Viceroy's inquiries, his Military Secretary, Colonel Colley (an able Officer recently from the Staff College at Sandhurst) laid a paper before him, denouncing the existing mountain frontier as an extremely bad one, and maintaining that, according to modern notions of military science, India could only be safely defended against an enemy advancing from the west by the British occupation of the whole mountain mass of Afghanistan, that is, by securing the western passes leading into the valley of the Oxus, as well as those debouching on India. Similar views to these had been propounded in India 50 years ago by a frontier officer, General Jacob, and have been reiterated by other soldiers and eminent men, such as Sir H. Green, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir B. Frere. But, after repeated investigations into the whole question by the highest military authorities in India, these proposals had been unanimously rejected by successive Governments. The Blue Books giving the proceedings of Lord Canning's

†† Parliamentary Paper, 72 of 1879.

Parliamentary Paper, 73 of 1879.

Government in 1857, and especially of Lord Lawrence's Government in 1867†† afford the fullest information on the subject, and the papers of Lord Lawrence, Major-General Durand, Sir Henry Norman, and the late Lord Sandhurst exhaust the subject on the side of the impolicy of extending our frontier. Lord Lytton, however, adopted the views of Colonel Colley.

Now of these two grave subjects, which were maturing simultaneously in India, only one came to the notice of the Council of India. The discussions which were taking place between the Viceroy and the Amir in 1876 and the early part of

†† This scheme had also been shadowed forth in Sir B. Frere's letter.

1877 were not reported home till the 10th May 1877, and then only in the Secret Department. But the views of Lord Lytton as to the reorganization of the North-west frontier were necessarily laid before Council,* and the Despatch from India, 17th May 1877, and other Despatches of Lord Lytton, disclosed to the Council of India the views of Lord Lytton as to Afghanistan.

Contemporaneously with the above-mentioned Despatch, another arrived in England from the Viceroy, dated 23rd March 1877,† announcing a new treaty with the Khan of Khelat, by which the occupation of Quetta by British troops was secured. These Despatches and the other referred to caused great alarm amongst members of Council,‡ who, with the exception of one or two voices, unanimously deprecated any extension of the frontier. They pointed out that the occupation of Quetta was the first step which had been perseveringly urged for forty years, as the indispensable preliminary to a successful aggressive policy, and they dwelt mainly on the consideration that, if once the frontier line is extended into the mass of mountains west of the Indus, it will be impossible to avoid the necessity sooner or later of annexing the whole of Afghanistan.

Lord Salisbury deemed these fears groundless, though he entirely concurred in the deprecation of an extended frontier line, and he justly remarked that whatever the views of the Government of India might be, they were only a subordinate Government, and that the Home Government was quite strong enough to restrain any inclinations of a too bellicose character, even if they existed.

The two Despatches, however, underwent great discussion, and were not replied to for many months after their arrival.

In deference to the views expressed by members of Council, Lord Salisbury, in approving of the occupation of Quetta,‡ expressly enjoined on the Government of India to carefully abstain from any measures which can be held to indicate on the part of Her Majesty's Government, a resolution permanently to maintain British troops in that town.

§ Parliamentary Paper, No. 3, In his Despatch on the proposed North-western Beloochistan, 1878. frontier he expressed himself as follows:—§

“Fears have been expressed that administrative modifications of this kind might carry with them a change in the pacific policy which has for many years guided the Indian Government in its dealings with neighbouring tribes and States. It is almost superfluous for me to draw your Excellency's attention to these apprehensions, for they are as much at variance with your own views as they are with the instructions which the Indian Government has uniformly received from the Government of Her Majesty. Your Excellency as plainly perceives as Her Majesty's Government that a policy of conquest on your North-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree counteract the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause. The changes now under consideration have no such object. They are measures of defence and security, not of aggression. *They will operate as a guarantee for the maintenance of existing territorial limits.*”

The Council was entirely satisfied with this emphatic declaration of policy, but it is submitted that the above references and these quotations completely make out my point, that the idea of an improved military frontier emanated not from Her Majesty's Government but from the authorities in India.

I have now to show—and it is another important consideration which has been hitherto overlooked, or has not been sufficiently adverted to—the effect which this notion of an improved frontier extending into Afghanistan produced on the mind of the Amir in resisting the British proposals for more intimate relations between the two Courts.

Up to the period of the conference with the Amir instituted by Lord Lytton, the Afghans entertained no fears that we had any desire to annex their country. Dost Mahomed significantly told Lord Lawrence that his country contained nothing but rocks and men, but plenty of both. Shir Ali, in the same sense, remarked that he had no fears on the score of annexation by the British, for his country produced barely a million sterling of revenue, and it would cost India ten millions to occupy it.

But when the Amir's Agent appeared at Simla in 1876, the views and intentions of the Viceroy as to an improved frontier had apparently oozed out, as things do in India. Lord Salisbury, in one of his Despatches, had cautioned the Viceroy that all publications and political statements relating to Afghanistan were at once translated and made known to the Amir; and, in point of fact, when the Kabul Agent, in October

1876, was describing to the Viceroy the Amir's state of mind, he used some remarkable words, to the effect that "the Amir is just now in great fear of Russia on the one side, and of India on the other. He sees the continued acquisitions of Russia year by year, and he has Sir Henry Rawlinson's book in his hands." In fact, he already felt himself in the position of the earthen pipkin, without being told so.

His apprehensions of annexation were thus aroused in October 1876, but, when his Agent met the English Envoy at Peshawur in March 1877,* the first step of probable annexation, the occupation of Quetta, had been already taken, and the Amir's repugnance to accept Lord Lytton's proposals is completely accounted for.

Further evidence as to the deeply ingrained repugnance of the Afghans to Europeans (Russians or English) obtaining any political footing in their country might be accumulated en masse, but the two following extracts deserve careful attention at the present moment.

On 7th February 1877, when Dr. Bellew assured the Kabul Envoy that the British Agents were to be posted in Afghanistan for the Amir's advantage, he shook his head negatively, and said, "We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us, and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands."—*Command Papers, Afghanistan*, p. 202.

The Envoy also stated on the day following, "The people of Afghanistan have it deeply rooted in their hearts that if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands."—*Ib.*, p. 208.

The above retrospect has shown that the deliberate policy of our Government against annexations or conquest is to be found in Lord Salisbury's Despatches, and, therefore, even in a party sense, the casual expression of Lord Beaconsfield in an after-dinner speech as to a scientific frontier cannot be tortured into any binding obligation on our Government.

The question is still open, not only as to what is the most scientific frontier, but, more important still, what is the best political frontier for India. On the first question it would be presumptuous for any civilian to offer a remark if there existed a *consensus* of military opinion upon the subject. But they are all at loggerheads respecting it. Some advocate the western face of the Hindu Kush; others the abandonment of Kabul, and the occupation of Kandahar and possibly Herat.

† The "Times," 5th January. Lord Lytton, in his recent speech† at Calcutta on New Year's day, strongly recommends the retention of "the established military line of defence which the present year has given us," whatever that may be, but Sir Henry Norman, who has both fought on the frontier, and for 20 years, both as War Secretary and as Member of the Governor General's Council, has had more to do with the military policy of the Government than any man in India, now, with all the additional information that the campaigns of the last two years has supplied, is decidedly of opinion that, both on military and political grounds, it is far wiser to retire altogether from the mountains so soon as military exigencies and political considerations will allow.

What is apparent to every eye, whether civil or military, is this, that wherever we draw the scientific line in the mountain range we cannot stop there, but must advance.

‡ The "Times," 4th January. Already we hear from the well informed correspondent of the "Times" (General Vaughan?)‡ what the prevailing policy in high places in India is, viz., to break up Afghanistan into a number of quasi-independent principalities, to extend the frontier to Kandahar, and to make over Herat to the Persians.

It is to be feared that the Cabinet will be inundated with numerous proposals of this kind from Indian theorists, and that Government has but little opportunity of ascertaining what the calm views are of men who have been studying this class of questions all their lives, and who adhere with conservative tenacity to opposite doctrines which in their opinion have been tested by time and good results.

I have no hesitation in recording, after what I may call a complete judicial investigation of the subject, my entire adhesion to Lord Salisbury's views, that conquest and annexation in Afghanistan will lead to political and financial embarrassment in India, which no possible advantage can countervail, and that speedy retirement from Afghanistan should be insisted on.

Ready objections to any proposal of withdrawal can, of course, be made, and loss of prestige will figure in the argument. The all-sufficient answer to this objection is that

we did retire under very similar circumstances more than 30 years ago, without the slightest injury to that very untranslatable word *prestige*, and that, during the whole of that period, both Afghanistan and British India have flourished as they never did before, and, on the whole, there has been very little to complain of in our mutual relations.

The campaigns of 1878 and 1879 have demonstrated to the Eastern world what Sir Henry Durand foretold in 1867, that the Afghans are not able to offer the least effective resistance to a British force whenever it thinks fit to enter their country. They also show that the Russian interference so much bruited abroad as the real danger to India when an Indian difficulty occurs is an entire delusion. These facts having been so clearly proved, the English army will return to India with a greatly increased sense of their power diffused through Asia.

A much more serious objection occurs, arising out of the anarchy in which we should leave the country were we to retire now. This constitutes the great difficulty of our position; but it is much more an Afghan question than an English one. If the Afghans were left to themselves, they would undoubtedly constitute some form or other of government, probably not without fighting, and the survival of the fittest would occur. It would be repugnant to British feeling to leave the country a prey to civil war, with the self-reproach that it was ourselves who had produced it; on the other hand, the alternative of administering the country, with the certainty that, however temporary we might intend our rule to be, it would undoubtedly become permanent, presents such a formidable prospect for British interests in the East that the most strenuous efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it. The position requires all the wisdom of Government and all the tact of our best administrators, but I am sanguine enough to believe that if, by the promulgation of large and liberal views such as statesmen on both sides entertain, the Afghans can be brought to see that the independence of their country is as much desired by England as by themselves, and that the British Government will render them all the assistance in their power to accomplish it, a happy solution of our present difficulties might be effected.

E. PERRY.

10th January 1880.

No. 5.

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR remark of yesterday as to the possible necessity of occupying Kandahar induces me to lay before you the rough copy of a note (the only one I have) which I submitted to Lord Cranbrook in January last.*

Its value, if any, consists in this, that it sums up the deliberate opinions of my colleagues Sir H. Norman, Sir R. Montgomery, and Sir F. Halliday, whom I consulted before committing myself to paper.

I was disposed to think Lord Cranbrook did not much dissent from these views, and he seemed to concur in the opinion that it was not desirable to maintain the permanent occupation of Afghanistan.

But the notions which emanated from India, or possibly from England, about the same period, that it was good policy to break up Afghanistan, found favour with Lord Beaconsfield's Government, and Shir Ali was hailed as Wali of Kandahar with promises of assistance.

I have not seen anywhere the exact terms by which Her Majesty's name has been pledged to this arrangement, but I observe that Lord Lytton states we are pledged; and we have Mr. Lepel Griffin's speech to the Afghans, in which he announces Her Majesty's decision.

The extent to which Her Majesty is committed remains, of course, a considerable factor in the question under discussion.

But the consequences likely to result from this arrangement are so serious that it appears to me all the efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it.

Whether Afghanistan shall remain under one ruler, or be broken up into two or three petty principalities time alone can decide. But if it is sound policy to resist the permanent occupation of Afghanistan, and to revert to the notion of an independent

* No. 4.

Afghanistan, many times asserted by the late Government, is it possible to do so if we fetter ourselves with any pledge to support the ruler of Kandahar?

We may take for granted that if we leave, as we ought, to the Afghans themselves to determine whether they will live under one ruler or several, the issue will be determined in Afghan fashion, not without a struggle. So it was with Dost Mahomed, so with the late Shir Ali, and so also will it probably be with Abdul Rahman, whom Lord Lytton contemplates and desires to see ruler of Kabul.

But if *our* ruler is established at Kandahar, we shall have another Shah Soojah on our hands, and success will lead to the permanent occupation of the whole country.

I would throw out for Lord Hartington's consideration whether it would not be expedient to address to the new Viceroy a Despatch to be made public by him on his arrival in India.

Opportunity might be taken to express Her Majesty's strong determination to make no annexations of territory beyond the frontiers of India, and of her desire to see established an independent and flourishing Afghanistan. All that England requires is that that country shall not be made the seat of any intrigues or disturbances which may affect our Indian empire, and to this end ample guarantees may be obtained without affecting the real independence of Afghanistan.

Various passages from the Despatches of the late Government may be cited to show that the above policy is quite in accordance with what they frequently announced, and in particular the Despatch of Lord Salisbury may be cited with respect to the occupation of Quetta, which was the first step in the aggressive policy of the last four years, and in which he distinctly held that the occupation was to be only temporary.

May 10, 1880.

E. PERRY.

No. 6.

NOTE ON THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

ON the assumption that the question of the best line of frontier to be occupied by us on the north-western border of India will shortly be reconsidered, in anticipation of the withdrawal of our forces from Kabul and its neighbourhood, I venture to submit a few observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India. In making these observations I assume that the provisions of the treaty of Gundamuk are entirely at an end, and that we are at perfect liberty to arrange our frontier solely with reference to what may be considered our own interests.

I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground, for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furrah and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief, the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me, indeed, pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may

anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamuk than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

In considering the best line for our North-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as I know, in view to resisting the Afghans. Any contention to such an effect would, I submit, be absurd. The greatest alarmist can hardly apprehend danger to India from a mere Afghan invasion unless our military power was so broken or so feeble as to render our whole position in that country insecure, and in such a contingency any extension of our old border would be a source of much additional weakness. The Afghans very wisely and naturally have never shown any desire to molest us since we took up the line of frontier occupied in 1849, and the conviction often expressed by myself and by others of far greater authority that the very largest force of Afghans which could possibly be brought against us would, in the plains on our border, be speedily shattered by a moderate number of our troops of all arms, has been well borne out by the experiences of the late war in the territory of the Afghans themselves.

The old frontier, too, has this advantage with respect to Afghanistan, that it is for the most part separated from the territory heretofore under the direct rule of the Ameer of Kabul, and we have thus during a long series of years been spared many causes of irritation and disagreement likely to arise if our subjects and our officers had been constantly in direct contact with the subjects of Afghanistan.

I would therefore urge that, as respects the Afghans, no advantage is to be gained by us from extending our frontier, even if the extension did not bring with it very serious disadvantages, which I shall hereafter state.

Apart from the Afghans proper, however, it has been sometimes alleged that an advance of frontier will place us in a stronger position with respect to the border tribes who either own a very slack allegiance to Kabul or own no allegiance at all. I can understand that this might be asserted with some show of plausibility, and might even find acceptance with impartial persons ignorant of the physical peculiarities of the frontier hills, if we were really proposing to take up a new line of frontier beyond the hills which these tribes occupy, but no one who speaks with any sort of authority has ever ventured to recommend such a measure. It would be one of the most difficult extensions of territory that could be conceived, involving the employment of an army even larger than that maintained at present in Afghanistan with so much strain on our resources. The results would certainly be very inadequate, but this is not what has been proposed or what was adopted in the Gundamuk Treaty, putting Kandahar aside, and it is not now, I presume, to be thought that we should desire to go beyond the arrangements of that treaty. By it we were to occupy Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber Pass, three isolated forward positions having no military communication with each other, and the first separated from the second and third by some hundreds of miles of difficult country inhabited by more or less warlike tribes. Can any adequate benefit, as respects the tribes along our frontier, result from the occupation of these three separate forward positions?

In the Sind direction anything deserving the name of an inroad in force into our territory has not taken place for many years, and in this direction any advance to secure our subjects from molestation in future seems unnecessary.

The occupation of Kurrum has rather created than lessened difficulties with the tribes beyond our old border in that direction, and notwithstanding the very strong force in that district, raids have taken place in its rear and outrages been committed entailing, I believe, a greater loss on our own people than ever took place in a much longer period formerly, when the Kohat and Bunnoo frontier was held without a European soldier, and by a force certainly not a third as strong as that which now holds those places and Kurrum.

The placing troops in the Khyber, too, can be of little use as a protection to our territory. Half a dozen regiments may hold the pass in the way it has been held during the past 18 months, with the aid of money payments to the tribes and local levies, though not without outrages in the pass and destruction of telegraph wires from time to

time, but these very Pass Afreedies have never by their conduct during the last 30 years rendered it necessary to organise an expedition to punish them. Their offences have been robberies or murders by individuals or small gangs, the prevention of which is a matter of police, and even these offences have sensibly diminished of late years, and have never been so numerous as to warrant such a costly measure, both in life and money, as the occupation of the line from Jumrood to Lundi Kotul. It is doubtful, indeed, whether placing garrisons in the Khyber would have any sensible effect in checking such offences as I have referred to, while, for the exercise of any influence on border tribes a few miles away from the Khyber, such occupation would be absolutely useless.

In truth, none of the three forward positions arranged to be occupied after the Treaty of Gundamak can possibly exercise any real influence over the border tribes with whom we have had serious trouble, namely, the Mahsood Wuzurees, and the tribes on the Yusufzai border. It is only with these people that, since 1849, we have had any real fighting on a large scale, and it is only on the two expeditions in these respective directions, in 1860 and 1863, that we have sustained a loss of over a hundred men killed and wounded. A reference to a map which shows the nature of the country as well as the distances will convince any one how little use troops placed in the Khyber would be to exert any influence on the border tribes of Yusufzai, and nothing but an overpowering force in Kurrum could afford to detach troops for the coercion of the Mahsood Wuzurees, while a much smaller body of troops than that now in Kurrum, if within our old territory, could not only check inroads by these people, but, if necessary, chastise them, as was done on a previous occasion.

In reality there is little call for any re-arrangement of our frontier line as respects the border tribes. The only point at which it occurs to me we might perhaps advantageously now obtain control is over the line of pass between Kohat and Peshawur. Undoubtedly it is a disadvantage to have a piece of independent territory on the direct and shortest road between two important frontier garrisons, and if the Punjab Government thought it expedient and were assured that it was practicable to assume direct control without entailing on us extensive or prolonged military operations, I think the measure should be allowed; but any actual advance seems to me injudicious, and certain to entail upon us inconveniences out of all proportion to the advantages which any one has assumed could be gained with respect to the tribes by such advances.

There remains to consider how far our occupation of Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber would strengthen us against that European Power of which, as I think, such unreasonable alarm has been expressed.

Is it possible for anyone to say that we now really dread a Russian invasion of India? Has not our experience during recent operations in Afghanistan, comparatively close to the magnificent resources of India, and the accounts we read of Russian difficulties when operating against undisciplined tribes in Central Asia, dissipated the apprehensions of the most inveterate of Russophobists? A policy started to place an English Agent in Afghan territory has step by step involved us in operations which have lasted for two years, and which we shall be fortunate if we conclude without an expenditure, present and prospective, of 20 millions sterling, and then we shall probably not have achieved the object with which we began. With this experience is it possible to apprehend that Russia is likely to subjugate or to influence Afghanistan so as to make it a base for operations against India? At all events, it is more than ever evident that any Russian advance, if indeed it is possible, would be made at great risk, and that it must be effected with so much slowness and deliberation as to give us leisure, 20 times over, to occupy any or all the posts on the scientific frontier, and also Kabul and Kandahar, before a Russian advance could have made itself felt.

The question is sometimes put as to whether the advocates for adhering to the old frontier line would defend India from Russian attack on or beyond that frontier. To that I would reply, that a good General acting on the defensive usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time came. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send, while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee. The most eminent scientific authority who has spoken on the subject of our Indian frontier, General Hamley, has

admitted that we can readily defend our old frontier and give a good account of any enemy in the valley of the Indus, and he deprecated advance beyond our Peshawur border.

The sum of the whole is, that we should be content with the old frontier and gradually strengthen it, and not commit the folly of prematurely thrusting forward troops in anticipation of invasions which may never come. To do so is to waste troops and resources, and perhaps, after much money has been spent in a particular direction, we may find that invasion may be more readily accomplished in a different direction. Let us not forget, either, our position in India, and that dangers worse than a Russian invasion are possible. We might have bitterly to repent some day the absence of several thousand troops in positions beyond the frontier, whence at the moment of need elsewhere it might be impossible to withdraw them, and where they themselves might be in great need of support.

Taking in succession the three forward positions named in the Gundamuk Treaty, how would they affect Russian invasion.

Beyond Peshawur the extreme point to be held by us was distant four marches from that garrison. It is obvious that if desired the Khyber can be traversed and the forward positions occupied in the course of a few days. When the railway is completed to the Indus or Peshawur, with a permanent bridge at Attock, it may be possible, if we have no troops in advance requiring support, to have even a smaller garrison than heretofore, and certainly there can be no need to increase that garrison. What is needed is to maintain at Peshawur and its neighbourhood transport for a strong division of all arms, and as troops could be brought in a day by railway from Rawul Pindee and Jhelum, and from several other stations within two days, we should have the means of at once pushing into the Khyber, if we needed to do so, a body of troops fresh from healthy stations, and provided with efficient and untired transport.

The next point retained by us under the treaty was the valley of Kurrum. Leaving the general disadvantages of this as of the other positions for future remark, I would observe that its occupation cannot be needed as a defence against Russia. The force in Kurrum has, since October last, been of no use whatever to General Roberts at Kabul, and has itself suffered much trouble at the hands of the surrounding tribes. For six months communication from Kurrum into Afghanistan is, for military purposes, quite closed, and of all these forward positions this seems the most absolutely useless. If circumstances render any advance by the Khyber necessary, an advance might be usefully made by Kurrum as a diversion, but this can be done when the time comes. It is unjustifiable to lock up a large force in Kurrum on the remote contingency of a Russian invasion, especially as, if that invasion came, it might be in quite a different direction, and yet those troops could not be withdrawn from their useless position.

It is hardly possible to conceive a European force attempting to invade India by the Shuturguridan, even if the attacking power could at the same time force us to use bodies of troops to repel invasion in other quarters, but if such a hazardous enterprise was to be attempted there would, as in the case of the Khyber, be ample time to bring up troops from garrisons in our old territory.

The occupation of Pisheen and Quetta seems as unnecessary as that of the Khyber and Kurrum. An advance of Russia on Herat would be a serious undertaking on the part of that power, and despite what has been lately written about the resources of the Herat district, I have most excellent authority for saying that it could not support the most moderate European army. How then could Russia hold it if she ever reached there, still less how could she cover the 400 miles of difficult country between Herat and Kandahar? If she could do this, still what influence could be exercised against such an advance by a division divided between Pisheen and Quetta? And if we proposed to fight Russia at Herat or Kandahar, the occupation of Pisheen would not very materially lessen the time it would take us to place at either of these towns the large army necessary to cope with the considerable force with which Russia alone would dare to advance troops, and transport animals would have to be brought in large numbers from the rear before any move counter to Russian advance could be attempted, while according to the best information obtainable by me there are no resources at Pisheen or Quetta which are of sufficient importance to an army to justify our holding those places in order to secure their resources.

I do not forget that a railway is in progress towards Pisheen, and it may be said that if we maintained transport at Pisheen for troops to be brought up from the rear when wanted, as I have proposed for Peshawur, it would greatly strengthen us against a Russian advance to do so, and this, of course, would be impossible, unless we kept troops there also. I would reply that Peshawur has been ours for 30 years, that it is a large

city with great resources, in a fertile district, and that no question can now be raised of our not holding it. None of these reasons apply to holding Pisheen. Again, cattle can easily be maintained in large numbers at and about Peshawur, and with a bridge over the Indus those kept at Rawul Pindee can be at Peshawur in a week. No similar advantage is to be found at Pisheen, and to bring transport sufficient for an army to Pisheen by a railway like that under construction, with a break of gauge in the middle of it, would be so tedious as to render the railway next to useless for the purpose. The railway would have quite enough to do to take up the troops needed for active operations with their provisions and stores, and, until their transport came, no advance could be made. Such an advance, I suppose, is contemplated by those who advocate the occupation of this and other forward positions, for I presume it is not desired to lock up troops at any of them or at any places beyond them to stand a siege in garrisons liable to be cut off by an invading foe.

As to the railway, no argument whatever should be based upon it. Constructed as it has been, there seems every probability that large parts of it will be destroyed when floods come, and when this occurs, it may possibly be thought not worth while to renew it. It will prove a very ruinous work from a financial point of view, any predictions of its paying being to my mind fallacious. When we consider the cost of keeping up a railway in such a country, it is difficult to conceive that the requirements of a few thousand troops and the trade that can ever be expected from Kandahar can afford any set-off equal to the expenses of working and maintenance. Having gone so far with the railway, if we keep troops at Pisheen it may be well to maintain it, at all events as far as it has gone, but it will involve heavy cost, and in the end it would save much pecuniary loss if, by withdrawal from Pisheen and Quetta, we could dismantle the railway and use the rails, sleepers, and rolling stock elsewhere.

Quetta offers no more advantage than Pisheen for opposing Russian advance, and in addition it has proved, as was predicted, very unhealthy for our troops. By treaty with the Khan of Khelat, no doubt we may keep troops there, apart from any provisions of the treaty of Gundamuk, but I am not aware that there is any use in doing this. We went there originally to restore order in the territories of the Khan of Khelat. Having done this let us honourably come away, or at all events propose to leave whenever the Khan thinks he can hold his own against his Chiefs without us, and when we are satisfied that disorder will not follow our withdrawal. We might, however, reasonably revert to an arrangement formerly in force by which a political officer remained with the Khan, and had with him an escort of suitable strength. The Khan's territories so match with ours that this arrangement may be desirable after our withdrawal.

Having sufficiently adverted to the negative advantages of occupying Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber, I would turn to a consideration of the positive disadvantages attending such a measure.

Politically the disadvantage would be that we should be extending, so to speak, our sphere of irritation, and placing ourselves in positions where it would be difficult to keep still. Either from the front of these advanced positions, on their flanks, or in their rear, constant trouble may be expected, entailing operations which will almost certainly end in further advances and occupations. We also irritate the people, who would as a rule like us better at a distance than at hand, and very probably we destroy any hope of a friendship which would be valuable if the improbable event of a Russian advance really took place. I have seen it stated in more than one letter from Kabul that the people dislike us and the Russians alike, but that our occupation of Kabul has led them to desire nothing more than a Russian advance which should rid them of us. This feeling will no doubt disappear when we leave, for the Afghans certainly do not desire to be interfered with by Russia, but the statements I have quoted illustrate what has often before been said, namely, that our best plan to ensure having the Afghans on our side as against Russia is to leave them alone. Our occupying forward positions has an exactly contrary tendency.

One great military disadvantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamuk arises from the unpopularity of the service beyond our frontier. The Native soldier likes a campaign, but he objects strongly to a prolonged absence from his country, especially when, as in the Khyber and at Quetta, he is placed in most unhealthy and disagreeable positions. He cannot obtain leave of absence, a privilege which, if constantly withheld, as it has been of late, would end in the loss of our Native army, and this and the frequent deaths and invaliding of soldiers beyond our frontier are serious obstacles to recruiting. We know, indeed, that recruiting is now so difficult that most extraordinary and expensive measures have been resorted to to complete the ranks, and, as far as we know, these measures have not been successful. No doubt with a withdrawal from

Kabul and Kandahar the number of troops beyond our frontier will sensibly diminish, but as long as we maintain a certain force beyond the frontier there will be a disinclination to enlist. This will not seem strange to those who know the Native soldier, especially if they read the lamentable accounts of the state to which some regiments were reduced by sickness last year.

The cost of holding forward positions is the third objection, and here there is scope for discussion, not as to the fact that there must be considerable expense, but as to the amount. It is impossible that any estimate can be exact, for certain elements for calculation are wanting. These must be assumed, and I will give my reasons, of course, for such assumption. I would, however, remark that in 1867 and 1873 I prepared the estimates of the probable cost of moving troops into Afghanistan under certain assumed conditions. I endeavoured to be moderate, but I believe was charged with exaggerating the probable cost. In point of fact, we have not done nearly as much as I assumed would be done in the way of occupation, and my supposition that all the troops sent into Afghanistan would be replaced in India has only been carried out to an extent, perhaps, of one third. Yet the actual expenditure has far exceeded any estimate I then made. I mention this to show that my predictions were not formed in an exaggerated spirit, and I shall observe the same desire to be moderate now.

The first point to settle is the amount and description of force needed to hold the advanced positions, and, as respects the Khyber and Kurrum, I think it is reasonable to accept as appropriate a force similar to that left last year after the conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamak.

After the troops had been withdrawn, there remained in the Khyber and in Kurrum respectively the following troops, on the 1st August 1879 :—

In the Khyber.

One field battery of Royal Artillery,
One Native mountain battery,
Two companies of Sappers and Miners,
Two regiments of British Infantry,
One regiment of Native Cavalry,
Five regiments of Native Infantry,

and there were present, excluding all absentees, 111 British officers, 1,600 British and 3,660 Native soldiers. In August, when there was much sickness, one regiment of British Infantry was withdrawn, reducing the European troops to 872 men.

In Kurrum.

One battery, Royal Horse Artillery,
One and a half field batteries, Royal Artillery,
Two mountain batteries, Native Artillery,
One company of Sappers and Miners,
One squadron of British Cavalry,
Three regiments of Native Cavalry,
Four regiments of British Infantry (less two companies),
Six regiments of Native Infantry,

and the numbers present were 223 British officers, 3,555 British and 6,265 Native soldiers. This number of men continued there, subject to the ordinary fluctuations, until the war broke out again in September. The numbers here given do not include more than 1,200 Native soldiers, a half field battery of Royal Artillery, and two companies of British Infantry at Kohat.

There is no reason to suppose that the force allotted to the Khyber and Kurrum was excessive, and we know that it was supplemented in the former by a local levy, and that subsidies were given to the tribes. Whether this was the case in Kurrum I do not know, but here from October to the present time a force of about 8,000 men has been locked up, though, as far as aid to our troops at Kabul was concerned, they have been useless.

The Indian Army Commission have allotted to the Khyber and to Kurrum, in their scheme for the garrisons of India, the following troops :—

Khyber.

1 Native Mountain Battery.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
1 Troop Native Cavalry.
3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Kurrum, including Thull.

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Guns, Native Mountain Artillery.
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 2 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

Making allowance for the fact that the Indian Army Commission contemplate an addition to the strength of regiments, their estimate is considerably below the force actually employed in the Khyber and Kurrum after the conclusion of peace in 1879. Under favourable circumstances, the force they have proposed for Kurrum might suffice, but I believe that a prudent commander would consider that the least force that could properly hold the Khyber would be that actually serving there on the 1st September 1879, namely,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Native Mountain Battery.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

For Pisheen and the country in its rear we cannot refer to actual experience, for instead of being our most advanced position, Pisheen has hitherto simply been a post on the line of communication with a strong division at Kandahar, but the Indian Army Commission, on the assumption that Kandahar would be given up, have allotted to Pisheen and the posts between it and Dadur inclusive,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Mountain Batteries, Artillery.*
- 1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

This force seems to me too small, considering that it has to hold a most important forward position, and to guard Quetta and a long line of communications, flanked by independent tribes who might give infinite trouble. I doubt a prudent Commander being satisfied without at least another British Infantry regiment and one and a half regiments of Native Cavalry, so as to bring up his force to a brigade of Cavalry and two brigades of Infantry. Recent experience has shown how unexpectedly our communications are assailed, and how suddenly large forces appear against us in the field. Forgotten lessons have indeed sharply repeated themselves to us since the Indian Army Commission closed its proceedings, and we should benefit by them. I therefore assume that the addition just stated is accepted. This would bring up the troops in positions beyond our old frontier to—

- 3 Field Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Native Mountain Batteries.
- 1 Garrison Battery.
- 4 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 6 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 5 Regiments British Infantry.
- 13 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the present establishment of Corps in India, which is, as respects British Corps, the ordinary peace complement of men, but which has given an increase of 96 and 200 men respectively to every Native regiment of Cavalry and Infantry beyond the frontier, the force I have detailed would comprise about 5,000 British and 15,000 Native soldiers.

The effective charge for these corps in time of peace, and on the peace establishment, as calculated from data of the cost of each unit of the Indian Army, made by Sir G. Kellner in 1879, would be somewhat over 750,000*l.* per annum. If to this we add a hundred per

* I am not certain what proportion of this is intended to be Native, but in my calculations I provide for two mountain batteries here, one European and one Native.

cent., I am sure we shall not do more than provide for the additional charge on account of the increased establishments of Native regiments, the extra charges for staff for a complete transport, for provisions, for extra allowances and for rations to Natives, for the greatly increased cost of Native Cavalry, for depots in India, for increased non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to the heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond our frontier, for works and roads, for civil and political charges, and for subsidies to Native Chiefs and others.

Against this it is impossible to assume that any material set-off can be looked for from revenue. The whole revenue of the Khyber, Kurrum, and Pisheen could not, under the most favourable circumstances, appreciably reduce the foregoing large military charge, while the revenue of the Quetta territory will, of course, go to its own ruler.

I have assumed that these troops are in excess of the old establishment of the army, or that if reductions could be effected the reductions would be *pro tanto* so much less than they otherwise might be. I cannot think that we had too large an army in India before the Afghan war, and our occupying forward positions, which are much more likely to need support than any frontier garrisons previously occupied, seems to me a strong reason for not diminishing the force in India. If this view was accepted, and it may be forced on us, the extra cost of the forward positions would be something like a million and a half a year. If only half the troops beyond our frontier were in excess of the old peace garrison of India, then the extra charge of the whole and the normal charge of half would be due to the advanced positions, or 1,125,000*l.* per annum, and in the very improbable contingency of no addition being made to the old establishment to replace the force beyond the frontier the extra charge would still amount to 750,000*l.* per annum. Even if my estimate of the extra cost of the troops is unduly large, and may be reduced by a fourth or a third, it will still be seen that a heavy pecuniary burden will be thrown on India, but I believe my estimate of the troops costing double as much as they would in peace in India is not excessive. I would add that, of the 750,000*l.* stated now to be spent monthly on the Afghan war, exclusive of home charges and cost of frontier railways, a very considerable proportion must be due to the troops in the Khyber, in Kurrum, and between our frontier and Pisheen, or that would be placed at Pisheen if Kandahar was given up.

In conclusion, I urge, for all the reasons I have set forth, an entire withdrawal within our own frontier. On the line of the Khyber or in Kurrum no time will be so appropriate for this withdrawal as when our troops return from Kabul. There is no object to be gained in remaining longer, and in fact it will be easier to come away then than later on. But I advocate no precipitation. Leisurely marches and frequent halts of a day or two should be made, not only in view of allowing the impedimenta to get well away, but also to show the Afghans that our withdrawal is in no respect like a retirement before an enemy. Some may think it undesirable to relinquish control of the Khyber Pass. If this control can be maintained, so as to secure a safe transit for trade and travellers, by the subsidizing of the Chiefs or by any arrangement not very expensive, and which will not involve the employment of our troops or any obligation to send those troops from time to time to restore order in the pass, possibly there is no objection to our, to this extent, controlling the Khyber, but I do not think we should go beyond this. Kurrum should be made over to whoever is left as the ruler of Kabul, as before, a measure which will greatly strengthen his hands with his subjects.

On the Kandahar side the retirement might be more deliberate, and be made first to Pisheen and then to Quetta. The withdrawal from Pisheen, however, should not be much delayed, or trouble may arise which would be urged as a reason for again advancing to Kandahar. It should be understood that once we came away, our officers and troops had no concern with what took place at the points given up, and the halt at Pisheen should not be understood as being made to enable us to see whether matters were going to be well managed or not at Kandahar. I think, therefore, a halt at Pisheen of a fortnight or three weeks would be ample, and all troops, except those for Quetta, should then return to India in a leisurely manner.

We went to Quetta for a purpose quite different from that which took us to Kandahar, and the former place should be held until the conditions are fulfilled, as I have before suggested, but the Political Officer should be told that he is to encourage the Khan to exert himself to do without our aid, so as to allow of our troops leaving. If necessary, however, they might remain until the season following that in which Pisheen was given up.

Having urged strongly that these retirements should take place, I must avow my belief that they would produce no injurious political effect in India. That we have

made a great mistake in going into Afghanistan no doubt is felt by Natives of intelligence, but this mischief is done, and is not to be repaired by stopping there. The Natives know that on every occasion we have defeated the Afghans, and they will also certainly know that we shall be stronger in India when we come away than it is possible for us to be when we have the strain of an Afghan war on our hands. Further, I am fain to believe that they will feel it is on the whole more just on our part to leave the Afghans to themselves than to occupy certain positions in their country on the plea that we must do so to protect ourselves against the improbable contingency of Russian invasion.

(Signed) H. W. NORMAN.

26th June 1880.

No. 7.

MEMORANDUM on our future POLICY in AFGHANISTAN.

THE present war in Afghanistan has, in many respects, closely followed the various phases of our first operations in that country.

We have easily beaten the enemy in the open field; we have overrun the country without serious difficulty; we have met with reverses in Southern Afghanistan and had to take refuge within the fortifications of Kandahar, and the only ruler we have as yet set up and helped to provide with an efficient native army has been deserted by his troops at the first opportunity. The disaster of the retreat from Kabul in 1842 has been imitated, although fortunately on a much smaller scale, in the defeat at and flight from Khusk-i-Nakhud.

The point, however, where the parallel ceases is in the utter collapse of the native army.* This had certainly not been generally foreseen, and must have been most unexpected by those who had looked forward to the early encounter of the Sepoy and the Cossack on the banks of the Oxus. A little consideration will, however, show that there is nothing extraordinary in this collapse. Perhaps the most prosperous provinces in India at the present time, or at all events those whose prosperity has progressed most rapidly, are those from which we have hitherto drawn our best recruits. The natives of Oude and the Punjab, as their riches and civilization increase, lose their taste and aptitude for a military life, and are disinclined to exchange the ease and plenty of their homes for prolonged garrison duty in a severe climate and amongst a treacherous and hostile population. Another cause has also been at work in lessening our recruiting field in India. Many duties which before the mutiny used to be entrusted to the native army are now carried out by the police, and although the police and army together may employ as many men as were formerly required for the army alone, still the number of native troops has, for the last 20 years, been considerably below the number maintained in the days of the East India Company. The demand for soldiers having been less, many men who would formerly have served in the army have turned their attention to other pursuits.

The present state of affairs shows conclusively that the native army is not capable, as at present recruited and organised, of undertaking operations on a large scale for an extended period beyond the frontiers of India.

If one result of the present war is to cause judicious improvements in our Indian army and the formation of an efficient reserve, it will not have been altogether unprofitable to this country.

Another matter which has become painfully evident is the complete failure of our means of transport. Our expenditure of baggage animals has been so ruinous that some years must elapse before we shall be able to provide transport for a large body of troops for prolonged operations on the north-west of India. During that time, it is true, our railway communication will be carried to our frontier and probably beyond it, and in our next advance into Afghanistan our camel and cattle transport will not be required until points very much further in advance are reached than has been the case during the present war. It must, however, be borne in mind that as our system of railways becomes extended in India, the supply of camels for transport purposes will gradually diminish. This fact became apparent some few years ago in carrying out the yearly reliefs of troops, when it was discovered that in those districts well provided with railways the natives no longer found it profitable to breed camels for transport purposes.

* The absolute failure in the supply of recruits is not confined to the Bengal Presidency, but extends to the whole of India.

In discussing our future policy with reference to Afghanistan, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind these two well established facts ; first, that the native army is no longer to be reckoned on for extended operations in that country ; and second, that our means of transport have been exhausted.

The points for consideration as regards our immediate policy in Afghanistan appear to be the following :—

1. How far the attitude and power of Russia in Central Asia should influence our proceedings.
2. Should Afghanistan be united under one ruler, or divided into separate provinces.
3. The line of frontier we should take up and the positions, if any, that we should occupy in the country.

With regard to the first question we may consider it a certainty that Russia will subdue the Tekke Turkomans, and, if necessary to effect this thoroughly, her troops will occupy Merv. But we may confidentially anticipate that she will not be able to advance beyond Merv, or even to hold that place permanently. From Merv to Herat is 230 miles, through a more or less desert country the whole way.

We may safely judge of the difficulties Russia must encounter in her progress in Central Asia from the experience we have gained in Afghanistan during the last three years. We have advanced from Sukkur to Kandahar, some 400 miles, and from Peshawur to a short distance beyond Kabul, some 200 miles, and, having done so much, we are exhausted and incapable of moving further. The march of detached brigades beyond these points were on a small scale, and are not here taken into consideration. We have had the resources of the whole of India at our disposal for transport animals, and we have used them up. Russia has to move all her troops and stores by sea, and to land them on the difficult shores of the Caspian, and has then to collect from the scattered and generally unfriendly Turkoman tribes the camels necessary for transport purposes. So difficult is it found to collect a sufficient number of these, that the main advance probably will not be undertaken until a line of rails has been laid down for part of the distance. The distance of Merv from the Caspian is considerably greater than the distance of Kandahar from the Indus. In the country to be traversed, Russia can obtain no supplies whatever for the men, and but scanty forage for the horses and cattle. So that she has not only to contend against enormous difficulties in providing transport, but also against very great difficulties in obtaining sufficient forage. She may be better off for men than we are at the present moment, but this will be no great advantage if she has not the means to move their baggage and supplies. A march on Merv will severely tax the powers of Russia, and it may be seriously doubted if she will attempt to undertake it.

Russia has always been content in her advances in Central Asia to take one step at a time, and to secure her advanced position before attempting a further movement. She will be content now to re-establish her reputation in Central Asia by a successful expedition against the Tekke Turkomans, and will then be prepared to wait patiently before making any further advance. Russia knows she need take no step to checkmate any movement of ours, as she is well aware of our intention to evacuate Afghanistan, and of the strain in men and money the present war is to us. She is besides now busied with arrangements for a war with China, and on this account alone will be glad to forego any operations against the Turkomans beyond what may be absolutely necessary.

We may therefore conclude that Russia will not now undertake any operation in Central Asia beyond those necessary to chastise the Tekke Turkomans.

We can then leave Russia altogether out of our calculations in any arrangements we may make in Afghanistan, and whilst firmly maintaining the principle that Afghanistan is beyond the sphere of Russian influence, we may feel assured that for *the present* Russia has no wish to exert her influence in that country. We must not, however, expect that this will always be the case.

Although we may have no cause to feel uneasy at present regarding the advance of Russia in Central Asia, that is no reason we should not at all times keep ourselves acquainted with her movements and designs in that part of the world. It is extremely unfortunate that, owing to the Consulship at Asterabad having been so long vacant, we have now no means of learning the progress of the Russian expedition against the Tekke Turkomans. Not only does it appear advisable to fill up the vacancy at Asterabad without further delay, but it might also be judicious, until affairs at Herat and in Western Afghanistan are settled, to detach an officer as Consul to Meshed.

If we were kept accurately informed of the state of affairs in those regions the Government would be at once able to dispel the discreditable state of alarm into which

this country is periodically thrown by rumours of Russian expeditions against Herat or Northern Afghanistan. If knowledge is power, ignorance is weakness, and this weakness we constantly show by the undignified fear displayed at every report or threat of Russian movements. It is frequently said, and occasionally truly so, that our military disasters are attributable to the defective information obtained by our Generals. It is probably safe to say that in the conduct of foreign affairs the same cause is at work, and that when we are outwitted by foreign powers, it is owing to our being deficient in the necessary information.

As regards the question of Afghanistan remaining one united kingdom, or being divided into separate provinces, it may be urged that, by having a united Afghanistan, our influence would be exerted over the whole country through one ruler, who would be responsible to us for the behaviour of all minor chiefs, instead of our having to control them separately. The difficulty of establishing a Resident, with a sufficient escort, could, if necessary, be confined to Kabul or its neighbourhood, instead of being multiplied by the number of separate chiefships that might be formed; the field of Russian intrigue, which will, sooner or later, make itself felt again, would be narrowed, and we should be continuing the policy of maintaining an independent and united Afghanistan closely allied to England, which policy we have hitherto proclaimed it our intention to follow. Russia has not openly disputed the principle we have laid down, that Afghanistan is beyond her influence, and if she has tacitly accepted it, we may presume she has done so on the understanding that the country remains united and independent. If Afghanistan is to be dismembered, she will claim her share of the spoil. With the revenue of the whole of Afghanistan at his disposal, and able to draw recruits from the entire kingdom, the ruler of the country will be in a position to hold the outlying provinces of Herat and Turkestan in subjection, and to consolidate his power as successfully as was done by Shere Ali. Deprived of the revenues and resources of the province of Kandahar, his hold on the outlying provinces would be feeble, and they would soon offer a favourable field for native intriguers supported by Russian influence.

Two principal reasons have been put forward by various authorities for the maintenance of Kandahar as an independent province, and for the retention of a British garrison at that town. The first is, that Kandahar is a place of great strategical importance as regards any further operations we may have to undertake against Afghanistan, and the second is, that it will be an important stage gained on the road to Herat, and will enable us, when the struggle takes place with Russia, for the possession of that town, to forestall her there. To maintain our influence at Kandahar without interference with the ruler at Kabul, it is contended by many eminent authorities, that the province should be separated from the rest of Afghanistan, and governed by a Chief, who would be advised by a British Resident. The limits of the province of Kandahar have not been officially defined; it is probably intended that they should extend to and include Farrah.

Kandahar is undoubtedly a point of great strategical importance, but it possesses this importance only in time of war. If we occupy such a position as will enable us to seize Kandahar on the first symptom of war, we obtain practically all the strategical advantages of the place itself, and at the same time avoid all the inconveniences which its permanent occupation would entail. If instead of Kandahar, we hold the Pishin Valley, we shall shorten our line of communication with India by over 100 miles, and at the same time be near enough to Kandahar to seize it when the necessity arises, and near enough to avail ourselves of the resources of the valley of the Arghandab.

There is no reason if we give up Kandahar, why the railway already in progress should not be continued to that place from Pishin. One of the conditions of making over the province to Abdul Rahman might be that he should furnish labour and funds towards the construction of the line within his territory, and that when our troops are finally withdrawn, he should be responsible for the protection of the line within his dominions.

As regards the value of Kandahar as a *point d'appui* against a Russian advance from Herat, or as an advanced base for a British advance on that town, it is contended that Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake any offensive operations in Afghanistan, and we ourselves are incapable of advancing on and occupying Herat in the face of Russian opposition, and many years will probably elapse before we are in a position to do so.

The formation of the province of Kandahar into an independent Chiefship will practically cut off the district of Herat from Kabul, for the line of communication between those two places will then be restricted to the road over the Bamian Pass and through Afghan Turkestan, the mountain portion of which is closed by snow for at least two

months in the year. The advocates of the formation of an independent province of Kandahar do not appear to have put forward any proposal for the future of Herat, beyond the suggestion, which has happily been found impracticable, of handing it over to Persia. Herat is not strong enough, with reference to its powerful and aggressive neighbours, to be independent, and if weakly held by the ruler at Kabul it will become a source of constant trouble to Russia, Persia, and ourselves.

The establishment of an independent province of Kandahar under our protection, means, in fact, the dismemberment of Afghanistan, for the ruler at Kabul would then no longer be able to retain an efficient hold over Afghan Turkestan and Herat. The former would eventually fall to Russia and the latter to Persia, and would remain in the hands of that power so long only as it might suit Russian policy that it should do so.

We should then find ourselves at Kandahar, ready, it is true, to oppose an advance of Russia from Herat, but Russia meantime will be at the Hindu Kush, a few marches only from Kabul, and we should in no way have increased our power or means of opposing a Russian advance from that direction. When the Russian Agent went to Kabul in 1878, he did not proceed *viâ* Herat but *viâ* Bamian; when a body of Russian troops was moved to Djam in 1878, there was no intention of sending it to Herat to help the Afghans against us, but it was to have proceeded to Kabul. Kabul has for years been the seat of political and military power in Afghanistan, and the ruler at that place has been master of the country.

In our dealings with Native Princes in India we have maintained our supremacy over them by making our power felt at their capital, as is now done at Morar in Gwalior, at Hyderabad in the Deccan, &c. The same principle should apply in Afghanistan. Our occupation of Kandahar, as regards any influence it will exercise over the ruler at Kabul, is futile; he will remain as open to Russian intrigue as he has ever been, and we shall continue as heretofore, ignorant of what may be taking place at his capital until the mischief has been done. In fact, we shall in no way improve our means of counteracting a danger which has already been experienced, although we may be better able to guard against a Russian advance from Herat, which is a danger which has not yet occurred and cannot be experienced for many years to come. We shall provide against an improbable and remote contingency, but shall gain no advantage against one of daily and immediate occurrence.

To make our influence and power felt in the country, it must be exerted at or near the capital, and for the reasons put forward on a previous occasion, the formation of a fortified cantonment at Kushi, with a British Resident, who could thence proceed to Kabul when necessary, is again strongly urged. If this proposal cannot be carried out, then it is suggested that a strong brigade of all arms, with carriage complete, should be cantoned in the highest part of the Kuram valley, which is suitable for occupation all the year round, and that the road thence across the Shutur-Gurdam Pass should be improved by our troops before they completely evacuate Northern Afghanistan. The knowledge that this force is ready for an advance at any moment on Kabul would have a very powerful influence on the conduct of affairs in that town.

The Government have decided that a British Resident is not in future to be stationed at Kabul, but it will probably be necessary to appoint an agent especially entrusted with Afghan affairs to reside on the frontier. This officer should be at the cantonment in the Kuram valley in the summer, and at Peshawur during the cold weather, and it should be his duty to pay periodical visits to Kabul.

The serious difficulty undoubtedly exists of our having bound ourselves to support the independence of the Wali of Kandahar, but this support, it is supposed, has not been promised unconditionally. His inability to maintain his position and rule has already been proved by the wholesale desertion of his troops, and this alone would appear sufficient reason for releasing us from our engagements.

Kandahar under a Native Prince but with a British garrison, would be independent in name only; in a very short time the administration would of necessity pass into our hands. It is impossible to disguise the fact that the independence of Kandahar, under the conditions proposed, means the annexation of the province to the British dominions.

What then becomes of our declaration that we had no intention of annexing any portion of Afghanistan beyond what might be absolutely necessary for the safety of our own frontiers? What faith will the Afghan nation in future place in British promises? They will say that in our first expedition against Afghanistan we suffered a serious disaster and were driven out of the country. In our second war, that we found it impossible to conquer the country, but, nevertheless annexed that part where the inhabitants are the least warlike, and where alone we could hope to retain our hold, and that we did this in spite of promises that the integrity of the country should be maintained.

In any future war between this country and Russia, Afghanistan will play a very important part, and it is as well we should consider what effect any arrangements we may now make may then have. The Afghans will not then look with favour upon those who have destroyed their independence and broken up their empire; they will rather side with the power that has shown them unvarying friendship, and which has not attempted to rob them of territory. A few Russian officers and a supply of arms would render the northern Afghans such a formidable enemy that they would seriously cripple any offensive operations we might undertake at the same time in Europe.

It is not recommended that Kandahar should be at once evacuated. This should not be done until Abdul Rahman has shown that he is firmly established in power, and is faithful to the promises he has made to the British Government; and Kandahar must also necessarily remain in our hands until the defeat inflicted by Ayoub Khan has been thoroughly avenged.

Lastly, as regards the frontier line we should occupy, there appears to be no reason why any alterations should be made from that contemplated in the treaty of Gandamak. By occupying Kushi, or the Upper Kuram Valley, we are in a position to enter Kabul, either as a friend or an enemy, whenever we may wish to do so, and from Pishin we can advance in a few days on Kandahar whenever the necessity arises.

Whether under any circumstances it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar, or Kabul, it is impossible at present to say; but, from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy the difficulty and the risk of a long march, through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base of operations.

(Signed) C. J. EAST,
A.Q.M.G.

Intelligence Branch,
Quartermaster-General's Department,
War Office, 16th August 1880.

Endorsements on the above.

Quartermaster-General,

I submit the within paper on "Our future Policy in Afghanistan," by Colonel East, A.Q.M.G.

I consider the views therein so ably put forward, of the greatest interest and importance at the present time.

I concur generally in the conclusions at which Colonel East has arrived.

(Signed) A. ALISON,
D.Q.M.G.

18th August 1880.

I think this a very good minute upon the present condition of affairs in Afghanistan, and I fully concur in the views expressed regarding the desirability of our leaving Kandahar, and retiring upon Pishin, as soon as political events will allow us to do so.

(Signed) G. J. WOLSELEY.

23rd August 1880.

No. 8.

MÉMOIRANDUM by Field Marshal His Royal Highness the DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE on
Colonel EAST'S PAPER on our future POLICY in AFGHANISTAN.

WHILST admitting to the fullest extent the value of this paper, I confess I am not in the least convinced by it of the advisability of giving up Kandahar as the result of the great struggle we have been and are still engaged upon in Afghanistan. On the contrary, I feel more and more satisfied from all that is now going on, that upon the retention of Kandahar largely depends our general position and influence in the East, and more particularly in Central Asia; and even our hold on India will be shaken should we not have the boldness to maintain what we have so dearly purchased.

I firmly believe, that with a good line of communication by railroad, which is now in progress and considerably advanced to Kandahar, that city might and would in time become a great emporium for commercial purposes, and that the trade of Persia and Central Asia might in this way be very considerably diverted from passing, as it now

does, through the provinces of Russia, and that then our power would be largely increased in those parts, besides securing to us those commercial advantages which now fall to the share of our rivals. The railroad, in connecting Kandahar with India, would bring the trade down to Kurrachee, whence it would be shipped in perfect security to any portion of the world. Again, as a military position, I am strongly in favour of Kandahar. We know, by recent experience, that the march thence to Herat is not by any means difficult of accomplishment, and as Herat must ever be looked upon as the key to any advance on the part of Russia to India, the facility of reaching it before the Russians could attain it from Merv would, in itself, be of immense importance. That Russia is bent upon reaching Merv is palpable from all their movements, and is hardly denied by them. We cannot, if we would, prevent their attaining it, and I do not think we shall make any effort to do so, consequently I feel satisfied their object will ere long be accomplished. To us this would be a heavy blow, but for our occupation of Kandahar. But with Kandahar in our possession—and we are actually there now—I think we might look on with perfect calmness to Russia's occupying and holding Merv.

Such being my views, I ask myself what are the chief arguments against it as contained in Colonel East's paper. The first is the collapse of our native armies, the second the breakdown of our transport. I think too much importance is attached by him to both these incidents. I do not believe in the utter collapse of the native armies. No doubt native troops cannot be too long kept in the field or away from their native habits, as must be the case when the troops are in the field. It must be remembered that the army in Afghanistan has been for *two years* consecutively in the field. This would be a severe strain upon the best European troops, how much more so with natives deprived of all their usual habits and comforts. The native armies have fought faithfully and admirably and have never flinched. Give them rest and time to recover themselves, and there is no reason to doubt that they would be found as ready and willing again to go wherever ordered. Very probably recruiting has been checked and suspended by what has been required of the troops in so protracted a campaign. But there are many other causes which have added to the difficulty of obtaining recruits, and which are referred to in Colonel East's paper, and in other communications I have received from India. The severity of military duties in India has been very great, the facility of employment is far greater than what it was, and the labour market has now to be watched in India, as it has to be even at home. In fact, the price of the military article, in the shape of men, has greatly increased in value, and there has not been any sufficient rise in the remuneration offered to induce men to enlist as freely as in former times. So that I think we must not ascribe to the unpopularity of the war alone the difficulties with which we are contending.

Then as regards transport, there is no doubt that at the present moment this has seriously broken down, and hampered our movements. But this has been chiefly caused by the want of preparedness at the outset of the contest, and the consequent overworking of such animals as could hastily be collected, bad or inferior in themselves, and rendered totally inefficient by the vast amount of work they were called upon to perform from the deficiency in their numbers. But as regards the retention of Kandahar, I do not think this ought to cause any uneasiness, for with the railroad once completed to Kandahar, the traffic will be conducted mainly on this line, and transport animals will only be required in reduced numbers, and as auxiliaries to the great line of communication by rail.

I hold, therefore, that the objections chiefly raised by Colonel East to the retention of Kandahar ought to be, and would be, met by judicious measures, and as I feel satisfied that our prestige would receive a vital blow by retrograde movement in that direction, I adhere strongly to my conviction, that Kandahar ought, on no account, ever again to pass out of our hands.

As regards the question of expenditure, I firmly believe that, in the long run, it will be found much less costly to retain our hold of the advantageous position we have acquired, both in a commercial and in a military point of view, than to have to fight for our very existence in India should our interests and prestige suffer, as I am persuaded they would were we now to withdraw to Pishin as suggested.

GEORGE.

Kissingen,
August 31st, 1880.

No. 9.

NOTE *on* the RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,

ON the 26th June last I submitted to your Lordship a note on the subject of our line of frontier on the north-western border of India; but in that note I confined my observations in the main to the questions connected with the line of frontier to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak, that is, the Khyber Pass up to Lundi Kotul, the Kuram Valley, and the country beyond the old frontier of Sind up to Pisheen. I did not touch on the question of occupying Kandahar, for, as far as I knew, there was then no proposal that we should occupy it. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamak we were entirely to withdraw from it, and under a more recent arrangement made by Lord Lytton, with the details of which I was imperfectly informed, Kandahar was to be made over to the Wali Shere Ali, who was to be supported by us, but to what extent I did not know.

Recent events, however, have made it important that some other arrangement should be made, and any sort of notion that may have been entertained of the power of Shere Ali to hold Kandahar must be discarded. Few believed in his power to do so at any time, but it is now conclusively proved that, except under the immediate support of our troops, he is quite incapable of retaining the position of ruler of Kandahar.

In my note of the 26th June, on the North-western frontier, I made the following allusion to Kandahar:—

“I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar, any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground; for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

“To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furreh and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

“Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me indeed pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

“As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

“In considering the best line for our north-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as know, in view to resisting the Afghans.”

Very important events have occurred since I wrote the above, but I think it will be admitted that these events have not weakened the force of what I urged. Ayoub Khan

came from Herat to the Helmund, very much incited to do so, it would seem probable, by our having set up Shere Ali as ruler of Kandahar. The troops of the latter either wholly deserted his cause or became unreliable, and we had the mortification of suffering a disastrous defeat, and of seeing a considerable body of our troops shut up in Kandahar. It is difficult indeed to speak with respect of an arrangement which forced us to support at Kandahar a ruler who was evidently quite incapable of holding so important a province. We may, hope, however, that the arrangement which we entered into of our own accord with Shere Ali is at an end, and that we shall not attempt a similar experiment at Kandahar with any other chieftain. If this is admitted it remains to consider whether we shall permanently occupy the place as a British possession, a course which is being strenuously urged by those who have incited and applauded the policy which took us into Afghanistan two years ago, and some of whom at least would gladly see us remain at Kandahar as a sure step towards the eventual annexation of all Afghanistan.

At the outset of the discussion, the question of what is meant by the occupation of Kandahar must be raised, and the reply at first sight, I presume, would be that we should take over the province of Kandahar as recently allotted, or intended to have been allotted to Shere Ali. Few of those who write so readily about annexing Kandahar really know what such an annexation means, while others who are better informed and who desire the entire annexation of the Afghan kingdom must smile at the innocence with which taking Kandahar to ourselves is described as a small matter, when they know that it means a most gigantic step towards achieving the annexation they wish for.

The territory to be given to Shere Ali was described by Sir Donald Stewart, in a Despatch to the Government of India, dated 16th February 1880, as the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pisheen and Sibi, with possibly that part of Seistan watered by the Helmund; the district of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-rud and Zemindawar, separated about nine years ago, and the district of Furrah originally belonging to Herat, but which was formed into a separate province since the capture of that city by the Ameer of Kabul in 1863. This is stated by General Stewart to be the minimum already practically fixed, and he enclosed a cutting from a map showing the extent and approximate limits of the territory. It is there shown by "an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle, with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated, or indeed cultivable." Sir D. Stewart estimated the number of inhabitants at between half a million and a million, three-fourths being Dooranees, according to their own account, the only true Afghans, and Colonel St. John estimated the revenue at 20½ lacs, which sum he assumed, might "be largely increased by a settled government and by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar."

Judging by the map, the province thus comprised would extend forty or fifty miles beyond Khelat-i-Ghilzai, or say 130 from Kandahar in all, in the direction of Ghuznee and Kabul. It would reach a point about 30 miles beyond Furrah, or 260 miles from Kandahar in the direction of Herat, and within 130 miles of the last-named place. Due west it would extend to the Persian frontier beyond Lash Jawain, a distance of 300 miles from Kandahar, and it would extend 120 miles to the eastward, and about 300 miles to the southward of Kandahar. This is a tract of country one fifth larger than England and Wales combined, and about the same size as the Punjab territory annexed by Lord Dalhousie after the war of 1848-9, while it is so placed as to hold forth a sure prospect of discord with the rulers of Persia, Herat, and Kabul. The people too, General Stewart says, comprise a large majority of Dooranees, the class which we are told has chieftains most inclined to be hostile to us, and whose expulsion from the city of Kandahar was deemed essential after the defeat of General Burrows and advance of Ayoub Khan.

To take upon ourselves the responsibility of this large and unprofitable territory cannot, I think, be contemplated. If it is contemplated, then we had better prepare to maintain at least 20,000 troops in Southern Afghanistan, with the prospect of having to send a good many more. If we take Kandahar with only a moderate territory round, including the tract between it and Pisheen, so as to guard our communications and command sufficient supplies, still difficulties will arise as to who is to have the territory of the province of Kandahar, and many troubles may be caused by various claimants for different portions of territory, and we ourselves from time to time be involved in these troubles.

Putting this aside, and supposing the smaller tract only is taken, that is the country between Pisheen and Kandahar, and a tract of 50 to 70 miles in other directions, I will ask what advantage accrues to us?

Taking the military arguments first, we see it broadly stated by anonymous newspaper correspondents that military men quartered at Kandahar were unanimously of opinion that we ought to retain the place. I have good grounds for doubting that this assertion is correct, and though I am unaware of General Stewart's opinions at present, I certainly understood that he at one time considered Kandahar useless as a military position. But after all what does the military opinion amount to? We do not know what attention these military officers may have given to the various considerations which must be borne in mind by a responsible Government. They could not say that service there was popular, for such a statement would be directly opposed to facts; they could not say that by holding Kandahar we would require fewer troops in the army of India than if we did not take Kandahar, for not only would a large force be required for Kandahar and the communications, but the presence of this force beyond our frontier could in no way enable us to weaken Sind by having less than the very small garrison which has sufficed for it for many years prior to 1878.

In short it comes to this, that some authorities consider Kandahar to be a good military position while others disagree with this opinion, but if the former view is correct, we have to ask for what purpose is it a good military position and necessary for us to hold. We have had no trouble in India from the Afghans, and assuredly need anticipate no trouble from them to warrant our undertaking the occupation as against them, nor can it be believed that we are in danger from Persia, and must therefore take this forward position permanently. It must be the old story of Russia invading India, and to oppose her it is deemed by the advocates of this policy necessary to keep a force at Kandahar, which, of course, necessitates other troops on the line of communication and in reserve. But are we to undertake serious and immediate responsibilities and difficulties merely in the prospect of a contingency, such as the advance of Russia to Herat? Our being at Kandahar would not prevent Russia from advancing to Herat if she desired to do so. An occupation of Herat could only be prevented by our sending a considerable army there, and not by remaining at Kandahar. The contingency is remote, and if Russia really intends to injure us in India, which, of course, would involve war in Europe, my impression is that she is at least as likely to make an advance from the direction of Tashkend towards Afghan-Turkistan and Kabul, as to move forward by Herat.

Our real danger of Russia taking possession of Herat, without giving us a cause of war, would arise if Persia had the place, as, I understand, was at one time contemplated as a good arrangement for England. Then, indeed, Russia might, under some plausible pretext of a quarrel with Persia, find reasons, with which we could hardly quarrel, for taking Herat. I trust we shall entirely discourage any occupation of Herat by Persia, and without such occupation it does not seem likely that Russia could find grounds to take Herat, even if she desired to do so. My contention is that the probability of our having to struggle for Herat, or to defend India from Kandahar, is so remote that its possibility is hardly worth considering as an argument for an inconvenient and costly occupation. I think such an occupation would involve too large a charge for the small extra facility it might afford us in bringing up at some future day the 30,000 or 40,000 men it might be requisite to use if we had to fight Russia at Herat or at Kandahar, or between those two places.

The military reasons, therefore, seem to me to be of little force, while financial reasons must assuredly be *nil*. Holding Kandahar with a moderate *entourage*, it is hardly to be supposed that we could realize 10 lacs of rupees a year, even under the favourable circumstances anticipated by Colonel St. John, and this sum would leave us heavy losers. A railway, which would be almost a necessity of our occupation, would never recoup us for the outlay of construction and maintenance. Its first cost would be very heavy, and establishments would require handsome pay to induce them to serve. Is it possible to believe, after our experience of railways in fertile, thickly populated parts of British India, that a railway across the desert of Sind, and passing over mountain ranges in a sparsely populated country like Beloochistan and Southern Afghanistan, is likely to pay its heavy working expenses, maintenance, and interest on money laid out? It would be the wildest assumption to suppose that any occupation of Kandahar could ever result pecuniarily in anything but a heavy loss.

The political reasons urged in favour of occupation or annexation, as far as I understand them, are as follows:—

I. That we shall influence Afghanistan and Central Asia generally from Kandahar in a way favourable to our views.

II. That we shall introduce good government where otherwise there would be bad government.

III. That annexation is desired by the people or by a majority of them.

IV. That our prestige will suffer by retirement, especially in the eyes of the people of India.

V. That it is advisable to remain at Kandahar in order that we may have something to show in return for our heavy loss in lives and treasure in Afghanistan during the last two years.

As to the first reason it appears to me that our presence at Kandahar, so far as it exerts any influence, will be unfavourable to us. Every one engaged in the recent war whose opinion I have read, and I have read many opinions, from those of the two most distinguished Generals the war has produced down to that of an intelligent Native Officer has expressed himself to the effect that the less we have to say to the Afghans the better for our influence over them. For many reasons they dislike our presence, and though we lavish money on them and treat them with justice and kindness they are in no degree reconciled to our being in their country. They are an independent people and do not like us in the position of conquerors, the only position in which we can remain among them, and apart from this our ways and our religion are so different from that of the Afghans that we can never expect them to tolerate us in their country unless it may be to aid them to repel or to expel some other invader.

It is to be hoped that we may so far flatter ourselves as to believe that the second reason urged is, in a sense, true. No doubt, so far as our means extended, our Government would be far better than that of any Afghan, but it is a Government not desired by the Afghans, and we have no right to take territory without the consent of those to whom it belongs, merely to enable us to bring into play our system of good government.

The third reason, namely, that our rule is desired, is absolutely opposed to all our experience. There may be a certain number of Hindoo traders and others who think we would protect or favour them, but can anyone suppose that the Afghans themselves wish for our rule? Who of them has lost an opportunity, when such opportunity offered, of injuring us? No place ought to appreciate us more than Kandahar, where our money had been lavished, most strict discipline maintained, as was indeed the case everywhere with our troops in Afghanistan, and where we had very scrupulously abstained from everything calculated to annoy the natives, and yet, how did they behave? A full inquiry into recent events at and near Kandahar will, I think, show that the behaviour of the Afghans of the city and neighbourhood was the reverse of friendly directly we fell into trouble, and we are told that the villagers not far from Kandahar murdered our fugitive soldiers after the defeat of Khosk-i-Nakhud. These people cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling.

Fourthly, it is alleged that our prestige in India will suffer by retirement. I do not see why this should be alleged of Kandahar more than of Kabul, the retirement from which place seems to have been followed by no such result. On the contrary India seems to have accepted the retirement as a wise and just measure. I feel sure the same sentiment would follow a retirement from Kandahar, and we should further know that, prestige or no prestige, we should be far stronger in India after the retirement, and would be so in long years to come when any recollection of a temporary or partial loss of prestige would be forgotten.

The last argument, though it appeals to national feelings, seems to me one that can hardly be pressed. It amounts to this,—that we have made a very bad bargain of this Afghan war, but it is so painful to admit this that we must cling to a part of our bad bargain. If the portion we retained would cost us nothing hereafter, there might be a show of sense in the argument, but if it can be shown that our remaining at Kandahar simply means a perpetuation of a bad bargain, surely we had better, like sensible people, admit we have made a mistake, and let our first loss be a final one. Let us not condemn others to die in Afghanistan, because we have already lost many valuable lives, or lavish millions in addition to those millions that have already gone past recall, merely because we are unwilling to admit that we have been led into grievous error.

I have thus noted a few observations on the reasons assigned for holding Kandahar. It hardly seems worth while to allude to the argument that we should create and improve trade. I am sceptical as to trade receiving any considerable development because we establish our guns and bayonets at Kandahar, but if this result was certain, and if every one of the other reasons assigned for holding the place was true, I would say they were immeasurably outbalanced by the evils of any such occupation, and I will now detail those evils, though I shall be far indeed from exhausting the catalogue.

First, as to political evils. One of these, of most importance in my mind, is that we should be guilty of injustice. No doubt we may have taken territory in India under circumstances now considered not creditable according to strict rules of justice and right. It might be hoped that our sense of justice had improved in these latter years, but, if we annex a portion of Afghanistan we shall, I think, commit a great wrong, and a great wrong is a political error in any country, but most of all so in India, where our supreme position gives us so heavy a responsibility, and where, as Christian rulers, we should set an example of Christian justice to our subjects. Necessity cannot fairly be alleged, as it was alleged, rightly or wrongly, in some of the cases of annexation, that are now condemned. Our greatest annexation during the last fifty years was that of the Punjab, but this annexation only took place after an actual invasion of our territory by the formidable army of the Punjab, and after the failure of our attempt, subsequent to the defeat of the Sikh army, to maintain the lawful sovereign of the country peaceably on his throne. We annexed Oudh in 1856, and though individually I think the measure was wrong, our title to do so was, under the circumstances, incomparably greater than anything that can be alleged in favour of annexing Kandahar. I feel certain that the real political effect of such annexation will be injurious to us in India, as it will impress upon the Chiefs and people the notion that a mere cry that we should be the better for possessing certain territory is sufficient to justify us in seizing it.

If it is stated that the wishes of the population justify our annexation, I would say that the evidence seems to me to tend in the opposite direction. On what occasion have the people given practical proofs of friendship for us? I have already shown what they did when we were in trouble last July and August, and it is notorious that then everywhere our communications were stopped or threatened. It is not likely that a province, three fourths of the population of which are Dooranee Afghans, the people who, it is said, General Primrose had to expel from the city directly after the defeat of Burrows, is much in favour of annexation by the British. Our well-wishers are probably confined to a few of those who make money out of us, and the friendship even of these is not to be relied on whenever circumstances stop their gaining profit out of us. It seems to me that we have no grounds for evading the charge of injustice in annexing, by the plea that we are acting in accord with the wishes of the bulk of the people.

Then, assuredly, the political effect of burdening India with the inevitable cost of the annexation would be bad. It is not likely that the English taxpayer will approve of an annual charge to meet that cost, wholly or in part, and it is evident that if we hold Kandahar taxes must be added in India, or imposts maintained that otherwise might be abolished to the great contentment of our subjects. If we stop all charges for Afghanistan, we may enter on a settled course to improve our financial position; but if we remain in that country, not only are extra charges inevitable, but these charges must be so uncertain, and, I fear, with a constant tendency to increase, that a state of things will continue which is highly undesirable from a political point of view.

Remaining in Afghanistan means a continual simmering of trouble with real troubles from time to time. Hence there will be a constant excitement in India. We can never be quit of Afghan difficulties while we remain in the country. Disputes of one kind or another are certain to arise, in which we shall be involved, and when any reverse or check takes place we see how readily panics arise in India, and such panics may at any time be taken advantage of by those classes of our subjects or feudatories who do not wish us well. Nothing can have a better effect politically in India than for the people to know that we are very strong within our borders, and that we have ceased to have the constant anxieties which arise from our troops being thrust forward into advanced positions in an inhospitable country, full of unfriendly and warlike people.

Our object is always said to be to have a friendly and strong Afghanistan. Breaking up the country, as we must do by holding Kandahar, ensures us enemies, and certainly cannot make Afghanistan strong. It is difficult to conceive that the ruler of Kabul could conquer and hold the Herat province if we held Kandahar, and it is difficult also to conceive, looking to past history, as recently quoted in a memorandum submitted to your Lordship by Sir Erskine Perry, and also judging by common sense, that a ruler at Kabul can feel himself powerful and contented if he does not hold Kandahar. I have already alluded to the difficulties which beset us as to territorial jurisdiction if we hold Kandahar. They seem to me almost insuperable, but it is quite certain that whether we take the whole Kandahar province or only a limited part of it, a series of struggles must take place among the chieftains, of which it would be difficult for us to keep clear,

and which certainly would place in the far distance any hope of a united or friendly Afghanistan.

Turning to the military financial aspect of the question, it must be observed what a great misfortune it will be if we have to maintain troops in excess of the real requirements of India. Apart from what I look upon as a weak and unfounded fear of Russia, I suppose few now assert that we have a better frontier by advancing than we had previously. At all events on the Sind frontier, which alone can be affected by our advance on Kandahar, we have had no military trouble for many years, and a most moderate garrison, not 5,000 men for all Sind, has amply sufficed. A force placed at Kandahar may be considered entirely in excess of Indian requirements, and so far from enabling us to do with fewer troops in Sind it would necessitate, I think, an addition so as to have a reserve at hand ready to come up.

The amount of force required at Kandahar depends, first, upon the territory we take, and secondly, upon the supposed object of holding Kandahar. If we occupy the whole province and hold Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Girishk, Furrak, and other necessary places, besides Quetta and our lines of communication, I do not see that less than 20,000 or 22,000 men would be sufficient, and this force would have to be very thoroughly equipped for movement, and require a strong reserve to be brought from Sind and India if ever operations were to be extended towards Herat, for I need hardly remark that our being at Kandahar would not hinder Russia, if so minded, from occupying Herat, unless we are prepared to bring up a large force to that place. No doubt many of the advocates of annexation look upon a move to Herat as a necessary sequence to the occupation of Kandahar, though I have very high military authority for saying that if we are to oppose Russia we ought not to advance to Herat to do so.

Assuming, however, that we only hold Kandahar, the country between it and India, and a territory extending to that unsatisfactory line of frontier, the Helmund, and for 40 or 50 miles in other directions, and also assuming that the present army in India generally is looked upon as sufficient to afford a body of troops to move up speedily if extended operations become necessary, I cannot think that, judging by past experience, we could prudently keep less than 15,000 men beyond the old frontier. When Ayub Khan advanced from Herat last July, General Primrose had rather more than 12,000 men under his orders, or deducting the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, he had about 11,000 men, all of them beyond the old frontier. We have seen how inadequate this force proved, and I should hope that we should in future have at least 15,000 men to compose the Kandahar division thus distributed.

Kandahar, including the adjacent territory to the west, north, and east :—

- 4 Batteries of Artillery.
- 1 Regiment of British Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the communications, extending 250 miles, and excluding the garrison of Quetta and reserve at that place :—

- 1 Battery Native Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Reserve Brigade at Quetta and garrison for that place :

- 2 Batteries Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.



This force is in reality only in excess of that which General Primrose had to the following extent, viz. :—

- 1 Field Battery retained at Quetta in 1879, but returned to India without relief when General Stewart left Kandahar.
- 1 Mountain Battery taken on by General Stewart from Kandahar, and not replaced last July, though intended to be so.
- 1 Regiment British Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment Native Infantry.

This seems a moderate addition, and assuming that the additional corps were about the same strength as those serving in Afghanistan last year, would bring that force up to about the 15,000 men I have put down as necessary.

In Artillery it will be seen that I have only brought up the strength to the scale of 1879. A British Cavalry regiment has been added for Kandahar, and this I look on as important. A regiment of this arm accompanied General Stewart to Kandahar, and was most useful, but was withdrawn in April 1879, to be hurried up again, from a distance of more than a thousand miles, directly General Burrows was defeated. No doubt Native Cavalry are excellent, and for general purposes are more useful than British Cavalry, but the latter are, in my humble opinion, an essential component part of a well constituted force in India. It was accepted as an established rule in India, after experience of the Mutiny and Sikh wars, that British Cavalry were, in all practicable cases, to be a part of any considerable force of all arms, especially if there was Horse Artillery. That was a wholesome rule, and had it not been departed from at Kandahar we might have had a different result to General Burrows' action. No doubt the presence of British Cavalry, inaccessible to those influences which may be brought to bear on our Native Cavalry, and possessing superb discipline, adds enormously to the moral strength of a force, and I am quite sure that Sir F. Roberts would readily acknowledge the advantage he has experienced during the last twelve months from the presence of the 9th Lancers.

The only other addition I have made is that of a regiment of British Infantry, a regiment and a half of Native Cavalry and a regiment of Native Infantry, just sufficient to enable the General Commanding to bring up a reserve brigade of 3,000 men of all arms to Kandahar whenever wanted, without unduly weakening Quetta or his posts of communication. That such a reserve should be maintained at or near Quetta, completely equipped with transport, however expensive it may be to keep transport at Quetta, seems to me essential. Had any proper moveable reserve been maintained, such as I propose, and General Phayre, instead of only being able to send forward to Kandahar dribblets of Native Infantry prior to Burrows' defeat, been able to move forward with a strong brigade when first reinforcements were called for, that brigade would have reached Kandahar a fortnight before Burrows' reverse, and might have entirely prevented it.

Let us not suppose that trouble is ended because Sir F. Roberts has defeated Ayub and captured his guns. That distinguished Officer captured all the Kabul artillery in October 1879, and yet his splendid force was compelled to retire behind the walls of Sherpur in December. In fact, the Afghans are stronger when the uncongenial discipline to which their forces have been subjected of late years is destroyed, and they are at liberty to fight in their own fashion. If, therefore, we are capable of learning by experience, we shall not leave Kandahar in future without a strong reserve above the passes.

It may be urged that if we make a railway a more moderate force will answer. I doubt this. The railway, for about 250 miles, will have to be strongly guarded, and it is not only liable to attacks but also to interruptions from floods, of which instances occurred this year, although the rainfall was not excessive. No doubt a railway is useful in bringing reinforcements and stores, but it must not be implicitly relied on, and at all events the force I have specified is the least that I think should be maintained above the passes, completely equipped for movement and quite independent of the railway.

The entire cost of the occupation of Kandahar, according to the foregoing view, and by calculations based on the plan adopted in my note of the 26th June 1880, would be about 1,400,000*l.* per annum.* I think this is fairly and entirely chargeable to the cost of occupation, for I am not aware that the occupation of Kandahar would strengthen us in India or on any other part of our northern frontiers, while certainly some reserves would have to be held in constant readiness to support Kandahar and Quetta.

Besides this large charge, no doubt much would have to be done in the way of constructing permanent shelter for the troops and in improving or constructing fortified posts, and these, together with the completion of the railway from Sibi to Kandahar

* That is taking the ordinary cost of the troops in India and adding 100 per cent. to cover the increased cost of supplies for European troops, larger establishment, of Native regiments (96 men in the Cavalry and 200 in the Infantry), staff, transport, rations, and extra payments to Natives, increased cost of Native Cavalry: depôts in India, heavy non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond the frontier, rations to families of British soldiers allowed during absence of troops in Afghanistan, for works and roads, and for civil and political charges and payments.

(250 miles), and the probable improvement that will be necessary to the railway up to Sibi, could hardly take less than 2,000,000*l.* sterling.

For all this what return can be expected? It can hardly be supposed that the territory I have assumed round Kandahar would give a net revenue of 100,000*l.* a year, while the prospect of the railway covering its working expenses and cost of maintenance in a difficult country, and necessarily high cost of establishments, and probably, in parts, of fuel, is doubtful. That it could also cover the interest on capital seems impossible, when we recollect the sparse population and sterile nature generally of the country through which it passes and to which it leads.

On the other hand, if we frankly put aside our Russian bugbear and give up Kandahar, we may discontinue the railway, and save a great outlay, and by bringing back our troops to India, even if we do not reduce regiments or batteries, we might save all the additional expenditure consequent on foreign service and increased establishments.

Entire withdrawal from Afghanistan would be hailed with joy by our Native Army. Nothing short of this will restore the old popularity of our service. We know that recruiting, even though a bounty is given, has been practically stopped, and this to those who know the Native Army is not surprising. Good and loyal soldiers as they are, and always anxious for a campaign, prolonged service out of India, and especially in Afghanistan, is hateful to them. No device of a reserve will remedy this defect, for neither army nor reserve can exist without recruiting, and I can conceive nothing more disastrous to the popularity of the service than a continuance of the liability to be sent to Afghanistan, combined with the formation of a reserve which should give the State a claim to re-enrol a man when he had left active service and settled down at his home. We cannot do without our Native Army, so let us not tamper with it. It serves our purpose for all really necessary objects connected with the defence of India, but it will not serve us if we condemn a large part of it to duty in Afghanistan. We cannot replace this army in Afghanistan by Afghan levies, for they would eventually turn against us, and to replace them by Europeans would be too heavy a burden.

The mere fact of our making Kandahar British territory would in no way reconcile our sepoys to service there, nor would the extra advantages given them on the ground that service at Kandahar is foreign service be prudently withdrawn. In Burmah, which has been ours since 1852, the sepoys still receive all the advantages of foreign service, and the heirs of those who die there receive pension, and this undoubtedly would still have to be allowed at Kandahar if we annexed it.

Doubts, too, have been expressed as to the suitability of all portions of our Native Army for service in Afghanistan. Loyal, well-disciplined, and brave as those troops are, many of our soldiers are physically inferior to the Afghans. A determined attack by fanatical Afghans tries the best troops, and there is an opinion among officers who have recently served that the result of such attacks if really carried home may be doubtful, unless our forces were in the main British, Sikhs, Pathans, and Goorkhahs, elements of the Army which, for many reasons, it is impossible to largely increase. We are only likely to see such attacks when we meet the Afghans on their own ground, for it is not the disciplined soldier, but the fanatical Ghazee, who makes such attacks, and these people usually have neither the inclination nor the means to enable them to proceed to distances in a body.

I trust I have made clear some objections to holding Kandahar. I have already urged that we should not permanently hold Pisheen and Quetta. I think I can add little to what I said on that subject in my note of the 26th June. It is to me doubtful whether holding Pisheen would be much of an improvement over the occupation of Kandahar. We might require less troops and have fewer sources of trouble around us, but in all probability being near to Kandahar something would soon draw us back there. Further, by all accounts, Pisheen possesses few resources. It is also distinctly Afghan territory. As to Quetta, it is impossible to see any justification for our permanent occupation of the place. A treaty empowering us to send troops into the territory does not warrant our permanently taking Quetta, and our doing so is opposed to Lord Salisbury's Despatch of 1877. Quetta is hateful to our troops, and very sickly. It is folly to suppose that it is necessary to hold Quetta in order to secure ourselves against Russia, and the wise and just course is to give it back to the Khan, and, with it, to give the district of Sibi, taken by us from Kabul in 1879. My urgent contention is that we should come back altogether,—not hurriedly, but deliberately, and with a determination henceforth to leave the Afghans to settle their own affairs, and with

a resolve not to interfere with them unless they are actually allying themselves with Russia for unfriendly purposes towards ourselves.

If we retain Kandahar, or if we retain Pisheen, I venture to predict that we shall have an army in the field before a year is over engaged in opposing those with whom we ought to have no cause of quarrel.

I feel deeply the momentous issues that hang upon the decision as to the retention or abandonment of Kandahar. To my apprehension a judicious withdrawal will be for the great and lasting benefit of India, while a continuance there will be productive of endless evil, and be a measure which, once formally decided on by Her Majesty's Government, can hardly be revoked save under circumstances of dishonour and disaster.

As a humble contribution to the facts and arguments already before your Lordship on the subject, I venture to submit the foregoing remarks.

H. W. NORMAN.

20th September 1880.

No. 10.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE importance of Kandahar strategically is generally allowed by military authorities as to the following:—

It covers *all* the lines of communication between Southern Afghanistan and the Indus.

It commands the easiest westerly approach from Herat, which will infallibly be used by any hostile body coming from that direction. This route presents no physical difficulties; the absence of such has been well proved lately by Ayooob Khan bringing with him a large force of artillery, 30 guns, not particularly well mounted.

It commands the roads to Northern Afghanistan and powerfully flanks the Kabul line. No force designing to reach India from the Oxus would dare venture on advance through Kabul and the Khyber, Kandahar being held in force by the troops of India.

From Herat to Kabul there is no direct road practicable for wheeled artillery. The only other such route than by Kandahar is the roundabout one viâ Maimena, Balkh, and Bamian.

For supplies for an army Kandahar is the next best situation to Herat. It is a real emporium to which the products of the surrounding valleys, some of them very rich, readily flow in, and where everything required for soldiers, except European necessities, can be obtained in ample sufficiency.

Being a trade centre the inhabitants generally are very peacefully disposed, and in the first part of this war, as well as in 1839–42, showed themselves very ready to keep on good terms with us. The adverse display after the disaster of Maiwand was mainly from surrounding tribes led away by the temptation of expected easy plunder.

Politically, the advantages resulting from retention of Kandahar are very great. The establishment of good order and fixed system of government promoting peace and prosperity in Southern Afghanistan would have a wide-spreading effect, helping to civilise the tribes, and to gradually induce them to forego their clan animosities, while by our influence steadily gaining ground, we should easily become acquainted with all that went on in Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

If the present arrangement with Abdool Rahman is to bear real fruit, his being relieved of the trammels attendant on the administration of Kandahar from Kabul will be a great help to him rather than an injury.* He has quite as much as he can manage to consolidate his power in Northern Afghanistan, and aid in money given him there will be far more useful to him than being saddled with a distant charge. In the arrangements lately entered into, Kandahar was excluded from what he was to receive, and there is not the slightest necessity for altering that rôle. It should be borne in mind that an united Afghanistan under one ruler was only revived by Dost Mahomed towards the end of his reign. In the settlement of the country amongst the Barukzye family, Kabul and Ghazni were Dost Mahomed's portion. Kandahar was allotted to his five half brothers, Pardil Khan, Sheredil Khan, Kohundil Khan, Rehimdil Khan, and Mehrdil Khan, while a Suddoozye Prince still ruled at Herat. Separation now is therefore but a return to the "status quo ante." Dost Mahomed only took possession of Kandahar in 1854, and of Herat just before his death. His youngest son, Shere Ali, succeeded to these possessions, but throughout his reign there were constant disturbances in all

* Recent papers show he has expressed himself to this effect.

parts, no stable rule or improving government, and of all places the one that suffered most was Kandahar. It was regarded as a sort of milch cow, and whenever the Ameer was pressed hard for money, a demand was made on Kandahar, to be squeezed out of the people as the Governor thereof best could, and as he well knew the tenure of his office depended on prompt obedience he used the screw freely. Then he had to meet his own wants besides, and it is only natural that government from Kabul and by its officials finds no favour with the Kandaharis. They are weary of oppression and disorder, and would most gladly welcome a firm regular rule.

In a commercial point of view the security given to trade by a strong government at Kandahar cannot be otherwise than most advantageous to the Afghans as well as to ourselves, and should have full consideration. It will insure that trade safe and speedy transit to and from our sea ports, causing a very largely increased demand for our home fabrics, especially cotton goods, which are greatly desired in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while the exports from those parts will proportionally increase. There has always been a certain amount of trade from Kandahar down the Bolan Pass into Sind, bringing the products of Kandahar, Ghuzni, Kabul, Herat, and even from countries beyond, such as wool, excellent woollen stuffs, silks, carpets, dyes, fruits, &c. for the Indian markets. Before disturbances were stirred up in Beluchistan the flow of this trade was very regular. For the ten years, 1863-73, the records show that the average value of the wool alone brought down annually by the Kafilahs amounted to 60,000*l*. The journey then took up the whole of one cold season, so that the merchants could only make one trip a year. With railway communication the trips may be repeated more than once and the trade expand accordingly.

The extension of influence gained by means of such a trade would be quiet, certain, and steady. No government understands the value of such action better than Russia. Her most effective pioneer has ever been, and still is, commercial intercourse, and large sacrifices are unhesitatingly made to promote it. Her most strenuous efforts have been devoted to keeping the trade in Central Asia in her own hands. British goods from India are completely barred from the Khanates, owing to the heavy duties imposed on them by the Russian authorities. Assistance, and with no sparing hand, is given to merchants by the Russian Government to enable the former to push their goods to most distant markets, and, sending the best, to sell them there at greater advantage than like goods conveyed by a nearer and cheaper route. That this has been done for a long time past in the direction of India may be proved by the following fact:—Thirty years ago the collector of Shikarpore reported that Russian fabrics brought down by Kafilahs through Afghanistan were being sold at fair prices in the bazaars of that city, and much approved of by the people. Specimens were ordered to be sent to England to ascertain the nature of the superiority. They were forwarded to a firm at Manchester, who readily testified to the excellence of the articles, for they found their own trade mark on them; they were of their own making. These goods imported into Russia had been transmitted from there over the long land journey, and were made to compete successfully with articles from the same manufactory that had reached the same place mainly by water carriage. This was not simple commercial enterprise of merchants, but the powerful lever of trade influence promoted and largely aided by a government that knew its value.

Why should we not extend our influence and commerce, but in a fair and legitimate way, when the opportunity is presented to us? Why should not our merchants be able to compete rightfully with those of Russia in the various markets of Afghanistan, Khorassan, and Persia, if not in the Khanates, and what more favourable position for such competition could there be than Kandahar.

Russia is using every effort to draw the trade through Armenia and by the Caspian on to the routes under her own special guidance and command. Why should we not avail ourselves of alternative routes yet left open to us.

The above remarks refer to the advantages following the retention of Kandahar. It should now be considered whether retention would be costly and draw unduly on the revenues of India. It has been hastily assumed by some that the cost must be very heavy, and that occupation of Kandahar must entail a large increase in the Indian army. More careful consideration will, however, show this assumption to be entirely wrong; that no increase to our army is required, and that any extra expenditure incurred in the administration and management of the occupied country will be more than covered by the returns on the spot.

The disciplined force necessary to hold Kandahar would be two strong brigades of infantry, each consisting of one full British and three native regiments, with artillery and cavalry in proportion, in all about 8,000 men, supported in Pishin and on the line of com-

munication by a third brigade with cavalry and artillery, 4,000 more, making a total of 12,000 men in advance of the old Sind frontier. Up to Sibi might be held from Sind.

Now, it has always been decided that there should be in India a body of at least 30,000 men over and above ordinary garrison requirements to be used and moved in any direction from which danger threatened, and especially with an eye to necessary operations in or towards Afghanistan. The commission which lately sat at Simla went much further than this. They state that under their proposed distribution of the troops, it would be possible with comparative ease, and without any demand from England, to put into the field 12,674 cavalry and 55,272 infantry, with 240 guns, besides siege artillery and sappers, leaving at the same time for the preservation of internal order in India a force of British and native troops numbering over 96,000 men and 160 guns.

Garrisoning Kandahar then, and maintaining proper communications with our old frontier line, would only employ 12,000 men, who would otherwise have to be kept ready for service in India, mobile in a strict sense, that is with the same means of transport as they would have in Afghanistan, and this would be taking only a small portion of the old recognised available body, leaving enough for regular relief and a margin besides.

With the railway completed the reliefs could be carried out as often and as systematically as in any other part of our possessions, and the present objections raised to long service in Afghanistan would entirely disappear.

The brigade on the line between Kandahar and Sibi should not be frittered away in small detachments, but divided into strong bodies, located in central positions, from which suitable parties could be sent when required to put down with promptness any disturbances that might arise. The intermediate portions would be watched and protected by local levies taken from the neighbouring tribes, properly enrolled, regularly paid, and held strictly responsible for faithful and efficient performance of the duties assigned to them. There would be no difficulty in getting the services of any number of men well fitted for the purpose, and at a rate of pay much below that of regular troops.

The extra military expenditure then on account of occupation of Kandahar would only be certain field allowances to the troops, the transmission of stores not procurable in the country (ordinary supplies, such as grain, meat, and forage, can be obtained in plenty and at cheap rates), and providing shelter for the force. This latter could be easily managed at Kandahar for no great outlay; indeed, it already exists to a considerable extent. The cost of the levies on the line would also be debitable to the same head.

The civil management of the district would be placed in the hands of a well chosen British Agency, supervising and controlling the establishments already existing, with the least possible alteration in the arrangements for collection of revenue, tenures of land and general administration.

For police purposes and ordinary maintenance of order a sufficient body of local levies should be entertained on the old irregular system under select British officers, similar to the mounted and armed foot police in Sind.

The cost of the above (also that of the small body of local levies required for military purposes) should be fully met from the revenue derived from the Kandahar District, from Pishin, and the so called assigned districts down to Sibi, all of which would be most justly applicable to the expenditure which brought good government, and established peace and order in the country.

Under the rule of the late Ameer the revenues of the Kandahar district only were reckoned at 7 lakhs of rupees (Indian) per annum. During the year of our occupation, though some duties were abolished as obnoxious, a return has been received showing that the above amount had been more than doubled, reaching 15 lakhs, and this, with continuance of regular government ensuring safety of person and security of property, will certainly be still further increased without pressure on the people.

It has been suggested to hold Pishin, that is the line of the Khoja Amran range, some 80 miles south of Kandahar, with Chaman on the northern face as the most advanced post. This would be a very far inferior position to Kandahar. It would be equally in Afghanistan, among Afghan tribes, but no real beneficial influence could be exercised from it over the city of Kandahar where everything in this part of Afghanistan is concentrated. Indeed, standing aloof from it, as it were, would have a most injurious effect for us on all around, by making it appear we were afraid to undertake the responsibilities which as a great power we ought to assume for the protection of our own possessions, and for the well-being of those we had been brought amongst. The force required for this position would be quite as large as that for Kandahar, without having as a set-off the advantages the latter plainly affords. Supplies in Pishin and its immediate neighbourhood are very limited, especially forage for cavalry and transport animals, and would

only suffice for a small portion of the troops. The deficiency would have to be sent up from below the passes, to assure its being forthcoming. Accommodation for the troops would call for a large outlay, having to be entirely freshly constructed on some new site to be fixed upon as suitable.

If it was ever necessary to re-advance to Kandahar, it would take at least a week for the force to reach, with the not unlikely probability of finding it in possession of opponents.

To briefly summarise what it has been endeavoured to show in the above remarks—

That Kandahar has particular advantages in a strategical point of view.

That ordinary necessary supplies for a force garrisoning it can be obtained on the spot in ample sufficiency.

That the inhabitants generally are peacefully disposed, and occupation would thus be easy, and free from the friction likely to be found in other places.

That politically our being established at Kandahar would be most advantageous.

It would be no help—indeed a weakness to him—handing it over to the new Ameer of Kabul.*

That commercially Afghanistan and India would benefit by our establishing a settled form of Government and security at Kandahar, in the rapid increase and expansion of trade, which again would benefit merchants generally.

That we have a just right to endeavour to compete on fair grounds in Afghanistan, Khorassan, &c. with the trade which for many years past Russia has been vigorously and cleverly pushing in that direction.

That no addition to the present army of India would be called for in consequence of the occupation of Kandahar.

That the extra military expense of such occupation would be comparatively trifling.

That the cost of administering the district of Kandahar, including Pishin and the assigned territory down to Sibi, would be more than covered by the revenues received and realised, without pressing at all on the people.

That Pishin as a position is in every respect far inferior to Kandahar—wanting in the advantages of the latter—and having disadvantages which the other has not.

(Signed) W. MEREWETHER.

24th September 1880.

No. 11.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR Lordship will probably by this time have in your hands the Memorandum relating to Kandahar of Sir Henry Norman, than whom as (virtually) Minister of War in India for so many years, and as having served on the Afghan frontier, there is no higher military authority. I will endeavour to consider the question solely as a politician, premising that as military authorities differ among themselves as to the best frontier for India in case of a Russian invasion, the whole question has to be decided by statesmen, and on large political grounds.

After our first invasion of Afghanistan in 1840, General Jacob sounded in 1856 the note of alarm against Russia, and contended that with her hold over Persia she could whenever she pleased take possession of Herat and Kandahar, and thus find an easy entrance to the plains of India. His remedy was first of all to occupy Quetta with a strong force and then to place a garrison of 20,000 troops in Herat. Lord Canning's Government maturely considered this scheme and rejected it. The outlines of Jacob's policy have been persistently maintained ever since by Bombay officers, Sir B. Frere, Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir W. Merewether, Sir H. Green, not one of whom has ever been in Afghanistan proper, with the exception of Sir H. Green and Sir H. Rawlinson, whose experience of the country was founded on political service there 40 years ago.

Eleven years later Sir B. Frere (then Governor of Bombay) brought to the notice of the Supreme Government the same policy in a somewhat different form. Sir H. Rawlinson at about the same time in two articles in the "Quarterly Review" and in a confidential Memorandum (which he afterwards published) to the Government of India reiterated Jacob's arguments. But the Government of India (then exceedingly strong, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Sir H. Maine, Sir H. Durand, Mr. Massey) peremp-

* He has said he would rather not have it.

torily rejected the scheme, and the military Minutes of Lord Sandhurst and Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Durand, and the political one of Lord Lawrence in 1868, are eminently worthy of reperusal at the present moment.

When Lord Salisbury subsequently sanctioned the occupation of Quetta, which was much opposed in Council as the first step of Jacob's policy towards annexation, he inserted a paragraph (to satisfy the fears of the Council, see paragraph 25, *Biluchistan Blue Book*, 1878, p. 10) ordering Lord Lytton "to abstain from any measures which " could be held to indicate the resolution of Government permanently to maintain " British troops in that town." The advocates of annexation were entirely satisfied with this clause, being satisfied that once at Quetta the British would never come away.

Thus then the first step of Jacob's policy was adopted; now comes on the second, the occupation of Kandahar.

The military force required for holding this province, its cost, and its effect on the native army of India will no doubt be fully discussed by Sir H. Norman. But it is well to point out that Sir H. Rawlinson maintained that 10,000 men would be sufficient to hold Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat.

But if Kandahar is occupied and annexed (for no one now advocates the setting up of another Wali) what reasonable ground can there be for supposing that we shall stop there. Herat and Kandahar are most intimately connected, and within easy marching distance, and inhabited by the same warlike Durani race (I speak not of the commercial and trading Hindus, and Parsiovars of the towns, a most insignificant lot), and Herat till lately has been held by the annexationists to be the key of India. Now they go much further afield, and after the Treaty of Gundamak it has been deliberately recommended that we must occupy Maimana, and from thence it is but a step to the whole valley of the Oxus. When I see how successful the arguments and advocacy of the annexationists have been, in spite of the declared counter policy of the home Government, I feel little doubt that, unless such a strong Government as we have at present seizes the golden opportunity which the collapse of the puppet Wali affords to return to our ancient frontier, the annexation of all Afghanistan is inevitable, and with it a shock to the Indian empire which sooner or later may prove fatal.

Then what do all these arguments which we see in many public organs amount to? They are the same that might have been used for annexing Naboth's vineyard. But that vineyard was at all events a desirable possession. Afghanistan, on the other hand, consists of rocks and men. The English public is always prone to applaud vigorous blows and occupations of new lands, but no one who studies the temper of the times can fail to see that the sentiment of public morality is strengthening from day to day. Assuming for the moment that Kandahar is a useful strategic point, and likely to be, on the authority of men calling themselves patriots, but with no local knowledge of Afghanistan, a "great emporium of trade," could not Louis Napoleon say the same for the annexation of Belgium and Bismarck for that of Holland? But Europe unanimously condemned such filibustering proposals.

But lastly, whilst we are urged in the name of civilisation to advance the British standards, are we quite sure that when we destroy the independence of a nation we are not sapping the very elements on which true progress depends? It is a moot question to the present time whether there is not more happiness under a native state in India than under our own rule. And I am quite satisfied that the difficult problems arising for us as to the mode of governing well 200,000,000 of Indians are sufficiently numerous without attempting to draw within our sway many millions of other races, especially when they are so warlike and intractable as the inhabitants of the Afghan mountains.

Public opinion is probably now on the balance between giving up and holding Kandahar, but after many years' study of the subject, and with no prepossession in favour of Afghans, I am satisfied that both justice and the interests of India require that we should leave that turbulent race to govern themselves in their own rude independent method.

(Signed) E. PERRY.

24th September 1880.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE time has now come for deciding on the future policy to be adopted in regard to Kandahar. It has been generally assumed that there are but four courses among which to make our election, which have been thus formulated :—

1. We may continue to support the Wali Shir Ali as an independent ruler.
2. We may remove him, as utterly inefficient and unpopular, and appoint some stronger Sirdar, in whom we have confidence, in his place.
3. We may reunite Kandahar and Kabul, leaving both provinces in absolute possession of Abdur Rahman, undisturbed by our presence ; or
4. We may annex Kandahar to our Indian Empire.

But I venture to add two other alternatives :—

5. We may retire from Kandahar to Pishin, or further south (as we did in 1842), without making any local arrangement, and let the Kandaharis elect their own ruler ; or
6. We may continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Government whom Abdur Rahman may appoint.

I will now briefly consider each of these proposals.

1. There can be no doubt that in equity any pledges we may have given to the Wali Shir Ali are as binding now as at any former period. There has been no imputation on his loyalty, nor indeed on his sincerity, for he never professed to be able to govern without our strong armed support. He has merely shown himself to be thoroughly incapable, thus convicting us of a gross blunder in placing him in power, and promising him protection against his enemies. If he should now seek to hold us to our promises which, however, under the circumstances, he will probably not attempt, we should find ourselves very awkwardly placed. We could not fulfil our engagements, and should be obliged, therefore, to pay forfeit, however highly he might assess his damages.

2. With regard to finding another Chief to replace Shir Ali, and carry out the policy entrusted to the former Wali, I do not think the prospect would be hopeless, in so far as character and position were concerned. If it had so happened, indeed, that Mir Afzal Khan, the former governor of Kandahar, had accepted our friendly overtures, instead of flying into Persia at the approach of our troops, we should have had an instrument ready to our hand, fully as well qualified personally to govern Kandahar as is Abdur Rahman to govern Kabul, for Mir Afzal is the senior representative of the old Kandahar Sirdars, and has the highest reputation for ability, firmness, and local knowledge. His fanaticism, however, renders almost impossible any friendly arrangement between himself and the British authorities, and even if it were not so, if he were still uncommitted, and were now disposed to coalesce with us, it is hardly likely that, having just escaped the perils of pledging our protection to one Afghan Chief, we should commit a similar imprudence with another. The establishment, therefore, of a "puppet" King at Kandahar, be it Shir Ali, or Mir Afzal Khan, or any one else, under our auspices, may be considered at present beyond the field of debate.

3. The third proposal, to make over Kandahar to Abdur Rahman, and to withdraw our troops from Western, as we have already from Eastern, Afghanistan, presents perhaps the readiest solution of the pending difficulty, and is the course, moreover, to which it may be inferred from their language the Government is most inclined ; but there are grave impediments in the way, to which I proceed briefly to refer. In the first place, Abdur Rahman has no wish to possess Kandahar, nor, if he coveted its possession ever so much, has he the power, unaided, to conquer the province or to retain it. A great deal has been written about the sin of disintegrating Afghanistan, or interfering with the hereditary claims of the Amir of Kabul, but the fact is, that Abdur Rahman has personally no more to do with Kandahar and Herat than he has with Peshawur or Lahore. He has no hold upon these provinces whatever, either in virtue of his birth or conquests, or family connexions. He stated distinctly to Mr. Lepel Griffin, at their last interview, that "he had no hankering for Herat or Kandahar," that "If he was not interfered with from those provinces, he certainly should not interfere with them," that "he declined to be responsible for tracts where he had no power," &c., &c. And when we consider that Dost Mahomed Khan ruled for 25 years at Kabul before he ventured on the conquest of Kandahar, while the feeling at the latter place against the Kabulis has been deepening year by year ever since, we may well understand the reluctance with which, at the very outset of

his career, and while still struggling for power at Kabul, Abdur Rahman would see himself committed, at our dictation, but without our aid, to the forcible occupation of Western Afghanistan. It is my firm belief that Abdur Rahman would decline the responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support, either in men or money, in excess of his Kabul requirements, and I am further sure that, to thrust him on this enterprise with inadequate means would raise against him a host of enemies and endanger his position as Amir. But these are mere local considerations, interesting because practical, but not of any large political significance. The really important questions involved in the proposal to abandon Kandahar to Abdur Rahman and to retire precipitately to Pishin or Sinde, refer to the effects which such a proceeding would have upon our general position in Europe and in Asia. To say that we should be stultified would very imperfectly represent the situation. In real truth, we should abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world. Already the first result of our vacillating Afghan policy has shown itself at Teheran, where our staunch supporter, the late Prime Minister, has been driven from office to be replaced by a notorious Russian partizan, and where accordingly we may expect to see Russian influence completely dominant in the future. The natural results, indeed of our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances, which are, in truth, not favourable to our military reputation, and which will assuredly be magnified by report to our disadvantage, would be to leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. Assisted actively by Persia, she would have no difficulty in occupying Merv in the course of one or, at most, two more campaigns. Bokhara, at the same time, would be absorbed and the Russian would march with the Afghan frontier along the line of the Oxus. At the same time, Persian nominees would be established at Herat and Kandahar, Ayub probably, or one of the Meshed refugees, at the former, and Mir Afzal at the latter; and Abdur Rahman, whether he wished it or not, would be obliged, in order to maintain his position, to enter into friendly relations with his old friends at Tashkend and Samarcand. Whether all this would constitute any real danger to India must be a matter of opinion. According to my present lights, without anticipating any attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration, I think that the evidence of our recoil before the advancing power of Russia, such as our withdrawal from Kandahar would be considered to be, would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule; and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness upon our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe.

4. *Annexation*.—It may be inferred from the arguments made use of in the preceding section that I am in favour of annexation, but such is not the case. I have never advocated annexation *pur et simple*, nor would I give my adhesion to such a doctrine at the present crisis, except as a last resort. I have no superstitious abhorrence of the principle of annexation, as some writers appear to have, nor do I question the validity of our title to annex, a title acquired by the blood shed at Maiwand and Kandahar; but I do very much question the expediency of such a course. I look with extreme apprehension at the prospect of introducing among the wild tribes of Kandahar, without previous training, our tax gatherers and police, our law courts, our vagaries of over-education and over-civilization, and above all our missionaries. We have no experience in India, or at any rate a very limited experience, of the difficulty of administering the affairs of a province inhabited exclusively by Mahomedans. The Duranis of Kandahar, though a good deal under the influence of the priesthood, are not, as a rule fanatical; yet they would, I feel satisfied, offer the most determined opposition to the interference of Europeans in their domestic affairs; and it would require the nicest care to reconcile them even with the limited control of our non-regulation system of government. If we are driven by force of circumstances to annex, we must, I submit,—at any rate at first,—employ a full Native machinery for all details of administration, keeping our European official supervision entirely in the background. Otherwise the friction will be insupportable.

But why should we gratuitously face the difficulties when we can obtain all the advantages derivable from annexation by other means? All that we require at present at Kandahar is a strong military position, giving us a complete control over the resources and communications of Western Afghanistan, presenting a bold front to the north-west and enabling us to devote our undivided attention to the railway, this last-named undertaking being in truth the germ of the whole matter, the only factor in the Afghan

question which is worthy of very serious consideration. Our best course then, as it seems to me, would be simply to hold on, as at present, leaving the civil government of the province to be provided for as I shall presently suggest, and waiting on events. It is not likely that the public mind, either in Europe or in Asia, would appreciate the distinction between annexation and a continued armed occupation. The palpable result, that is the impression produced on the public, would be that we were holding our ground in a most admirable strategical position, covering the whole Indian frontier, for the Kabul line equally with the Bolan is controlled from Kandahar, and so improving our communications with our base as to promise shortly to render our advanced *place d'armes* unassailable. When the railway to Kandahar might be completed and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province; then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire.

5. *Retirement without arrangement.*—I have ventured to supplement the list with this proposal, not because I in any way approve of it, but because, if Abdur Rahman decline the responsibility of attempting without our aid to coerce the Kandaharis, and if the Indian Government still adhere to its resolve to withdraw its forces before the winter, there will positively be no alternative but to repeat the unsatisfactory procedure of 1842. On that occasion we simply marched out of Kandahar in two columns, one bound for Kabul, the other for Sinde, neither asking for further aid, nor granting protection, but rather proclaiming our indifference as to consequences. The result was that although Prince Sudder Jung, as a Suddozye and the titular head of the Duranis, was able to hold the town for a brief period after our departure, he was compelled to fly to India on the re-appearance of the old Sirdars from their refuge in Persia, the former Baruckzye rule being at once restored, and our partizans in the place, those who had provisioned Kandahar throughout the troubles of the preceding year and had supplied carriage for our march to Kabul, being plundered and maltreated, and in some cases murdered. In the present instance, if Abdur Rahman held aloof, we should probably have no resource but to leave the town in charge of the municipal authorities, who would remain at their posts until it suited Mir Afzul Khan to return from Persia, when he would naturally resume his government and avenge himself on those who had supported the British occupation. We have made an effort at Kabul in friendly communication with Abdur Rahman to shield our adherents against the presumed hostility of the party now in power, and it is to be hoped that our effort may be successful, but it is not easy to see how such a course could be followed at Kandahar if we retired behind the Khojak range without providing any regular government for the upper country, or entering into any definite understanding with the local ruler. Perhaps the difficulty of finding a “strong, friendly, and independent” governor for Kandahar, coupled with the impossibility of leaving the province a prey to complete anarchy and sacrificing our friends to the vengeance of the anti-English party, who are, no doubt, as far as rank and influence are concerned, in the majority, may compel us after all to adopt the extreme measure of annexation, but I should hope that this very hazardous step might for the present be avoided, and would suggest in the meantime a middle course, which, if it could be carried out, might relieve us from our embarrassment.

6. I would propose then to offer the sovereignty of Kandahar to Abdur Rahman on very much the same terms that we offered it to Wali Shir Ali, that is coupled with the condition of our retaining a strong British garrison in the province for military purposes, but entirely unconnected with the civil government, and also providing for our completion of the railway to Kandahar, in two years, say from the date of agreement; Abdur Rahman might thus delegate any officer in whose loyalty and ability he had sufficient confidence to administer the province. The governor appointed from Kabul would receive the full moral support of the British garrison, whose presence again would testify to the cordial relations existing between Abdur Rahman and the British Government. He would realise annually the full surplus revenue, estimated by Colonel St. John to amount at present to about six lakhs of company's rupees, contributing perhaps a moiety of this sum, in grain, for the use of the British troops. These troops, again, would not be employed in collecting revenue, nor even in quelling local disturbances, but would be reserved for the higher duty of protection against external foes, and would serve the main purpose of giving weight and consistency to the government.

Sir Donald Stewart has already well observed that if a permanent British garrison were maintained at Kandahar the troops should be located, not in the city or in the immediate neighbourhood, but at the distance of 10 or 15 miles, adding that “the position of the troops should be, *mutatis mutandis*, that of the garrison of Secunderabad

"in the Deccan." I entirely agree with this recommendation, and have no doubt that a suitable locality might be found for the camp on the Arghandab at a distance of about 10 miles from the city.

And now let us consider practically the various interests concerned in this proposed arrangement:—

(a.) Would Abdur Rahman agree to it? Would he so far identify himself with the British as to be a party to a sort of joint government at Kandahar? His late anxiety to obtain from us a treaty guaranteeing to him our support, renders it probable that he would not object to the principle of association, but the partnership might compromise him with the anti-English party at Ghazni and Kabul, and thence arises a certain element of uncertainty as to the practicability of the arrangement. In so far as Kandahar is concerned I should anticipate no serious difficulty, for though Abdur Rahman may be personally unpopular in the south, and would thus probably be unable to coerce the Duranis if he merely trusted to his position as Amir of Kabul, yet backed up by an efficient British force, and represented by a governor, whom, if wise, he would select from a popular local family, the case would be widely different. Abdur Rahman's Baruckzye Lieutenant would be at least as competent as Wali Shir Ali to govern the Kandaharis on all ordinary occasions, and on extraordinary occasions, such as possible invasion from Herat or Ghazni, the British garrison might be relied on, notwithstanding recent experience, to clear the way. It is possible, of course, that jealousies might arise between the British authorities in camp and the Afghan governor in the city. It is possible that this officer might abuse his power and burthen us with the odium of his tyranny, but these are minor evils which might easily be borne and remedied, provided only that Abdur Rahman, the responsible head of the government, were strong and loyal at Kabul.

(b.) What would be the real effect upon British interests of this compromise between annexation and withdrawal? It may be conceded that it would be an object of much value to obtain the full moral effects of annexation, in regard to prestige, military strength, security of frontier, extension of trade, &c., without encountering the evils of friction, national irritation, and risk attendant on the larger measure, but the question still remains for consideration whether, in the present state of the finances of India, those moral effects would be worth the expenditure of money and strain on our resources which would be necessary to secure them? I do not pretend to be able to estimate the difference of cost between a continued military occupation of Kandahar and the alternative of partial or complete withdrawal. Of course, if we decided on retiring within our ancient line of frontier, not only abandoning the Kurram Valley, but evacuating all Western Afghanistan as far as the mouth of the Bolan, the immediate relief to our military expenditure would be enormous, but if alarmed at the almost certain political consequences of such a wholesale surrender, we merely proposed to withdraw behind the Khojak range, I doubt if the pecuniary relief would be perceptible. It has not, I think, been sufficiently considered that to create a large station in Pishin which shall in any way compensate for Kandahar, either as a military barrier or as a focus of political influence, is almost impossible. At any rate such an undertaking would be prodigiously costly, both in its inception and its maintenance, for the country south of the Khojak is a wilderness, without inhabitants, without cultivation, almost without water, and, moreover, the position is strategically of quite second rate importance, for it can be turned on either flank, both from Kabul and Herat. I have discussed this question repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pishin in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sinde.

(c.) Among the drawbacks to our maintaining a force above the passes has been often quoted the unpopularity of the service with our Native soldiery. To such an extent, indeed, has this feeling, it is said, prevailed recently at Kabul that it has seriously interfered with our recruiting powers in India. I cannot, however, look upon this as a permanent difficulty in so far as Kandahar is concerned, for the climate is there of the Indian type, the bazaars are well supplied, the troops, European as well as Native, could be economically and comfortably housed in the new cantonments, and the communication with India would be rapid and constant. As soon, indeed, as the railway were completed the regular relief of regiments would be accomplished with the same ease and celerity as in India, and if all service above the passes were regarded as foreign service, entitling to batta or free rations and extra warm clothing, we should probably

soon see a revulsion of feeling on the subject in the Native Army. What the strength of the Kandahar garrison should be the military experts must decide. I would suggest a regular force of about 5,000 men of all arms, together with local levies of the same strength, Hazarehs for choice, if their enlistment would not too violently excite the animosity of the Afghans.

Other objections have been raised to this scheme, which may be briefly noticed. It has been said on one side that the presence of our troops at Kandahar would keep open a festering sore; on the other, that it would not be fair to Abdur Rahman, as it would show our distrust of him and would discredit him with his own people. These are delicate topics on which the less is said the better. There is an Eastern proverb that "a wise man treats his best friend as if he would one day become his enemy." I have no wish to endorse this cynical maxim to its full extent, but undoubtedly we are bound, after our past experience, to exercise due caution in all our dealings with the Afghans, and to consult our own interests in the first place rather than their wayward feelings of pride. The presence of a British garrison at Kandahar, over and above the support it might yield to our foreign policy, would be our best guarantee for the permanence of the Kabul arrangement, and cannot, therefore, be too strongly insisted on as a measure of proper, and only proper, precaution.

I have only now to say a few words in conclusion on the subject of the Kandahar railway.

Of all possible political short comings connected with Afghanistan, the most fatal, as it seems to me, would be the abandonment of this most promising undertaking. The railway was the most efficient arm of defence hitherto devised against Russian aggression, far more efficient than the conquest of Kabul, or the establishment in power of a friendly Amir, for its effect when completed would have been to transfer our military base from the Indus to within 350 miles of the threatened point of attack, namely, Herat. If we now abandon the work as a sequel to the withdrawal of our troops from the upper country, it must be remembered that we virtually deprive ourselves of the power of protecting the Afghan frontier from Russian aggression, and that the promises accordingly of assistance against external attack, which we recently volunteered to Abdur Rahman at Kabul, are rendered impossible of performance, for we could not and should not, whatever the emergency, march troops again from the Indus to the Oxus.

But the political were among the least of the advantages to be expected from the railway. Commercially it would have revolutionized Central Asia, changing the trade routes, and superseding by direct train from the seaboard at Karachi the present supply through Russia and Persia of European goods to the various countries watered by the Oxus and its tributaries.

That it would have stimulated in a like degree the productive and manufacturing industries of the Afghans, and all the populations in their neighbourhood, can hardly be doubted, and the gain thus accruing to peace and order, and social prosperity would have been immense. Hitherto the British occupation has impeded trade, the whole available carriage of the country being required for military purposes; and if the occupation be maintained, as above suggested, this dislocation of the normal course of supply and demand will no doubt be continued, and will even increase in intensity as the means of transport become exhausted, unless the iron horse steps in to relieve the pressure. Should the Government, however, decide to resume the railway works, and continue the line to Kandahar, as a subsidiary measure appertaining to the prolonged occupation, I feel satisfied that the result would be most beneficial. This is not the place perhaps to dissect statistical tables and calculate financial results, but I have seen reliable data which seem to show that the railway, merely as a commercial concern, would yield a fair return on the capital outlay; while I make bold to say that its general effects would be of a far greater and more extended value. The opening of the railway, indeed,—the true pioneer of civilization—would inaugurate a new era for Kandahar. The Western Afghans, who are essentially a trading race, meeting the British in the caravanserai and bazar, instead of on the battle field, would soon lose their national antipathy, and would fraternize with us in the paths of peace and commerce. Common interests would produce common sympathies, and a way would thus be gradually paved for the amalgamation of the tribes of Kandahar with the other subjects of our Indian Empire.

H. C. RAWLINSON.

25th September 1880.

P.S.—It may be only proper to notice that as I am closing this Memorandum, intelligence arrives from Persia of the Russian Government having despatched Colonel Grodekoff with three officers to the Khorassan-Afghan frontier, laden with presents, but

charged with what is called an "exclusively commercial mission." As Colonel Grodekoff knows nothing whatever of commerce, but knows a good deal of Afghan politics, being the officer who very recently published a very interesting account of his journey from Samarcand by Sir-i-pul and Mymeneh to Herat, there can be no reasonable doubt that his present mission is connected with the pending settlement of Western Afghanistan. Can it be prudent, then, to obliterate all traces of our Kandahar occupation, and even cancel our means of acquiring information as to current events upon the frontier, just as Russia is showing signs of renewed activity in that direction, and the opportunity seems to be now offering for the realization of her long-cherished scheme of exerting a direct influence at Herat?

H. C. R.

No. 13.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

I AM very strongly impressed with the danger of a prolonged occupation of Kandahar by our troops. This will plead my apology for a brief statement of my views on the subject, in the hope it may aid you in your decision.

Should our troops remain at Kandahar for any time, entanglements are likely to arise; and it may be afterwards difficult to withdraw. There will be hostile gatherings, and threats from tribes. Assassinations will be continued as before, and a bitter spirit will be stirred up.

There are many parties in Afghanistan, and beyond its limits, who, from various motives, will encourage and foment disturbances with the view of embarrassing us.

I assume of course that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to retire from Kandahar; and that we no longer consider ourselves bound to support the Wali, who has proved himself to be so incapable. He can retire to India with a suitable provision.

Kandahar formed a portion of the territory of the late Ameer of Kabul, and therefore should form a portion of the territory of the present ruler.

Now that we have acknowledged Abdool Rahman, the natural and common sense view is to place him in possession.

Were a communication at once made to him, he would depute a governor to take charge of it, as he did successfully at Ghazni, when he was not so strong as he is now. Our troops could then retire to India.

The occupation of Kandahar by Abdool Rahman would greatly strengthen his position at Kabul, and give him a greater hope of his being able to establish his authority over the whole kingdom.

And when an opportune time came he would settle matters with Herat.

I feel convinced that no ruler of Kabul, shorn of Kandahar, could hold his position long there. This is an additional reason for strengthening him.

Supposing the line I have suggested carried out, our troops could return in November. We should be relieved from an enormous expenditure, and from the probability of great future embarrassments.

I have heard it rumoured that Lord Ripon contemplates holding Pisheen. In my opinion no greater error could be committed. Pisheen is a portion of Afghanistan which we have no right to occupy. And further, the influential families residing there are Syuds as well as Afghans, and are held in great esteem by the leading families of Kandahar and Kabul.

The retention of Pisheen by us, or our bestowal of it on any one but the Ameer of Kabul, will lead to great future difficulties, and would be most impolitic.

The Princes and Chiefs of India watch closely all we do. It will be a relief to them when they find we are not resuming the policy of annexation. It is what they dread, naturally feeling that their turn may come next.

And the Mahomedan subjects of our Indian Empire, numbering over 50 millions, and whose sympathy has been entirely with their Afghan co-religionists, will rejoice when they learn that, though conquerors, we have not curtailed the possession of the only great Mahomedan power bordering on India. We shall gain credit for moderation at a time when they have seen that there is no army to oppose us.

With a British agent as heretofore with the Khan of Khelat, our influence will be paramount through the whole of that territory. There is no need for any garrison of our troops at Quetta. It will only keep up a sore on the Afghan frontier and launch us into troubled waters. Besides being costly, the place is unhealthy and disliked by our native troops.

In conclusion, I would only again repeat, withdraw as soon as possible. There should be little resting to see what may turn up. Time is precious. All is quiet at present. This may not last.

Abdool Rahman, as the ruler of Kabul, has a right to Kandahar, and he will gladly take it off our hands.

R. MONTGOMERY.

September 28, 1880.

No. 14.

MEMORANDUM on the RETENTION of KANDAHAR and PISHEEN.

I AM loth to add to the volume of the documents which have been already written on this vexed question. Almost all that can be said in support of their views by the rival schools of Indian politicians has been already stated with far greater ability and authority than any to which I can aspire. Yet I feel so strongly the gravity of the issues which are involved, and the formidable nature of the forces marshalled in support of what I consider a mistaken policy, that I am glad of the opportunity which has been afforded to me of expressing to Lord Hartington those views which, had I already taken my seat on the Viceroy's Council, I should have submitted to Lord Ripon.

My opinions on this subject have not been hastily formed. I had ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the circumstances which attended the inception of Lord Salisbury's Afghan policy. I have carefully watched the development of that policy since the day when Lord Lytton assumed the office of Viceroy. Its history has been told with admirable force and accuracy by the Duke of Argyll, to whose stringent criticisms no attempt has as yet been made to return an adequate answer. I compare the results of the policy with the previous utterances of the rival schools of Indian politicians. I find that, on the one side, not one of the advantages, which, according to the advocates of a "forward" policy, were to have been reaped by a departure from the time-honoured traditions of India's greatest statesmen have as yet been obtained. It appears, Lord Hartington said in a Despatch to the Government of India of 21st May 1880, "that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country." On the other hand, I find that the gloomy predictions of the opposite school have been realised to a very remarkable extent. History, I conceive, scarcely furnishes another so striking example of the speedy and complete fulfilment of political prophecy. With these facts before me, I ask myself which of the two rival schools is likely to prove the safer guide for the future? Are we still to follow those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, are the advocates of a policy discredited by the logic of accomplished facts, or should we not turn for guidance to those who, like Sir Henry Norman, have shown a statesmanlike foresight justified by subsequent events?

It would, indeed, be too much to expect that the advocates of a "forward" policy should confess their errors. There may to this day be living protectionists who steadily adhere to the views they expressed prior to the repeal of the Corn Laws. Each supporter of the late Government may have his own explanation to account for the ill success of its Afghan policy. As must always happen in such matters, a number of minor incidents cluster round the broad lines of the policy in respect to which it is conceivable that this or that accident, different conduct on the part of this or that individual actor in the scene, or other adventitious circumstances, might have given a different turn to the current of events. But it is difficult to believe that to those who are unfettered by preconceived opinions, and who look more to the leading features of the policy than to its details, the inference as to the relative value and authority of the two schools can be doubtful.

Nothing would be easier than to quote numerous passages from the abundant literature on this subject in support of these views. I content myself with one example from the writings of each school.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Gundamak, Sir Henry Rawlinson commenced an article in the "Nineteenth Century" in the following words:—"The curtain has

“ fallen on the second Afghan war almost as suddenly as it rose, and the public, in so far as it is represented by the London press and the London world, seems almost ashamed at having been deluded into taking an interest in so small and ephemeral a matter. A reaction of this nature is perhaps the natural consequence of the exaggerated tone which was taken at the outset by the opponents of the war, in regard to its character and the risks that it involved. The late Lord Sandhurst, it is well known, affirmed a few years back that it would not be safe to advance on Kandahar with a less force than 30,000 men, and the expense of such an enterprise was popularly estimated at twenty millions of money. We were told, indeed, that our so-called ‘Jingoism in the East’ would inevitably lead either to national disaster or national bankruptcy, and now, because these sinister predictions have not been realized, but, on the contrary, a short, inexpensive, and not inglorious campaign, skilfully conducted and bravely supported, has been crowned with a peace promising substantial political results, we are taunted with having made a mountain of a molehill, with having raised a hobgoblin for the mere purpose of laying it, and, in fact, with having betrayed the nation into a needless and unseemly exhibition of alarm.”

Compare this jubilant statement with subsequent events. When the “curtain had fallen on the second Afghan war,” no long interlude was allowed to elapse before it rose again on the third, and again, a little later on an episode which may almost be dignified by the name of a fourth war. For a considerable time we had a force across the frontier largely in excess of the 30,000 men of which Lord Sandhurst spoke. The popular estimate of the cost of the war is, I fear, not far wrong. Two incidents,—the murder of the British Envoy and the defeat of General Burrows,—have occurred, which come nearly within the category of “national disasters.” We are, I believe, free from any danger of “national bankruptcy,” but Sir Henry Rawlinson’s policy has taken us as far along the road to the bankruptcy of India as it was well possible to travel in two years. The most “sinister predictions” of the adverse school have been too truly realized. A war which has lasted for two years can scarcely be called “short.” It has certainly not been “inexpensive.” It has had its inglorious as well as its glorious incidents. It has not always been “skilfully conducted.” The “peace,” with which we were “crowned” when Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote, was of the most ephemeral description. Its “political results” can certainly not be termed “substantial.” The Afghan difficulty bears, I fear, in allegorical language, a far greater resemblance to “a mountain” than to “a molehill.” The “hobgoblin” has indeed been raised, but has not yet been laid. The nation, or at all events a large section of it, so far from exhibiting a “needless and unseemly alarm,” is, I fear, far too prone to forget the true history of this Afghan business, and still to turn for guidance to those frontier politicians who have in the past led it astray.

Compare, by the light of our present knowledge, these utterances of Sir Henry Rawlinson with the opinion expressed by the Government of India on January 28th, 1876. After reviewing the probable results of forcing a British Resident on the Amir,—results which were all subsequently brought about,—the Government of India went on to say, “A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations, and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty’s Government have in view, We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Amir on a satisfactory footing, and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan, and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship’s Despatch.”

If I dwell on the previous utterances of the two schools, it is because Indian questions are often,—in my opinion too often,—decided by an appeal to the authority of experts, and I submit that, if any such appeal is to be made, it is essential to bear in mind, in deciding on the policy of the future, the relative claims to inspire confidence which each of the two schools can adduce by an appeal to the past.

I turn now to the arguments in support of keeping Kandahar and Pisheen, considered on their own merits. I wish, however, in the first instance, to observe that I deprecate any compromise between annexation and withdrawal. Sir Henry Rawlinson’s proposal that we should “continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Governor whom Abdur Rahman may appoint,” can only be considered as a half-way house towards annexation. Indeed, Sir Henry Rawlinson recognizes as much himself. In his article in the “Nineteenth Century” of August

1879, he makes use of the following phrase:—" Practically, no doubt, we shall do pretty much as we please throughout the entire region, and, indeed, I can only look on the present nominal reservation of rights as the transition stage between independence and annexation." He was then speaking of the state of affairs as they existed subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuk, but there can be no doubt that the opinion he then expressed applies equally well to the actual condition of things, for in his note of 25th September he says, " When the railway to Kandahar might be completed, and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province, then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire." It is as well to call things by their real names. The question we have to consider is whether we shall withdraw from Kandahar, or whether we shall annex the province, either at once or after a transition period of "military occupation."

I would also dispose of one further preliminary point. Almost every argument which may be advanced against remaining at Kandahar appears to me to hold equally good against remaining at Pisheen. I can add nothing to the excellent remarks made by Sir Henry Norman on this subject. Moreover, on this point the authority of Sir Henry Rawlinson himself may be evoked. "I have discussed this question," he says, "repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pisheen in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sindh." That is the real question. Are we to remain at Kandahar, or are we to go back to our old natural and common-sense frontier?

Some of the arguments urged in favour of annexation may, I think, be speedily disposed of

The first is that the people themselves desire our rule. The same argument was used in respect to Oudh before the mutiny. There may be a few traders who have expressed opinions favourable to annexation. Under the rule of the late Khedive there would have been no difficulty in finding a few individuals at Cairo or Alexandria who would have expressed views favourable to the annexation of Egypt by England; but if anyone had hastily inferred that their ideas represented the general feeling of the people, he would have fallen into a great error. *Primâ facie* there is every reason to suppose that Sir Henry Norman is right when he says, "These people (the inhabitants about Kandahar) cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling." It would take much stronger evidence than I have as yet seen adduced to make me believe that this does not represent the true state of the case.

Another argument is based on the commercial advantages of annexation. Even if the commerce to be opened up were much more considerable than I conceive it will be, it could afford no sufficient justification for so sweeping a measure.

Next there is the argument based on "prestige." I am not one of those who attach no importance to prestige; but I object to its becoming a bugbear, which is to hurry us against our will along a road which we do not wish to travel. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that if we were to retire to Pisheen or Sindh it would "very imperfectly represent the situation to say that we should be stultified." In real truth we should abdicate our position as a first class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world." Surely this is exaggerated language. Our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances would, he goes on to say, "be magnified by report to our disadvantage," and would "leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. It would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule, and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness on our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe."

Now to what does all this amount? It amounts simply to this, that we are to be debarred from pursuing a line of conduct which is dictated by sound policy for fear of what ill-informed and ignorant people will say; everything is to be sacrificed in order to preserve a semblance of continuity between the policy of the late and the present Government. It is perfectly true that withdrawal to our original frontier will stultify those who were primarily responsible for our advance beyond it. And it is equally true

that in the eyes of a considerable section of the British public, whose opinions also have to be considered as well as those of Afghans or Persians, the present Government would be stultified by a decision not to withdraw. But these are not the points at issue. The real point at issue is which course is most conducive to the public interests. Even supposing that it were brought home to the minds of some Asiatics that it is difficult to ensure a continuity of foreign policy under the English form of Government, can any one suppose seriously that the expression of this very trite sentiment would oblige us to "abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power" and "hereafter play a very subordinate part in the history of the world?" We surely need not be so very much alarmed at every false report circulated to our disadvantage, or at the movements of every Russian colonel in Central Asia, or at every article in the Native or Continental press which proclaims that the power of England is on the wane. We have shown our strength in the field, and we can now afford to pursue whatever policy may, on its own merits, commend itself to us.*

As to the effect which withdrawal would exert on the Native mind in India, this, as Sir Henry Rawlinson observes, must be a matter of opinion. My own view is that, so far from "predisposing many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule," it would inspire them with additional confidence in our intentions; they would regard it as a sign that a policy of territorial annexation found no favour with us. As regards the effect on natives of British India, I maintain that those of them who are in a position to form any opinion on the subject will not be slow to perceive that the retention of Kandahar is synonymous with a high rate of military expenditure, and, therefore, with burdensome taxes. In fact, those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, have for years studied this great question from one point of view only, are too prone to forget that the first and cardinal point of our policy in India is to administer such territory as we already possess in a manner conducive to the welfare of its population. "We are too apt to fall back on the abstract and theoretical splendour of the Indian Empire," Mr. Gladstone said, with perfect truth, in the House of Commons, on 12th June 1879, "and we do not sufficiently recollect that the administration of that Empire, in the final judgment of history, will bring no advantage or glory to us, except in the exact and precise proportion that that administration confers benefit upon that Empire, and renders India prosperous and happy." I maintain that the retention of Kandahar necessarily involves discontent in India by reason of the high taxes which will have to be maintained. And, moreover, that it not improbably involves an indefinite adjournment of many of the fiscal and other reforms of which India stands so much in need.

As to the influence which our withdrawal may exert on our position in "the Councils of Europe," I will only say that it appears to me that our position would be considerably strengthened by the knowledge that we were no longer embarrassed by complications beyond our Indian frontier.

I turn to another argument of greater importance than those to which I have so far alluded. It is alleged that the strategical advantages of the Kandahar position render it imperative on us to retain it in our own hands.

In dealing with this question I would, in the first instance, observe that it is the business of politicians and not of soldiers to arrange the terms of peace when the fighting is over. I am far from saying that strategical considerations should not be allowed their due weight, but the opinions of strategists should be corrected and checked by the light of broader and more general views. It is the special business of the strategist to ensure the retention of such a position at the close of a war that in the event of another war he may enter the field with a decided advantage. In securing this position he not unfrequently lays the seeds of a future quarrel;—witness the Franco-German peace of 1871, based to a great extent on strategical grounds, with the result that for the last ten years there has been a constant expectation of war in Europe. On the other hand, it is the business of a politician to ensure, so far as is possible, a lasting peace, even at the expense of some apparent military advantage. I deprecate, therefore, too unreserved an acceptance of the views of the strategists.

* Lord Wellesley, who was not likely to under-estimate the value of prestige, wrote thus to Lord Ellenborough on July 4th, 1842, under circumstances which bear a striking analogy to the present condition of affairs:—"Your Lordships, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Kabul with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Soojah had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England."—"The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough," p. 175.) The Duke of Wellington, also, on September 3rd, 1842, said that the press were beginning to "discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, vengeance, &c." But, he adds, "I recommend to you to leave out of the question all this stuff."—(*Ibid.*, p. 290.)

Another preliminary point on which it would be well to have some clear idea is this, is it against Russian invasion or Russian intrigue that we are now exhorted to advance our frontier? It used to be a favourite argument of the advocates of the forward policy, when the difficulties which a Russian invading force would have to encounter were pointed out to them, to reply, that they did not fear actual invasion, but that what they feared was Russian intrigue, which would disquiet the minds of the natives of India. It is clear that if intrigue is all that is to be feared, the question to be argued is not one of pure strategy, but I think I shall be correctly stating the views of the forward school if I assume that although, in Sir Henry Rawlinson's words, "no attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration" on the part of the Russians, is to be anticipated, and although, in the words of Major East (Memorandum of August 16th, 1880), "Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake offensive operations in Afghanistan," at the same time that invasion is a contingency which, although remote, is of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate some measures being taken to guard against it, that Russia may attempt to establish a "dominant position at the Court of Kabul," from whence "a preliminary skirmishing array of intrigue and agitation might be directed against the Indian frontier" (Sir H. Rawlinson. "Nineteenth Century," August 1879), and that she may then gradually advance, and so occupy outworks which shall eventually serve as a base for future invasion. It is, therefore, on this assumption that I proceed to discuss the question, merely observing that other means besides those involving territorial annexation may be employed to prevent Russia establishing "a dominant position at the Court of Kabul," and that, in my own opinion, the invasion of India by Russia, although just within the bounds of practicability as a military operation, is not a question of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate any precautionary measures beyond such as are involved in consolidating our position in such territory as we already hold.

I have had the advantage of reading the opinions of those high military authorities who, although sometimes differing as to the precise nature of the frontier line which it is desirable to hold, agree in advocating some advance beyond the base of the mountains. I do not discuss the proposal of the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department to occupy Kushi, for I conceive that there is no intention to adopt it. Neither do I discuss the desirability of occupying permanently the Khyber and the Kuram lines, for there appears to be a tolerable agreement of opinion that they should be abandoned. I confine my remarks to the Kandahar line, and I take, as the text of what I have to say, Sir Frederick Roberts' Memorandum of May 12th, 1880, and Sir Edward Hamley's lecture delivered at the United Service Institution. Both are authorities entitled to be heard with the utmost respect. Sir F. Roberts speaks with a special knowledge of the topography of Afghanistan, and with all the well-deserved prestige acquired from his recent brilliant feat of arms. Sir E. Hamley has studied strategy as a science perhaps more profoundly than any other officer of the British Army.

I infer from what Sir F. Roberts says that he was formerly an advocate of the frontier which was dubbed "scientific" by Lord Beaconsfield, but which is now universally recognised as being very faulty. I must confess to some surprise in reading the reasons which have induced him to alter his opinions. "No one," he says, "has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan than I have," and he adds that "nearly a year's residence at Kabul has . . . manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian Empire. . . . So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill-disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital (Kabul)," but now "Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and though, no doubt, still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India." It is, I confess something quite new to me to hear Afghanistan spoken of as a "military power" capable of offensive operations against India. I had always understood that the Russians, and not the Afghans, might be the possible invaders of India, and that the whole object of the war was to prevent Russian influence, and still more Russian soldiers, from establishing themselves in Afghanistan. Had any doubts existed as to the slight capacity of the latter country unaided to adopt an offensive attitude, they must, I should imagine, have been thoroughly dispelled by the events of the late war.

Turning to Sir F. Roberts' arguments in favour of the retention of Kandahar, I find that they are entirely based on the desirability of our assuming the offensive, and fighting the Russians somewhere in Western Afghanistan. "It is, of course, impossible," he says, "to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but looking to the altered con-

"ditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to
 "which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously con-
 "templated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch
 "from India to Persia and Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that
 "it is by this line (the Kandahar-Herat line) that all offensive operations on our part
 "would most advantageously be carried out. . . . We should decide to remain
 "merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to
 "striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. . . . To what extent these offensive
 "measures might be pressed in southern and western Afghanistan scarcely comes within
 "the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and com-
 "plicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia,
 "and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid
 "advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand,
 "be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan and the
 "valley of the Helmund. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come
 "to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive move-
 "ments against Russia would be carried on." I postpone answering these arguments
 until I come to deal with Sir E. Hamley's opinions, but before leaving Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum. I would point out that there is some apparent inconsistency in his views.
 "The longer and more difficult the line of communication is," he says, "the more
 "numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far
 "from shortening one mile of road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very
 "mouth of the Khyber." Why, I would ask, does this argument apply only in the
 case of the Khyber? Why does it not equally apply to a Russian advance by the Bolan? * And this inconsistency becomes still more apparent when Sir F. Roberts, leaving purely strategical grounds, touches on the political aspects of the question. Whatever others may think, Sir F. Roberts has been far too intelligent an observer of the events passing round him to be under any delusion as to the sentiments which the Afghans entertain towards us. "It may not," he says, "be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the
 "less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan,
 "or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans
 "to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime." Quite so. That has always been one of the main arguments of those who advocate a non-interference policy. But then, Sir F. Roberts adds, "the military occupation of Kandahar is, as I
 "have before stated, of vital importance. Even then we should make our presence but
 "little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province." This is virtually the same policy as that advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson. I submit that it is one which is wholly impossible of execution. We cannot occupy Kandahar, and at the same time "make our presence but little felt," any more than the Prussians could occupy Paris or the French Berlin without their presence being felt. We cannot obtain the political advantages of non-interference, and at the same time the alleged military advantages of occupation. We must choose between one and the other.

I turn to Sir E. Hamley's lecture. Although I cannot agree in his conclusions, I fully recognize that his paper is the most forcible which has been written on the strategical view of this question. Sir E. Hamley has far too profound a knowledge of the principles of strategy to be under any delusion as to the true value of the so-called scientific frontier. He advocates giving up the Kuram and the Khyber. He dwells on the fact that "an English army corps, say 24,000 strong, with artillery, extends with its
 "combatant forces only, on a European road about 16 miles in length, and with its
 "trains 27 miles. Allowing only a slight increase in the nature of the road, the com-
 "batants of a similar force in the pass would stretch 18 miles, the total, with trains, 30.
 "Thus, when the head of the combatant column issued from the pass, its rear would be
 "nearly two days' march behind; and, considering the host of animals required for the
 "necessary supplies on such an expedition, the rear of the trains could then scarcely be
 "less than six days behind the head of the column, that is to say, only about two

* The same inconsistency appears, I may observe, in Major East's proposals. "Whether under any circum-
 stances," he says, "it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar or Kabul, it is
 "impossible at present to say, but from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy
 "the difficulty and the risk of a long march through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his
 "army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake
 "this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base
 "of operations." Nevertheless, Major East advocates an advance to Kushi.

“ marches beyond Jellalabad.” He then points out the great difference which exists between the narrow mountain chains of Europe, which have been successfully passed by great armies, and the deep ranges which border India. “In a couple of marches,” he says, “the Prussian armies were through the Bohemian mountains, and presently combined in the attack at Sadowa. But here, the shortest pass through the barrier, that between Kabul and the Indus Valley, is 190 miles long, the Gomal nearly 300 miles, and not days, but weeks, are occupied in the isolated march.” Sir E. Hamley, however, advocates the retention of Kandahar, but what are the conditions under which he discusses the question? They are as follows:—“Let me pause,” he says, “to say what I understand by an invading army. Not all the assembled forces of the Afghans,—not such a Russian force as we saw lately assembling on the frontier of Bokhara,—not such an army as Persia can at present send forth,—any or all of these would fall far short of the requirements of such an enterprise. But I will suppose that Russia has completed those improvements in her communications which we know she persistently contemplates; that she has united the Caspian with the Aral by a railway; or that, combining with Persia, she has made a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat; that the ruler of Afghanistan has thrown in his lot with them; and that within the fortified triangle Herat Kandahar Kabul, the dispositions for this great undertaking have been brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion. We may be assured that an invading army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous horde, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership.” Now, it is conceivable that if the actual condition of affairs were such as is assumed by Sir E. Hamley, it might give us a strategical advantage to be at Kandahar. That is a matter of opinion which I will discuss presently; but in the meanwhile I would observe that the case he puts is purely hypothetical. Not only does it not represent the actual condition of affairs, but it represents a state of things which could not possibly be brought about except after a long lapse of time, during which we should have ample opportunity of deciding on our course of action, for it is scarcely to be supposed that, whilst the Russian dispositions for invasion were being “brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion,” we should remain perfectly quiescent, and not take such steps as the circumstances of the time required to repel the attack. Russia cannot certainly be said to have “completed those improvements in her communications” which she without doubt contemplates. The Caspian and the Aral are not united by a railway. She has not as yet succeeded in “combining with Persia” to make “a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat.” The ruler of Afghanistan shows no special predilection to “throw in his lot” with the Russians, and, after what we know of the promises given to Sher Ali and the manner in which he was subsequently thrown over, it is hardly too much to assume that the Court of Kabul will not be very favourably disposed to trust to Russian support in the immediate future at all events. The Russians are not established “within the fortified triangle of Herat, Kandahar, Kabul,” nor is it at all probable that they will be established there for a long time to come. In fact, the actual condition of affairs is so wholly different to that which Sir E. Hamley supposes, that it might fairly be deemed a sufficient answer to his argument to say that he does not touch the immediate point at issue. That point is whether at present, when Russia has not taken any one of the preliminary steps which, it is admitted, must be the forerunners of invasion, and when invasion is regarded as a remote, although possible, contingency, it is desirable to take up a position which will almost necessarily oblige us to assume the offensive, and to fight a decisive battle under circumstances in which defeat would, in all probability, involve irreparable disaster. For it is to be remembered that, if we occupy Kandahar, we shall stand pledged to an offensive attitude, and we shall fight at a great distance from our ultimate base, to which we shall be connected by only a single line of communications.

Now, what do the text-books on strategy say as to the best way of defending a mountain frontier? I quote from Sir E. Hamley’s own able work “The Operations of War.” What he says is quite in harmony with the views of other writers on strategy. After pointing out the grave objections to attempting to defend many passes—objections which appear to have been lost sight of by those who formerly advocated the so-called “scientific” frontier—he goes on to say (p. 221),—“If, then, the defensive army, seeing the danger and futility of occupying all the passes, concentrates in the chief of them, the enemy would the more easily break through the front at unguarded points and descend upon the rear; and the fate of a body of troops attacked in front, and dependent on a single intercepted issue in rear, would generally be the same as that of

" the Austrians at the Monte Legino.* It is more usual therefore, and more consonant with prudence, to hold the principal passes,—that is to say, those which lie most directly in the line of operation, and have the best communications with the rear,—with advanced guards, keeping the mass of the army disposable at points in rear where many valleys and passes unite; thus securing the retreat of the advanced posts, supporting them if necessary, and opposing with a formidable force the first hostile troops that cross." The advanced guards are not meant to offer serious opposition to the invaders; they are merely meant to give timely warning to the main defensive body of the direction in which the invader is advancing, and retard his advance. They may be sent when we are on the eve of war. They do not require any special preparation now. This is a very different military operation from that involved in deciding at once to hold the outposts of one road to India in strength. Applying, therefore, these general principles to the case of our Indian frontier it might appear, at first sight, advisable to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Sir E. Hamley discusses this view of the question, and finds much to be said in its favour. "There is," he says, "no spot in the world where we could make such a military display of strength at short notice as on the Lower Indus. Thus, with the passes suitably guarded, the army of the Lower Indus assembled beyond the river, the reserves at Lahore and Mooltan ready to reinforce either of our two armies (*i.e.*, the army opposite the Kyber and that opposite the Bolan), we should be in a situation full of promise, and it was the consideration of it which caused me to express elsewhere the opinion that we ought, with good management, to give an excellent account of any foe who should attack us in the valley of the Indus." Our position would, indeed, as it appears to me, be even more promising than Sir E. Hamley supposes, for I venture to think that he under-estimates the difficulties which an invading army would have to encounter when once it had crossed the Bolan. It would have to traverse a country described by Sir A. Alison as "a waste land extending for 96 miles, including 28 of howling desert, and abutting on a wide and bridgeless river." (Memorandum of December 16th, 1878.) However this may be, Sir E. Hamley discards the idea of assuming a strictly defensive attitude. "It is not," he says, "always judicious to await invasion. . . . It is sometimes a judicious course, sometimes not." In this particular instance he thinks we would be injudicious, because there is "a concurrent testimony of all Indians that there is no territory on which it could be more perilous to give an enemy the chance of winning a battle than our Indian Empire."

Now, I am far from denying that there is a great deal of force in this argument. When the time comes, or even at some time before war has been declared and the march of the invading columns commenced, it may be desirable to put ourselves in a position whence we may more conveniently assume an offensive attitude than we could from our present frontier. What I object to is pledging ourselves at present to such a course of action. In answer both to Sir F. Roberts and Sir E. Hamley, I maintain that, on strategic as well as on political grounds, it is wiser to preserve complete liberty of action. Sir Henry Norman's argument on this head appears to me to be quite unanswerable. In his Memorandum of June 26th, he says:—"A good General, acting on the defensive, usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter-advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time comes. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send,† while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee."‡

* This refers to Napoleon's campaign in 1796 against General Beaulieu. It is described in Adam's "Great Campaigns of Europe, 1796-1870," pp. 1-12.

† I would observe on this point that the advocates of the forward policy always appear to me to forget how necessary it is, with our limited supply of European soldiers, to husband our resources. We have to deal with a Power which, whatever other difficulties it may have to encounter, has at its command an almost unlimited supply of recruits.

‡ The argument against going too far in the direction of a policy of natural insurance against all possible risks was well stated by Sir George Cornwall Lewis in writing to Lord Palmerston on November 23rd, 1860, in connection with the expenditure on fortifications to guard against a French invasion. "If," he said, "the evil is remote and uncertain, I think it is better not to resort to preventive measures, which insure a proximate and certain mischief."—Ashley's "Palmerston," vol. ii., p. 333.

For these reasons, therefore, I maintain that on strategical grounds it is undesirable to keep possession of Kandahar or Pisheen.

Another argument in favour of annexation is based on our moral obligation not to leave anarchy behind us. I admit this obligation. We are bound before we retire to make the best arrangement of which the circumstances admit for securing to the people of Kandahar whatever Government gives the best chances of stability. I do not, however, admit that having once established such a Government we are bound to secure its permanency. I think we should retire with the distinct understanding that, in so far as internal dissension is concerned, the new ruler of Kandahar must look to his own resources and expect no aid from us. This is a point of very great importance, as to which it is most desirable to have some definite opinions. After all that has occurred it would be almost hopeless to expect that internal disturbances in Afghanistan will not be even more rife in the future than they have been in the past; and when they occur there will very probably be an outcry both in England and from the Europeans in India against the Government. Opinions may be expressed that we should repair our mistake, as it will be considered, in retiring by undertaking fresh military operations. It will be said that our prestige will suffer severely if we remain inactive, that we are leaving the field open to Russian intrigue, &c. Nothing would, of course, be worse than to retire, and then to be obliged to advance again after no great interval of time. Unless, therefore, the Government is fully determined to withstand any such outcry, and to resist the powerful influences which may very probably be brought to its support, it will be better at once to adopt the views of the "forward" politicians, and to remain at Kandahar or Pisheen.

Assuming, however, that the Government has quite made up its mind on this point, the alternative courses which present themselves in view of carrying out the policy of withdrawal may be considered. I assume that we shall not again commit what Sir H. Rawlinson terms the "gross blunder" of setting up the Wali Shir Ali. There remains the question of incorporating Kandahar into Abdur Rahman's dominions. This would be the best solution, if it be practicable. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that Abdur Rahman "has no wish to possess Kandahar," and that he "would decline the" responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support." I cannot say how far these statements may be correct, but a reference to Abdur Rahman himself would speedily solve the question. If, as Sir Henry Rawlinson supposes, Abdur Rahman does not want to govern the people of Kandahar, and the people of Kandahar do not want Abdur Rahman to govern them, the only other solution is for the Government of India to take steps, through its officers on the spot, to find out on whom the choice of the people falls, and, having installed him in power, to retire.

Another argument in favour of retaining Kandahar is based upon the condition of public opinion in England. Although there may now be a sufficiently strong party in this country opposed to the policy of annexation, who can say that, in the future, when the Russians advance to Merv, or some other obscure town in Central Asia, a new wave of Russophobia will not pass over the country and drive the Government into the adoption of a forward policy?

After the instructive experience of the last two years who can rely on the sagacity and self-command of the British people in resisting plausible appeals to their pride or their prejudices on questions so little understood, and so remote from their political experiences? I admit the force of this argument, but the conclusion I draw from it is, not that we should occupy Kandahar, but that we should come to terms with the Russians, and discover some *modus vivendi* with them in Central Asia. I will only add that, if any treaty be made with the Russians, it should, in my opinion, be published to the world, and that care should be taken in framing it that no conditions are imposed on either side which, so far as can be foreseen, there would be any strong temptation to evade.

To sum up, therefore, I think that no attempt at a compromise between the two rival schools of policy should be made. We should simply return to the policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, at the same time coming, if possible, to a general arrangement with Russia on Central Asian affairs. That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence, on 4th January 1879, in the following terms:—

"We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having

to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling as it is to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."

"Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

This, therefore, is the general policy which I should like to see adopted and publicly avowed by Her Majesty's Government. The time and method of carrying it into effect must necessarily be to a great extent left to the Government of India. I would only on this point observe that, as it appears to me, the longer the delay, the greater will be the difficulty of carrying it into execution. Already the effect of Sir F. Roberts' victory over Ayub is beginning to wear off, and it is not impossible that before we can retire, fresh military operations will have to be undertaken, for I agree with those who think that our withdrawal should on no account have the appearance of a forced retreat. The longer, however, we remain within what Sir Henry Norman calls the "sphere of irritation," the more shall we increase the power of whatever party there may be in Afghanistan favourable to Russian influence rather than to British, the more hated shall we become, the heavier will be the charges which the Indian taxpayers will have to pay, and the greater will be the danger that we shall be driven forward against our will to extend our frontier to Herat or even further. Sir A. Hobhouse ("Fortnightly Review," September 1880) has, not without reason, drawn attention to the fact that, in the eyes of the extreme Russophobists, not even the possession of Kandahar affords sufficient security to our Indian possessions, but that further extension northward and westward is contemplated as a very possible contingency.

I have said that, in my opinion, the Government of India must judge how and when the withdrawal from Kandahar is to be effected. The withdrawal from Quettah calls for some special remarks. It should, I think, be the aim of our policy to hand over Quettah eventually to the Khan of Khelat, but I doubt whether it would be expedient to do so yet awhile. The reasons, or at all events the ostensible reasons, which took us to Quettah are different from those which have led to the occupation of Kandahar. They were explained by Lord Salisbury (Despatch to the Government of India of December 13th, 1877), in the following words:—"The existing force has been placed there for the purpose of preserving the peace of the Khan's dominions, the security of commerce in the Bolan Pass and the plain which lies below it, and the safety of your Agent."

The annexation of Kandahar would necessarily involve the permanent occupation of Quettah, although Lord Salisbury was careful to explain in the Despatch, quoted above, that its occupation was intended to be a purely temporary measure. I submit that to annex Quettah without the consent of the Khan of Khelat would be an arbitrary and impolitic act, even if it did not constitute an absolute breach of faith. We have a certain right to annex Kandahar; we have the same right—that of conquest—by which we hold the whole of India, although the original injustice of the war affords a strong moral plea for not exacting the right in this case. But we have not even this right in the case of Quettah. The Khan has done us no harm; he has, I believe, on the contrary, shown a friendly disposition to us throughout the recent troubles. I have not

the text of the Treaty of 1854 by me to which to refer, but I believe that under that treaty we have the right to locate British troops in the Khan's territory. On the other hand, we are bound by Art. 3 of the Supplementary Treaty of December 8th, 1876, to "respect the independence of Khelat," and Art. 6 of the same Treaty expressly declares that the location of British troops at Quettah was in consequence of the desire expressed by the Khan and his Sirdars for their presence there. Moreover, in his conversation with Lord Lytton on December 8th, 1876, the Khan expressed some anxiety lest troops should be stationed in his dominions without his permission, and was formally reassured by the Viceroy on this point. Under these circumstances I do not think it would be justifiable to give permanency to our occupation of Quettah without consulting the Khan. It may be that he would not object, but the tone of his recorded conversation with Lord Lytton, and facts reported in respect to alleged intrigues between the Khan and the late Amir Shere Ali, lead me to suppose that the location of British troops at Quettah, even as a temporary measure, was not altogether so pleasing to him as might be inferred from the terms of the Supplementary Treaty.

I will only add that, when we withdraw altogether from Afghanistan, I trust we shall do so without making any treaty either with Abdur Rahman or the ruler of Kandahar, whoever he may be. If any treaty is to be made it should be with Russia.

E. BARING.

London, 7th October 1880.

No. 15.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR by GENERAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

What are the several courses open to us regarding Kandahar?

1. We may abandon it to any chance ruler.
2. We may remain in occupation in support of some native ruler.
3. We may deliver it to Abdul Rahman.
4. We may annex the district, or such portion of it, together with the town and fortress, as considerations of military and political necessity may lead us to determine on.

The *first course* would throw the district open to competition and leave it liable to become the scene of sanguinary struggles between rival candidates, and abandon the peaceful inhabitants to the mercy of any of the turbulent chiefs who could command a following out of the wrecks of the Kabul army and other disorganised bodies.

In case of the return of Ayub Khan, or the establishment of any of the cleverer or more powerful leaders of the party of the late Ameer Shere Ali or his sons, the nucleus of an opposition to Abdul Rahman would be formed and the settlement of the Kabul Government very possibly overturned.

The return and successful re-establishment of Ayub Khan at Kandahar would be the greatest possible discredit to us. He would claim to have driven us away by his victory over General Burrows, and would be believed. It would be partly true.

Second course.—The occupation of Kandahar by a British garrison in support of or in alliance with a native ruler would be of all measures the worst. It has often been tried; hardly ever with success; and our recent experience of it should put it out of the question.

Third course.—We might deliver Kandahar to Abdul Rahman, but its people and its interests are separate and distinct from those of North-Eastern Afghanistan. Kandahar has constantly tried to be independent of the domination of Kabul and has only been retained by superior force.

There would certainly be a struggle for its possession, which might probably end in unseating our recently elected Ameer, and entailing an additional disgrace to those which our retreating policy would inflict on us.

According to the best authorities our first announcement of our intention to retire was received by the inhabitants of the town with great regret.

Whatever assurances may be given of immunity for those who have been friendly to us, or have assisted us, it is certain that they will never be ultimately fulfilled by Afghans.

We may try and justify our abandonment of our obligations to those who have befriended us, by declaring our belief in their future good treatment, but we shall do so in the face of our fullest experience to the contrary.

Fourth course.—For the security of British India and the welfare of the district of Kandahar, the permanent annexation to India of the fortress and its surrounding territory appears to me to be the best course we could adopt.

The extent of territory to be so annexed must depend on considerations of military and political expediency, and can be referred for the opinions of the experienced officers who know thoroughly the country and the race affinities of its populations.

It is urged against the retention of Kandahar that it will require a large force for its defence and the maintenance of its communications, and that the expense will bear heavily on the resources of India.

The expense of repeated expeditions, with their contingencies of transport, which will be the certain consequences of our retreating within our old frontier, will undoubtedly be as heavy without the compensation of the revenue of the annexed province and the profits of extended commerce.

The question of expense is an Imperial one. Let us consider what England would lose with the loss of her power and influence in India.

The whole of her mercantile affairs connected with the trade of the East hang on our possession of India. There is hardly a mercantile house in Great Britain that is not deeply interested in commerce with India. Hardly a family that has not a vital interest through some of its members in the security of our Indian possessions.

Certainly, at least half the expense of the occupation of Kandahar should fall upon England.

If the Russians in Central Asia are a reality, if they have possessed themselves of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent, if they are about to occupy Merv, of which they make no secret, if they have an easy road to Herat, which is a fact well known, and a fortress there before them in a fertile country, held by a people without unity and without leaders,—who that regards the course of Russian progress can doubt that, if we are timid, apathetic, or consenting, a few years will see them in possession of a fortress which, in their hands, will be rendered impregnable, and will command the road to India with a facility for aggression which may be measured by Ayub Khan's rapid march to Kandahar?

It is difficult to believe that any one can be really blind to the danger to India which a little extension of the alliance which actually existed between the Russians and the Ameer Shere Ali would have matured.

The difficulties of the march of an army through a rugged and mountainous or desert country are relied on by some people as a protection; they may afford protection against sudden predatory invasion, though India has too often succumbed to such visitations, but to those who know what skill and science can do to remove difficulties, when there is a base to work from, and when there are men, means, and time, backed by a steady will and unflinching purpose, the protection of a difficult country vanishes.

For more than 800 years the Afghans have looked on Hindustan as a fair ground for conquest and plunder. Whenever they were at all powerful, even within the time of the British possession of India, they were always contemplating an invasion of Hindustan, and the recovery of the dominion which they once held, of which the decline of the Mogul dynasty, and the warlike prowess of the Mahrattas and Sikhs, gradually dispossessed them.

No sooner had the Ameer Shere Ali become strong, through our assistance, than, on his failing to obtain the concession of all his demands, he at once closed with Russia, and proclaimed to his people the prospect of a religious war against us.

Let the tone of his later communications with us, his great military preparations at Kabul, his alliance with Russia when war between that country and England was so imminent that Russia was moving a force to be ready to co-operate with Afghan allies,—let his public and honourable reception of a Russian ambassador, combined with his public and insulting rejection of Sir N. Chamberlain's mission,—speak for the necessity of our proceeding against him as an act of self-defence.

To those who know the whole of the circumstances that occurred before, and have been discovered since, our capture of Kabul, it seems impossible that any one approaching the subject in a fair and unbiassed spirit, free from party and political feeling, could deny that our war with Afghanistan was an act of self-defence.

It is true that we at first announced that we made war on the Ameer and not on the Afghan people. We had driven away Shere Ali, and were leaving the country peaceably under the Treaty of Gundamuk, when the treacherous massacre of our Embassy and the defence of that act by the mass of the Afghan people placed the war on a new footing and gave us the right of conquest to dispose of Kandahar in satisfaction for the injury done to us.

After our proclamation of the permanent annexation of Koorum, our declaration to the Khyber chiefs that they should never again fall under the dominion of Kabul, and our establishment of Kandahar as a separate State, the abandonment of Kandahar or the retreat from the frontier of the Treaty of Gundamuk will be misunderstood and attributed in the East to the prowess of the Afghans.

The misfortunes of the first Kabul war have made a greater impression than the subsequent victories of the British commanders. Even the English press, in times of anxiety, refer more to the destruction of Elphinstone's force than to the victims of Pollock, Nott, and Sale. If we now retire, the memory of the defeat of Burrows will outlive the splendid victory of Roberts and his army. One of the difficulties arrayed against remaining in Afghanistan is the alleged dislike of the Native army to serve in that country, and the consequent difficulties of recruiting. The same comparatively liberal payment that has filled the colonies of Great Britain and France with coolies, and has provided bodies of Sikh police for Shanghai and Singapore will fill a Kandahar *corps d'armée*. Let the soldiers be sufficiently paid for the hardships and dangers of exile in Afghanistan and there will be no difficulty in filling the ranks.

If the Kandahar corps is composed of troops of Southern India, who have not had war training for a long time, half the force should consist of Europeans, until the Native regiments have become familiar with the Afghan style of warfare, and as able to beat them as they were on former occasions.

If the annexation of Kandahar is determined on, it should be carried out as an Imperial measure in the most complete manner; nothing should be left to chance.

The most important points are the selection of proved officers for the military command and for the political administration. The best science and skill should be devoted to fortifying the positions taken up.

The city must be made secure against attack, otherwise it will never have confidence or rise to the prosperity which it should attain. The citadel for the command of the city and the security of our magazines should be made as perfect as possible, and the force for their occupation should be separate from the field force, which should be ever ready to move at the shortest notice.

The line of communication should be secured by proper forts, amply provisioned at all times.

The railway should be advanced to Kandahar as rapidly as possible; if properly protected, in a new line of country, where negligences are sure to be punished, it will do more to promote the peace and prosperity of the country than any other measure, provided that the military occupation of the country be efficiently carried out. The completion of the railway will allow of the reserve of the British force being placed wherever it will be most healthy and easily fed, but it must ever be remembered that Kandahar will be a frontier post, which must be maintained in sufficient strength.

The government of the country should be adapted to the spirit and habits of the people, and should be conducted as much as possible by the employment of native Afghans, who will soon identify themselves with the Government, if it is made to their interest to do so.

The cumbrous regulations of India, with their indispensable tribe of foreign agents, should be excluded.

If the annexation is carried out on wise and liberal principles, the district of Kandahar will become prosperous and valuable. The inherent vitality of the trade between India and Central Asia has enabled it to struggle on in spite of the perils and exactions to which it has been subject. A safe road to Kandahar will give it a clear start, and instead of purchasing Russian articles at Peshawur, we shall deliver British manufactures to Central Asia.

(Signed) NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

Gibraltar, 12th October 1880.

No. 16.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

Bearing in mind the tenure upon which we hold possession of India, I would for military reasons deplore our permanent retention of Kandahar. Many of those who now urge us to keep possession of that place know little of the difficulties we had to face in 1857. Having served through the Indian Mutiny, I remember them well, and looking back at them now, it is difficult to understand how others who had the same experience can wish to add to the responsibilities which then nearly crushed us. What should we have done in 1857, 1858, and 1859 if we had had a garrison at Kandahar? So hard were we then pressed that even a clear-headed governor like the late Lord Lawrence was only prevented from falling back behind the Indus by the persuasion of his military advisers. To occupy a point so far removed beyond our frontier would be a serious financial burden even in times of profound peace, and in time of any great trial its possession would indeed be a white elephant, capable of ruining our Indian Empire by the cost which the necessity of supporting it would entail upon us. In my humble opinion, the question of the retention of Kandahar is not a military one, for I can see no possible strategical advantage in its present occupation. Its retention will certainly cripple our military resources, and it would seriously hamper our strategical operations in the event of any great internal disturbance in India. My opinions on this point are somewhat influenced by the conviction that if we determine to keep a garrison at Kandahar the annexation of the surrounding district, and of the country between it and our frontier would sooner or later be forced upon us, and I feel that any such extension would be an increasing source of weakness to us.

Our recent operations in Afghanistan have taught us the true value of the Afghan military power. We can now afford to smile at the superstitious horror with which we have hitherto contemplated all idea of military operations in that country, a horror which has come down to us from the disasters of 1840. We have now learnt to appreciate the Afghan troops at their proper value, and to realise the fact that any well appointed column of our troops, if ably commanded, can march from one end of the land to the other. The English people have begun to see that our military disasters in 1840, as indeed all the disasters that have ever befallen us, are the result of the incompetence of the commanders employed. There is no Afghan army that could prevent an English division from marching from Quetta to Kandahar whenever it might become advisable to do so. If, therefore, we can at all times occupy Kandahar when we wish, why go there until the necessity for doing so has arisen?

The previous occupation of that place would do little to facilitate our march there with the large force we should be obliged to send through the Bolan in the event of difficulties with Russia, whilst it would, I conceive, have the effect of embittering Afghan sentiment against us, and by doing so would increase our difficulties when the time does come for us to measure swords with our great northern rival in those regions.

According to my reading of the military problem involved in this question, we secure no military advantage by the retention of Kandahar, whilst we incur considerable military risks by remaining there.

The objections to its retention on financial grounds are so evident that I shall not attempt to dwell upon them.

Whenever the Russians march upon Herat we must certainly occupy Kandahar, unless we intend to give up India or to allow it to be taken from us, but the longer we can postpone that occupation the better we shall be able to incur the vast expenditure it will necessarily entail upon us. As we can always get there with the greatest ease, I would deprecate in the strongest terms our going there until the necessity for doing so actually arises, and I am therefore of opinion that the sooner the troops now there can be withdrawn from it with safety and honour the better it will be for the true interests of our Indian Empire.

G. J. WOLSELEY,
Lieutenant-General.

November 20, 1880.

No. 17.

(No. 13 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25th November 1880, on the subject of the retention of Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA on the Retention of
Kandahar, dated Umbala, 25th November 1880.

1. The retention of Kandahar is in my opinion necessary on political, military, and commercial grounds.

2. If we retire from it we shall indeed have lost all hold whatever of Afghanistan, and forfeited every shadow of influence over that country which our victories have conferred upon us. We have one after another abandoned every point which had been advanced as a reason for going to war with Afghanistan. The first and perhaps the most important of these was the right to send a British Envoy to Kabul, and to maintain him there with a small escort. Our Envoy went, and he, together with his escort, was massacred a year ago.

3. We have now evacuated Kabul and the whole line of country back to Lundi Kotal, making way for a new Amir; but we explicitly avow a determination to maintain no British officer at his court, and only a native official when it may be quite convenient to the Amir to receive him. Even when that time may come, can we trust implicitly to the reports he may render? Are our previous experiences of native agents at Kabul satisfactory? I imagine not entirely so.

4. This want of supervision leaves the Amir free to exercise such Russian sympathies as he may retain, or failing these leaves him exposed to all the well known wiles and activity of Russian intrigue and diplomacy. Of all this we shall know nothing, or at all events no more than the Amir may choose to let us know.

5. In our early discussions regarding the evacuation of Kabul, it was always assumed that the retention of Kandahar would enable us better to dispense with the services of a British Envoy at Kabul; and up to the time when the withdrawal from Kabul was agreed to, there was no such dissent from this proposition as in any way alarmed me as to the future of Kandahar; but the moment the withdrawal from Kabul became an accomplished fact, there arose a tendency to isolate the Kandahar question, and to declare that the one did not in any way depend upon the other.

6. Our late colleague Sir Edwin Johnson explicitly avowed on all occasions that such assent as he gave to the policy of withdrawal was based on the condition of retaining Kandahar.

7. I have throughout viewed with regret the abandonment of our position at Kabul, and have merely accepted circumstances as day by day we, by our own acts, made the place untenable, by the reduction of our stores, of our ammunition, and lastly, by our arrangements with Abdul Rahman.

8. But when the inevitable came, there still remained to us Kandahar as something of a make-weight against the abandonment of Kabul and the loss of our political influence over Kunar and the Momunds. It was and is an assertion of our might, a manifestation of our power and determination to retain a strong influence over the destinies of Afghanistan and over its foreign policy.

9. In the course of the discussion on the draft Despatch to the Secretary of State, regarding the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram lines, I first became alarmed for the fate of Kandahar; for the putting aside of all mention of it as bearing on these matters seemed to indicate that these measures were in the minds of many but a prelude to the abandonment of Kandahar. I trust that in this I may be mistaken, and that my honourable colleagues may be found willing to admit the vast importance of this possession, not only to India but to the British nation. I am bound to say that his Excellency the Viceroy has always declared that he held himself free from any sort of compromise regarding Kandahar, when he advocated the policy we have pursued regarding the Kuram and Khyber lines.

10. Whether the holding of Kandahar will enable us to tap Kabul more effectually for political information, than can be done from Peshawur, may be open to doubt; but I think that by good political arrangements it may be made to serve this purpose. At Kandahar we must be brought into contact with members of the ruling family and Sirdars of influence, who would be ready to assist us in this for a consideration. At Peshawur we meet the mercantile rather than the governing classes.

11. I think it will be found that Kandahar has ever been a province which has been easily governed and administered, furnishing revenue for imperial purposes at Kabul and Herat, over and above the expenditure necessary for its own purposes. If this has been the case under Afghan rule, how much more may it be expected to prove so under our more enlightened sway.

12. Our occupation of Kandahar must be of a much more costly kind than that which was necessary under the Amirs, and the revenue which probably does not exceed 23 lakhs of rupees at present, would fall far short of our expenditure; but I have no doubt that under the influence of our rule trade would so increase, and agriculture so prosper, as to largely augment the public revenue under both these heads.

13. The garrison we are bound to maintain at Kandahar must for some years be out of all proportion to the revenue, but this garrison will supply us with all the force which may be necessary for the collection of that revenue. I have reason to believe that there is no part of Asia which can be so easily and so cheaply governed as the province of Kandahar.

14. The existing system of government is purely patriarchal; the area of land under cultivation in every village is perfectly defined and the Government dues perfectly well known. The police, revenue, and judicial work is done by the village maliks, elders, and kazis; no complicated and expensive system of administration is at all necessary. All that is required is a strong, personal, central government, ready to enforce its decrees and to punish offenders with a strong hand. The stronger this class of government may be, and the more the strength of the individual selected to administer it may be known and acknowledged, the better the Afghan will understand and the better he will like it. There are two things for which the country is not fit—first, our regulations, secondly, legislation. Hold it free from these for the next 20 years, and the material prosperity of the country will advance, and its population become as noted for obedience under our rule as that of the Punjab. All the elements of prosperity are to be found in the Kandahar districts, and with a strong, just system of government, such as that we are bound to introduce, and with a cheap fiscal system, such as that we find ready to our hand, there is no reason why (apart from political vicissitudes and external influences,) the country should not eventually pay for the maintenance of the force necessary for its retention.

15. Kandahar is for every purpose a strategic position of first-class importance. The movements of Sir Donald Stewart and of Sir Frederick Roberts to and from Kabul via Ghazni, show how easily the route can be traversed, and how completely Ghazni and Kabul are commanded from it. But whilst we recognise this, we must also admit that these movements prove that Kandahar itself is liable to sudden attack from Kabul, and that the temporary success of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's recent expedition proves it to be easily assailable from Herat.

16. I cannot pretend to believe that the ruler of Kabul, be he who he may, even our own nominee, will calmly and for ever accept the partition of the country which involves the alienation of Kandahar from Kabul. There are many circumstances which might induce Abdul Rahman to seek to disturb this settlement of affairs. Russia intervening, the price she would be prepared to pay Abdul Rahman for his active support and assistance would be the restoration of Kandahar. Kandahar will always be the objective of the Sher Ali faction under Ayub Khan, or whoever may hold

supreme power in Herat. Complications under these heads are bound to arise, and all those who advocate the retention of Kandahar, as I do, must acknowledge and be prepared to face them. This is the richest province of Afghanistan. It is therefore an object well worthy of a struggle to possess on the part of the rulers of Kabul and Herat; but it being necessary for us in a political and in a military sense, its comparative wealth may well be acknowledged as an additional reason for our retention of it. We are therefore bound to hold Kandahar in strength, not merely to garrison it, as was the case up to a very recent period. I have already submitted a proposal* for the force I consider absolutely necessary to this end; and in addition to the troops a large depôt should be formed there, well supplied with stores and all sorts of munitions of war, calculated for the supply of a considerably larger force than that now allotted to it; for it is impossible not to foresee the probability of a concentration of troops on this spot, either for aggressive or for defensive purposes. We should so fortify, and so supply Kandahar as to make it a strong place d'armes, affording us a base for possible offensive movements against Herat, or a certain barrier against any power that can assail us from Central Asia.

17. The value of Kandahar cannot be fully understood until we come to consider the significance of its possession by us, in connexion with the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Kandahar is an important strategic point on the line by which alone a serious attack on India can be delivered by Russia. It is the only line by which an organised Russian army could reach Kabul. It is also the direct route to India. The true base for this movement is the Caucasus and the Caspian. This is clearly indicated by the movements now taking place along the slopes of the Kopet Dagh towards Merv or Herat, as the case may be. I suppose no one will for one moment believe that the ostensible object of Skobelev's expedition, viz., the punishment of the Akhal Tekes, is the true one; the true intent of this expedition is scarcely veiled, and this is the securing of a base from which to attack India. Merv has some significance in this sense, but it is secondary to Herat; and I have no doubt that Herat is the real object of the expedition. Askabat is often mentioned in Russian papers as a place of great significance, notably in some which came before the Government of India in 1876. It was then named as a point to be reached by one of their expeditions, partly military, partly scientific. At this point it would be easy to change the direction of an army from Merv to Herat. The distance of Askabat from Herat is much the same as from Herat to Kandahar. The importance of this point on the Russian line of advance can hardly be overrated. In the face of General Skobelev's movements along the skirt of the Kopet Dagh, it is incumbent on us to retain Kandahar. This indeed appears to me to be an obligatory point, so long as Russia shows the slightest indication of advancing eastward from the Caspian. The object of this expedition, organized in great force, with great care, entrusted to a specially able commander, and supported by the construction of telegraphs and railroads, is not an aimless one. We may rest assured that Merv and Herat are the only points worthy of the attention of Russia on that line. Askabat leads either to the one or the other with equal facility. As to her asseverations regarding these districts, we have a clear measure of the value to be attached to them, by contrasting with her words, her acts in the matter of Khiva.

18. It maybe worthy of note that Russia is now far stronger in the Turkoman provinces than she was in 1878, when she was able to threaten the line of the Oxus by the assembly of three separate columns, the main and central one at Djam, the left on the Alai towards Kashmir, and the right column on Charjui, a valuable support to a movement on Merv or Herat from the Caspian. If, as we are informed, Russia stands relieved of her difficulty with China, she will be able to divert to the Oxus much of the extra strength gathered for the purpose of dealing with that country, in the province of Ili and on the Amur. Russia is pressing forward the construction of a railway which undoubtedly will become the Caspian-Askabat-Herat line, whilst we hesitate about the continuance of the Sukkur-Sibi and Kandahar line.

19. I believe that fertile as many of the valleys of the Kandahar province are, cultivation is capable of great extension. It is a wool producing country, abounding in fruit and grain of all sorts. The vine flourishes, so does the mulberry; it might become a great silk-producing country likewise.

20. Let us not be frightened into the abandonment of Kandahar or induced to occupy it weakly on account of the difficulties of supply which have momentarily beset us. I can easily imagine this being made a handle of to bring about either end. This is not the normal state of things, but one that has been brought about by purely adventitious circumstances. There have been two seasons of drought, and consequently of short produce; but short produce for these two years could not have affected the question so

* See papers appended.

seriously, had not Ayub's advent brought with it a host to eat up supplies, and at the same time so disturbed the tribes in the rear as to have rendered the movement of supplies from the base extremely difficult. This was aggravated by the arrival of Sir F. Roberts' army with its attendant followers and transport animals, all causing an immense consumption of grain and forage. The resources of the country are abundantly sufficient, under normal circumstances, for the supply of any force we may desire to maintain, or which we may have occasion to send there hereafter. I believe that the productive powers of the soil of the district of Kandahar have been greatly undervalued by many who have had personal opportunities of seeing the land. It is not every observer who observes correctly, but it is a fact that whilst some will say that the limit of productive cultivation has been reached, and that all else is barren, there are those who declare that there are large tracts of country possessing a rich brown loam soil, an eighth of which is habitually cultivated, one fourth being brought under cultivation in favourable years, but the whole of which is cultivable being well within reach of irrigation from the Argandab. Even the hills, which from a distance appear to be so rocky, are declared to have a fair proportion of this rich brown loam distributed over them. We know how fertile the orchards in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages are, and how valuable are their products. Why should we imagine that this fruitfulness is confined to these very limited spaces? Before we give up Kandahar on account of its limited production of supplies, let us have the country agriculturally examined by some expert in soils, one who knows how to recognise the indications of fertility as yet latent and undeveloped.

21. In connexion with this question of supply, the resources on the line of communication should be considered. With reference to Pishin, where I propose to station the first reserve for Kandahar, Sir Robert Sandeman writes:—

“Now it is undoubtedly true, that owing to the extraordinary drought of the last two years, grass in large quantities could not be obtained from local sources, but it is equally true that the armies under Generals Stewart, Biddulph, and Phayre were at first entirely supplied with forage obtained in Pishin and Quetta. Few people can be aware of the very heavy demands for food supplies for man and beast this country has had to meet since the outbreak of the Afghan war, and it was not until we had explored the Lora, Kowas, Arambi, and other valleys that we properly appreciated the fertility of Pishin. To the traveller marching through the Bolan Pass, and along the direct caravan route to Gulistan, the country may appear barren and unproductive; but had your correspondent travelled off from Gulistan towards the Lora River, he would have found the intermediate plain green with cultivation, and that the wheat crops in Pishin contrasted favourably with those growing in the most favoured parts of India.”

He goes on to speak of the broad and fertile plains of Sibi and Kuch Gundawa, as being rapidly brought under cultivation under the influence of our protecting power; and of the Marri hills as a great grazing country, whence a considerable cattle trade with Sind and the Punjab has already been developed. This does not look as if we should be precluded from keeping troops in Pishin on account of its barrenness, or being obliged thereby either to increase the whole force in Kandahar itself, or to draw the support back upon Sind. Indeed, were it otherwise, I do not see how the advocates of the Kojuck Amram, as the line of frontier for the future, could in any way justify their scheme, for the country they propose to occupy could not support the troops necessary to that object.

22. I have no trade statistics which would enable me to put forward an estimate of the value of the trade which now passes between India and Kandahar; but the wool produced in Zamindawar and between the Helmand and Herat, is well known in the wool marts of England under the name of “Kandahari.” This is a trade capable of vast extension, for hitherto it has been carried on in the face of every conceivable difficulty, the outcome of an unsettled and extortionate Government, of tribal exactions and most defective transport. We may imagine how trade would improve under a settled Government firmly established at Kandahar, and a railway connecting that place with Karachi, and the Indian railway system. Then as regards British exports, Manchester goods could be delivered at Kandahar at the rate at which similar goods are now laid down at Lahore. By this route, too, a valuable outlet for Indian teas could be established. This, I take it, means the absolute control of the trade with northern and eastern Persia, and of that with Central Asia. Commercially, Kandahar, the natural emporium of this trade, appears to be necessary to us.

23. Kandahar like India itself is ours by right of conquest. It matters little to us whether the inhabitants desire our presence or not. If it is desirable that we should keep it from a political, a military, and a commercial point of view, there in the interests of the nation we are bound to remain. We cannot recede without our motives being

misunderstood ; not only in Kandahar and in Afghanistan generally would this be the case, but in India itself. No Asiatics can be conciliated by concessions, for these are looked upon as signs of weakness, whether it be weakness of will or of military power. Putting aside, therefore, all pretence of acting for the benefit of the people or for the aggrandisement of any native potentate, I would frankly annex the province of Kandahar, and that promptly, as a matter vitally affecting our own interests. The province, I contemplate, would embrace Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the line of the Helmand, and back to Shorawak and Pishin ; Zamindawar and Bukwa, up to the Kashrud, being declared independent of Herat and kept strongly under our influence.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

PAPERS referring to the Proposal mentioned in paragraph 16 of the foregoing Minute, being Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Military Department, October 20, 1880.

Afghanistan.

MEMORANDUM from Captain T. DEANE, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, No. 8,611-K., dated 7th October 1880, Kabul—Special.

Forwards, for information, a copy of the following letter addressed by Colonel Allen Johnson, Secretary to the Government of India, to the Quartermaster-General in India, No. 8,610-K., dated 7th instant :—

“ I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter No. 7,839,* dated the 20th September 1880, submitting, for the consideration of the Government of India, certain proposals for the garrison to be retained at Kandahar and along the lines of communications.

“ 2. These proposals involve the retention at Kandahar of a large proportion of European infantry, and will permit of a force consisting of a cavalry brigade and two infantry brigades, with a full proportion of artillery, taking the field, leaving at the same time a strong garrison at Kandahar.

“ 3. It is proposed also that a brigade of Bengal troops should be kept in reserve in Pishin for a forward movement, should such be necessary, or for operations in the vicinity of the railway line.

“ 4. The lines of communication to be held as they were previous to the withdrawal of the troops.

“ 5. The tabular statement forwarded with your letter under reply shows the force his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recommends should remain at Kandahar, and the troops which are to return.

“ 6. It is observed that his Excellency strongly recommends that a British cavalry regiment should form portion of the Kandahar force ; that the 15th Hussars should return at once for embarkation for England, the 13th Hussars being sent up to relieve the 9th Lancers, and the 10th Hussars being railed from Mian Mir to Lucknow after the Durbar camp is broken up.

“ 7. In your letter marginally quoted (replied to by Military Department, No. 8,548-K. of the 4th October 1880), his Excellency modifies the arrangements recommended, to the extent of the Bengal cavalry regiment and the Bengal infantry regiments, which were recently sent up, being sent on to Kandahar to relieve a similar number of Bombay regiments, the reserve brigade by this change being composed of Bombay troops.

“ 8. In reply, I am to state for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India having duly considered the Commander-in-Chief's proposals, consider that although the force proposed for Southern Afghanistan is a very large one, and contains an unusual proportion of British to Native troops, in deference to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's strongly expressed opinion that the force named is absolutely necessary for the safe occupation of Southern Afghanistan, the Governor-General in Council sanctions the whole of the proposals in the correspondence referred to.

“ 9. I am, however, to express the hope of the Governor-General in Council, that as the tribes settle down along the lines of communication, and as the railway line is opened out, Sir Frederick Haines will find it possible to reduce the very large force at Kandahar, as well as that in support in Pishin.”

* This letter is not on record in the India Office.

GARRISON at KANDAHAR and on LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Kandahar Garrison - -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts. 1 troop	6 regts. 2 cos.	
On communication Mundi Hissar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total - -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts.	6 regts.	
On communications :											
Abdul Rahman - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	
Melkarez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Dubrai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Gatai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 sq.	1 regt.	
Chaman - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 troop	4 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
South Kojak Post - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	2 cos.	
Killa Abdoola - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	"	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 sq.	1 regt.	
Kushdil-Khan-ka-killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 sq.	2 cos.	
Gulistan Karez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	1 coy.	
Segi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	$\frac{1}{3}$ "	
Dina Karez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Meturzai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Kassim Killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Gurkai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ "	
Kuch - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	3 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ troops	1 regt.	
North Chappar - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	2 cos.	
Dargi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Shor - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	
Sharigh - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Nassak - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 16	det. 12	
Harnai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ troop	1 regt.	
Thal - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	5 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Kuriak - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	"	
Sinnerai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	2 "	
Spin Kuch - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Spin Tangi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 coy.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	1 regt.	
Sangan - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Dullojal - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Zindigi-ab - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 coy.	
Kuchali - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Gunda - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ coy.	
Khelati Killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Thuli - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	1 coy.	
Nari mouth - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	$\frac{1}{3}$ "	
Sibi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4 troops	3 cos.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 regt.	1 regt.	
Quetta and Bolan - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	1	—	2 sq.	2 regts.	
GRAND TOTAL - -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6 regts.	14 regts.	

Garrison at Kandahar on Lines of Communications—*continued.*

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Brought forward - -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6	14	
Moveable column, Pishin (Bengal Native Troops) - -	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	2	
Total required - -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Kabul-Kandahar Force - -	1	3	—	—	2	1	—	—	3	9	
Bombay troops (including 1st Madras Cavalry) - -	—	5	2	4	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	6	16	
Bengal troops sent up - -	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	
Total - -	2	9	2	4	3	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	11	28	
Deduct required - -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Troops to return - -	1	4	1	1	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	1*	—	4	12	

NOTE.—Troops to return :—

15th Hussars - -	England.	15th Native Infantry.	9th Lancers on relief by 13th Hussars.
66th Foot - -	England.	23rd Pioneers.	8th Bengal Cavalry on relief by 7th Bengal Cavalry.
2-60th Rifles - -	England.	24th Native Infantry.	
72nd Highlanders -	Lucknow.	25th Native Infantry.	
92nd Highlanders -	England.	2nd Goorkhas.	
E-B Royal Horse Artillery - -	Bombay Presidency.	4th Goorkhas.	
C-2nd Royal Artillery	Bombay Presidency.	5th Goorkhas.	
11-9th Royal Artillery	Jutogh.	2nd Sikhs.	
*5-11th Royal Artillery	Mhow.	3rd Sikhs.	
($\frac{1}{2}$ 15-9th to move up) to	Quetta.	17th Native Infantry.	
3rd Bengal Cavalry.		2 Bombay regiments.	
3rd Punjab Cavalry.		3rd Hyderabad Cavalry.	
		Central India Horse.	

RESOLUTION.—To be communicated to the departments concerned.

LONDON :
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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

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3	28 Feb.	Letter (No. 40.)	Government of India with 2 Enclosures.	Secretary of State	Minutes by Mr. Rivers Thompson and Major E. Baring.	6

No. 1.

(No. 49.)

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF
INDIA IN COUNCIL.

India Office, London,
3rd December 1880.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. In my secret Despatch, No. 23 of the 21st May, relative to affairs in Afghanistan, I divided the questions then requiring decision into three categories. I expressed, in the first place, the strong desire of Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of the British forces from Northern Afghanistan, subject only to such delay as might be necessary to avoid serious risk to the health of the troops on their march through the passes, and as might enable an attempt to be made to reconstitute the Government of Kabul under a Native ruler. I then stated that Her Majesty's Government viewed with dislike the occupation of Kandahar, in support of a Native ruler placed there for the purpose of securing the disintegration of Afghanistan; but that they admitted the possible necessity of adhering to this arrangement in consequence of pledges which had been given to the Wali Shere Ali Khan. Lastly, I intimated the desire of Her Majesty's Government that your Excellency in Council should consider the question of the retention of the positions acquired under the Treaty of Gundamak, mainly from the military point of view, leaving it open to you to recommend their retention should they be thought valuable, but also free to relinquish them if that course should appear desirable, without any reference to the consideration that their abandonment would be a departure from the policy of the Treaty of Gundamak.

2. The intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the first point have been completely and satisfactorily accomplished. I have expressed in separate despatches their approval of the measures taken for the withdrawal of the army from Kabul, of the recognition of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, and of the language which has been held to him on the subject of his future relations to the British Government and to foreign powers.

3. In my Despatch, No. 45, dated the 11th November, I have stated fully the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Kandahar. While leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawing from that province, and as to the arrangements for its future administration preliminary to withdrawal, Her Majesty's Government hope that it may be found unnecessary to prolong the occupation of it by British forces beyond the winter.

4. As to the retention of those positions beyond the old frontier which were acquired under the Treaty of Gundamak, your Excellency in Council has decided, with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of British troops from the Khyber Pass and the Kurram Valley. But no official information of the views of the Government of India as to Pishin and Sibi has yet been received, and, until the question of the retention of Kandahar had been determined, a full expression of those views could scarcely be expected. As, however, further delay in the consideration of this subject may be inconvenient, especially in reference to the question of further expenditure on the extension or completion of the railway, I think it desirable to furnish you with some indication of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

5. All the arguments for and against the retention of Kandahar seem to apply with somewhat less force to the occupation of Pishin. It does not appear that such a measure would give the Indian Government commanding influence in Afghanistan, or a strategic position of importance in view of a possible invasion by some formidable power, or that it would result in the development of a great and civilizing trade—advantages which some anticipate would accrue from the annexation or occupation of Kandahar. On the other hand, its retention, even as an assigned district as provided by the Treaty of Gundamak, would be a virtual annexation of territory. Its possession would keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and be a constant temptation and pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, though

the inducement and the necessity might be somewhat less than it would be if Kandahar were annexed to the Indian empire.

6. To hold Pishin would require a force which, though not so strong as that which would be requisite at Kandahar, would still be considerable; and the consequence would be a prolongation of the military and financial difficulties which are inseparable from the employment of British and Native troops beyond the frontier. From the information at present in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, it appears that the district of Pishin is less productive than had been supposed, and that the climate is unhealthy. If this be so, there would be much difficulty in supplying a force of the strength necessary to secure the objects of occupation, while the strain upon the efficiency of the army would be constant.

7. On the whole, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the case is not one in which a compromise between two conflicting lines of policy is desirable or possible. Her Majesty's Government have deliberately adopted the view that the true defence of India consists, not in the acquisition of strategic positions at a greater or less distance from the frontier, nor in a competition with any other Power for influence in Central Asia, but in the good government of India, the development of her resources, and the perfecting of the military organisation and efficiency of her army. It is desirable that this should be known and understood, and Her Majesty's Government deprecate in the strongest manner the continuance of any part of an alternative policy which is not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consists in its forming a part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which have been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 2.

No. 21 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, HER MAJESTY'S
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Fort William,

MY LORD MARQUIS,

February 2, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatches, dated 11th November* and 3rd December† 1880, respectively relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The former despatch contains an exposition of the considerations which should guide the Government of India in the policy to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan, and communicates the wishes and instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the military positions now occupied by British troops beyond the Afghan frontier. It is noticed with regret that the immediate withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar has not hitherto been found possible; and Her Majesty's Government desire that we should keep steadily in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion. They recognize, moreover, the desirability of assisting, if this be found possible within a limited time, the establishment of some settled Government at Kandahar. In the despatch of December 3rd, your Lordship recapitulates briefly the instructions already issued upon the questions requiring decision in connexion with our position in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. Her Majesty's Government, while leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawal, and as to the arrangements for the future administration of the province, express their hope that it may be unnecessary to prolong the occupation of Kandahar beyond the winter. This despatch conveys to us further a very distinct and direct intimation of your Lordship's opinion that the retention of Pishin would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

3. Upon a full consideration of these instructions we have decided that, since the importance of withdrawing from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion is paramount, the movement of our forces must necessarily be so timed as to enable the greater part of them to reach stations in India before the extreme heats set in. Our choice of time

is thus very closely limited; and this limitation must inevitably affect and govern the conditions of any plans we may be able to entertain for the future administration of Kandahar after our forces shall have left it. With regard to this latter question we have already reported to your Lordship the preliminary steps that have been taken for communicating with the Amir Abdul Rahman, and we propose to address your Lordship again on this subject in a separate letter. In the meantime we have the honour to report that preliminary instructions for the withdrawal of our troops from South Afghanistan have been sent to the military authorities, with the request that proposals for carrying out the necessary operations may be submitted without delay.

4. The concluding paragraph of your Lordship's despatch of December 3rd intimates clearly that Her Majesty's Government have decided to withdraw altogether from Pishin. In respect, however, to the time and manner of relinquishing that district, we desire to state our views clearly to your Lordship.

5. It is to be recollected that the Pishin district has already been for two years under the political authority of British officers, who have collected the revenue, established a police, and availed themselves in various ways of the resources of the country, and the good-will and services of the principal residents. Since the beginning of 1879 our dealings with the settled population of the Pishin valley have been upon the understanding that the territory had been assigned for an indefinite period to the British Government. Our position, military as well as political, in Pishin, differs from that which we hold in and around Kandahar sufficiently to require that the measures for withdrawing from the Pishin district should be separately considered and carried out. In Kandahar, and beyond the Kojuk range generally, our endeavours to arrange for some government which may assume authority after our military occupation shall have terminated, are necessarily limited by and subordinated to the military and political exigencies inseparable from the primary condition of early evacuation. In Pishin these exigencies are by no means so imperative; while on the other hand, we have incurred liabilities toward the population of this particular district. If any period of confusion intervenes before a regular government establishes itself at Kandahar, the knowledge that Pishin has been left unprotected and masterless, and that as soon as our retiring troops have crossed the valley there is nothing more to fear from the British garrison at Quetta, may very possibly invite plundering incursions from various quarters.

6. In this situation and prospect of affairs, we are of opinion that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government may be interpreted as leaving to the Government of India considerable discretion in arranging the time and manner of the final relinquishment of Pishin. We propose to instruct our political officers that the assignment will be given up, that this must be frankly explained to the people, and that all their arrangements must be determined toward that end; but that the dissolution of our connexion with the district should be managed, as a political measure, with circumspection and with regard to the future interests of the classes concerned. We do not anticipate that this policy will entail upon us any material degree of additional expenditure, or risk of complications with Afghanistan. It may be necessary to maintain, for some short period after the evacuation of Kandahar shall have terminated, a detachment at some place in Pishin, within support from Quetta, for the assertion of so much political authority as may be required for gradually completing our arrangements. But the former Afghan governors did not keep regular military stations in the valley, so that there will be no need or pretext for the Afghans attempting immediately to place garrisons there; nor is it likely that any ruler in South Afghanistan, whatever might be his attitude towards us, will commit the imprudence of crossing the Kojuk range to interfere with our provisional dispositions for the peace of this outlying district, so long as the object and intentions of the British Government are clearly explained and understood.

7. The Minutes which are being recorded on the subject-matter of this despatch by some of our honourable colleagues, will be forwarded by a subsequent mail.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

No. 3.

No. 40 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, the 28th February 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 21st February 1881, we have the
honour to forward the remaining Minutes† of our honour-
able colleagues.

* No. 35.

† By Mr. Rivers Thompson, C.S.I.

By Major E. Baring, C.S.I.

	We have, &c.
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	W. STOKES.
"	RIVERS THOMPSON.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	D. M. STEWART.
"	E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MINUTE by the HON. RIVERS THOMPSON, C.S.I.

HER Majesty's Government, acting on their own responsibility, and "influenced mainly by considerations of a broad political character," have ordered the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. In the despatch which contains these orders, it is indicated, as the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that if it be found possible within a limited time to establish some settled form of government in the place, it should be our endeavour to secure it; but whatever settlement may be arrived at, we are to make it clearly understood that the future ruler of the country will be left entirely to his own resources, and that it is not our intention to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of British troops beyond our frontier. These orders apply not only to Kandahar, but extend under very distinct and definite terms to the final relinquishment of Pishin, "the retention of which would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted." Briefly it may be said that a united Afghanistan under a ruler friendly to ourselves is the object which Her Majesty's Government wish to secure—an object which, thus broadly stated, every one probably in England or India would desire to promote—though from the precipitate action which Her Majesty's Government have taken in the matter, and the peremptory manner in which, without waiting for the advice of those responsible for the government of India, this decision has been promulgated, there is too great reason to fear results of a very different character.

It has been affirmed that there can be no compromise between the two lines of action which contemplate, on the one side, the complete abandonment of Kandahar with our return to our original borders; and on the other, the annexation of Kandahar to British territory. The instructions of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India definitely and irrevocably adopt the first of these alternatives; and though in words Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to His Excellency the Viceroy in Council the responsibility of fixing the date of the recall of our troops from Kandahar, the very plain and strong terms in which the orders are conveyed, and the evident desire that no time should be lost in giving effect to this intention, scarcely leave to the Government of India the smallest discretion in the matter. The problem is easy enough if we accept the responsibility of quitting Kandahar on a fixed date, regardless of its fate and of the consequences to the people, many of whom were our faithful adherents during the late

war; but the problem is a very difficult one, if we are to attempt to reconcile the urgent orders for an early evacuation with any endeavour to see the establishment of some form of government upon our withdrawal. I deprecate therefore the peremptory character of the despatch which forces our action in a matter which necessarily demanded very delicate handling; and I regret the premature publicity which, by exciting the ambition of every aspirant to the vacancy will, upon our unconditional retreat, inevitably lead to civil war and confusion in every part of the country which we surrender.

As an argument for our withdrawal from Kandahar has been based upon our previous policy in connection with that place, I would revert briefly to the circumstances under which the administration of Kandahar was intended to be vested in Sher Ali Khan, with the open support of British troops. It is well known that this arrangement formed no part of our plans when the first campaign was concluded and the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Indeed, with the return of Yakub Khan to Kabul, and the appointment of a British Resident at that capital, the maintenance of any control or supervision in the direction of Kandahar was as unnecessary as it would have been impolitic. It was unnecessary because seven-eighths of the population in Kandahar being Durani, the rooted dislike of Kabul domination was in itself a safeguard against formidable intrigues in opposition to ourselves in Kandahar: and the acquiescence of the Kandaharis in our temporary occupation, with the commercial prosperity which our occupation had brought, had shown to us the strong improbability of any active hostility against us in that quarter. It is obvious, however, that when upon the events which followed the massacre of September 1878, Yakub Khan abdicated, and Abdul Rahman succeeded to the vacant throne at Kabul, without obligations of any kind of allegiance towards us, we had to look elsewhere for those material guarantees for peace and order which, from our past experiences of Afghan misconduct, were essential to our own security in India. The arrangement adopted in these circumstances was that of a native administration for the separated province of Kandahar under our own direct supervision. It was a system of administration which had been under long discussion by Lord Lytton's Government, and was accepted, I believe, very much in the desire to avoid the necessity of annexation, while obtaining for ourselves as complete a security as possible against foreign intervention in Afghan politics. On this understanding we recognized and admitted Abdul Rahman to the throne of Kabul: and on this understanding we abandoned the right to maintain at Kabul a European Residency. It may be allowed that the failure of the Wali's administration at Kandahar was conspicuous even before the military disaster of Maiwand; but it became obvious to most people who gave a thought to the subject that if, or when, the arrangement of a nominal native ruler at Kandahar under the protection of British bayonets broke down, it must lead either to the annexation of the Kandahar territory by the Government of India, or to its restoration under a consolidated rule to the Amir at Kabul. I always entertained the opinion that the latter might have been quite a possible alternative; and that time, if it had been allowed to us, might have worked out this solution. Evidently, however, two conditions were essential to its accomplishment: first, that Abdul Rahman should succeed in establishing himself in Kabul, and should prove himself a reasonable and friendly neighbour to the British Government; and, secondly, that Russia should show by her acts and not by her words merely, a permanent and honourable adherence to her voluntary promises to abstain from all interference with Afghanistan. On these terms we might have seen our way some day to an eventual cession of Kandahar to Abdul Rahman or to his successor. But it is not unreasonable to assert that such a hope is against all the facts of the position as they now appear. Abdul Rahman is in no sense master of the situation in his new kingdom; and we are yet in uncertainty as to whether even the offer of Kandahar is one which he is prepared to accept without such extensive guarantees from us as would be gravely embarrassing; while the condition, as it applies to the acts and intentions and promises of Russia, seems, in the face of recent events, putting aside the whole history of her relations with Central Asia, to be absolutely illusory. I regret, therefore, the precipitancy of Her Majesty's Government, because even if our negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, they expose us, in the attitude of Russia and with Abdul Rahman's undisguised leanings towards that power, to a very perilous future; and if, as is almost certain, Abdul Rahman after accepting Kandahar from us is unable to hold it, the whole of Afghanistan will become the scene of prolonged hostilities, with the result (very discreditable to ourselves) of Ayub Khan's acquisition not only of Kandahar but of Kabul. On either alternative I venture to say the interference of the British power would be imperative in its own interests, and we should have

to regain, at the sacrifice of another costly war, all those advantages of our present position which we are now proposing unconditionally to relinquish.

If I speak of British interests in India and the security of its north-west frontier against foreign aggression, I shall be understood as meaning that the importance attaching to these objects is the measure of our belief in the good faith of Russia. I share the opinion of most of those who consider the question from an Indian standpoint, that the dangers and risks which menace us from the progress of this power eastwards are real and positive dangers, which cannot be set aside by mere calculations of still long intervening distances. Even if all the past could be ignored of the steady advance of Russia to the banks of the Oxus, where its power is paramount at this day, and if we could remain satisfied in the security of a barrier such as the range of the Hindu Kush affords—delusive and dangerous as such a confidence would manifestly be—there are many other circumstances, which our recent operations in Afghanistan have clearly brought out, which justify us in taking precautions in our own behalf. Look at the origin of this last war. Whatever may have been the cause which induced Sher Ali to seek a Russian alliance in preference to our own (I attribute it myself entirely to the so-called policy of “masterly inactivity,” which alienated Sher Ali by its persistent disregard of reasonable claims and reasonable fears), I venture to repeat what I have before asserted, that no Government, whether in England or India, could have hesitated for a moment to repel the action which the Amir of Afghanistan adopted in September 1878, when, against warning, expostulations, and earnest endeavours on our part to maintain peace and amity, he wilfully chose to cast in his lot with a power which we are obliged to recognize as a rival quite as much as a neighbour. The policy of Russia in Central Asia, and especially as it approaches Afghanistan, must always be an object of the keenest anxiety to any one responsible for the safety and good government of India; and when we found that Sher Ali had been led on by intrigues and promises to reject our advances with ill-disguised hostility, at the very time that an embassy from Russia was welcomed, “*not only without hindrance but with much ceremony,” and with open demonstrations of salutes and illuminations at Kabul, we had no option but to resent by force the open attempt of Russia to establish her influence in Afghanistan. The fact that this mission started from Tashkend at the end of May 1878, that it took nearly four months in its deliberate progress without the slightest intimation to the Government of India, shows not only the secrecy with which the whole business was organized, but the facility with which such operations could be repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that, if we had not interfered actively, the permanent establishment of that influence would have been attained; and if we might entertain the hope that the lessons of the war which followed will not be soon forgotten in Afghanistan, we can scarcely expect that the success of her schemes, in embroiling us in the Afghan difficulties of the last two years, will prevent Russia, whenever the occasion suits her, from renewing her intrigues with a power which, as far as we are concerned, we propose now to leave in a position of complete isolation. The contention that the results of our recent military operations in Afghanistan, involving the loss to Sher Ali of his kingdom, the exclusion of his son and heir from the throne, and the sufferings of the people from the war, will operate to diminish the chances of any Afghan prince ever again entertaining insidious proposals from Russia, seems to me opposed to all our past experience of the Afghan people. The miseries of the war will soon be forgotten. Indeed, if reliance can be placed upon statements often made to our officers during the war, the flood of money poured into the country during our military occupation of Kabul was held by many to be more than a compensation for the troubles which the war brought upon them. And as for the rest, while we know now better than we ever did before that Afghanistan as a State can never stand by itself, but must lean upon some external support; if it is not to India she can look, she will as certainly as before turn her looks to Russia. The probabilities of such a dependence will be assuredly confirmed if Abdul Rahman is, in the eventualities of the future, to emerge with our aid as the ruler of a united Afghanistan. Already we are not without indications of the kind of pressure he is intending to put upon us in his need of support of men and material; and further he has never disguised from us, even from the earliest days of his negotiations, the debt he owes to Russian hospitality during his exile of twelve years, and the obligation by which he is bound to recognise those services.

There is another consideration which seems to me to deserve prominent attention in connection with the proposal for an immediate withdrawal from Kandahar. It is one to

* The quotation is from a Russian official despatch.

which I have little excuse for referring, because, as a strictly military question, it has already been the subject of discussion by the highest military authorities, many of whom could bring to bear upon it a practical knowledge of the place, the people, and the surrounding country. If we may not rely upon the now well known opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala regarding the necessity of holding Kandahar, "because he is an officer who during recent years has had no connection with the political or military affairs of India," we may at least have the advantage of the professional opinion of nearly all the military advisers of the Government of India, as pronouncing warmly in favor of Kandahar as a strategic position of great importance; and not only so, but we also have the fact that everyone whose opinion has been taken only consented to the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram routes on the express understanding that Kandahar was to be retained. This discovery of the importance of Kandahar is one which comes upon us in India with something like a surprise; for hitherto, not without reason, from the activity manifested by Russia on the line of the Oxus, the thoughts of our statesmen and military experts have been directed mainly to the progress of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush with Kabul as its objective. Our recent experiences in Southern Afghanistan as to the advantages of Kandahar as a military position, its capability of easy communication with our base at Kurrachee, its accessibility from Herat, always contested and denied till Ayub Khan's march and defeat of our troops at Maiwand showed the futility of the objections—and more than all the advance of Russia from the Caspian eastwards and her latest achievements, in the cause of civilization and commerce, against the Turkomans—must indicate to all unprejudiced minds the certainty that it is by this direct route from Herat to India that Russia aims in the conflict with us, which she at least knows to be inevitable. We have heard of them within the last few days at Geok Tepe, at Askabat, on the Tajend—places which a glance at even the largest maps will show to mean the practical occupation of all that part of the country of which Merv is the centre. No one, I suppose, will contest the fact that Merv is now as much at the mercy of Russia as any other Central Asia, dependency which she dominates, or that the seizure by her of Herat is a question only of time and convenience. Now, on our part, it may be allowed that we have been effusive in our indignation, as far as words are concerned, at the open violation of Russia's promises on the subject, and have very precisely intimated to Amirs of Kabul on more than one occasion that Russia's interference with Afghan affairs will not be tolerated; but our action when the emergency has arisen has always belied our language, and we remain idle spectators of the determined extension which Russia is, step by step, making of her dominion towards Herat. I discredit altogether, because it has failed us in the past, the assurance which is given to us on such occasions that when the real crisis comes England will deal with Russia in the matter as a European question. As we too well know to our cost from the past, it will be just as simple and easy for England to acquiesce a few years hence in the occupation of Herat as it is for England now to accept the practical occupation by Russia of the Merv territory. Then, as now, Indian opinion will be subordinated to party politics at home. Then, as now, the excuses in favour of Russian ambition will be equally ready and be equally deserving of respectful consideration. India, as before, will be left to indifference, amid the wrangles of political parties, as to the side which was the first to give cause of offence to Russia; and this is the more to be dreaded because we know as a fact that the movements of Russia are not regulated by promises, but by the exigencies of her policy; and that that policy is dictated more by the irresponsible ambition of Central Asian officers than by the authority which makes the vows and protestations at St. Petersburg.

The only argument which for a moment seems to me tenable, to justify the precipitate orders which Her Majesty's Government have issued, is that which is based on the expenditure involved in the retention of Kandahar. It is estimated to amount to 2,000,000*l.* annually, and though the details of the estimate are not before us, we have reason to suppose that the large expenditure thus indicated is calculated on the exaggerated alarms of the few partisans in favour of our retirement. Assuming, as we may rightly do, that India will have to bear an increased expenditure (whatever it may be) for the security of our frontiers and the safety of our Indian Empire, the question is simply whether it is worth our while to spend this money as an insurance against risks of very serious magnitude. I concur with the many who think that the outlay is necessary in our interests, because the withdrawal from an advantageous position which our arms have gained, and which as a military position we can easily fortify, will inevitably involve

complications and difficulties which the retention of Kandahar would avert; and because any retreat now to our original limits, with the policy which it proclaims of absolute non-interference, will in the end entail a much heavier expenditure than the measures advocated in the cause primarily of our self-preservation. Besides we have often before, with every addition of territory that has been forced upon us in India, heard these financial forebodings of failure; though fortunately they have never been realised. I think it will be found, looking back to the acquisition of Sind and of the Punjab after the wars on the Sutlej, that similar alarms of its uselessness and costliness found public expression; and when Lord Dalhousie annexed Lower Burmah in 1850, there were not wanting signs of disapproval that we were adding to the burdens and risks of our empire by extending it beyond the proper limits of British India. In the first case there were the stock arguments which now prevail of sterile sands and barren deserts, of a fierce people with strong warlike instincts with whom no truce could ever be made. And we find it after 30 years the most peaceful and loyal of our Indian provinces, supplying the best material for our military services, and with a revenue which compensates for all the risks incurred. While in Burmah, the most prosperous and promising of our Indian dependencies, the solution of the problem has been all the more remarkable from the fact of the more rapid development of successful administration. It would be foolish to ignore, from a financial point of view, the difficulties which an extension of territory beyond the Indus may involve; but that neither the financial nor the administrative difficulties are insurmountable has in a manner been proved already by the success achieved in a part of this very country in the assigned districts of Sibi, and by the prospects held out up to this time of the profitable occupation of Pishin. If any doubts are entertained upon this

' Not yet
received.

point I would refer to recent memoranda* upon the subject by Sir R. Sandeman, the Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, which show conclusively the fatuity of proposals which, in violation of the obligations which we have publicly and officially assumed, would abandon to anarchy and confusion the peace and prosperity now established throughout the whole tract of country under our control.

But perhaps the most grievous and humiliating part of the orders in this connection is that which affects not only the stoppage of the railway works now under construction by the Nari Gorge, but the dismantling of the rails and the destruction of the earthworks already completed to a considerable distance towards Quetta. We certainly are not acting here exactly without precedent, for we can all remember the case in which the Chinese Government recently having got possession of a railway proceeded at once to demolish it and to break up its rolling stock. There is, however, this difference between the two cases, and it scarcely tells in our favour. The Chinese Government had never seen a railway before, and may have had just that kind of excuse for its folly which ignorance and superstition would excite. We on our side cannot plead such excuses, and least of all in places where we come in contact with barbarism. This wilful and deliberate surrender of advantages, gained after a vast expenditure of time and thought and money, and which would subserve peaceful administration much more than they would supply the military requirements of our position at Quetta, may be intelligible, by a stretch of imagination, to some people who fancy that there is a high moral motive concealed in our proceedings; but, as far as they affect India, they are absolutely beyond the comprehension of any native in the country.

In conclusion, I wish to say that I believe it to be an entire misconception to suppose that a large majority in either Kandahar or Pishin would not now accept the continuance of the British occupation of those provinces. I am certain at least that a few months of native government, be it under Abdul Rahman, Ayub Khan, or any other chief, would vastly increase the number "of the already powerful party who prefer British rule to any other." I am supported in this opinion by a very remarkable paper* by Colonel St. John upon the subject; and admittedly there is no one who can speak with the authority and personal experience with which he can speak upon the position of affairs at Kandahar.

Not yet
received.

* No 71, dated 5th February 1881.

The 24th February 1881.

(Signed) RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 2. in No. 3.

MINUTE by the Hon. E. BARING.

1. After the very full discussions which have taken place during the last two or three years, it is unnecessary that I should give my reasons for considering that the determination of Her Majesty's Government to evacuate the whole of Afghanistan is eminently wise and statesmanlike. I will only say that, ever since I have given any attention to Indian affairs, I have been an advocate of the frontier policy adopted by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook,* that I consider a political error of the first magnitude was made in departing from that policy, and that I welcome a return to it. I should have been content to add nothing to what has been already stated by others of far greater ability and authority than myself,† had it not been that, as the Member of the Governor General's Council primarily responsible for the conduct of the finances of India, I am desirous that the very important financial aspects of this question should receive due consideration.

2. I am of opinion that, in addition to the general political reasons which may be given in favour of evacuating Afghanistan, it may be shown that it would be highly inadvisable to subject the finances of India to the strain which would be involved upon them by continued occupation.

3. It is, I believe, held by competent military authority that it would require about 6,000 British and 15,000 native troops to garrison Kandahar and to maintain the line of communications. The extra cost consequent on the service of these troops out of India is estimated at 1,000,000%. [100 lakhs of rupees] a year. This estimate, however, makes no allowance for the expenditure on barracks, fortified posts, &c., which would necessarily be very high. It is based, moreover, on the assumption that the troops would belong to the ordinary establishments of India, and includes only extra charges beyond those which would be incurred were the troops serving in India. If, as is more than probable, the force in India had to be increased, the ordinary pay, rations, and other charges of as many corps and batteries as were added, would of course form part of the extra cost consequent on occupation. I cannot doubt that the cost of occupying Kandahar would eventually prove to be considerably in excess of 1,000,000%. a year.

4. The cost of occupying Pishin would no doubt be less, but I cannot help thinking that it would still be very heavy. I observe that my honourable colleague, Sir Donald Stewart, who speaks on this subject with the weight of unquestionable authority, says that—

“The retention of our authority over Pishin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd of December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at very insignificant cost by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.”

Sir R. Sandeman says that “it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.” On the other hand, the Indian Army Commission (Report, p. 26), proceeding on the

* That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence in a Despatch, dated January 4th, 1869, in the following terms:—“We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

“Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances, and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.”

† Notably by the Duke of Argyll in *The Eastern Question*, vol. II., pages 215 to 455. So far as I am aware, no adequate attempt has as yet been made to answer the arguments contained in this volume.

assumption that Kandahar would be given up, allotted a very considerable force* to Pishin and the posts between it and Dadur, and it is within my personal knowledge that Sir Henry Norman, who also speaks with high authority on this subject, considered that the force proposed by the Commission erred on the side of inadequacy. After the experience we have gained in Afghan affairs, I think it not unreasonable to incline to the pessimist, rather than to the optimist, view of possible expenditure.

5. I will endeavour to state very briefly my reasons for thinking that the finances of India are not in a sufficiently prosperous condition to justify the Government in imposing upon them the additional charges to which I have alluded above.

6. The first essential condition of sound finance exists in India. The revenue exceeds the ordinary expenditure. In the year 1879-80, for which the accounts are now complete, there was a deficit of only 1,183,000*l.* after treating as ordinary expenditure a sum of 6,125,000*l.* on account of the war. The expenditure on productive public works is now limited to 2½ millions a year. Although I would very gladly see private enterprise substituted for State agency in the construction of many of those works, I am amongst those who consider that the capital outlay by Government

	£	£
EXPENDITURE—		
Ordinary -	63,543,000	
War -	6,125,000	
		69,668,000
REVENUE -	-	68,485,000
DEFICIT -	-	1,183,000

on works which are strictly productive may properly be excluded from the account of ordinary expenditure.

7. The actual financial condition of India is therefore prosperous. I am glad of an opportunity of expressing this opinion, because the recent failure in the war estimates has naturally tended to induce a belief that the present financial condition of India affords ground for serious alarm. This is not the case. We need be under no serious anxiety in respect to our current finances. The difficulties with which we have to deal, considerable though they be, are different from those which obtained at the time when Mr. Wilson came to India in 1860. India is not in a state of chronic deficit. She can not only pay her way, but provide a large surplus of receipts over expenditure. More than this, the different branches of revenue show a fair degree of elasticity. Thus, if we compare the net receipts of 1869-70 with those of 1879-80, we find that the land revenue has increased from 20,812,000*l.* to 22,199,000*l.* Excise has increased from 1,991,000*l.* to 2,697,000*l.* Customs, which in 1869-70 yielded 2,168,000*l.* yielded in 1879-80, in spite of considerable reductions of duty in the interim, a sum of 2,022,000*l.* The salt revenue has risen from 5,462,000*l.* to 6,867,000*l.* Stamps and registration have increased from 2,281,000*l.* to 3,149,000*l.*

On July 1st, 1880, a return was presented to Parliament showing the net charge on the revenues of India for interest on debt, interest, and other charges for guaranteed companies, and working expenses and maintenance of State railways and irrigation works, classed as Productive Public Works from 1868-1869 to 1880-81 (Budget Estimate). This return shows a reduction in 12 years of 3,558,000*l.* in the net charge on the revenues of India, which is accounted for by an improvement in the net result of the guaranteed and State railways and other productive works of 4,041,000*l.* (including 703,000*l.* from land revenue due to irrigation works), while the net charge for interest on debt has increased by 483,000*l.*

8. Are we therefore justified in saying that the condition of Indian finance is thoroughly prosperous? I think not. However encouraging may be the aspect of the present, the possibilities of the future are at all events sufficiently grave to render severe thrift and economy a paramount necessity.

9. I cannot think that the financial condition of that country is free from anxiety whose main source of revenue is derived from payments in silver, either fixed in perpetuity or only capable of increase at long intervals, whilst at the same time it owes a large sum annually in gold. The home charges have of late years been gradually increasing. In 1881-82 they will amount to no less than 18 millions sterling. This charge is abnormally high, and moreover includes many remittances which are merely in the nature of banking transactions; but when all reasonable deductions have been made,

* 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
2½ Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
1 Regiment British Infantry.
4 Regiments Native Infantry.

the amount which India must send home to meet her current wants is still very large. Obviously under such conditions one essential element of State finance—stability—must be wanting. We can never feel any certainty of the sum to which the item “Loss by Exchange” may not amount.

10. No less than $8\frac{1}{4}$ millions of our net revenue is derived from opium. It is true that whilst the revenue from opium has of late years been steadily increasing, it has been decided to rely on opium only to the extent of $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions net in framing the estimates. But I cannot, on this account, consider that the force of the arguments based upon the precarious nature of this revenue are

	£
Opium receipts, 1879–80	- 10,319,000
„ expenditure, 1879–80	- 2,067,000
Net revenue	- <u>8,252,000</u>

diminished. Six and a half millions is a very large sum of money, and there will always be a tendency to discount the anticipated receipts above that amount. It may reasonably be argued that the degree of embarrassment which would be caused by the whole or partial loss of the opium revenue increases in the direct proportion of the sums which the Indian Treasury derives from this source. The anomalies and inconsistencies attendant upon the present system are year by year being brought into more prominent notice. Only a short time ago, the Government of India, alarmed at the increasing export of opium from Persia to China, placed a duty upon all Persian opium transhipped at Bombay, and subsequently moved the Government of ~~the~~ free port of Singapore to adopt a similar measure. The Colonial Office in London declined to accede to this request. I mention the circumstance merely as an instance of the expedients to which India is driven by reason of her reliance upon the opium revenue.

11. Nearly seven millions of the total net revenue is derived from salt. I believe salt to be a legitimate source of revenue, and I think that it may properly constitute the financial reserve upon which the Government of India should fall back in times of emergency. But in order that our salt policy should be sound, and that the salt revenue should constitute a real reserve, it is essential that

	£
Salt receipts, 1879–80	- 7,266,000
„ expenditure, 1879–80	- 341,000
Net revenue	- <u>6,925,003</u>

the duty should not be too high. There is good reason for supposing that over a large part of Southern India the recent increase of duty has diminished consumption, or has at all events stimulated illicit manufacture. Much has of late years been done towards the equalisation of the salt duties, but I cannot think that our fiscal policy in respect to salt can be considered thoroughly sound until we have arrived at a uniform rate of Rs. 2 per maund. I need hardly point out that to arrive at this rate would involve a considerable sacrifice of revenue, and, although we may no doubt look to a certain steady growth of revenue, I cannot think that there is much hope of giving practical effect to the policy for a long time to come unless we reduce our expenditure.

12. The time cannot be far distant when almost the whole of our sea customs duty will have to be abandoned. I will not now attempt to discuss the advisability or otherwise of the partial repeal of the cotton duties. My own opinion is that the measure, however desirable in itself, was financially and politically premature; financially, because I think that India can with difficulty afford the loss of revenue; politically, because I think it would have been wiser to have postponed a change of this nature until the time, which cannot now be far distant, when the natives of India will be to a greater extent associated with us in the government of the country. However that may be, the partial repeal of the cotton duties must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to their total repeal, and eventually, in all probability, to the repeal of the duty on other imported goods. Here again the necessity of a reduction rather than an increase of expenditure is forced upon us.

13. I need not repeat the statements which have been so frequently made, to show that we cannot rely upon new sources of revenue to make good any increased expenditure. Indeed, in the face of the strong opposition which the income or license tax excites in India, it is doubtful whether we shall be able to hold to any system of direct taxation.

14. It has been determined, and I think wisely determined, to provide 1,500,000*l.* a year as an insurance against famine.

15. Lastly, the pressure of the population upon the soil, which year by year increases in intensity, presents an economic difficulty of the first magnitude, with which, indeed, I doubt the capability of Government to cope by any direct means, but which renders it imperative upon us to reduce in every possible way the pressure of taxation.

16. On these grounds I consider not only that it would be in the highest degree unwise to take any steps which would have for their result a large increase of expendi-

ture of a wholly unproductive nature, but I entertain a strong opinion that the reduction of present military expenditure is of all others the financial question which most deserves the earnest attention of the Government of India.

17. I am aware that it is sometimes argued that the expenditure consequent on the occupation of Southern Afghanistan is only in the nature of an insurance which will guard us against political and financial evils at some future date. Leaving out of account the political arguments, which in my opinion invalidate this plea, I consider that, on purely financial grounds, the argument involves a fallacy. When on analogous grounds Lord Palmerston wished to spend a large sum of money on fortifications, Sir George Lewis objected that in such matters prevention was not better than cure. A precisely similar argument applies in my opinion to the occupation of Southern Afghanistan as an insurance against Russian invasion. The dangers from the side of Russia, even if they be not altogether imaginary, are uncertain and remote. The political and financial evils of occupation are certain and proximate. By the occupation of Southern Afghanistan a stimulus will be given to that spirit of territorial aggrandisement which it is, in my opinion, the duty of English statesmen to check; whilst the immediate result must be to adjourn indefinitely the fiscal reforms of which India stands so much in need, if indeed it be not to necessitate the imposition of burdensome and unpopular taxes. I submit that the interests of the natives of India, to which alone we should look, do not justify us in expending the money derived from the taxes which they pay upon the occupation of Southern Afghanistan.

18. I should add that the surplus revenue of Southern Afghanistan is insignificant compared to the estimated cost of occupation. Colonel St. John estimated the revenue of the provinces of Kandahar, Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, Farah and Kelat-i-Ghilzai for 1880-81 at Rs. 20,50,000, and the expenditure at Rs. 14,50,000, leaving a surplus of only Rs. 6,00,000. The revenue of Pishin Colonel St. John estimated at about Rs. 62,500. Sir Robert Sandeman's estimate is Rs. 45,000. The resources of these provinces would, without doubt, be to some extent developed under British rule, but it is clear that the revenue could not within any appreciable time increase in such proportions as would make good any considerable portion of the cost of occupation. Moreover, all experience has shown that increased expenditure under our costly system of administration generally swallows up any progressive increments of revenue.

19. Allusion has occasionally been made to the commercial advantages of occupying Kandahar. I give in the margin figures showing the trade between Kandahar and British India during the last three years. The imports consist principally of wool; the exports of European piece-goods. No doubt the result of British administration and the construction of a railway would be to develop the trade; to what extent is a matter of conjecture. I cannot, however, think that the indirect financial advantages to be derived on this account could ever seriously counterbalance the direct disadvantages of the expenditure which would be the result of occupation.

20. On these grounds I am of opinion that, independently of other reasons, the necessity of retiring from Southern Afghanistan is, on financial grounds, forced upon us.

E. BARING.

February 19th, 1881.

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FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

FURTHER PAPERS.

No. 35 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 21, 1881.

WITH reference to paragraph 7 of our Despatch, dated 2nd February 1881,* we have the honour to forward the minutes† of our honourable colleagues, which have been already recorded. Any other minutes which may be under preparation will be forwarded subsequently.

* No. 21.

† By Mr. Whitley Stokes, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Mr. J. Gibbs, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Lieut.-General Sir D. M. Stewart, G.C.B., dated 31st January 1881.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1.

MINUTE.

THE present Secretary of State for India has directed us to withdraw our troops from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. Though this order affects, in a high degree, the military, political, and commercial interests of an empire for which the Government of India is primarily responsible, his Lordship has issued it without giving us a chance of remonstrating against a measure to which he must know that all the members of Lord Lytton's Government, and most of the members of Lord Ripon's, are strenuously opposed. To argue at length against a foregone conclusion would be mere waste of words, and I shall therefore confine myself to setting down briefly the reasons which render me unable to assent to the policy which our Despatch of the 2nd of February 1881 accepts without demur.

Those reasons are, first, that in the opinion of strategists, such as Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir F. Roberts, and Colonel Hamley, the retention of Kandahar, with a small space beyond* is desirable for the defence of India against an invading army. I myself know nothing of strategy, but anyone can see the advantage of holding a strong city situate on the only road from Central Asia to India along which wheeled carriages and heavy guns can be moved, the only road on which a railway can be made connecting India with the Caspian or Asia Minor.† Recent events have made it as certain as anything of the kind can be that the Russians will soon be established within a few days' march of the northern frontier of Afghanistan, in a position communicating with the Caspian by a light line of railway; and when this is effected the invasion referred to may almost be said to have already begun.

Secondly, because Abd-ur-Rahman, to whom the Secretary of State proposes to make over Kandahar, seems by recent accounts to be a *roi fainéant*, and is, at all events, not

* Including a portion of the Helmund river with the command of the passage at Girishk.

† See in *The Times* for September 10, 1880, a letter signed "Kandahari," the statements of fact in which are, according to two high authorities whom I have consulted, quite trustworthy.

strong enough to hold it. He cannot even control his own part of the country, though he has had six months to seat himself in the saddle, has been strengthened by our friendly presence at Kandahar, and has been largely helped with money and arms. Our withdrawal will therefore in all probability lead to anarchy and a long civil war in Afghanistan. For these calamities we shall be, and ought to be, held morally responsible. Moreover, as the Secretary of State himself remarks, protracted war in that country will probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies.

Thirdly, the result of this civil war will apparently be that Ayub, our bitter enemy, who defeated us at Maiwand, and who has already gathered a considerable force at Herat, will succeed in establishing himself at Kandahar, and ultimately at Kabul, and that we shall then have to enter on another costly war in which, if our relations with St. Petersburg happen to be at all strained, Ayub will be directly or indirectly helped by Russia. Now that General Skobelev has vanquished the Turkomans and taken Geuk Tépé, Russia will soon be at Merv, and then, unless we show an unflinching front, she will occupy Herat, which, as we know to our cost, is within striking distance of Kandahar.

Fourthly, the surrender of the sole prize which we have gained in the late Afghan war will be regarded, not only by the Afghans, but by the people of India, as a confession of weakness, fear, and instability of purpose; and, however glad they may be, individually, to leave Kandahar, the wilful relinquishment of their solitary trophy will disgust and dishearten the men of our native armies. To say, as has been said, that this result will be counterbalanced by the "moral effect" on our native allies "of a scrupulous adherence to declarations" which were made under circumstances totally different from those that now exist, is to use a phrase which will seldom be understood by Orientals, and which, when understood, will, I fear, be received with a smile of derision. The coincidence of the surrender with Skobelev's victory and with the unhappy state of affairs in Ireland and at the Cape, will not, to the native mind, appear a mere accident.

Fifthly, because the withdrawal from Kandahar, opposed, as it is, to the policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, will create a belief in this country that our action in matters vitally affecting India is subject to the vicissitudes of English party politics. Nothing can be so destructive of the local influence of the Government of India, except, I would add, the hasty determination of such questions as the present one, without reference to the opinions of the members of that Government.

Sixthly, because, according to many competent persons, our commerce would gain largely by a permanent occupation of Kandahar. This, of course, would involve the completion of the railway from Sibi, and Kandahar would then be only two days' journey from Karáchi. As Kandahar commands the chief trade-routes from India to Persia and Central Asia, it is needless to point out the opening which would thus be made for what some authorities call a great and civilising trade,—for what would, at all events, be a mutually advantageous exchange of British manufactures and Indian teas for Asiatic carpets, wool, silk, dye, and other produce.

These, stated very briefly, are my reasons for wishing to retain Kandahar, as an assigned district, administered mainly by Afghans, if it is thought impolitic to annex it to the Empire.

I shall now mention the reasons given for surrendering Kandahar. They appear to admit of easy answers. It is, in the first place, said that the financial burthen of retaining Kandahar would be more than we could conveniently bear. I believe that this is a mistake. I know that the late Financial Minister thought so; and Lord Napier of Magdala is probably right in holding that if we retreat, the savings thus effected will soon be spent in costly punitive expeditions like those which, down to the commencement of the war with the Amír Sher Ali, we had to send so constantly against the Afghan borderers. Then, with a strong garrison at Kandahar, we might safely diminish our force on the Pesháwar frontier. Besides, as irrigation and agriculture would at once extend under our rule, we should soon derive a fair revenue from Kandahar and its fertile environs, and the financial benefit of increasing our trade with Persia and Central Asia would, no doubt, be ultimately considerable.

It is, again, alleged that our sepoy are unwilling to serve so far from India, and that the occupation of Kandahar will therefore cause what is called "a constant strain on the organisation of the native army." But according to competent judges, this is a mere question of abolishing stoppages and granting a little extra pay. Pay the sepoy, says Lord Napier of Magdala, with sufficient liberality to compensate them for exile in Afghanistan, and there will be no difficulty in getting recruits for a Kandahar force.

Then it is said that we must give up Kandahar, because at the outset of the war which ended with the treaty of Gandamak, we declared that we had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. But, as every one knows, after this declaration was made, Cavagnari was murdered, and a third war broke out, in which the Afghan people, both of the South and of the North, sided with his murderers. In this war we have been victors, and may righteously retain any portion of our vanquished enemy's territory. There is contradictory evidence as to whether, at present, our rule would be popular, or the reverse, with the people of Kandahar. To my mind, this matters little. Our rule would rapidly enrich the citizens, who are mostly traders, and the villagers of the neighbouring valleys, and would therefore soon become popular enough. In any case it seems that if the Kandaharis dislike us, they dislike still more the Kabulis to whom the Secretary of State proposes to deliver them.

It has, lastly, been urged that the military occupation of Kandahar would be more advantageously taken when the advance of Russia makes it clear that not only the safety of India, but the independence of Afghanistan, is threatened. But supposing that we are not then at war with the Afghans, on what pretext are we to occupy Kandahar? Are we to set aside the ordinary rules of international law and seize a neutral's territory for our own defence? Even supposing that the Afghans, also dreading a Russian attack, voluntarily allowed us to occupy Kandahar, we should have no time to make the city and the citadel secure. That, I understand, would be a long business, especially as it ought, I am assured, to be combined with the erection of forts along our line of communication. But this latter supposition is untenable, for when Russia advances against India, she will take care to have the Afghans on her side, bribing them with the promise of the plunder of a country which they have so often looted.

On the whole, the general effect of the arguments in favour of the surrender of Kandahar is (if I may venture to say so) to confirm the conclusion that we should retain it. But if this be not done, it seems to me that the only reasonable course open to us is to restore Yakub Khán to the Amírship, and make Kandahar over to him. I am one of the few persons who have read the mass of so-called evidence against that Amír. I say now, as I have always said, that it does not establish his complicity in the murder of our Envoy, and I therefore think that we should not treat his abdication as irrevocable.

For the reasons stated by Sir Donald Stewart, in his minute of this date, I am also opposed to the surrender of Peshin and the Amran Range, which, in his Despatch of the 3rd December 1880, the Secretary of State has recommended. In fact, with the Sibi Railway prolonged to Gulistan Karez, and a line on this side of the Range from Gulistan Karez to Kila Abdulla, connecting the Gwája and the Khójak passes, we should have a defensive position almost as strong as Kandahar itself.

WHITLEY STOKES.

Calcutta, 31st January 1881.

Enclosure No. 2.

MINUTE by the HON. J. GIBBS.

HER Majesty's Government have decided on the withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar, and the relinquishment of that city and district, leaving it, if possible, in the hands of some settled government.

Abdul Rahman has been offered it, but it seems doubtful if he will be able to take advantage of our offer, or, if he does, to be able to take charge by the middle of April, by which time our troops are to be withdrawn, so as to avoid the great heats on their return march.

Although leaving under such circumstances recalls to one's mind the old saying "après moi le deluge," I can quite understand why the order has been passed, and we have only to obey it. Nevertheless, I must confess it does not shake my faith in the opinion I have long formed that sooner or later we shall hold Kandahar and Herat also, and for similar reasons to those put on record some 30 years ago by the then Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces—"It may be wrong, it may seem highly immoral to advance our frontier, but the 'red line' must and will extend, do what we may;" and this I believe will prove to be as true in regard to Southern Afghanistan as it was formerly to the Punjab.

I see many objections to our holding Kandahar now, and many good reasons why we may retire from it with comparative ease, and I do not therefore oppose such a course.

I only trust that we may not, by our retiring in April, throw the country into a more active state of anarchy than generally exists in those parts.

But with regard to Pishin and the territories which lie to the south of the Kojak range, I must say I cannot allow the proposed reply to the Despatch, No. 49, from the Secretary of State, to go without placing on record my dissent from the view taken by Her Majesty's Government at home.

The country within the Kojak range is geographically separated from Kandahar proper by the Kojak Amrum range, and a desert of 80 miles wide, its inhabitants are not numerous, and there are reasons for supposing that amongst them we are more likely to introduce a settled government than any power which may rule at Kandahar. While as regards the country marked on the maps as part of Afghanistan, and which lies to the north-east of Biluchistan proper, although a portion of the Kandahar State, that Government has had less direct hold over it than it had over the other portions of its territory. While as regards Sibi and the territory round it, which was shown in our maps from 1850 to 1870 as an oasis about 20 by 18 miles, coloured green and marked "Kandahar territory," as far as my memory serves me, since 1854, the hold over it was even less direct than over Pishin.*

I think, therefore, that from a geographical point of view, Pishin, and certainly Sibi, do not stand on the same position as Kandahar.

Then our position as regards these parts is from another aspect peculiar. Not long ago it was included in the territory ceded to us under the Treaty of Gandamak, and we informed the people we were going to occupy it, and we have done so, and taken the measures regarding its settlement, which are set out in the fifth paragraph of the reply to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. I feel assured that it will only lead to strife and confusion if we now withdraw from our present position; we should certainly, by so doing, damage our prestige in Biluchistan, not improbably place our ally the Khan of Kelat in a difficult, if not dangerous, position, while our action will be viewed in India in the undesirable light of the natural result of one government succeeding another, and by the inhabitants of the district as the result of minds as unstable as their own, if not as a breach of faith.

I do not want to annex it, but strongly protest against giving it up now. We are holding it "for an indefinite period,"—let us continue to do so. The time may come when we may, with credit to ourselves, add it to a combined and friendly Afghanistan, but the present is certainly not the time for deserting it. We should only add thereby to the confusion which must arise when we leave Kandahar, nor even if Abdul Rahman does take possession, we cannot expect him to do so with the good-will of the people, while to expect Ayub Khan to keep quiet and abstain from trying to regain what he thinks is his own, cannot, for a moment, be expected.

So far from thinking, as the Secretary of State's Despatch lays down, that by holding Pishin as we do now we should keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and have a temptation or pretext for interfering with its domestic affairs, the contrary in my opinion would be the result—it would be a position easily held, a stand-point from which we could calmly view all that is going on beyond without any need or desire to be mixed up in it, not likely to be interfered with by the Kandaharis, who would have to cross a wide desert and a heavy mountain range to come near us, staying where we are, strengthened by the possession of the good-will of the inhabitants, who will be only too glad of the security our presence affords them.

As to the troops required to hold it, it is of course a military question, but from what I learn, especially from Sir R. Sandeman, our agent at Kelat, I apprehend a very small addition to the force we shall be obliged to keep for some time at Quetta will suffice. It was not a district which used to be held by Kandahar troops; and the knowledge of our force at Quetta will suffice, with a few small detachments, to do all that is required.

This subject also involves the question of the railway. Believing, as I do, that a railroad is one of the greatest of civilisers, and knowing that already the kafilah merchants are making their inquiries regarding it, and remembering how strongly such a line for commercial purposes has been urged on Government from time to time since 1857, and looking at what we have spent and how very little extra will be needed to make it useful as far as Hurnai, while its safety will be provided for by the tribes themselves, many of whom are anxious for it, I think it would be a great mistake not to finish it, at all events up to that point.

31st January 1881.

(Signed) J. GIBBS.

* Note.—I notice that Sir Robert Sandeman puts forward a claim of Kelat to Pishin, on the ground that it was once formally granted to that State, but of this I have no detailed information.—J. G.

Enclosure 3.

MINUTE.

WHEN the question of the occupation of Kandahar was discussed in Council in September last, it will be in the recollection of those who were present at that discussion, that my objection to our retirement from that place was based on the engagements which had been formally entered into with the ruler and people of Kandahar, and from which it appeared to me that we could not honourably withdraw.

Though I am bound to say that some of my colleagues did not appear to attach much importance to these alleged obligations, the point was admitted to be one which required the fullest consideration, and it was eventually decided that the further discussion of that and of the general question should be deferred till Mr. Lyall's return from Kandahar, when the Council hoped to be in a position to come to a satisfactory settlement of them.

Owing, however, to the removal of the Government from Simla to Calcutta and the unfortunate illness of the Viceroy, the Council has not had an opportunity of continuing the discussion of these questions till quite recently.

This is the position in which we find ourselves to-day with regard to the question of the occupation of Kandahar.

I do not myself consider Kandahar to be a place of great strategical value, nor am I an advocate of annexation for any purpose, not even if it could be demonstrated without a shadow of doubt that our frontier would be improved and strengthened by such a measure.

My objection, therefore, to the action of Her Majesty's present Government in regard to Southern Afghanistan is based, not on a disapproval of the effect of that action, but on their disregard of obligations which were formally and publicly undertaken by their predecessors in office in the name of Her Majesty the Queen.

My contention is that whether the policy of the late Government was good or bad, it ought not to be disturbed without the clearest necessity, for nothing can be so destructive of our influence in this country as the creation of a belief that the policy of its Government is subject to the vicissitudes of English parties.

To guard myself from misconstruction, I would desire it to be understood that I do not for a moment pretend to argue that our policy is never to be subjected to change. But I must repeat that the complete reversal of a deliberate policy recognises a principle that must be always inconvenient and sometimes dangerous.

Whether the necessity for a change of policy is or is not in the present instance capable of demonstration it is not my intention here to discuss, because it would serve no useful purpose to enter into a barren disputation on a subject which has not only been finally disposed of by Her Majesty's Government, but which will certainly receive, if it has not already received, the sanction of Parliament, and is therefore beyond the stage of practical criticism.

But the question of the evacuation of Peshin seems to me to stand on a totally different footing. That district has been assigned to us by treaty; and although that instrument may now be considered inoperative, it has led us into obligations with regard to the population of the assigned districts, from which we cannot retreat without discredit, and as I think humiliation, and on this ground I protest against the immediate, or even early rendition of Peshin to any Afghan Government.

The time may come when the district can be restored to Afghanistan with the full consent of the people and without detriment to the interests of the empire; but till that time arrives we are bound to guard those interests by continuing to acknowledge our obligations before the world.

However opinions may differ about the value of Pishin, no one can doubt that the possession of the Amran Range is a very important acquisition to our frontier, and it will not be easy to justify to the country any sacrifice of the advantages which accrue to us from the possession of that mountain barrier.

The retention of our authority over Peshin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges, contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at a very insignificant cost* by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.

* Sir R. Sandeman says it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.

If Her Majesty's Government consider that the conditions of assignment are practically identical with annexation, it would be easy to stipulate that the entire revenues of the district after payment of the civil charges be surrendered to the Afghan Government.

I would ask that this minute be sent home with our reply to the Secretary of State's Despatches Nos. 45 and 49 of 11th November and 3rd December last, respectively.

(Signed) D. M. STEWART,

Calcutta, January 31, 1881.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING

THE TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
KANDAHAR TO AMIR ABDUL-RAHMAN KHAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

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No. 1.

No. 3 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 12, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding Sirdar Sher Ali Khan of Kandahar.

2. Your Lordship is aware of the circumstances under which the Sirdar was recognized in March last as independent ruler of the Kandahar province. The authority then assumed by him was lost four months later, when Sirdar Ayub Khan advanced from Herat; and Sher Ali Khan afterwards showed little inclination to resume it. Immediately after the relief of Kandahar by General Roberts, Sher Ali Khan informed Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all the aid in his power for the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India, as he had lost confidence in the people, and as he felt little hope of restoring a good understanding between them and himself. On the 30th October he addressed a letter to the Viceroy in which he stated that, since no immediate settlement of the affairs of the country could be expected, he proposed to withdraw with his family to Kurrachee.

3. Before this letter was received the situation of affairs in Southern Afghanistan had been very carefully considered, and it seemed on the whole advisable that the Sirdar's offer should be accepted. Recent events in this part of Afghanistan had left no doubt that, except with the active and unreserved support of the British Government, Sher Ali Khan was altogether unable to maintain his position as independent ruler of Kandahar. The greater part of his regular military force had deserted him on the approach of Ayub Khan; while the people of the province showed no disposition whatever to assist him, but on the contrary turned with the greatest animosity against the British troops with whom he was acting in the field. It may be admitted that the hostility of the Duranis, who form by far the majority of the population of South Afghanistan, was inspired mainly by their fanaticism, and by the dislike with which they regarded the occupation of Kandahar by foreign troops. But all the circumstances of the outbreak tended to prove that the Sirdar's government had not been popular, and had acquired no intrinsic strength apart from the support which might be given by British arms. His government, if restored in the districts adjacent to the capital, could be maintained only by a general undertaking to defend and uphold the Sirdar's authority against foreign invasion. It is manifest, however, that we could not have entered upon obligations of this nature and extent without embarking upon a course of policy leading towards the indefinite, if not the permanent, military occupation of Kandahar by a British force—a measure to which Her Majesty's Government (as we had been informed by your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May) entertains the strongest objection. Accordingly, the Sirdar was informed that the Government of India were fully prepared to accord him an honourable reception in British territory, and that nothing should be wanting to ensure his comfort and security so long as he might reside under British protection. On the 29th of November Colonel St. John telegraphed that Sher Ali Khan cheerfully acquiesced in this decision; that he chose Kurrachee as his place of residence; and that he would start as soon as arrangements could be made for his journey. A fortnight later he left Kandahar, and on the 27th of December arrived at Kurrachee. An allowance of Rupees 5,000 per mensem has been settled upon him, and suitable arrangements have been made for his accommodation and that of his family. The

Sirdar has expressed himself much gratified at all that has been done ; nor is there any reason to suppose that he is not in fact very well satisfied with the treatment that he has received.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA, dated Kandahar, the 30th October 1880.

After compliments.—Now that the Foreign Secretary has come here, and that I have had several interviews with him, I have understood from him, after much conversation regarding the affairs of this country, that arrangements for it, after recent events, are still undetermined. Some time is required to decide them. Of course the British Government is entitled to act according to its own interests. Under any circumstances I am of one opinion with and agree with the Government in any views they may entertain regarding future arrangements. But since both in former times and recently I have for a long space of time administered the affairs of this Government, and know most of the people thoroughly, (I fear) that, perchance, in this time of uncertainty, some persons may do evil, which may cause the British Government to become cold-hearted towards me, and thus I may be ruined. Therefore, with the permission of the British Government, I, with my family, will proceed to the port of Kurrachee, for is not it also a possession of the British Government? If ever in the future arrangements for this country my services should be required, I shall be ready in the territory of the British Government. But if some other arrangement is come to, no doubt the British Government is entitled to act as it pleases, and I shall always consider myself its sincere friend. Also I heartily assure your Excellency that the British Government may always consider me its sincere friend.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Dated CAMP JACOBABAD, 19th November 1880.

LETTER from His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar.

I HAVE received the letter addressed to me on the 30th of October by your Highness, and I have given full consideration to its contents.

Your Highness has rightly perceived that recent events have necessarily unsettled the arrangements previously made with respect to the government of Kandahar, and that some time may elapse before the future relations of the British Government with that country shall have been finally determined. And since your Highness has conveyed to me your desire to proceed, under these circumstances, to British India, I reply that I am fully prepared to accord you an honourable reception in British territory, and to make every provision for the entertainment of yourself and family, according to your high rank and dignity, so long as you may reside under the protection of the British Government. Be assured that you will be treated as a friend, and a distinguished guest, and that nothing shall be wanting to ensure your comfort and security.

Whatever arrangements you may wish made regarding your journey and your place of residence, whether at Kurrachee, or elsewhere, should be communicated to my officers at Kandahar ; and they will receive early and ample consideration whenever they are laid before me.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th December 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan left Kandahar this morning. Troops lined the streets from his house to the city gate, where a guard of honour was stationed, and a salute fired. I accompanied him for two miles beyond the city. Very few people were in the street. Major Heyland, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, accompanied him to Quetta, where Major Conolly meets him. He should arrive on nineteenth or twentieth. His family start to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th December 1880.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY, Kurrachee, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SIRDAR expresses himself most grateful for handsome allowance, rupees five thousand monthly, and satisfied to settle here or elsewhere, making a pilgrimage perhaps, or visit to Calcutta, or some point of interest in India. The house accommodation here is ample, but space round limited. I hope to obtain sufficient ground for a garden which the Sirdar is anxious to have. I consider an eligible native gentleman quite capable of taking my place, and Sher Ali names Gholam Nukshband Khan as a person he would like. The Sirdar's position as an entirely free agent distinctly intimated to the local authorities.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN to the ADDRESS of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 28th December 1880.

After compliments.—WHEREAS my request was, through your kindness, granted and complied with, I, in pursuance of the command of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had the honour of receiving at Kandahar, started without delay and ahead of my family for Kurrachee, where I arrived yesterday, Monday, the 27th December 1880, and I hope my family will also arrive here in ten days.

My honoured friend, I am and shall always be thankful for the honourable treatment which I received at the hands of the representatives of the most powerful Government from the time I quitted Kandahar up to the day of my arrival at Kurrachee. I confidently hope that, if my transient life is prolonged, I shall pass my remaining days with great ease and comfort under the shadow of the glorious Government. I feel certain that this honourable reception has been accorded to me by Government solely through your kindness, and I trust you will also use your best endeavours to better my position in future.

As I think it my imperative duty to inform you of my arrival at my destination, I write this friendly letter to you, trusting that you will always gratify me by the glad news of your good health.

No. 2.

No. 10 of 1881. (Extract)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 19, 1881.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence that has taken place with His Highness the Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Kabul.

2. It will be seen that on the 13th of October last the Amir wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, stating that he had been invited to send governors to the district of Khost and to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and inquiring whether he could do so with the assent of the British Government. Mr. Lyall was absent at Kandahar when the letter reached India, and only received it at Lahore on his return in November. From Lahore a reply was sent assenting to the Amir sending a governor to Khost, but the question of Kelat-i-Ghilzai was deferred. The opportunity was taken to inform the Amir that the British Government were disposed to reconsider the arrange-

ments that had been made in Southern Afghanistan, and to suggest that the Amir should send a confidential agent to whom these arrangements might be communicated, especially in regard to questions affecting Kandahar. The messenger who took this letter reached Kabul after some delay. He left Kabul with the reply, but it seems that he was way-laid on his return journey, nor is the cause of his disappearance yet known, though enquiry on the matter is still being made. The consequence of this miscarriage has been that some time was lost in obtaining from the Amir a duplicate of his letter which was not received by the Viceroy at Allahabad until early in the present month.

3. The object of this correspondence with the Amir is indicated by Mr. Lyall's letter to him of the 18th November; it is to ascertain whether any, and if so what, arrangements can be negotiated with the Amir for placing Kandahar under his government, whenever the British troops are prepared to withdraw from that city. Your Lordship's despatch of the 21st of May last left no doubt of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this withdrawal; while its general tenor leaned substantially towards the policy of restoring Kandahar to Kabul, and against any measures directed towards perpetuating the disintegration of Afghanistan. Under these instructions it became necessary to consider without delay some definite course of action for the establishment of a native government in South Afghanistan; and the problem appeared to offer no other practical solution than some arrangement, as suggested by Her Majesty's Government, for replacing the country under the dominion of Kabul. Upon these considerations it was thought expedient, in order to obtain an opening for preliminary discussions, to invite the Amir to depute a confidential agent to whom the views and intentions of the Government of India might be communicated.

4. Since the correspondence with the Amir was thus initiated, we have received your Lordship's despatch* of the 11th of November, which states much more distinctly the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The concluding three paragraphs contain positive injunctions that Kandahar must be evacuated as early as possible, and express a plain opinion that Kandahar and, if possible, all Afghanistan should pass under the dominion of the Amir Abdul Rahman. When, therefore, the Amir's letter of the 28th of December reached Allahabad, it seemed necessary, as much delay had accidentally intervened, to lose no more time in advancing upon the line of policy prescribed by these despatches. The Amir asked for a personal interview; but the difficulties in arranging immediately so important a business as a formal meeting in India with the Amir of Kabul were obvious, while there is great doubt whether it is judicious to agree to such a meeting, before the basis of a discussion shall have been fixed, and especially before the Amir shall have understood within what general limits the British Government is actually prepared to assist him.

5. The reply, therefore, which has been sent to the Amir postpones the question of an interview, but agrees to his sending a governor to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, a place which, it is to be remembered, formed part of Kabul territory under the Amir Dost Muhammad at a time when Kandahar was still under a separate government, and to which the Amir of Kabul can therefore fairly lay claim. Moreover, its occupation by the Amir Abdul Rahman will place him on the road toward Kandahar, and will test his power and inclination to advance further, if the subsequent course of events facilitates the extension of his dominion in South Afghanistan. And as all accounts represent the Amir to be in straits for money, the sum of five lakhs of rupees has been offered him for his immediate expenses.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Khurecta, dated Simla, 10th September 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE already instructed my officers on the frontier to inform your Highness of the success which has attended the march of Sir F. Roberts to Kandahar, and of the complete dispersion by him of the army of Sirdar Ayub Khan. The knowledge that this victory will assist in the consolidation and strengthening of your Highness' Government, by relieving your Highness from any danger of attack from without by the discontented persons who followed Sirdar Ayub Khan, has caused me additional pleasure.

I rejoice to learn, through my officers, and especially from your Highness' letters to Mr. Griffin, that your Highness is establishing yourself firmly at Kabul, and that you are consolidating your Government there.

Accept my congratulations and rest assured that I shall always be glad to hear of your welfare.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated Kabul, 28th September 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that I received and perused, on the 25th September 1880, your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 10th idem, containing the happy news of the success and victory gained by General Roberts and of the signal defeat suffered by Muhammad Ayub Khan at Kandahar, and giving expression to your Excellency's wishes for the prosperity and advancement of my rule in Afghanistan. I was exceedingly gratified by the particularly benign sentiments which your Excellency has given expression to. I confidently hope that, by the grace of the Everlasting Sovereign, so long as I live my heart will be cheered and gladdened by the display of conspicuous favours and befitting kindness of the powerful British Government, and that I shall win its perfect confidence day after day by my honest dealings and good deeds.

As regards my children and dependants residing at Tashkend, I wish them to come to the capital, Kabul. Therefore, I request your Excellency to let me know what your Excellency thinks advisable and proper to do in the matter, so that I, acting upon your Excellency's suggestion and advice, may make arrangements for them to proceed to Kabul.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Khurecta, dated Simla, 25th October 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE received your letter, dated the 28th September, and fully appreciate the friendly sentiments which you have expressed. It is unnecessary for me to write at length in this matter, for you are well aware of the good-will which the British Government entertains for your Highness. But I desire to assure your Highness that it gives me much pleasure to receive your letters, and to be informed of your sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the friendship which now happily exists between the British Government and the Kabul State.

As regards what you have written about your children and dependants, I think your Highness' wishes are natural. Now that your Government has become firmly established, it is fitting that your family should be collected around you; and I have already caused your Highness to be informed that I shall be glad to do anything in my power to facilitate the journey of those members of it now in Kandahar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., dated Kabul, the 13th October 1880.

After compliments.—I write to apprise you that whereas I have not for some time past addressed a friendly letter to you, I beg to write this to give expression to the most affectionate and cordial sentiments I entertain (towards you), as well as to mention that previous to this I alluded to the matter of Khost in my letter to the illustrious (British) Government. But I have not received an answer yet. The Maliks of Khost have just waited upon me and entreated for a governor. The Tokhi Maliks, too, having come to the capital (Kabul), asked for regulations, rules, and a governor for Kelat-i-Tokhi. Whereas I, having in view the sincere friendship and perfect affection, cannot venture upon such matters without the consent and permission of the representatives of the sublime British Government. I have re-assured and cheered the Tokhi Maliks, and for the present left the affairs of Kelat to them to manage after the usage of their tribe, and having promised them to nominate a governor in a few days, I have dismissed them. I, therefore, write to ask you to inform me, as speedily as possible, of the intention of the representatives of the illustrious Government in regard to the matter of Kelat and Khost, so that, agreeably to the advice and suggestion of the representatives of the illustrious Government, I may assume the administration of those two districts. And whereas seven months have already elapsed of the current year, and their affairs are still in confusion and disorder, the sooner they are arranged and put in order, the more beneficial it will prove to the two allied States.

What more can I write beyond the professions of affection and concord.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 1st November 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform you that I have recently received and perused a letter from my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Henry Griffin, intimating that he is going to England for a few months, and that in his absence I should communicate with, and address my letters to, his Excellency the Viceroy, or to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Therefore, agreeably to the wishes of that officer, I always remember and gratify you by addressing friendly letters to you; and in this cordial epistle I beg to state that on the 22nd Shawal (28th September 1880) I wrote to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and also to my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, regarding my children and dependants, who are in Tashkend, stating that I wished them to come to the capital, Kabul, and soliciting to be informed what his Excellency deemed advisable to do in the matter, so that, acting upon his Excellency's suggestion and advice, I might make arrangements for their journey to Kabul.

It is now 35 days since I wrote, but I have not been informed in reply on the subject by his Excellency the Governor-General, or by Mr. Griffin as yet, so that I may have made arrangements for their departure from Tashkend. As the cold weather has set in, and the roads and passes will be shortly blocked on account of snow and cold, I request you to get a reply from his Excellency the Viceroy as speedily as possible and communicate it to me, so that I may make the arrangements early. Should any delay take place, it is evident that the matter will have to be put off till next year, and this would be the cause of uneasiness and anxiety to me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Dated 18th November 1880.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

Your friendly letter of the 13th of October, addressed to Mr. Lepel Griffin, has been delivered to me, because before its arrival Mr. Griffin had departed from India to Europe.

In his absence I trust that your Highness, in accordance with the very kind and friendly letter addressed to me by your Highness on the 1st November, considering me

as your sincere friend, will not fail to write to me on matters in which it may appear to your Highness that private communications with the Government of India may be convenient and desirable.

With regard to what your Highness has written about Khost, there is on the part of the British Government no objection to your making the necessary arrangements for the administration of that district, though on the subject of Kuram the views of the British Government have already been explained to your Highness separately.

With regard to Kelat, the Government is not yet prepared to give a definite reply, but in all probability some satisfactory conclusion may by discussion be found. I am authorised to inform your Highness that the course of recent events in Afghanistan has led the British Government to consider whether the general arrangements made in South Afghanistan may not require some modification, and that the Government is desirous that any future necessary changes in these arrangements may be made in communication and consultation with yourself, particularly in regard to questions which affect Kandahar. In this way it is most probable that a satisfactory settlement which may tend to the peace of Afghanistan and to the strengthening of your Highness' power may be arrived at in the interests of both States. But in order that this may be accomplished without inconvenient delay, and with a full knowledge of your Highness' views and wishes, it is of much importance that, if your Highness sees no material impediment, you should lose no time in deputing to India a confidential agent, well acquainted with your Highness' affairs, with whom the whole matter can be discussed, and to whom the intentions of the Government, which are in the direction of your Highness' advantage, and for the confirmation of friendship between the two States, may be explained. These matters cannot easily be transacted by correspondence, and as delay is inadvisable, the coming of your Highness' confidential representative is very expedient for the acceleration of conclusions. If, indeed, your Highness should prefer that a confidential Mahommedan agent should instead be sent to Kabul, this will be done on hearing from you, but for various reasons it is supposed that the preferable course is for your Highness to send an agent here with a letter to myself, though on this your Highness will judge.

The bearer of this letter, Haji Atta-ulla, has not been made acquainted with the precise contents or purport of my communication to your Highness, nor is it necessary that he should know them.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that I received and perused, at a most auspicious hour, your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 25th October 1880, in reply to my cordial epistle on the subject of the departure and return of my children and dependants from Tashkend. My heart (warm in affection) was exceedingly rejoiced and gratified at the manifestation of the benign sentiments and esteem by your Excellency. By the perusal of a sentence which occurs in your Excellency's kind letter, *viz.*, "now that your Government has become firmly established it is fitting that your family should be collected around you," I feel greatly indebted and thankful to your Excellency for the fellow-feeling and good-will thus shown by your Excellency. I beg to write that, as the collection of my children and dependants, who are at Tashkend and Kandahar around me, would expand the bud of my benevolent heart and compose my senses (mind), so the dispersion of the evil-wishers and the scattering of the enemies of the two allied States, whether they be of my own or any other family, will tend to the security of the empire, to the advancement of the country, and to my own personal welfare.

Under all circumstances, I sincerely hope that, as long as I live, by the grace of the Omnipotent God, my friendship with the illustrious Government will remain firm and strong, and that, through the friendly attentions and good offices of the most glorious British Government, no doors of commotion and injury, whether domestic or foreign, will be opened to the face of this God-granted Government. Copies of the two letters, one to the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, requesting him, as a matter of necessity, to allow my children and dependants to leave Tashkend, and another to General Ivanoff, asking him to send Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand, are enclosed in this friendly letter for your Excellency's perusal.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to General VON KAUFMANN, Governor-General of Turkistan, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that since the day I set foot in Afghan Turkistan, whence, with the help of God, I proceeded by regular marches in the direction of the capital, Kabul, I was, through the kindness and good offices of the illustrious British Government, nominated to, and I succeeded in obtaining, the Amirship of this country, and I directed my attention wholly, both day and night, to the administration of public affairs and to the protection and security of the borders and confines. Till now I had no time to address a friendly letter to your Excellency regarding the dismissal of my sons and of those whom I left behind at Tashkend; but now that I have a little leisure from the organization of the State, and as the cold weather is approaching, I write that, during the period of 13 years which I passed in the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Czar, and under your Excellency's kind protection, I was treated with the utmost honour and respect, and that I returned to my native country and motherland of my own free will and of my own accord. Whereas it is necessary that my sons and those whom I left behind should also return to their mother country and join me, I expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will, on the arrival of the bearer of this letter, namely, my trusted agent, be pleased to give leave to my sons, Sirdars Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and my other dependants, to quit Tashkend, and to Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin to leave Samarkand and to return to the capital, Kabul, so that, before the weather gets cold and the rigor of the atmosphere prevents travelling, they may cross the Amu and set foot on their own soil.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to General IVANOFF, Governor of Samarkand, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—I have at this moment written a letter to General Von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkistan, and despatched it by the hand of my confidential agent,* regarding the

* Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

dismissal of my children and those whom I left behind from Tashkend, and the dismissal of Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand to the capital, Kabul. I hope that his Excellency will be so good as to give them leave to return to their native country and motherland before the cold weather sets in.

No doubt, after the perusal of my letter, the authorities of the sublime (Russian) Government will not delay in dismissing them. I also write to ask you to allow Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan to leave Samarkand as soon as this letter reaches you, so that he may accompany my sons, Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and other dependants of mine, to these quarters.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 11th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to you that previous to this, when my valuable and esteemed friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, was going to England, he gratified me by a letter intimating that, in the event of my having anything to represent or wanting anything to be done, it would be fitting and desirable that I should write to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India or to the Foreign Secretary. Accordingly, I therefore write this friendly letter to you, unreservedly stating what I have in my mind, viz., that the disturbed state of Afghanistan and the embarrassed affairs of this country are apparent and well known to all the representatives of the sublime Government. When I had an interview with Mr. Griffin at Zimma in the Kohistan district, and we talked on the confusion of the affairs of Afghanistan and on the welfare of the two States, that officer gave me the promise and good tidings of a grant of 100 lakhs of rupees by Her Imperial Majesty's Government, (saying) that shortly and in a little while the above-mentioned sum would reach the Afghan Government from the Imperial Treasury, so that the breaches made in the empire may be closed up as before, and that advantages may soon accrue from it (the grant) to the two allied States. But four months have now elapsed since my arrival at the capital, Kabul, and I have received only 17 lakhs in all out of the subsidy promised by Government. The whole of the amount

received has been applied to the necessary expenses of the troops and to the improvement of the country, but not one-tenth of the ravages brought on the country has yet been repaired. Undoubtedly large sums of money are indispensably necessary for the conduct of the affairs of the State and for the maintenance of the army, the payment of the troops being one of the imperative duties. I therefore write and ask that, if the British Government intends paying and remitting the sum promised for the promotion of the interests of Afghanistan, the sooner it is remitted the more advantageous it will prove. Should there be any delay in transmitting the same, please inform me, so that I should disperse (dismiss) the soldiers who have collected and be content with a few only; for out of the revenues of the country nothing has come or will come to my hand that may be applied to the payment of the troops. Those who have appropriated the revenues to their own use would not disgorge it in any way. They would not pay it willingly, nor can it be realised from them by pressure or force. After I have deliberately and minutely weighed and examined the income and expenditure of Afghanistan I find that (after paying all the income) there will be still due by me a large sum on account of the pay of troops and other necessary expenses.

The degree and extent of the desolation of the country and the destruction of the materials of the Afghan Empire are such that they cannot be restored and replaced with little money and small funds. Reparation of all this waste depends upon immense sums of money and upon the kindness and favour of the glorious British Government; and in demanding the promised subsidy I have not and will not have any other object in view than to organise the affairs of this State and to strengthen the basis of the friendship subsisting between the two allied States.

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th December 1880.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

News has reached me which appears fairly trustworthy, that Haji* left Kabul about 16th, and something has happened on the road. Haji not heard of as yet

* The bearer of the letter of 18th November to Amir.
beyond Gandamak.

Enclosure 12 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th December 1880.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

I am of opinion that the Haji is probably dead. His followers arrived at Gandamak have no trace of him. Have written to Jellalabad directing information to be sent to Amir, and requesting recovery and forwarding of any papers.

Enclosure 13 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 25th Moharram 1298 (=28th December 1880).

After Compliments.—Be it known to you that Haji Atta-ulla Khan, who was deputed to me by the British Government, brought a friendly letter from the Government of India (to my address) which I received and perused. Two or three days afterwards I wrote a reply to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, and handed it over to the Haji, who started in that direction on Wednesday, the 15th December 1880. Now, from the letter received from Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan, Governor of Jellalabad, on Monday, the 21st idem, I learn that the Haji has not reached his destination, and that nothing is known as to his whereabouts, or about the Government letter. I have, therefore, sent you Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan's letter in original, so that you may be fully informed of the Haji's state.

I have written a second reply to the Government of India, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, in the sense of the first letter, without any addition or diminution, and forwarded by the post of this God-granted Government. The second reply bears date Tuesday, the 28th December 1880. It is hoped that you will acknowledge its receipt as soon as it reaches you.

Enclosure 14 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 28th December 1880. (Extract.)

After compliments.—Your Excellency's gratifying and sublime letter, dated the 16th November 1880, which shows that your Excellency kindly bears me in mind and sympathises with me and the people of Afghanistan, reached me and was perused by me at an auspicious moment. I have fully and thoroughly understood the matters mentioned therein. With regard to Khost, your Excellency has been pleased to say that it should be organized and administered by me. With respect to Kuram, this matter was referred to in a previous correspondence. Regarding Kelat-i-Tokhi, your Excellency wrote that this matter required consideration. The above points (matters) which your Excellency has deemed it advisable and expedient to communicate have caused me much pleasure. As regards what your Excellency wrote, that certain changes in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan are under your Excellency's consideration, it is clear and evident that the representatives of the illustrious British Government are striving hard day and night to set the affairs of myself and of the people of Afghanistan on a permanent footing, so that it may advance, and that its affairs may be properly and well administered. What your Excellency may have in contemplation for the well-being of Afghanistan cannot but be appropriate and good.

As for Kandahar, whatever arrangement may be considered beneficial to the interests of the two States would also be approved by me. But I will state a few things which I have in my mind—

First, that I desire to have an interview with your Excellency and wish to confer personally with you. The affairs of Afghanistan are in such a deranged state that they cannot be properly represented through the lips of another person, and that, unless I represent them myself, my affairs will remain unaccomplished, and I shall incur loss of reputation.

Secondly, that there is no qualified man in Afghanistan to whom I could impart the secrets of my heart, and who has such an insight into public matters that he could know and give suitable answers to questions relating to State affairs and thus bring matters to a conclusion with your Excellency, without the necessity of a personal interview between myself and your Excellency.

I have myself set on foot the work and given it direction; after this some one (else?) may be appointed to complete it. I have, therefore, written this letter, so that your Excellency may be made fully aware of the real situation of affairs in this country. When I have an interview with your Excellency, then, as soon as every kind of question susceptible of discussion has been determined, I will pass from possibilities into action. I have adduced and brought forward so many arguments simply because I am afraid lest some unworthy act may again be committed by the people of Afghanistan, whereby I, who am sincere and straightforward in my dealings with the illustrious British Government, and who devote my time both day and night to endeavouring with all my heart and soul to improve Afghanistan, should be brought thus into everlasting disgrace.

The foundation of the government of Afghanistan has been laid anew, and I apprehend and fear lest some untoward circumstance should supervene to cause a change among the people of Afghanistan.

I have written what has occurred to me, and if your Excellency wishes me in any case to depute an agent, please God he shall be sent without delay.

I have not even communicated anything to Haji Ata-ulla Khan, and why should I do it?

Enclosure 15 in No. 2.

Khureeta, dated 7th January 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of KABUL.

YOUR Highness' friendly letter to me, dated 28th December 1880, reached me yesterday, after some accidental delay in Afghanistan; and I have much pleasure in sending a speedy reply.

It is a matter of great gratification to me that your Highness should have so clearly appreciated the desire of the British Government to lend its aid toward concerting arrangements for the restoration of permanent tranquillity in Afghanistan, and for the

strengthening of your Highness' authority in a manner that may be acceptable to your Highness, and in conformity with the wishes of the people. I observe also, with satisfaction, that your Highness declares yourself fully prepared to enter into the views of my Government upon the subject.

With regard to your Highness' kind expression of anxiety for a personal interview with me, I recognize thoroughly the advantages that might follow free and confidential conversation upon these matters at a meeting between your Highness and myself. I look forward to the prospect of meeting your Highness before long; and I will certainly endeavour so to form my plans that, upon my return to Northern India, this desirable object may be fulfilled at an early opportunity. But there are various reasons connected with the affairs of my Government and with the present state of my health which make it impossible to avoid delay in arranging for such an interview. On the other hand, it is essential to expedite the consideration of sundry matters that may become important and urgent; while it is manifest that by some preliminary discussions with, and explanations to, a confidential agent of your Highness, the ground may be cleared for an understanding of the general views and intentions of the two Governments. For these reasons I earnestly advise your Highness to lose no time in deputing to India some confidential agent, through whom I may transmit with security the communications which I desire to make to your Highness.

It is possible, however, that in the matter of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, to which your Highness referred in your letter of the 13th October, to Mr. Griffin, the interest of your Government may suffer by further delay. I therefore acquaint you that the British Government sees no objection to your nominating a governor to that place, according to the request of the Tokhi tribe. On receiving information of the approach of your governor, with a sufficient force, my officers in Kandahar will use their influence in aiding him to establish himself in Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and will declare that he has come with the assent and countenance of the British Government.

Enclosure 16 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of the purport of a Letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul on the 11th January 1881.

I HAVE just received a kharita from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to your Highness' address. I beg to forward it with this friendly letter.

Further orders have been issued to me by the Government of India that five lakhs of rupees should be kept in readiness at Peshawur for your Highness' necessary and immediate expenses; and accordingly the sum has been kept in readiness at the Peshawur Treasury. Your Highness should warn and inform me in what manner the aforesaid sum may be remitted (*lit.* made over).

No. 3.

(No. 12 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 12th January 1881, we have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copies of memoranda upon the position of affairs at Kandahar in October last, submitted by Mr. A. C. Lyall, Secretary to Government, Foreign Department, and Sir R. Sandeman, Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM regarding the PRESENT POSITION of AFFAIRS at KANDAHAR, dated Camp Kandahar, 31st October 1880.

I UNDERSTAND that the chief military reasons, brought forward by military men in favour of the retention of Kandahar, are briefly as follows:—The recent marches of General Stewart from Kandahar to Ghazni and Kabul, and of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and of Sirdar Ayub Khan from Herat to Kandahar, have shown the possibility of moving considerable armies through Afghanistan. It is argued that, were the British to hold Kandahar with an army, the power of the future Amirs of Kabul would be hopelessly destroyed, and as I heard an officer, who was arguing for the retention of the country, express it, the backbone of the country would for ever be broken. It is further considered desirable to keep a strong force within striking distance of Kabul and Herat, for it is believed that, were the Afghans to feel themselves within our power, they would cease to be a dangerous enemy, and by degrees we should overcome the determined hostility they have everywhere, from Kandahar to Kabul, shown towards us. Finally, it is said that the retention of Kandahar by the Liberal Cabinet would satisfy the Conservative party, and put a stop for ever to the chances of the Afghan war again breaking out with a change of ministry.

Whatever may be the value of these arguments, one thing is certain. The British Government cannot now, lightly, give up the possession of Kandahar, and, if it does surrender it, this ought only to be done after such arrangements have been made with the Afghans themselves as will secure to the British Government much that it has fought for, and for which it has expended much blood and treasure. I would, therefore, be in no hurry to evacuate Kandahar, although I would endeavour to arrange a programme that would enable me finally to give to the Amir Abdul Rahman the richest portion of his late grandfather's kingdom, which he must feel is needful to secure his hold upon his throne, and to place his alliance with the British Government in the eyes of his countrymen on a sound footing. It should not be forgotten, in considering this, that the people of Afghanistan did not object to the Amirs, Dost Muhammad and Sher Ali, receiving a substantial subsidy at the hands of the British Government. Friendship, accompanied by substantial material aid, the country would not reject.

The Amir himself, whoever he may be, can never be our friend so long as the most valuable portion of the Afghan kingdom is in our possession. It is, therefore, from every point of view desirable, if we intend Abdul Rahman to be a strong and successful ruler, and one acceptable to his people, to place his power on such a foundation as would enable him really to feel that we are the true friends we profess to be of himself and country.

With this object it seems necessary to maintain our hold on Kandahar until the chance of further attempts on the part of Sirdar Ayub Khan to regain his brother's lost kingdom are over. We should certainly lose no time in making Muhammad Ayub Khan feel that his hold on Herat is a most insecure one. I would begin this by encouraging the present Amir, by every means in our power, to make a bold attempt to recover Herat. It would doubtless be very necessary to break our views, with regard to the restoration of Herat and Kandahar, cautiously to the Amir, but if he is worthy of our support I would certainly give it heartily, and introduce a policy that would have for its aim the placing of our relations with the Afghans on such a footing that we would secure their friendship instead of their hostility.

With our improved military position at Quetta and in Pishin, and with Kandahar in our possession, to be disposed of at our will, we ourselves, as well as the Afghans, must be different from other races if we fail to come to an arrangement that will secure to both sides what they have so determinedly fought for.

The English Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, has declared that Afghanistan must be friendly to England, or cease to exist as an independent kingdom. The other power has shown, by great sacrifices, its determination to be independent. A great many will say the friendship of the Afghans is impossible, that we have gone too far, and can never make them our friends. I can only say, in reply to this argument, that I do not agree with them. The people showed no determined hostility towards us until we deported their Amir, Yakub Khan, and created a ruling prince at Kandahar. Since then, at the latter place, the change in the attitude of the people towards us has been so marked that there can be no longer a doubt as to Wali Sher Ali having been unanimously rejected by the people as their ruler. Late events, in addition to this unpopularity, have doubtless convinced the Government of India of the impossibility of re-establishing, with any chance of success, the late Government.

If this supposition is correct, as a preliminary step and before surrendering, on a fixed agreement, the country to Amir Abdul Rahman, I would summon the principal chiefs of the three most important clans, namely, the chiefs of the Barakzais, Popalzais, and Alkozais, and consult them as to the future, but I would do it in such a way as to leave no doubt of our intention to support the Amir we have recognised. I would also employ them, where possible, as long as we remain at Kandahar, in administering the country.

I have heard it argued that there are no leading chiefs to summon. The facts are, however, the reverse of this. In no country are there so many leading chiefs and heads of families as in South Afghanistan, as is shown by the list which accompanies this note. When Sirdar Sher Ali was created, from being Governor under the ex-Amir Yakub Khan, to be a despotic prince, the chiefs and heads of the great families were never consulted. A prince was thrust upon them. There were many reasons why Sher Ali was distasteful to the Popalzais as well as to Barakzais, and only those who wilfully blind themselves to this most unpopular act of our Government wonder at the whole country crying out against it, and calling in Ayub Khan to aid them to drive Wali Sher Ali and our small contingent of troops from the country, for one and all believed that the force left at Kandahar by the British Government was given to Sher Ali to enable him to rule over them, and was not a British army of occupation in the proper sense of the word.

Directly the Amir becomes strong enough, I would make over the country to him on terms to be fixed between his Government and the British. The real difficulty in surrendering Kandahar to the Amir Abdul Rahman is the almost certainty, under present circumstances, that directly we had marched from Kandahar Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan would make another effort to possess himself of the country. Until he is driven from Herat by Abdul Rahman, or, at all events, until the extent of his power becomes known, it seems to me almost impossible to surrender our military hold on Kandahar.

It is now necessary for me to say a few words with reference to the carrying on of the government of the province until affairs are ripe to enable the British Government to hand it over. I have already shown the undesirability of again placing the Wali Sher Ali in power. Without examining too closely into the motives that induced Sher Ali, the late Governor under Amir Yakub Khan, to accept the province as a gift from the British Government, we may well here consider briefly past events from the time of his assuming the government until now. These events have shown, and at the time of the Wali's instalment there were many who prognosticated that they would do so, that the country was greatly startled by what we had done. Outrages at once became frequent along the line of communication, culminating in the brutal murder of Major Waudby, the Road Commandant, who had gone to Dubrai to meet certain Malikis who had been heavily fined by the Wali for having been concerned in an outrage. Some said that the fine imposed by the Wali was so heavy that the people had become desperate, and many had joined the enemies of the British Government who took the opportunity offered of murdering a British officer. We, however, continued to trust the Wali implicitly, and bestowed on him arms and munitions of war, besides a battery of guns and some money.

Having raised an army, he proceeded with it to Girishk to meet and repel the advance of Muhammad Ayub Khan from Herat. It soon, however, became evident that he was entirely unable to cope in the field with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the next demand the Wali made on our Government was for assistance in troops, which we gave.

I need hardly allude to the fact that, by complying with the demand of the Wali for the support of our troops, we split into two bodies the Kandahar garrison. One portion was sent to the Helmand to support the Wali, the other portion being retained at Kandahar, thus offering to Muhammad Ayub Khan the opportunity of defeating our troops in detail. As the Helmand was fordable at many places, it is difficult to understand why our troops went there at all, and why the Wali did not, instead, retire from Girishk on finding this to be the case. I have seen no explanation of the causes that led to our action in this matter.

I pass over briefly the disastrous results of these moves; suffice it to say, the Wali's troops mutinied, were attacked by our troops, and a number killed, the guns (our gift) captured, and it was believed the Wali's army had, to a great extent, dispersed; subsequent events have shown that this was not the case. Our force then retired to a position some distance from the Helmand, fought Ayub Khan at Maiwand, and was defeated. The Wali fled from the field, and on reaching Kandahar visited General Primrose, and advised that officer to retreat at once, and surrender the country to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.

Under present circumstances it is surely very desirable to consider carefully these occurrences and the true value we are able to place on the Wali as a ruler, before we

again restore him to power. It is well known that the whole of the surrounding country, in addition to the Wali's army, took part in the battle of Maiwand, and it is generally admitted that the leading men of Kandahar had, for months, been in correspondence with

* Surteep Nur Muhammad headed a large party. Had such Chiefs joined the Wali, the heads of the Popalzai and other families might have been induced to do so also. Muhammad Ayub was only induced to march on Kandahar on hearing that the country was ready to join him. I was, however, told at the time that the Kabuli troops would not fight for Ayub Khan for reasons given me, and the result proved the truth of the statement made.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN.

Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who had been invited by them* to advance from Herat with the object of overthrowing the Wali's government. In short, the rising in the country amounted to a general insurrection.

The military situation at Kandahar, after the defeat of Maiwand, would have been very serious indeed, had it not been for the alarm previously taken by General Phayre at the state of affairs in the country. He had despatched from the line of communications, some days previous to the defeat at Maiwand, the 4th and 28th Bombay Native Infantry to Kandahar, where they arrived just in time to replace those killed at Maiwand.

To finish my short narrative of events it is desirable to add that General Primrose did not adopt Wali Sher Ali's advice. He was besieged by Muhammad Ayub Khan until the arrival of General Roberts' force within a short distance of Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra, in which Ayub Khan's forces were defeated and dispersed, the Wali asked to be relieved of his Waliship. I am informed that he was requested to take charge of the city, but refused to do so, and that Major Protheroe was appointed to carry on the duty of provisional governor of the town.

The events here briefly recorded should, of themselves, teach us the great danger of again putting up Wali Sher Ali. But in restoring him there would be also an entirely different danger to be met, if we care to examine and probe deeper into the politics of the country. Wali Sher Ali is not only an old adherent of the late Amir Yakub Khan, but it is well known that he and the present Amir Abdul Rahman are, for reasons unnecessary to record, bitter enemies. It is to be presumed that Sher Ali and the Amir, to some extent, know our views and intentions with regard to the permanent retention or not of Kandahar, the wealthiest province of the Afghan kingdom. Both fully know the past. Our action at the present time is, therefore, of vital importance. If we restore Wali Sher Ali, with a view to leaving the province in his hands when we retire, it amounts to placing the country actually at the disposal of Ayub Khan; for there can be little doubt that this would be the result of such a step. The present Amir will then have to meet in the field his enemies, Sher Ali and Ayub Khan, the former strengthened by the influence and money he must have accumulated during the time we have placed the country and its revenues at his disposal. Should the result prove fatal to Amir Abdul Rahman, we will have the knowledge that through our own acts we have destroyed our own work at Kabul. The position is not an enviable one in whatever way we may consider it, but common justice to the Amir whom we have recognised, if not care for our own interests, should prevent us from again trusting to the broken reed the late Wali Sher Ali has proved himself to be. If not very careful, we may destroy Abdul Rahman, and injure, in consequence, our own influence and position in the country, as it was injured during the first Afghan war. Moreover, to put it mildly, justice towards the Amir should prevent our committing an act that must, of itself, weaken him, and may possibly result in ultimately driving him from Kabul.

In the interests of all concerned, I think it very desirable that the Government of India should lose no more time in announcing to the country at large, from a general point of view, their intentions with regard to the disposal of Southern Afghanistan. I believe the continued reticence of our Government as to what their ultimate intentions really are with regard to the disposal of the province must prove detrimental to the very important interests at stake.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN, Major,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

NAMES of the SIRDARS of the DURANI CLANS of KANDAHAR and their different sections.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Maliks of Sections.	Remarks.
BARAKZAI -	Muhammadzai -	(1) Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, son of Sirdar Mehrdil Khan. (2) Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, son of Sirdar Purdil Khan. (3) Sirdar Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan, son of Sirdar Kondil Khan.	These three are the chief Sirdars of the Barakzai clan. Sirdars Mir Afzal Khan and Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan are refugees in Persia. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan is the Wali of Kandahar.
		(4) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	* Note.—For three years during Amir Sher Ali's reign Sirdar Sher Ali was the recognised Civil Governor of Kandahar, but two other Sirdars were associated with and watched over him, namely, Sirdar Safter Ali, Pharseowan, who was Commandant of the army, and Sultan Muhammad Khan, Pharseewan, Chief of Finance and Collector of the Government Revenue. Sher Ali was removed by the Amir and deported to Kabul for corrupt practices. (Sd.) R. G. S.
		(5) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	This Sirdar is the brother of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and is at Kandahar.
		(6) Sirdar Shirindil Khan -	These Sirdars are the sons of Sirdar Khushdil Khan, and nephews of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and are living in Kandahar.
		(7) Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan.	
		(8) Sirdar Ahmed Khan -	This Sirdar is the nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, and is now at Herat.
		(9) Sirdar Abdulla Khan - -	Is the son of Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan, and is now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(10) Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan -	The sons of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(11) Sirdar Abdulla Khan - -	
	Sherzai -	(1) Atta Khan - - -	These two men are the Maliks of the Sherzai section. They are living in the village of Chaplani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Bhaodin Khan - - -	
	Angezai -	(1) Abdulzahir Khan - -	The headmen of the Angezai section, and are living in the village of Chaplani.
		(2) Muhammad Umar Khan -	
	Malikdinzai	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan -	These two men are the Maliks of the Malikdinzai section, and are living in the village of Rawani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Syud Muhammad Khan -	
	Nasratzai -	(1) Muhammad Sadik Khan -	These four men are the Maliks of the Nasratzai section. Muhammad Sadik Khan is living at Gundi Mansoor, Muhammad Jan and Sher Ali Khan at Robat, and Gholam Muhammad Khan at Khaja Ali.
		(2) Muhammad Jan Khan -	
		(3) Sher Ali Khan, son of Lal Khan.	
		(4) Gholam Muhammad Khan -	
	Umarchanzai -	(1) Saifulla Khan - - -	These three men are the Maliks of the Umarchanzai section. Saifulla Khan is living at Maroof, Mir Adam Khan at Mard Killa, and Shahghassi Sarwar Khan at Tirri.
		(2) Mir Adam Khan - - -	
		(3) Shahghassi Sarwar Khan -	
	Khwanchezai	(1) Akram Akhundzada - -	These three men are the Maliks of the Khwanchezai section. Akram Akhundzada and Muhammad Nacem live in the town of Kandahar, and Haji Khushdil resides at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Muhammad Nacem Akhundzada.	
		(3) Haji Khushdil - - -	
	Garjezni -	(1) Azizulla Khan - - -	These are the Maliks of the Garjezni section, and live at Rawani.
		(2) Aminulla Khan - - -	
	Bahlolzai -	(1) Sher Muhammad Khan -	The headman of Bahlolzai section, and is living at Karezak, about four miles from Kandahar.
	Surpayi -	(1) Dost Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Surpayi section, and is living at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
	Gaibizai -	(1) Mir Afzal Khan - - -	Malik of Gaibizai, and lives at Timrau, about six miles from Kandahar.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Malik of Section.	Remarks.
POPALZAI -	Ayubzai -	(1) Taj Muhammad Khan - (2) Gholam Muhammad Khan - (3) Amir Khan - (4) Jan Muhammad - (5) Sirdar Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Ayubzai section. Taj Muhammad Khan and Gholam Muhammad Khan live at Kandahar, Amir Khan at Zakir, Jan Muhammad at Karz, and Sirdar Khan at Kulchabad. Taj Muhammad Khan is also the chief Sirdar of the Popalzai clan.
	Bamazai -	(1) Kalandar Khan -	This man is the Malik of the Bamazai section. He resides at Kandahar, but is now at Tirri.
	Badozai -	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan - (2) Attaulla Khan - (3) Akhtar and Muhammad Akbar Khan. (4) Fakrudin Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Badozai section. Gholam Muhammad Khan lives at Killa Azam, Akhtar, Muhammad Akbar Khan, and Fakrudin Khan at Bilandi, and Attaulla Khan at Mashore.
	Ismailzai -	(1) Shah Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Ismailzai section, lives at Mashore.
ALKOZAI -	Khalozai -	(1) Habbo Khan - (2) Paind Khan - (3) Abdul Hakim Khan - (4) Akram Khan - (5) Zakriya Khan - (6) Saadat Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Khalozai section. Habbo Khan and Paind Khan are also the chief Sirdars of the whole Alkozai clan. All these Maliks live at Jaldak.
	Panazai -	(1) Pir Muhammad - (2) Sartip Saleh Muhammad Khan - (3) Muhammad Halim Khan - (4) Majid Khan - (5) Karram Khan - (6) Nur Muhammad Khan - (7) Amir Khan - (8) Muhammad Sadik - (9) Dost Muhammad Khan - (10) Pir Muhammad Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan. (11) Azad Khan and Muhammad Azim Khan.	Resident of Sardeh. Do. of Chargolbah. Do. of do. Do. of Manara. Do. of do. Do. of Panjwahi. Do. of do. Do. of Rambasi. Do. of do. Do. of Deh Bagh. Do. of do.
	Zedan -	(1) Shahgassi Muhammad Jan -	This man is the Malik of Zedan, and lives at Kandahar.
	Kotezai -	(1) Makko Khan -	Malik of Kotezai, lives at Naghan.
NURZAI -	Talokzai -	(1) Abu Saced Khan - (2) Son of Adam Khan - (3) Muhammad Usman Khan, 1st - (4) Muhammad Usman Khan, 2nd - (5) Abdul Aziz Khan - (6) Majadulla Khan - (7) Shah Hussein - (8) Jehangir -	Resident of Kadni. Do. of do. Do. of Washir. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
	Jamalzai -	(1) Jumna Khan - (2) Muhammad Akram Khan - (3) Son of Sherdil Khan - (4) Nizamuddin Khan - (5) Faizu Khan -	Resident of Kadni. Do. of Dherawat. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
	Pirakzai -	(1) Akbar Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Pirakzai section, lives at Kadni.
	Gurg -	(1) Faizu Khan - (2) Shah Passand -	Headmen of the Gurg section, live at Rohat.
ALAZAI -	Alazai -	(1) Son of Majid Khan - (2) Dost Muhammad Khan - (3) Najibulla Khan - (4) Abdul Hakeem Khan - (5) Sahib Khan - (6) Mukhtiyar Khan - (7) Timur Shah Khan - (8) Muhammad Akbar Khan - (9) Muhammad Faihm Khan -	The son of Majid Khan is the chief Sirdar of the Alazai clan. The others are minor Chiefs of the clan. All these chiefs live in Zamindawar.

(Signed) THOMAS HOPKINS,
for Agent, Governor-General, Beluchistan.

Quetta, the 4th November 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.—(Extract.)

I UNDERSTOOD that the chief object of my visit to Kandahar would be to acquaint myself generally with the actual situation of affairs in South Afghanistan, by personal consultation with the British officers at Kandahar and at Quetta, and by availing myself of the opportunity of meeting Sirdar Sher Ali Khan and any other Afghans of note belonging to the place. It was not possible, by a rapid journey and a short stay at Kandahar, to obtain much information at first hand from the people, or to make any wide observation of the feelings of the country. Not two months had passed since the whole neighbourhood had been in arms against us, and since our troops had been besieged in the city. The principal persons of the Durani tribe—which includes by far the greater majority of the population of the country, and almost every man of influence—had joined the rising in support of Ayub's advance, and most of these had fled or were keeping aloof. The people close round Kandahar had signalized themselves by the massacre, at the end of July, of every British soldier or camp-follower who fell into their hands, and by fighting against us throughout August. The town and district adjoining were more or less under military occupation; there was no regular government beyond the suburbs of Kandahar; and the complete uncertainty among Afghans of every class as to the intentions of the British Government regarding their country made them very cautious about speaking their mind. All these circumstances added to the difficulty of getting at the real state of affairs. Nevertheless, it was of much use to be able to discuss everything with our officers on the spot; while there were at Kandahar a certain number of Afghans with whom it was useful to talk, and I had several long interviews with Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. I proceed to state my general conclusions upon what I saw and heard.

In the first place, it appeared evident that the movement of the Duranis in favour of Ayub Khan had been considerable and widespread. It seems to have been preconcerted by correspondence between his party at Herat and a number of the leading men of the tribe in the Kandahar country and in Zamindawar, who encouraged him to endeavour to expel the English and to upset Sher Ali Khan. I was told that Ayub Khan had long been meditating the advance, and that he would probably in any case have marched at harvest time; but that, as a matter of fact, he had received numerous invitations, promises of support on his arrival, and assurances that the English garrison was very weak. Sher Ali Khan had lost his popularity in the country by his open acceptance, from us, of the rulership of Kandahar as a separate State, which associated him with the foreigner, and placed him in direct conflict with the hereditary claims of the late Amir's family. He incurred the odium of having made a compact which kept us in Afghanistan, and enabled him to usurp the place of the sons of the Amir. His administration was probably as good as any Afghan Sirdar's rule usually is; but he is said to have taken no special pains to conciliate the jealousy of the other Sirdars, or to make himself acceptable to the people; and any Sirdar in his position, surrounded by foreign bayonets, would have become equally unpopular. The consequence was that on the appearance of Ayub Khan the whole country fell away rapidly from the Wali; his authority beyond the Helmund, where he had been attempting to collect the revenue (an unpopular function of government), collapsed at once; and his troops, except 500 cavalry, deserted to the enemy. When we retired into Kandahar after the Maiwand rout most of his cavalry broke up and withdrew for the time to their homes; and for the week before Ayub arrived the British Army was besieged in Kandahar by hordes of ghazis and armed peasantry. Sher Ali represents, not unreasonably, that he never expected to keep the country in hand under such an unforeseen contingency as the total defeat by Ayub of a British force in the field; and he told me distinctly that the rising was, in his opinion, more against us than against him—that it was the *ghazá*, or religious hostility to infidels, that raised the people. Nevertheless, although nothing has been proved against his good faith, and though he undoubtedly kept our force on the Helmund well supplied until it broke up, while the country was fairly quiet until we were defeated—yet it has been made clear that he could give us no help whatever in a crisis, and that he failed even to keep his troops together in the face of Ayub. Our alliance seems to have been materially damaging to both parties. The Wali suffered from the odium of adhering to foreigners and infidels, and of abetting their occupation of the country. On the other hand, we became responsible both for his civil administration (without exercising any control over it) and for his political antagonism to the late ruling family; while so far was the Wali from helping us in the field (except as to

supplies) that we might have fared better against Ayub Khan had we relied altogether on our own resources.

Since Kandahar has been relieved, and Ayub defeated, affairs in the country round have remained in much political confusion.

It is to be remembered that, when the separation of the Kandahar State from the rest of Afghanistan was originally contemplated, it was supposed that this province would, by the transfer of Herat to Persia, become conterminous on the west and north-west with Persian territory, which would manifestly have made the frontier much less liable to foreign invasion. The policy of the British Government was so to manage the constitution of the new State as to avoid unnecessary interference with its internal affairs, and this, it was thought, might be effected by continuing in power an Afghan Sirdar of the Kandahari family, who had before governed the place successfully, and who had been sent there as governor by Yakub Khan.

But the projected transfer of Herat to Persia fell through; and at this moment we have, instead, that place in the hands of an influential Sirdar, the rival of Abdul Rahman, who has crossed swords with us twice, and who, it is openly said at Kandahar, has only to appear again on the Helmund to be joined by the country side. All my information leads me to the conclusion that at this moment Ayub is by far the most popular candidate for rule in South Afghanistan, and that Sher Ali weighs little or nothing against him. In these circumstances Sher Ali would have little or no prospect of consolidating any authority at Kandahar, except under our complete protection, and unless we undertook the preservation of order and the guard of his frontiers. But this would inevitably involve a far greater degree of interference with the internal administration of the province than was originally proposed; and would imply much more direct and constant support than is compatible with independent rulership. Such a system would be of no advantage to us, and would please nobody, not even the Sirdar himself. We should be holding Kandahar against the will of the Duranis, and much to the dissatisfaction of the old ruling family, whether Herat were united under Kabul, or separate. The political objections to such a position seem to me sufficiently strong to outweigh any advantage that may be attached to the strategical position of Kandahar, or to the weakening of Afghanistan by dismemberment. I believe that the Duranis of Kandahar are now much opposed to our occupation, either indirectly through Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through our own officers. They have been for generations the dominant class, although the Amirs of Kabul latterly did their best to weaken the local power of the Sirdars, so that very few men of influence or wealth are now left, and our presence in the country is very unwelcome to them. They have a very distinct leaning toward the family of the late Amir Sher Ali; but I could not make out that they held any very deep objection to returning again under the Kabul Amirship. I mention this last point because it has been more than once argued that the Duranis of South Afghanistan would favour any arrangement that should release them from the yoke of Kabul. I may be wrong, but my impression is that no such feeling prevails among them to any degree worth setting against their dislike of foreign domination or interference; though toward the end of the Amir Sher Ali's rule they had become very sore at his despotic rule through the Kabuli soldiery, and at his revenue exactions. At this moment, there is no civil government worth the name outside the Kandahar suburbs. Under the orders contained in my letter to Colonel St. John of the 3rd August, all questions concerning our future relations with South Afghanistan were, and still are, reserved. The Sirdar has not resumed the authority which he lost in July and August last; he has now no regular troops, no arms or munitions of war. He has some 500 horsemen of his own clan at his disposal, and could, with money, raise a much larger number. The surrounding districts, east of the Helmund, are only so far under control that collections of revenue grain and the purchase of supplies go on under a sort of joint acquisition signed by Colonel St. John and the Sirdar. Across the Helmund there is no kind of government; Seistan is under its local chiefs, and Kelat-i-Ghilzai has been intrusted to the Tokhi Ghilzais. Thus the Sirdar only exercised about four months (from March to July) the authority which we recognized in March last. As soon as the Kandahar siege was ended he told Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all aid in his power to the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India. Colonel St. John was instructed, in reply, that the Sirdar's wish to retire should not be discouraged, but should be treated as matter reserved for subsequent consideration.

During my stay in Kandahar, I had several confidential interviews with the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, in which the state of the country, and the Sirdar's own position, were discussed. I admitted to the Sirdar—what was, indeed, a plain inference from the fact

that he had not been asked to resume the government of the country after Ayub had been driven off—that recent events, and particularly the behaviour of the Duranis, had led the Government of India to review their position at Kandahar. I referred to the Sirdar's expression, in September, of his desire to retire to India, and I said that the Government had reserved their reply until the whole situation could be deliberately considered. I added that I was now empowered to speak with the Sirdar on the subject, and to report the result to the Government of India, by whom he would be treated, in any case, with friendship and liberality.

The tenor of the Sirdar's answer was that he held himself entirely at the disposition of the British Government, that he had kept faith and done what he could during the recent disturbances; but that, whatever might be the future plans of the British Government, he was quite ready to acquiesce in them. The British Government, he said, had incurred vast expense and trouble in Afghanistan, and, having now gained at least long and varied experience of the country, should be able to judge what was best for its interests to do now. If the British Government wished him to leave Kandahar, he was prepared to withdraw—or to stay, if this were desired; and he intimated that he would have no objection to stay, with our protection and active support to his governorship. He gave me to understand that his policy would be to rely upon us for holding Kandahar as a secure basis for his operations, and then to push westward with his own resources and friends, so as to extend his authority beyond the Helmund, and even, he hinted, to Herat. This, he seemed to think (and probably he was right), would be necessary to the permanent consolidation of his authority at Kandahar and in the adjacent districts. Being asked whether he felt able to deal with the Duranis, who had so recently betrayed and attacked him, he rejoined that the country rose, out of fanaticism, against us more than against him; and that by a severe régime he could keep the people in order. He was naturally anxious to discover the intentions of the British Government regarding Kandahar before committing himself finally to any declaration regarding himself; and he wished to find out whether we were likely to annex the country ourselves. He was informed, in reply, that no definite decision had been taken, that some time might pass before our final arrangements were determined; but that his own future position should receive ample consideration. He repeated that he should make no sort of objection to the wishes, whatever they might be, of the British Government.

Throughout our interviews the Sirdar used no expression indicating that he held the British Government to be under any obligation to remain in Kandahar merely in order to restore and uphold his authority; nor did he appear to have any argument of this nature in his mind. His object appeared to be to discover what course the Government were likely to take; and he supposed, as most of the Kandahari people supposed, that I had come with authority to decide and declare what should be done with Kandahar. Pending this decision, the Sirdar was naturally averse to stating explicitly what he himself would prefer; since his conclusions must necessarily depend much on our line of action; nor was he prepared to admit that he had failed in his government, or that he could not resume it until he should have learnt as much as possible of what might be the effect on his own prospects of such an admission. At a later interview, however, I explained that the Government might still require some time before coming to a decision on Kandahar affairs, and determining what might be best for the interests of all concerned. I asked the Sirdar whether I should report to the Government that he left the whole question, so far as he was concerned personally, in the hands of the British Government, always understanding that he was himself sure of liberal treatment. The Sirdar answered that this might be stated; that he had placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, but that if the Government were to ask him to do anything beyond his power, and he were to ask to be excused, he hoped the Government would not be annoyed, and would accept his excuses as made through inability, not through unwillingness, to comply. He proceeded to make some remarks as to the general condition of the country. He said that it was suffering from want of administration and the general political uncertainty that prevailed—his meaning being evidently that we ought to waste no time in making up our minds as to the country's future. I told him that I must report in person to his Excellency the Viceroy the result of my visit to Kandahar, but that a settlement would be made as soon as possible. Hitherto the Sirdar had not been pressed in regard to his request, in September, to be allowed to retire to India; nor had he expressly repeated it. But it is probable that, when he clearly understood that I was not empowered to settle anything, and that I was returning very speedily to make a report to the Government, he thought it wise to secure his retirement on good terms. He informed me, through Nawab Hassan Ali, that he was prepared to write a letter to the Viceroy, and he made some allusion to the subject of his retirement. When

I met the Sirdar on the day before my departure, I told him that I thought a letter would be a convenient record of his own wishes and of the general result of our conversation. He said that such a letter would be written; and he went on to say that he had now no will or power of his own apart from the will of the British Government, and that the Government should look upon him as their sincere friend. With regard to the future arrangements for the country, if the Government wished him to do any service, he was ready to undertake that service as he had done before, and to administer the affairs of the country with the support of the British Government. If, however, some time must elapse before Government could come to a decision, he begged to be allowed to proceed to Kurrachee with his family until that decision was come to. If afterwards the Government wanted his services for the country he would undertake the service and come back from Kurrachee. Should, however, the British Government not require his services, he begged for a pension and for leave to enjoy it in any country he might choose to live, either here or in India, or any other country.

I told the Wali that these conversations would be submitted to the Viceroy at Lahore, and that in any case he might rely on the friendship of the British Government.

I asked the Wali why he wished to go to Kurrachee until the Government came to a decision. He replied that during the interval, if he remained here and were not Governor, the people might do something that might get him into trouble.

He said he would never turn his face away from the British, and that he was not afraid that they would do him any harm, but that he was afraid of his own people, who had already brought him into trouble, and might do so again, that it was simply a precaution, and that he did not wish to remain in the country during the interval. He said, "Until now I have served the British Government with loyalty, and I am afraid that the people may do something that may be the cause of a bad name and grief to me."

The letter was delivered to me on the evening of the same day; and on the next morning I left Kandahar.

The general impression that I formed of the Wali's position at Kandahar was that it had become untenable without our active and unreserved support. He had probably relied too much on us from the beginning, and had thus neglected to conciliate the Sirdars; but under the circumstances he can hardly be blamed for the failure of the experiment which placed him in charge of the government. Any Afghan Sirdar, situated as was Sher Ali Khan, would have incurred unpopularity; and in the present condition of Afghanistan the independent ruler of Kandahar would be exposed to intrigues and attack both from Herat and from Kabul. Against such opponents, who appeal both to fanaticism and to the loyalty of the Duranis to the old ruling family, Sher Ali Khan has no standing ground whatever; nor is it to be wondered that he has no independent hold upon the country. I much doubt whether he could secure the allegiance of any considerable body among the people by promising to protect them from the Kabul domination. He could only succeed by our subduing, in his name, the whole country which we might desire him to govern, and by our undertaking to repel foreign invasion and to put down insurrections; and to this extent I do not think we can, consistently with our own interests, pledge ourselves to support him. It may have been represented at Kandahar, as one advantage of a separate State, that the separation would free them from Kabul; but the people of Kandahar have themselves turned, at the first opportunity, so violently and treacherously against the British and Sher Ali that no room is left for supposing that they preferred his rule (which of course they consider inseparable, as it is, from foreign occupation of Kandahar) to being replaced under an Amir of Kabul. I believe that, as a matter of fact, they would again join any leader of an attack upon us and upon him, if he were restored to power at Kandahar; nor do I think they would do otherwise to any other Sirdar in his situation.

I append a memorandum, prepared at my request by Colonel St. John, upon the principal Durani Chiefs in and about Kandahar. It shows what men of influence there are in the country, and what has been their conduct during the late disturbances. There are, it will be seen, very few prominent men of considerable wealth and rank; and some of the leading personages joined Ayub, or have absented themselves permanently from the place. The paucity of influential Sirdars indicates the difficulty of joining any strong party for separate rule in South Afghanistan, and even of ascertaining clearly the wishes of the people generally. I have impressed upon Colonel St. John the importance of establishing, as soon as possible, a wider range of communication with the representatives, such as are to be found, of the Duranis. So far as I could judge at Kandahar, we needed larger information as to their general feelings and disposition, with more extensive intelligence as to what was going on in the

outlying districts. We are likely also to require the co-operation of the headmen of the clans and districts in the matter of procuring supplies during the winter. I instructed Colonel St. John that any persons who had not specially compromised themselves in the late attacks upon us, and whose presence at Kandahar might be useful, should be induced to come in, or to communicate with him. He was empowered to explain that they would not be molested, so long as they abstained, directly and indirectly, from attempts to molest us; and that their interest lay in aiding the British officers to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and to introduce such permanent arrangements as might hereafter be decided upon.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL.

November 1880.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

No. 554, dated Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

As requested by you, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on the principal Durani chiefs in and about Kandahar.

MEMORANDUM ON, and TABULAR LIST of, PRINCIPAL PERSONAGES in, or connected with, the PROVINCE of KANDAHAR.

WITH one or two exceptions, all the offshoots of the reigning family resident in Kandahar are descendants of the five Kandahari brothers, Purdil Khan, Kuhndil Khan, Shirdil Khan, Rahmdil Khan, and Mihrdil Khan. Of these, Shirdil Khan left no offspring; and Rahmdil Khan's children took to mercantile pursuits, dropped the title of Sirdar, and so faded into comparative obscurity, though their mother, the Walidah, Bibi Hawa, a first-cousin of the Amir Dost Muhammad and his brothers, is still alive and enjoys a high consideration. Muhammad Sadik, the eldest son of Kuhndil Khan, the most eminent of the five brothers, died before his father, leaving a son, Gul Muhammad Khan. Another son of Kuhndil, Gholam Muhaiddin Khan, is still alive; but he is a person of little importance, the wealth and power of the Kandahari branch of the Muhammadzais having passed to the families of Purdil Khan and Mihrdil Khan.

The son of the first, Mir Afzal Khan, is now a man of sixty-five or seventy, and enjoyed great influence in the province till he became Governor about eight years ago; but he had little power, the revenue being collected independently of him by officers deputed specially from Kabul. The exactions carried on by these men made Mir Afzal's government most unpopular, and his efforts to raise the country against us in January 1879 met with no success. He fled to Farrah when we arrived before the city; waited there till he heard of the deportation of Yakub, when he retired to Persia, where he has since been.

He is said to be of a kindly disposition, though very fanatical, and has a large number of wives and concubines. He had but little landed property in Kandahar. His daughter, as is well known, married the late Amir, by whom she had the Waliahd, Abdullah Jan. She is now in Farrah with Hashim Khan; but it is said intends to join her father at Meshed.

Mir Afzal has several sons, all of whom retired with him to Persia; but one, Abdul Wahab Khan, returned to Herat at Ayub Khan's invitation, and governed the city during that Sirdar's absence on his Kandahar campaign.

Sirdar Mihrdil Khan, the youngest of the Kandahari brothers, left several sons. The eldest, Khushdil Khan, died two years ago, leaving four sons, all of whom are men of some weight, though none have shown much signs of capacity. They are—

Muhammad Hasan Khan.		Shirindil Khan.
Muhammad Anwar Khan.		Roshndil Khan.

The first three returned to Kandahar a few days after our arrival in January 1879; they have always professed themselves faithful adherents of the British Government, and I have had no reason to doubt their sincerity. Shirindil Khan is a man of more capacity than the others, and has some talent for business, but has no more backbone than the

majority of the family. Roshndil Khan was in Kabul during the earlier part of our occupation, but followed his uncle, Sher Ali, down to Kandahar.

Of the Wali Sher Ali Khan it is unnecessary to speak.

His brother, Muhammad Husain Khan, is, I believe, the ablest of the family; but is no favourite in the country generally, and is certainly not to be trusted too far.

The Wali's eldest son, Haidar Ali Khan, is a lunatic, but has a son of eighteen or twenty, by name Ahmad Ali Khan. He ought, I suppose, to be the heir, but it is evident that the Wali's favourite is his second son, Nur Ali Khan, a young man of six or eight and twenty. He has pleasant manners and is certainly intelligent, but does not seem to have much force of character.

Of the Muhammadzai Sirdars not belonging to the Kandahar branch, but resident in the province, the principal was the Sartip, Nur Muhammad Khan, son of Talmur Khan. He had been on bad terms with the Kabul party for many years, and had no pension from the late Amir; nevertheless, he led the tribal cavalry to resist our advance and commanded at the affair near Takht-i-Pul on the 4th January 1879. He fled to Farrah with Mir Afzal Khan, but returned when Sirdar Sher Ali came down from Kabul, and was apparently one of his warmest supporters. His treachery in going over to Ayub was quite unexpected, and a great blow to the Wali, who had trusted him implicitly. He has a numerous family, including one very able son, Sher Muhammad Khan.

Sirdar Ghulam Muhaiuddin Khan, son of Kuhndil Khan, is a debauchee prematurely aged. He had little influence or property in the province, but enjoyed a very large pension, nearly Rupees 50,000 per annum. He fled with Mir Afzal to Farrah, and returned with the Sartip towards Kandahar; but, instead of coming into the town, halted at a village a few miles distant, and sent in to Sirdar Sher Ali demanding the order (*barat*) for his pension. This, he was told, would not be given unless he came for it, on which he retired again to Farrah, which he left with Mir Afzal for Persia. He has two grown-up sons. One, Dastgir Khan, deserted the Wali and went over to Ayub. The other, Nasir Jan, frightened at a demonstration made against him by the military authorities on some false information, fled to the hills, whence he went to Ayub Khan's camp; but he took no active part against us, and is only waiting my permission to come in to Kandahar.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, son of Muhammad Sadik Khan, and grandson of Kuhndil Khan, is our sincerest partizan out of the Wali's family. He has large property and considerable influence on the Helmand. I put him at Girishk in March 1879 as a sort of Governor, and he was very useful in keeping the country quiet and in obtaining information. He is not a very warm friend of the Wali, and would, I believe, prefer our annexing the country to any other arrangement.

The paucity of influential chiefs among the Duranis of Kandahar has often been a matter of wonder to me, and I have spoken much on the subject to such leading men as there are. They admit that all the tribes and subdivisions of tribes had recognised heads under the Sadozais, and say that the *Khan Khels*, as they were called, are still known. In many cases, however, they have fallen into obscurity, and in one only have retained their old position. This solitary exception is Ahmad Khan of Lash-Jowain, head of the Ishakzai clan, who is allowed the title of Sirdar and enjoys semi-independence at Lash Jowain. No doubt the strength of their fortified capital and its vicinity to the Persian frontier have alone enabled the family to retain its position. The present chief Sirdar, Ahmad Khan, is not an old man, but is paralyzed. The family have always been well affected towards the British Government, and I have been in constant friendly communication with the Sirdar and his eldest son, Shamsuddin Khan. A younger son was sent by him to the Wali with a few sowars in June last, and was in Kandahar during the siege. Another son, either of his own accord or to keep up relations with both parties, joined Ayub Khan, and was present at Maiwand and Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra he returned to Lash Jowain, where he had a quarrel with his eldest brother, Shamsuddin Khan, and shot him dead. Not long afterwards I received a letter from Sirdar Ahmad Khan informing me of Shamsuddin's death, and of his having made his uncle, Muhammad Hasan Khan, his heir, to the exclusion of his younger sons.

In Kandahar and the neighbourhood the most important and influential man among the Duranis of late years was no doubt Fathi Khan, Achakzai. The family have been actively employed in the service of the reigning family, whether Sadozai or Muhammadzai, for more than a century, and have taken a leading part in events. Fathi Khan was Governor of his native province for about two years under the late Amir, having succeeded in procuring the disgrace of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali, who had held it for many years. He was disgraced in his turn and kept under open arrest at

Kabul till the British occupation. He made frequent requests to be allowed to return to Kandahar, but at the Wali's request I asked General Stewart to retain him in Kabul. His son, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and nephew, Haidar Khan, took an active part against us during the siege, and are still in hiding on the Helmand. Fathi Khan's object in wishing to return to Kandahar was no doubt to intrigue in favour of the sons of the late Amir. He was an unpopular Governor, less from what he did than from having been the first under whom nominees from Kabul managed the revenue of the province.

Other members of the same family are Muhammad Aslam Khan of Kalah Abdullah, now under arrest at Jacobabad; and Haji Sarbuland Khan, who has done us good service throughout our occupation.

A second family of great importance is known as the Shahghassi Khel; they are Barakzais, but not of the reigning family, and have large estates in Tirin. Having, however, been generally employed at Kabul and in Turkistan, they are not much known in Kandahar. Their chief is the Luinab Khushdil Khan, formerly Governor of Balkh. He is about thirty years of age, and said to be a great debauchee. He is now in Herat with Ayub Khan. His younger brother, Yusuf Khan, was sent by Ayub to Farrah after Mir Afzal Khan left it, and is said to have been a man of talent and character. He was killed on the 12th August during a sortie.

A first-cousin of these is the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan. As is so common in Afghanistan, he was on very bad terms with his relation, the Luinab, and entered the Wali's service. He was not in Kandahar during the siege, but took no part against us, and is now in Tirin making arrangements for sending in supplies.

The most influential family resident in Kandahar is, perhaps, that of Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan. The two latter have been in Kandahar since our arrival, and took measures to protect the arsenal from the mob during the two days that elapsed between Mir Afzal's flight and our entry. Ghulam Muhammad Khan is in Kandahar, and Fathi Muhammad has been for the last six weeks in Khakrez, collecting and grinding wheat, and sending it in to me here.

Taj Muhammad Khan, the eldest brother, is a man of considerable capacity, and accompanied Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Kabul as principal adviser. They are not on such good terms now, Taj Muhammad's advice not having been taken on two occasions, in both of which he was certainly in the right. He would not take employment under us unless he knew we were going to remain in the country.

This really concludes the list of prominent Durani Chiefs in Kandahar proper. Across the Helmand there are several in Zamindawar, on the Helmand and in Farrah. The first-named district is almost exclusively inhabited by Alizais, but none of their chiefs have the same paramount authority that was enjoyed by Akhtar Khan forty years ago. His son, Dost Muhammad Khan, head of the Hasanazai sept, has comparatively little influence. Majid Khan, Chief of the Khaluzais, last of the three septs of the Alizais, rebelled against the Wali in May last, was defeated, and died on the way to Herat. The most influential man after him is Sahib Khan, head of the Pirzais, who sent his brother in to me two days ago, offering his services. He has been asked to come in to Kandahar, bringing as many others as possible. Najibullah Khan, though his relation, Dost Muhammad, is the head of the Hasanazais, enjoys greater influence. Abdul Rahim Khan, also a Hasanazai, is a man of importance, Mukhtar Khan, Pirzai, and Taimur Shah Khan, Khaluzai, are said to be influential chiefs. These are the only men of rank and influence in Zamindawar, though there are a number of minor chiefs who accompanied them to Kandahar in the two visits they paid to General Stewart. All are now in Zamindawar, but may shortly be expected in Kandahar.

It may be noted, however, that, though the Alizai Chiefs of Zamindawar hold a high position among the Duranis, they have notoriously little real power over their clansmen, the most turbulent race in this part of the country. Abubekr, popularly known as "the thief" (dozd), has become a very prominent personage in the last two years. He is an Alizai, but of low origin, and until March 1879 was only known by his exploits on the high road. In that month he murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi at Haidarabad on the Helmand, and shortly afterwards followed General Biddulph's rear guard to Kushk-i-Nakhud, with a mob of 1,500 ghazis and villagers. After the defeat by Colonel Malcolmson he hung about Kandahar for some time; but when the Alizai chiefs gave in their submission returned to Zamindawar, where he was falsely reported to have been killed by a fall from his horse. He took part in the rebellion against the Wali in May, and was very active against us in July and August. He is said to be about 40 years of age, and is no doubt an enterprising partisan leader. After the battle of Mazra he

collected a band of Ayub's dispersed regulars and began his old trade of highway robbery, but was forced to leave the country by the Alizai Chiefs, unwilling to do anything to bring an army on them. He has now gone to Herat.

The minor chiefs among the Duranis on this side of the Helmand are very numerous. On reference to a transcript from the Amir's pay list for the year 1878, made when I first arrived, I find that 48 Barakzais, nine Achakzais, 26 Alikozais, two Ishakzais, two Alizais, 15 Popalzais, and six Nurzais, drew pay for tribal sowars from the treasury. Of these the principal are the following:—

Barakzai-Muhammadzais—Hasanuddin Khan, the brother of Saifuddin Khan, who while alive was the most influential man in Maruf, where Hasanuddin has still some authority. Is a man of 45, and has not been to Kandahar since our arrival.

Habibullah Khan, nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, took an active part against us lately, but more from enmity to the Wali and affection for his uncle, who is also his father-in-law, than dislike to us. He is in Tirin, and has written asking for pardon and orders. He is a man of capacity. I have told him to remain quietly in his home and send us supplies.

Abdul Kadir Khan lives near Kandahar, where he still is.

Muhammad Alan Khan, formerly Kotwal of the city, a clever man, and made himself very useful to us. Being suspected of intriguing with Ayub's party, both before and after the siege, he was placed in arrest. No proof being forthcoming, he has been released.

Barakzai-Umarkhanzai—Saifullah Khan, a man of some influence at Maruf.

Barakzai-Malikdinzai—Saifuddin Khan, also at Maruf, where he is the most influential man.

Barakzai-Angozai—Amir Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Umar Khan reside near Kandahar, and have occasionally been employed in Government service.

Alikozai tribe—Shahghassi Muhammad Jan, a man of 70, and of considerable influence amongst his fellow tribesmen, who are very numerous about Kandahar, lives in Kandahar.

Nur Muhammad Khan, a man of 50, lives at Panjwai, 15 miles from Kandahar down the Arghandab.

Majid Khan, about 60 years of age, lives at Minara, six miles from Kandahar.

Nurzai—Muhammad Umar Khan, son of Sirdar Ahmad Khan, is about 45 years old, lives for the most part in the city.

The only remaining notables among the Duranis of Southern Afghanistan are on the Helmund and in Farrah. A considerable section of the Barakzais is located on the banks of the former at and below Girishk. Its Chiefs are—

Yar Muhammad Khan, Angizai, a man of 40, possessed of considerable influence; he paid me a visit last year, but joined Ayub Khan after Maiwand. He has left his home on the Helmund and gone towards Khash. Agha Jan Khan, Angizai, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Muhammad Husain Khan, brothers, Malikdinzais, are also men of consideration. Sultan Muhammad Khan, Khanchehzai about 45 years old, is the principal man of his sept. He visited me in Kandahar last year and is now at his village on the Helmund near Kalah-i-Bist.

Fathi Muhammad Khan, also a Khanchehzai, has nearly, if not quite, as much influence as the last.

Minor chiefs of the same sept are—

Musa Khan and Ahmad Khan.

At Naozad, a place not shown on any of our maps, but which is on the north-west border of Zamindawar, and appears to be the most important in that part of the country, a Barakzai named Jabar Khan is said to be a man of wealth and importance.

The most numerous tribe of Duranis beyond the Helmund are the Nurzais; their principal man is Muhammad Umar Khan, who resides at Farrah, where he has more influence than any other chief. He accompanied Ayub to Kandahar, and has, I believe, returned to his home.

(Signed)

O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

No. 4.

No. 17 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 46, of the 19th November last, regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Kuram and the Khyber Pass.

2. Her Majesty's Government, in assenting to the proceedings of the Government of India, reported by our former despatch, desire to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the lands of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

3. We have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Kotal is within the lands of the Jajis. The Turis used to hold the valley to a point a little above the village of Peiwar, and there has always been a strong feeling of antagonism between the two tribes in regard to the upper portion of the Pass, so much so that at one time the posts upon the Kotal were held for both by a small body of independent Mangals located there for this express purpose. But there can be no question that the Kotal is within the recognised nominal limits of Jaji territory, and as a matter of fact the Jajis at once took possession when our troops left it. We have no information to show whether the posts are now held by the local levies or by the Amir's regular troops, but the ridge is believed to be in the possession of the Kabul Government, and is certainly not held by the Turis.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

No. 5.

No. 22 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE the MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

IN our despatch of the 19th January last,* we reported the correspondence which had taken place, up to that date, with the Amir Abdul Rahman in connexion with the affairs of Kandahar.

* No. 10.

2. The Amir did not reply immediately to the Viceroy's letter to him of the 7th January; and information received from Kabul indicated that he had been disappointed by the adjournment of the interview proposed by him. But it appeared to the Government of India to be important that His Highness should be placed, without delay, in possession of the general views and intentions of the British Government with regard to Kandahar; since the time for discussing them is materially limited by the prospect of an early withdrawal of the British forces from South Afghanistan. On the 30th January, therefore, the Viceroy addressed to the Amir the letter, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, explaining the basis upon which the Government of India are prepared to enter into arrangements for making over the Kandahar province, at the departure of the British troops, to the Government of the Amir of Kabul.

3. This letter had scarcely issued when a telegram was received from Peshawur, communicating the substance of a reply sent by the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of

the 7th January. There appears, however, to be in this letter, so far as can be judged from the abbreviation, nothing which might require the Viceroy's last letter to His Highness to be detained or modified.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) RIPON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.
 JAMES GIBBS.
 D. M. STEWART.
 E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 5.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness
 AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

Fort William, January 30, 1881.

IN my letter of the 7th January to your Highness, I explained the reasons which constrained me to consider advisable the adjournment of the personal interview proposed to me by your Highness' friendly letter of the 28th December. And I repeated my earnest recommendation that, if there were no great objection, a confidential agent should be sent by your Highness to my Government in India.

2. There has as yet been scarcely time for the arrival of your Highness' answer. But it is clear that correspondence with Kabul is uncertain, and in a former letter your Highness mentioned the difficulty of selecting a perfectly competent representative. And since it has become necessary that the British troops should move out of Kandahar in the early spring, any further delay in acquainting your Highness with the policy and wishes of the British Government might be prejudicial to your Highness' interests. I therefore address your Highness again without waiting for a reply to my last letter, and I desire to place you, as fully as is possible through the medium of a letter, in possession of the views of the British Government with regard to the future government of Kandahar.

3. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen Empress recognize that it is desirable, in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan, to assist, if this be found possible within a limited time, in the establishment, before the departure of the British troops from Kandahar, of some settled administration in that province. They would contemplate with satisfaction the restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan, and they will agree to the extension over the province of your Highness' authority. If, therefore, your Highness is willing at once to undertake measures for receiving from the British officers at Kandahar, as last year at Kabul, the charge of the administration, it is important that your Highness should lose no time in completing preparations necessary for occupying Kandahar and establishing your government there. The British Government are, on their side, ready to admit your officers, to declare their recognition of your government when established, and generally to assist your Highness, in the same manner as they assisted you at Kabul, by a subsidy of money at Kandahar, and by the present of some artillery and other munitions of war. They will also exert influence with the Sirdars of the country to induce them to adhere to your Government.

4. If on receipt of this letter your Highness determines, as I hope, to accept and act upon this offer, you should take measures for moving toward Kandahar whatever forces you may think necessary; and Colonel St. John, my resident at Kandahar, should receive direct information by an agent of your plans and movements. It is also manifestly expedient that your Highness should send me very early notice of your intentions.

No. 6.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 10.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, February 11, 1881.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your Excellency's Government, No. 3 of 12th ultimo, explaining the circumstances under which Sirdar Shere Ali Khan has retired from his position of Wali of Kandahar, and the arrangements sanctioned by your Excellency in Council for the accommodation and sustenance of the Sirdar and his family at Kurrachee.

2. Having so recently laid before you in my despatch of the 11th November last the views of Her Majesty's Government on the general question of the disposition of Kandahar and the future administration of the province, it is sufficient now to say that they entirely approve the proceedings of your Government in the matters under report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 7.

No. 27 of 1881. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 14, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch of the 2nd February,* we have the honour to

* No. 22. enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the reply, referred to in the 3rd paragraph of that despatch, sent by the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy's letter, dated 7th January. The Amir's reply is dated January 26th, and it will be seen that His Highness agrees to depute an agent to confer with the Government of India, although no authority is given to him to decide or settle anything. The agent named is General Amir Ahmad Khan, of whose arrival on the frontier of India we have not yet heard.

2. We also enclose copies of telegraphic correspondence with the Resident at Kandahar on the subject of the transfer of Kelat-i-Ghilzai to the Government of the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that Muhammad Sadik Khan, the Ghilzai Chief, who now holds Kelat-i-Ghilzai temporarily on our behalf, has written that he has been ordered by the Amir to leave a representative in the place, and to go himself to Kabul. But as it seemed inadvisable that the fortress should be made over to any one not specially nominated or appointed by the Amir, Muhammad Sadik Khan has been instructed to reply to the Amir that he will await the arrival of the Amir's officer; and the Viceroy has addressed a letter direct to the Amir of Kabul in explanation of the orders which have been issued.

3. We enclose also copy of a telegram received from Kandahar informing us that Sirdar Ayub Khan is sending messengers to our Resident there. We have instructed Colonel St. John to receive them civilly, but to inform them that no overtures on their part concerning Kandahar can be entertained.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 26th January 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's very kind letter, dated the 7th January 1881, and mastered its contents from the beginning to the end. The friendly sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter with a view to consolidate the basis of friendship and concord between the two sublime Governments, and your Excellency's good wishes for the prosperity of my State and the permanence of my government, have indeed afforded me great pleasure and comfort, and caused me both inward and outward satisfaction. I highly appreciate the divers kindnesses of the illustrious Imperial Government, and most gratefully acknowledge its daily increasing favours, and confidently hope that as long as I live I shall not, please God, propose, think of, or determine anything which may be against the will and wish of the representatives of the illustrious Government.

As regards the postponement of the proposed interview between your Excellency and me, for the several reasons explained by your Excellency, to some other time and to a favourable opportunity, and with respect to your Excellency's wishing me to depute an agent to India for the purpose of preliminary discussions regarding Afghanistan, I have, agreeably to the wishes of the representatives of the sublime Government, appointed to this service General Amir Ahmad Khan, whom I thought a loyal, truthful, proper, and worthy man. But he is authorised and empowered only to carefully listen to the proposals of the representatives of the sublime Government, and to report to me the facts and the substance of the discussions, but not to settle and decide anything with the representatives of the sublime Government according to his own opinion, since the affairs of Afghanistan are embarrassed to such an extent and degree that they cannot be set to rights through anyone but myself. The reason why I asked with urgency for, and insisted on, an interview, and why I still do so, is that I wish that the first stone of the foundation of the structure of sincere friendship between the two Governments be so firmly and strongly laid that it should not, for hundreds of years, see the face of destruction or suffer desolation. I still confidently hope that a friendly interview will take place between your Excellency and myself at some convenient time and on a suitable occasion, and that our affairs will be arranged according to our wishes. I am exceedingly thankful to the sublime British Government for their allowing me to take in hand the administration of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which act of kindness they have done for the advancement of my State, and I sincerely hope that they take great interest in my welfare and prosperity.

Regarding the arms and ammunition, which had been plundered or destroyed, I had a talk with Mr. Lepel Griffin during the interview I had with him at Zimma. I feel certain that he has made your Excellency fully aware of the circumstance. Since the last six months I have been endeavouring to collect the guns, and I have succeeded in procuring some, which, after being repaired, will prove useful.

As regards the ammunition, I have none. The two lead mines in the neighbourhood of Kabul have not been worked during the last two years of confusion and anarchy, and the people have no lead in store which might be taken. This being the winter season, no gunpowder can be manufactured; and the little ammunition I require I procure with the greatest difficulty. I therefore expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will be pleased to grant me whatever quantity of ammunition your Excellency may think proper, and to strengthen me as soon as possible.

I am resolved upon two things, from which I will never swerve. *First*, I will never undertake anything without the consent of the British Government. *Second*, I will keep the British Government informed at all times of the state of affairs in Afghanistan, whether good or bad, exactly as it is, without any addition or diminution.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 4th February 1881.

FORWARDS a memorandum regarding General Amir Ahmad Khan.

AMIR AHMAD KHAN is the son of Shahabuddin Khan, who went from Hindustan to Kabul in 1830, and there took service with Dost Muhammad Khan, at that time a Sirdar in Kabul. When Dost Muhammad was sent to India, Shahabuddin Khan remained in Kabul. On Dost Muhammad's return as Amir he appointed each of Shahabuddin's two sons to offices in the artillery, sending Amir Ahmad Khan, whom the present memorandum concerns, to Turkistan to serve as General of artillery under Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, father of the present Amir, and then in charge of Turkistan. Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, however, became displeased with Amir Ahmad Khan, having heard that he was teaching Abdul Rahman, the present Amir, to smoke opium, &c.; Amir Ahmad Khan, therefore, left for Kabul. Shere Ali Khan, who, though only heir-apparent, had considerable power, then appointed him to a post in the artillery. Subsequently, during his contest with Afzal Khan for power, Shere Ali Khan became suspicious of the two brothers, and on his return from India gave them no office, but made them some small allowance.

Since then Amir Ahmad Khan and his brother do not appear to have been heard of, and have, perhaps, lived in obscurity.

Peshawur, the 4th February 1881.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MUHAMMAD SADIK KHAN writes from Kelat-i-Ghilzai that a letter has reached him from Amir (that) that place has been given to him by (the) English, and ordering him to leave a representative there and come himself to Kabul. Muhammad Sadik asks for orders.

I propose to tell him that it is true we have given Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Amir, and that if he thinks he can safely leave fort in charge of any one else he had better go to Kabul, but, if not, to write that if he leaves before Amir sends a governor and troops there fort may be taken possession of by Ayub's party.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 7th. Muhammad Sadik should be instructed to reply to Amir that British authorities have directed him to make over Kelat-i-Ghilzai only to a governor nominated by Amir; therefore, pending receipt of Amir's further orders, or arrival of governor, he will hold the place for Amir. Letter in this sense goes direct from hence to Amir.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

A MESSENGER has just arrived from Herat, in six days, bringing letter from Ayub, dated 31st January, announcing departure on that day for (Kandahar?) of Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, and Omar Jan, Sahibzada, as envoys.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegram 7th. Ayub's envoys may have civil reception, but should be informed that you can entertain no negotiations about Kandahar, and Viceroy desires you to be strictly careful that your language shall hold out no hope to them present or prospective thereupon. You will consider how long envoys can be safely permitted in interests of our present policy to stay at Kandahar.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Dated, Fort William, 11th February 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL in India to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, the Amir of Kabul.

THE British Resident at Kandahar has reported to me by telegraph that a letter from your Highness has reached Muhammad Sadik Khan, who is now holding charge of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzai. It is understood to be your Highness' wish that Muhammad Sadik Khan should place a representative in charge of the fort, and should himself proceed to Kabul.

I am glad that your Highness has taken such early steps for assuming charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and it is the desire of the British Government that your Highness should be established there as soon as possible.

But for this object, and to prevent accidents or mistakes, or the danger of the place falling into the hands of your Highness' enemies, it seems advisable that the person who should receive charge of the fortress from Sadik Khan should be nominated or approved by your Highness; and Muhammad Sadik Khan has been directed, accordingly, to await your Highness' further orders on this point. He has been told that, as soon as he is informed of the person to whom your Highness would be willing that the fortress should be entrusted, he should immediately deliver charge to that person.

No. 8.

No. 39 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 28, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the arrangements which have been sanctioned for the future security of the Khyber Pass.

2. In the despatch from the Government of India, No. 208, of the 14th September last, your Lordship was informed that we proposed to withdraw all British garrisons from the Pass, and to entrust the protection of the road to the Khyber tribes, whose independence was to be formally recognized. This proposal was accepted in your

Lordship's despatch, No. 46, dated 19th November 1880. The whole of the arrangements necessary to carry it into effect have now been completed, after long and careful negotiations with the tribal representatives, and we trust that they will be approved by Her Majesty's Government. The total cost to the British revenues will be under two lakhs of rupees per annum—the sum of Rupees 87,540 being given in allowances to the different sections of the Afridis, and Rupees 87,392 being allotted to the payment of a corps of Jezailchis which the tribes desire to maintain. In consideration of these payments the Afridis have covenanted to undertake entire and exclusive responsibility for the freedom and security of the road, and to occupy with the Jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. Beyond this point their responsibility does not extend, Lundikhana being the defined western limit of the independent tribal territory in which, for the purpose of keeping open and free of interruption the passes into India, the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized.

3. It will be observed that the right of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber is specially reserved, by the agreement with the tribes, to the British Government. The Commissioner would defer for a few months the collection of these tolls or transit dues, but the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to see any sufficient reason for not levying them at once, upon the ground that the public will in any case look to our Government for the protection of convoys, and that the levying of tolls indicates that this responsibility (which cannot, in Sir R. Egerton's opinion, be disavowed) is accepted. There can be no doubt that a regular collection of dues by the British Government will induce the toll-payers to believe that they have secured our protection; while, conversely, to abstain from the demand may be interpreted as an admission, on our part, of some uncertainty as to whether our arrangements will effectually provide for the safety of convoys. It is, moreover, obviously desirable that the entire scheme shall be introduced and put on its trial from the beginning; nor is it improbable that if the British Government waives, even for a time, its acknowledged right to collect the tolls, they will be levied by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limits of these arrangements. We have therefore instructed the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that on this point his opinion is accepted, and that he should issue the requisite orders, at his discretion, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. With regard, however, to the question of responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass, our opinion does not altogether coincide with the views expressed in the 4th paragraph of the letter of the 14th February from the Punjab Government. The Commissioner, it will be observed, would at once throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the pass, would decline, on the part of the Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses, and would insist that the tribes must be left to protect the convoys and to award compensation for depredations. If robberies occur, the complaints are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy; the British officers assisting by their influence and advice, and holding in reserve the power, in the contingency of failure by the tribes to act up to their agreement, of stopping the allowances, disbanding the Jezailchis, and closing the pass. His Honour, the Lieutenant-Governor, on the contrary, would authorise the political officer to inquire into individual complaints, and to award the proper compensation. The view taken by the Government of India is that it is preferable, at the beginning, to follow strictly the procedure laid down by the agreement, and to refer all complaints, in the first instance, to the jirgahs. The 8th clause of the agreement appears to entrust the jirgahs with the power of award and of levying penalty, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. If in any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgahs of the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. All these arrangements must, in our opinion, be regarded for the present as experimental, until they have undergone trial, and the result shall have been practically ascertained. If the system works well, and the tolls are regularly collected, the annual cost of securing the proper fulfilment of Colonel Waterfield's agreement with the tribes will, we submit, have been well and advantageously expended. To keep the Khyber Pass safe and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands, are all objects for which the money payment, if by it they can be secured, is well worth making. It is known that the Afridis have been subsidized from time immemorial by all governments to whom the management and

political control of these passes have been a matter of importance; and that the tribes consider their services to be due to the authority that undertakes payment of these subsidies.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor, in his letter to the Commissioner of the 13th December (paragraphs 4-5), lays stress on the importance of trying the system of holding the pass through Jezailchis. In that letter, and the correspondence accompanying it, all the arguments for and against the employment of Jezailchis will be found very fairly stated. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties five hundred men, who might otherwise be disposed to plunder and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. We have therefore determined that the assent of the British Government may be given to the establishment of the Jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize it. But we have stipulated that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. The essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

7. The British troops now in the Khyber will be withdrawn with the least possible delay; though it is considered desirable that an alternative route between Lundikhana and Dakka, lying entirely in independent tribal territory, should be opened up before the pass is finally evacuated. We have also ordered the survey of another route through the Mohmand country, which could, in case of necessity, be used as an alternative to the whole Khyber line. But there is no reason to apprehend that these operations will retard the withdrawal of the troops beyond the close of the cold season.

8. The question of the political establishments permanently necessary for the conduct of our relations with the Khyber tribes has not been finally settled; but the estimates submitted by the Punjab Government appear to be capable of reduction.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

No. 412 S., dated 6th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

IN my telegrams of the 1st and 2nd September preliminary instructions were conveyed to you regarding the measures immediately necessary for giving effect to the orders of the Government of India, on the relations which will, in future, be observed with the Afridi tribes of the Khyber Pass for maintaining the road through the pass open and free of interference. I am now desired to forward copy of a letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August, from the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, and to communicate in detail the orders of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in pursuance of the instructions therein contained.

2. In the first place, as explained in my telegram, Sir Robert Egerton desires that you will take the earliest opportunity of summoning the headmen of the Khyber tribes to Peshawur and explaining to them the intentions of the Government of India, so far as they are definitely communicated in the Foreign Secretary's letter. You will observe that the wording of the second paragraph of this letter differs in a few details from that of my telegram, and in so far as this difference exists you will be guided by the letter,

which is herewith forwarded in supersession of the instructions conveyed by telegram. The *Id-ul-fits*, Muhammadan festival, falls on the 7th September, and it will probably be convenient to choose an early date thereafter for assembling the Maliks in Peshawur. The summons should extend to that portion of the Shinwari tribe which holds Loargai and Lundikotal, but not to the Shinwari tribe generally, or to any of the tribes connected with the upper portion of the Khyber between Lundikotal and Dakka. In regard to this portion of the pass, the management of which is intimately affected by our relations with the Mohmands and the Mohmand Chief, the Khan of Lalpura, instructions will be separately communicated as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter.

3. The main facts which it will be your duty to communicate to the headmen of the tribes are contained in paragraph 2 of the letter enclosed. The British Government has determined upon keeping the pass open, and ensuring securing of life and property to travellers. In effecting this object, relations are to be maintained with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference. The independence of the tribes is at the same time to be recognised and maintained. With them will rest the responsibility of preserving order and affording security on the road, and when the Government is satisfied that their arrangements for doing so are sufficient, the troops at present located in the Khyber will be withdrawn.

4. On these points the intentions of the Government are clear, and you will have no difficulty in communicating them to the assembled Maliks. On other matters mentioned in the second paragraph of the Foreign Secretary's letter, you will not be able to proclaim the intentions of Government with equal definiteness, and on these subjects I am to convey, in some detail, Sir Robert Egerton's views, in order that your communications with the tribal representatives may be as re-assuring to them as the circumstances will permit without unduly pledging the Government to specific promises which, in the course of the discussion, may have to be somewhat modified.

5. It is stated in the letter which accompanies this reference that, in consideration of the proper performance of the duty of preserving the Khyber road open and undisturbed, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber, although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. In regard to this subject care will be required to avoid any misapprehension. During the occupation of Kabul by the British Government in the first Afghan war, an allowance of Rupees 1,25,000 was made to the Khyberis in consideration of their keeping the pass open. All duties levied on merchandise were realised and appropriated by the Government. After the withdrawal of the British from Afghanistan, the Amir Dost Muhammad assigned Rupees 25,000 as allowances to the heads of the tribes, but this allowance, about three years before the death of the Amir, was discontinued owing to the misconduct of the Khyberis, who did not allow free passage to all travellers. In reporting the arrangements made in 1878 for the management of the pass, the late Sir Louis Cavagnari adverted to the arrangements above described, and appears to some extent to have accepted the subsidy of Rupees 1,25,000 paid in the first Afghan war by the British Government, as the basis of his negotiations with the Afridi Maliks. The subsidy finally arranged for distribution among the tribes, adjoining the Khyber between Jamrud and Lundikotal, amounted to Rupees 87,540, of which a detail was given in my No. 1143, dated 29th October 1879, to the address of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. In consideration of this subsidy, the elders of each tribe signed a written deed, appointing their representative Chiefs, and set themselves to protect the Khyber road and the telegraph wire, declaring that none of the tribe should commit dacoity, or robbery, or murder in the Pass or in British territory, and expressing their willingness to pay compensation for such offences, and to restore stolen property.

6. In the measures which have been adopted at different times to induce the Khyber Maliks to guarantee the safety of the Pass, the right of the Khyber Maliks to levy tolls has never been admitted to co-exist with their receipt of the subsidy. It is necessary to keep this fact carefully in mind in giving effect to the orders of the Government of India conveyed in this letter. The claim to compensation allowances on account of tolls could only be put forward by the Khyber tribes, in the event of the subsidy being withdrawn which was intended to compensate them for the abandonment of the levy of such duties, as well as for ensuring the safety of travellers. So long as the subsidy is paid to the tribes, the right of collecting tolls, if it exists at all, rests with the British Government. In regard to the question of subsidy, you are authorised by the instructions of the Government of India to inform the tribal representatives that the arrangements under which they have engaged to maintain the security of the Pass remain intact, and the

allowances of which they are at present in receipt will be granted to them in future as long as, and provided that, they are able to secure the Pass for the passage of travellers. But it rests with the British Government to decide whether in future the right of levying tolls, which belongs to it alone in virtue of such arrangements, shall be put into exercise or not. This is one of the subjects upon which your opinion is desired, and the communications which you make to the tribes should not pledge the Government in any way in regard to its action in this matter. Sir R. Egerton is inclined upon the whole to think that, if the Government abstain from exercising its right of levying tolls, the only result will be that traffic passing through the Khyber will be taxed in other places to the full extent of the burden which the trade is capable of surviving, and that to forego the levy of tolls in the lower Khyber would only be to increase indirectly the profits of those who collect such imports further westward. If the tolls are re-imposed, a further matter for consideration will be whether the collection of them should be made over to the Afridi tribes, a corresponding reduction being made in their subsidy, or whether they should be levied by means of their agency. On these questions also the Lieutenant-Governor will be glad to receive your opinion.

7. The next point which calls for some remarks is the allusion made by the Government of India to the possible retention of Jezailchis, or similar levies for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass. You are aware that throughout the correspondence which has taken place on Khyber management, the principle has been recognised that the Afridi tribes are bound, in consideration of the subsidy which they receive, to provide for the safety of travellers, and that the entertainment of a Jezailchi corps with officers was devised as a temporary expedient, on the distinct understanding that it would be possible greatly to reduce, if not entirely to put a stop to, this charge when the arrangements entered into with the tribes should be proved sufficient for their object, and brought into full working order. In considering, therefore, what arrangements should be made by the British Government to provide levies for the future security of the Pass, this fact must be kept prominently in view, and you cannot too firmly impress upon the Afridi representatives that this duty properly falls upon them, in virtue of the obligations incurred by the receipt of handsome allowances from the Government.

The cost of the Jezailchis which is now defrayed by Government was fixed in the letter above quoted at Rupees 72,100 per annum. The late Sir Louis Cavagnari apparently contemplated that Rupees 1,25,000, the traditional sum said to have been paid as subsidy during the first Afghan war, would be the extreme limit of expenditure required to subsidize the Pass, and was of opinion that a portion of the pay of the Jezailchi corps raised during the former British occupation of Afghanistan must have been included in this amount. But the aggregate amount, which has been paid by the Government on account of Pass allowances and Jezailchis, is Rupees 1,59,640 per annum. The Government has taken upon itself the duties of safe conduct (*badagga*), which it was entitled to claim from the tribes as one of the results of the subsidy. This has been done as a temporary measure, and your aim should be to secure the full equivalent for the allowances paid in the future. To what extent it may be necessary to provide for the retention of Jezailchis or similar levies, the precise mode in which they shall be paid, and their discipline,—these are points upon which it will be your duty to report fully to Government. The question, whether it may be possible entirely to withdraw the troops from the Khyber at an early date, is one on the decision of which this subject hinges; probably for a time a more or less organized militia will be indispensable in the absence of military garrison.

8. The foregoing portion of this letter deals with subjects on which you will have either definitely or indirectly to address the Khyber Maliks when they are assembled at Peshawur. Other points noted in the Government of India letter will call for deliberation and decision as time goes on, and according as circumstances shall indicate. The first of these is the question as to the time at which it may be possible for the troops to be entirely withdrawn from the Khyber. This is a question which will depend upon the completeness of the arrangements, which you may be able to effect with the tribes for the safety of the road after their withdrawal, and upon the time which it will take to give effect to such arrangements. Upon this question the Lieutenant-Governor desires to have your opinion.

9. All other questions noted in paragraph 4 of the Government of India letter will also require your careful consideration—how the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber shall be disposed of. It will be desirable to obtain a list of the former buildings from the military authorities, and to record your opinion regarding each.

10. As regards the westward limit to which we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road, the Lieutenant-Governor has no

doubt that Lundikhana must be included within the boundary, as otherwise the water-supply of Lundikotal will be deficient.

11. It remains to consider in what manner the political relations of the Government with the Khyber tribes shall be conducted in future. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that for the present, at all events, there must be a political officer as heretofore under the orders of the Commissioner of Peshawur, whose residence it will probably be convenient to fix at Jamrud, and who should be instructed, as long as he can do so with safety, to visit the Pass from time to time, and ascertain that the arrangements for maintaining tranquillity and a free passage to travellers are sufficient.

12. Should you find it necessary to ask for further instructions in regard to the matters mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter with a view to explaining these matters to the tribal assemblage, I am to suggest that the telegraph may be freely used for this purpose, as an immediate solution of all doubt on these subjects is necessary. On the other points you will be able to report at more leisure when you have formed your opinion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq.,
Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN reply to your No. 412 S., dated 6th instant, forwarding a copy of letter, No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address, I have the honour to state that, in accordance with your telegram of the 1st instant, I at once summoned the full jirgahs of the tribes concerned, to meet me at Peshawur on the 14th instant. I may note here incidentally that this summons will prove to some extent a test of the influence exercised among the Khyber Afridis by Sayad Mir Bashir, who has lately been agitating in Tirah, and of his position towards us; should the latter be, now, one of declared hostility, and should full jirgahs of every clan come to Peshawur in defiance of his attempts to prevent their compliance with my summons, it may be presumed that his authority is on the wane.

Upon arrival of the representatives of the tribes, the wishes of Government will be communicated to them as indicated in the instructions received from the Government of India.

2. My telegram, however, of the 11th instant to your address will have explained how the objects, that have to be attained, concurrent with the relinquishment by our troops of the Khyber Pass seem to me to be two—the first being the maintenance of our relations with the Khyber Afridis to the exclusion of influence or interference from any other quarter, while at the same time their independence continues recognised as heretofore; and the second being the continuance of the existing arrangements with them for keeping the Khyber Pass open for trade, modified as circumstances may now require owing to the withdrawal of our troops.

3. The Government is, I know, aware of the difficulties attendant upon the attempt to effect a coalition of the Afridi tribes concerned, in a systematic engagement for the independent management of the Pass.

Of the strength and stability of the tribal combination and of the measures proposed by the Afridis for the management of the Pass, we shall scarcely be able to form an accurate opinion until our troops have actually quitted the Khyber, and the system has been put to the test of practical working. Having regard to this element of uncertainty I am inclined to think that it may be advisable to disconnect the question of maintenance of exclusive relations with the Afridis from a matter that may assume various phases and the arrangements regarding which may be liable to change. The permanence of our relations with the Afridis is of essential importance, yet it cannot fail to be injuriously affected, if interlated with the question of Pass management by the tribes alone. For this reason, and in order to separate the two objects to be attained, I intended to suggest that the Government assuming the former position of the Amirs of Kabul with the Afridis should grant to them certain comparatively small subsidies quite irrespective of, and distinct from, any sum to be paid to the tribes as compensation allowance for keeping open the Khyber.

Thus whatever vicissitudes befall the management of the Pass and the compensation allowance, the maintenance of exclusive relations would remain unaffected.

4. It seemed to me that should the Afridis perceive the withdrawal of our troops from the Khyber to be conditional upon their decision regarding arrangements for the Pass, it was to be apprehended that they might endeavour to make capital, for party purposes, out of this fact, and that it would materially bias their decision. Yet to construct the durable tribal combination which is to work the object in view, it would seem important to exclude such influences, leaving the tribes to be guided by their pecuniary interests. Another possible aspect of the question seemed to be that the Afridis believing us desirous of quitting the Pass might stand out, trading on our supposed anxiety for retirement, and endeavour to dictate terms.

5. I considered that it would materially conduce to the possible success of the negotiations, if the tribes understood that our movements were not dependent upon their conduct, and that although it would be most desirable for purposes of trade, to keep open the Pass, yet that failure on their part to effect this need not necessarily lead to a re-occupation of the Pass, but might, according to circumstances, perhaps cause the total and permanent extinction of their compensation allowance, and the closing of the Khyber and the opening of other and parallel trade routes with Afghanistan such as through the Mohmand country in which they have no interests, and from which they can derive no benefits. The hand of Government would not then be tied in any way, no party among the Afridis could work on our relinquishment or re-occupation of the Pass for its own ends, and the only forces capable of producing coherence among the tribes after withdrawal of our troops, *viz.*, doubts as to the action we should under these circumstances take, and self-interest in retaining the compensation allowance in preference to other tribes profiting by the opening of parallel trade routes, would be appealed to.

6. The reply of the Government by telegram, does not, I think, meet my view of possible difficulties, but the instructions given will be of course carefully adhered to.

It seems to me possible that the Maliks, with the object of retaining troops in the Pass, and their present position and allowances, may plead difficulties in exclusive tribal management, or that under pressure from those who are not profiting by and are not interested in our occupation, they may declare their ability and willingness to keep the Pass open and safe as we desire, with the object of securing our departure in the belief that we shall not return, or that influenced by our supposed anxiety to withdraw from the Pass, they may bid for more favourable terms. The presence of our troops suffices to keep open the Pass, and until they have actually withdrawn, the tribal arrangements cannot come into working order. Should they fail, the Pass may become unsafe. The Government should, I think, consider now what it will do under contingencies that may not impossibly arise.

Quite agreeing with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that the tribes may be anxious to make satisfactory arrangements and may start them, we must reflect how we shall act in the possible event of failure.

7. It was on this account that I suggested in my telegram that we should keep separate two matters, which perhaps it may be better to call independent of each other. If difficulties arise in the Pass, and we have to withhold the compensation allowance, it might be still wise and very advisable to continue the tribal subsidies, and hold the tribes to us; we should thus keep up continuous influence in the tribe, through which the Pass arrangements might be again brought straight.

8. It will be a matter of some time and trouble for such a large body as the Afridis to work out a system that will have to meet with the approval of a preponderating section of the tribe, and it was on this account that it seemed to me advisable to think now whether it would not be better to give them a sufficient period within which to complete their arrangements, and then to withdraw the troops, throwing the entire responsibility of the road upon them, and leaving them to be guided by their own interests (as I have little doubt they will be) in doing their best to keep open the trade route and secure the compensation for transit dues. We should test their capabilities, humour their spirit of independence, and yet be able at any time to act as we may find convenient.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

No. 486 S., dated 20th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge receipt of your No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September, on Khyber Pass arrangements.

2. Your telegram of the 18th current announces the arrival and reception in Durbar at Peshawur of 180 Khyber Maliks, from which fact his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor gathers that full jirgahs of every clan have come in to receive the communications of Government, and that no adverse influence has availed to hinder them.

3. On the subject to which reference is made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter, the instructions of his Honour conveyed in my No. 412, dated 6th instant, will have sufficiently informed you. It was never intended that the Khyber Maliks should be given to understand that, in default of their making satisfactory arrangements for the safety of the Pass, the troops would be retained there. But any doubt which may have existed in your mind on this subject after a perusal of my letter of the 6th September, will have been removed by the Government of India letter conveyed with my No. 475 S., dated 18th September, and there is no need to dwell further on the subject than to state that Sir Robert Egerton concurs with your views as expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter under reply, which are in accordance with the test of the instructions contained in paragraph 2 of the Government of India letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August last.

4. With your proposals regarding the treatment of the allowances to the tribesmen, the Lieutenant-Governor is not able to agree. His Honour understands that you would propose to pay small subsidies, equivalent in amount, or nearly so, to those paid by the Amirs of Kabul in former times to the headmen, as a sort of retaining fee for their allegiance, independent of their success in keeping open the Pass and protecting traffic, and that the further payment of tribal subsidies should depend on these last-named considerations. The Lieutenant-Governor is not prepared to accept this arrangement. His Honour is not aware of any advantage to be gained by payments to the Afridis, except the security of the Pass road, and unless this is effected, there appears to be no excuse for making such payments. The headmen who would receive their allowances, independently of the consideration whether they kept the Pass open, would no doubt maintain professions of friendship, while their tribesmen might be committing raids and making the road impassable.

5. On the subject, therefore, of the future subsidizing of the Khyber Afridis, I am to request that you will be guided by the above remarks, and by the line of policy laid down in my No. 412 S., dated 6th September last.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

IN continuation of my No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880, to your address, I have the honour to report as follows upon the preliminary negotiations with the maliks and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in regard to the proposals for arrangements to keep the Pass open in independent charge of the tribes upon the withdrawal of British troops.

2. My telegram of the 18th September has acquainted you with the arrival at Peshawar on that date of 180 maliks and greybeards of the Khyber Afridis and Loargi Shinwaris. Subsequently their number was swelled to 314, by later arrivals from the more distant parts of Bara and Maidan. The summons to fetch them had been somewhat hurried, and not much time could be given to the Afridis, who are at present many miles distant in Tirah and busy with the autumn harvest, for the collecting of a large number of influential men. But for the purpose of being informed of the proposals of Government the tribes were adequately represented.

3. Shortly after arrival I met the maliks and representatives of the tribes, and after a few introductory remarks, informed them that they had been summoned to hear certain wishes of Government, which I then proceeded to explain. They were told that

their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, would be continued, and their independence would, as heretofore, be recognised; that although British troops would, for the present, remain at their stations in the Pass, they might, and in all probability would, be soon withdrawn, independently of, and not in connexion with, any reply that they might now make to Government, and without any reference to their present or future attitude; that the action of Government in this matter was perfectly free and dependent upon weightier issues and broader considerations than the comparatively unimportant matters connected with the Khyber Pass; that should British troops be withdrawn, the Government intended to maintain in force, subject to such modification as might be required, the existing arrangements with the Afridis for holding the independent charge of the Khyber Pass and keeping it open and free of interference; and that, in consideration of proper performance of these duties, the Government was prepared to settle with the tribes compensation allowances for tolls reasonably chargeable on trade passing through the Khyber.

The proposals were stated to them at some length, and they were invited to discuss them and ask for explanation, where required, from me and the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and to meet me again a few days afterwards when they had thoroughly considered the new arrangements.

4. Before the meeting broke up, two or three of the leading maliks, especially Abdulla Nur Khan, Kuki Khel, spoke at some length touching upon the points I had mentioned. All stipulated that they should be permitted to return to their homes in order fully to discuss everything with their tribes. They had come more or less ignorant of the intentions of Government, and could not return a reply, binding upon the tribes or concurred in by all, without consultation with the main body; that, in fact, they were not prepared to give a definite answer on the spot. This request to be permitted to consult with their tribesmen present and absent being reasonable and proper, was conceded to. The speakers then proceeded to point out that it was impossible for the Afridis to keep open the Pass themselves, that therefore they could not undertake independent charge of the Khyber; in fact, that the proposals regarding Pass arrangements subsequent upon the withdrawal of troops were impracticable, and would not be accepted by them; that they could not, by reason of internal feuds and want of concord and the evil habits of Afridis as a nation, keep the Pass open for traffic themselves, and would not engage to do so; that failure in carrying out their engagements would cover them with shame and give rise to imputations of bad faith. Finally, they said if the Afridis were able to keep open the Pass themselves they would have done so long ago for the sake of the profits arising from transit dues, but that they had not been able to do this.

In reply, I told them to confer together and with me and the Khyber Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and meet me a few days hence.

5. On the 26th September I again met the jirgas. In reply to my remarks that they had had full opportunity for clearing up doubtful points, they said that they continued to believe that it was impossible for them to hold the Pass, unless indeed with the assistance of Government. Questioning showed that by "assistance" they meant the forcible coercion by British troops of any recalcitrant tribe, interfering with tribal Pass arrangements, and punishment, by expeditions, of marauders and raiders. This was somewhat more satisfactory, as they had modified, in the interim, their former absolute refusal to accept independent charge of the Pass. They clearly had entertained the plan of forming a combination for the control of the tribes, which was to receive the active and forcible support of Government. The objection of course to that would be, with the proverbial instability of Afghan and particularly Afridi coalitions and combinations, the aid of Government might and probably would be constantly invoked. This was, to say the least, an undesirable arrangement. In reply, I told them that Government should be informed of their difficulties, but that the whole matter lay in their hands. To this Abdulla Nur Khan pointedly replied that the Afridis could never preserve concord in independent charge of the Pass, and for himself he would not undertake engagements he could not fulfil. At their request a month was given to the jirgas, after expiration of which they are to return to Peshawar with the final reply of the tribes.

This month it was anticipated would be very useful in ascertaining the currents of political feeling among the Afridis prior to their definite decision.

6. In my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September, and in my telegram No. 996 of the 11th September, I anticipated that the proposals of Government would present themselves to the tribes as involving questions of considerable difficulty (*vide* paragraph 3

of above letter). The difficulties are no doubt of serious magnitude; but I think it was not alone the awkward problem of tribal management that induced the maliks and tribal representatives to give their categorical refusal. Partly no doubt by standing out the Afridis hoped to raise the amount of the compensation allowance, in the belief that the keeping open of the Pass was a matter of much solicitude to Government; but I am of opinion this motive was opened out and disposed of by pointing out to them that other trade routes existed from Dakka to Peshawar. A further motive lies no doubt in the earnest wish of the maliks and others, who monthly benefit by our occupation, to prevent our abandonment of the Khyber, and by refusing to hold the Pass themselves, the maliks may hope to keep the troops there; but this consideration, I think, weighed less than the one I am about to state.

The Afridis no doubt received with satisfaction the announcement of the maintenance of the Government relations with them, to the exclusion of other influence. But if their subsidies were to depend upon their holding the Pass open, which they suppose to be a matter of no certain success, they probably felt that the time might sooner or later come when their Pass arrangements would break down temporarily or permanently; that this would involve the stoppage of the compensation allowance, and that they, cut off from Kabul, would, as a nation, not only have lost the subsidies which they received from Kabul, but also their allowances from the British Government. They would have fallen between two stools.

It was this consideration that led me to make the proposals in paragraph 3 of my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September. In fact, the more ignorant men in the jirgas at first rather suspected that Government, seeking some good excuse for stopping the Khyber allowances and thus saving money, was endeavouring to induce the Afridis to accept proposals of considerable difficulty, and to entrap them into entering upon engagements that they would be unable to fulfil.

These proposals to separate the two questions of the maintenance of our future exclusive relation with the Afridis, and the continuance of the existing arrangements for the keeping open of the Pass, were made with two objects—first of all to assist the present negotiation, and secondly, in order to secure those future exclusive relations with the tribes in the event of failure of the Pass arrangements.

Irrespective of the manner in which the present negotiations may have been affected by the amalgamation of the above two questions, I take it that our future relations can be better secured by the measure which I proposed.

I have already entered fully into the reasons, but regarding the advantages to be gained by payments to the Afridis beyond the security of the Pass road, and the excuse we may have for making any such payments, I think that, having been detached from Kabul and losing permanently the allowances formerly granted by the Amir, they will expect to receive an equivalent from us, and if they should not succeed in their endeavours to keep open the Pass, or if it were temporarily closed by the party in opposition, they, in forfeiting the compensation for tolls, would lose everything that connected them with the Government, and we should retain little hold upon them except through their dealings generally with British territory and their fear of possible coercion.

The maliks and jirgas would not unnaturally turn again to Kabul, and whether successful or not in recovering any of their lost position, we could scarcely expect them to assist us in our further dealings with the Afridis on our border.

I therefore think that, whether or no satisfactory arrangements regarding the Pass are brought about, it may be a question whether Government should not at the time grant certain small personal allowances to the headmen distinct from Pass compensation for tolls, also having in view possible failure in obtaining such arrangements, it may not be wiser to grant their allowances now in consideration of past services, as there may arise difficulties in making any such concessions hereafter.

8. To return to the progress of the Khyber Pass question. In my telegram No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, reporting that a month's grace was required by the representatives present to discuss the whole question with the tribes in Tirah, I asked if it would suit Government, in support of the Pass maliks, to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid, and the intervening posts with two native regiments, the present Jezailchi force being maintained and the tribal posts. In reply, I was asked by your telegram of the 7th October whether the maliks wish this, and whether I consider it desirable, and whether I propose to make the retention of these posts one of the conditions of our arrangements with the maliks, or merely suggest it as a measure which may be desirable in our own interests apart from the compact. I would reply by referring to paragraph 4 of this letter.

9. I will explain that before leaving Peshawar, the headmen at separate interviews and also together expressed themselves to me personally as hopeful of effecting the necessary arrangements with their tribesmen for the keeping open of the Pass; more especially Abdulla Nur, Kuki Khel, who is by far the most energetic of the maliks, and takes the most prominent part in all discussions, assured me that they would do their utmost to bring about a combination against the Khusrogi and other malcontent sections, and in their own interests endeavour to satisfy the Government.

It seems to me that the objections raised by him at first in the presence of the rest of the tribe may have been made with the object of increasing his own importance in their eyes, as one capable of making terms with Government and assisting Afridi interests.

The maliks, however, suggested that they would require the support of the Government Jezailchi force, perhaps somewhat increased. They do not draw any distinction between Jezailchis and native troops. All they wished to obtain was the co-operation of Government in some visible form.

10. It may not, however, be advisable to rely entirely upon the Jezailchis for the purpose, and I would prefer to propose that native troops be employed. In a separate letter, which I hope shortly to despatch, I shall consider whether it is desirable to hold the posts referred to by troops or by Jezailchis, or whether, once the tribes have taken independent charge of the Pass, it may not be advisable and expedient to throw the entire onus and responsibility of keeping the Pass open on to their shoulders, and to preserve Government from a jointly responsible position with reference to the Khyber.

11. I saw at the departure of the jirga that there were reasons for anticipating possible difficulties which have since occurred. Sayad Mir Bashir, the Tirah leader, appears to have taken advantage of the absence of the headmen at Peshawar, and to have recovered some of his old influence, and, tampering with the Malikdin Khel tribe, to have made a bid for some share in Pass allowances. He also appears to have endeavoured to gain over Saleh Muhammad, the Qambar Khel Malik; but the latter, though willing to join Mir Bashir in any attack upon the Shiah Orakzais, is said to have adhered to his agreements with us, and to have warned Mir Bashir that he was not to be expected to act against the Government.

In this letter I have confined myself to a mere narrative of the course of events in the negotiations with the tribes, without considering what measures may be proposed for the future in the interests of Government, which I trust to do in the separate but accompanying letter to your address.

The last news then from Tirah is that considerable difficulty has been experienced in uniting all the Khyber clans, especially the Malikdin Khel and greater part of the Zakka Khel, to return a joint reply to Government, and in consequence the arrival of the jirgas will be delayed till after the Id-uz-zuha on the 15th instant. In the meanwhile I propose on the 7th to have an interview with the Afridi Maliks at Jamrud, and there to personally ascertain the position of affairs and the proposals the maliks are prepared to bring forward.

Enclosure 5 in No. 8.

No. 5030 $\frac{1}{2}$, dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of PUNJAB.

IN continuation of my No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880, to your address, I have the honour further to lay before Government those proposals in regard to the future arrangements connected with the Khyber Pass, which may be appropriately submitted for consideration, before the receipt of the reply about to be made by the Afridi clans to the views of Government, as expressed in paragraph 2 of letter No. 2980 E.P., of the 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address.

2. In my letter No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880, I have informed you that, at the last interview with the tribal representatives, they desired that the tribal management of the Pass should be aided by active Government assistance in the forcible coercion by our troops of evil-doers or recalcitrant clans, and in the form of a body of Government Jezailchis distributed throughout the Pass, as the garrisons of posts and escorts to caravans and travellers. In connexion therewith, in my telegram, No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, I inquired if it would suit Government to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid and the intervening posts with troops; for in fact the request of

the Afridis for Government assistance in the form of troops or Jezailchis resolved itself into a demand that the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid should be held by Government. It seems to me, therefore, that three practicable courses are open to Government, which I proceed to state together and to discuss *seriatim* :—

- (1.) The first plan would be to hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops and from Ali Musjid to Lundikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis ; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.
- (2.) A second course would be to throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting a Pass of which they are to take independent charge, and continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.
- (3.) A third proposal is to abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, upon which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

3. Before considering the first course that I have suggested, I would note that the Government of India apparently contemplates a complete retirement of British troops from the Pass, but leaves optional the retention of Jezailchis. It is, however, immaterial whether, as I have mentioned, native troops hold as far as Ali Musjid, or whether Jezailchis alone garrison all the posts ; the fact would remain that a corps in the pay and uniform of Government would join the tribesmen in the protection of the road, *i.e.*, Government would visibly and really share with the tribes the duty of carrying out their engagements. Now, for reasons that I shall give below, grave difficulties present themselves in the purely tribal management of the Pass by a united committee, as it were, of the six clans composing the Khyber Afridis, so that Government might at any moment find itself pledged to assist and prop up a coalition of sometimes doubtful strength. And with the proverbially fickle and unstable character of Afridis, the undesirable necessity may frequently arise of the Government servants in the Pass having to defend themselves against the attacks of malcontent sections and clans, or of Government having to take active measures towards the support of its friends or the punishment of offenders. In short, so long as a man in direct Government pay and uniform continues in the Pass, any infringement of the Pass arrangements or attacks on the road would, by Afridi public opinion, be construed to be, and in effect would be actually, an act of hostility towards Government, though perhaps only personal and not necessarily tribal. And I need scarcely remark that the withdrawal of a strong brigade from the Pass and the substitution of a comparatively small and poorly-armed Jezailchi force (which in times of general tribal excitement cannot be safely relied upon) will strengthen and encourage any opposition to our proposals which may exist among the Afridis, and loosen the bonds now imposed on their rapacious instincts.

An entire withdrawal of all direct Government interference beyond Jamrud would keep Government free from being mixed up in the tribal Pass arrangements, and from being drawn into possible complications, from which it would seem highly desirable that we should stand aloof, unless we are prepared to enforce our position by arms if necessary. I will not enter into details, such as the question of preserving the efficiency of a Jezailchi force scattered through the independent territory of the Khyber up to a point (Lundi Khana) 20 miles distant from our nearest post of Jamrud. Were Government to decide to hold the Pass with regular troops as far as Ali Musjid, the Khyber would undoubtedly remain open, not, however, necessarily owing to tribal management, but more to the force and influence of Government. Whether, with a view to the considerations stated below, a half measure of this nature is worth the trouble and expense thereby incurred, is a question for Government to determine.

4. This leads me to the second issue, *i.e.*, the question of leaving the undivided and independent charge of the Pass in the hands of the tribe, unassisted by Government ; as an instance in point, I would mention the manner in which the Kohat Pass (between Peshawar and Kohat) is held by the Gail Khel. There can be no doubt that it would be most desirable in the interests of trade and civilisation if the Afridis were to agree to keep open the Khyber (either themselves levying tolls or receiving compensation therefor from Government), and I have strong hopes that the manifest advantages of doing so, and their self-interest, may induce them to form engagements for this purpose. It cannot be denied that changes, even in the short space of two years, have come over them, and that they are now more amenable to control and more civilised than they were. That this process of improvement would be much accelerated by dealings with us, is certain. Still the problem is one fraught with much difficulty and requiring great consideration. The only manner in which it can be managed is by a tribal combination. But to effect a coalition, even for a temporary object, of six clans, of different interests,

different politics, and different strength, numbering in the aggregate about 13,000 or 14,000 fighting-men of notoriously lawless and wild character, is of itself a work of some magnitude. Trouble has been experienced in collecting representatives from all the tribes to bring a joint reply to Peshawar in answer to the proposals of Government.

It would be sanguine to hope, if the tribes accept the proposed arrangements, that dissensions will not break out within a year requiring careful handling; and our experience on the frontier shows that a resolute tribal minority can do much to thwart the wishes and bind the acts of a majority, who, from the fear of incurring personal and lasting blood-feuds, hesitate to resort to force. It must also be remembered that any proposal in the supposed interest of Government is sure to meet with the bitter opposition of fanatics and bigots, of whom there are many, even among the irreligious Afridis. To illustrate the state of affairs, I would refer to the history of the past summer, when a semi-religious leader arose in Tirah and was checked only by a timely display of force from attacking the Khyber; and, although the Pass is now being held by five regiments, yet a great part of the Zakka Khel has continued up to this in an attitude of hostility. When the troops retire from the Khyber, the Zakka Khel will be less capable of control by us. In the future there is no certainty that any section or tribe may not, for selfish purposes, or from the sheer love of robbery, infest the Pass and upset the tribal coalition; moreover, the tribes most likely to do so are those dwelling furthest from our border and least under our hand. Or again, a general religious agitation may at any time arise. It cannot, therefore, be predicted that tribal management of the Pass will enjoy an unshaken and sure career. Tribal coercion can only go to a certain length, and with the withdrawal of British troops, the overawing element compelling upon all the preservation of order will disappear. During our occupation of the Pass, fear, and love of gain, have united to restrain and influence the Afridis; in the future, self-interest alone will remain. Were there some central power in the clans that could force fickle or discontented factions to subordinate their inclinations to the interests of the whole, the matter would be easy; but, as I have said above, in the absence of such a *vis major* (which during the campaign has been supplied by our troops), we cannot reckon upon intertribal coercion as always, or even generally, effective to control the minority. It may be replied that, should a section misbehave, we would stop its allowances, and, enforcing joint responsibility, proceed to deal in the same manner with those of the other Khyber clans closing the Pass, and thus bring pressure on all to reduce the hostile section. But there is still some fear that the clans may be unable to cope vigorously and at once with the malcontent party, or may hesitate to involve themselves in complicated feuds on behalf of the British Government; or some other motives may stifle the suggestions of self-interest in keeping the Pass open; in that case the stoppage of allowances would be bitterly resented by the friendly sections, who might complain that, for not having effected an organization that could scarcely with reason have been expected from them, they had lost their subsidies. To this it may be replied that the clans had agreed to joint responsibility (for that condition is a *sine quâ non* to any independent tribal management of the Pass), and they will answer that, with the best intentions, they had found themselves unable to perform their promises. At the present moment, with a large force in the Pass, I must still call it doubtful whether a tribal coalition will bring the malcontent Zakka Khel to give hostages and pay a fine. On the other hand, certainly those who benefit by the Pass arrangements, and especially the maliks, would do their utmost, as they told me [*vide* paragraph of my No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880], to keep open the Khyber; but it may judiciously be doubted whether their influence is able to meet every emergency without extraneous aid from Government. I must admit, then, that independent tribal management of the Pass is a problem of doubtful success; that at uncertain periods the Pass may become closed by the failure of the system; and that, if Government were to pledge itself to assist the tribes or join in their responsibility for the Pass, it might at any time find itself involved in some complications, and, perhaps, be called upon to act decisively by a resort to force. My endeavours, then, will be to initiate and introduce a system which will satisfy the Afridis, give sufficient strength to the Government party, and yet save Government from any direct responsibility.

5. If our efforts were being made solely for the purposes of protecting trade, the risk and uncertainty attaching to the Khyber might be considered too great, and not worth the advantages to be gained, and it might seem advisable to select some parallel line of road which, though presenting greater physical difficulties to transport than the Khyber, entirely turns the Afridi question and relieves Government of dealings with the Khyber tribes. Such a one exists in the road leading from the Shagai police station in the Peshawar district, by the Shilman Valley to Kam Dakka and thence to Dakka; in regard

to which I would refer to the separate correspondence showing the advantages of this route, based on the reports of Mr. Scott, of the Survey Department, Mr. Merk, assistant political officer, and the officers of the engineer department, who made the Inzari Pass road from Dakka to Lundikotal in the Khyber. By adopting and improving this route, Government would cease to have any dealing with the Afridis of the Khyber, and would have need only to maintain such exclusive relations with them as have been already declared shall be continued.

6. But it is not merely a question of the protection of trade. The Government clearly sees the advantages attaching to permanent and close relations with the Afridi nation who overhang the Peshawar and Kohat districts, hold the Khyber and Kohat Passes, and give us the most dashing recruits for our best native regiments, and in war the most reliable among our native officers; and Government has most wisely determined to maintain a political hold upon them to the exclusion of all other influence or interference.

The Afridis themselves, knowing that we no longer require the Pass for our army communications, are perfectly well aware that our desire to retain it is as much to enhance our military repute and political influence as in the interests of trade. They openly speak of this, and say, "You want to do what has never been done yet, that which Dost Muhammad and Amir Sher Ali could not do, and it is your *namus* (renown) you think of, and for this you must pay." They know we shall not interfere with their independence, and that we do not look to the income from transit dues. The Government party in the Khyber does not resent this. It has received nothing but increased honour and consideration at our hands, and much wealth. Upon them the more distant Afridis, who do not enjoy the profits, look with jealousy and aversion, and they are taunted with entering the "service of the unbeliever."

Were Government from fear of future responsibilities to withdraw its support from the Khyber maliks and not to force them into the mutual organization they have so much difficulty in agreeing to, it would perhaps have to regret a breach in the relations we desire to maintain which it might be difficult to repair. The Afridis, however much they might be compelled to admit that they had failed in fulfilling their part in the contract, would, I believe, feel resentful of our throwing over the Pass arrangements, opening any other route, and withdrawing, as a matter of course, their compensation for tolls.

This, it is said by competent native judges, would lead at once to raids upon our border, and, perhaps, military expeditions to coerce. Recruiting would be interfered with, desertions would follow, and anxieties and discontentment would prevail among the Afridis in our regiments.

It is generally supposed that the gathering last summer around the fanatic leader in Tirah, Mir Bashir, would have assumed alarming proportions had it not been for the stronger counterinfluence of the Government party in the Khyber.

And even if we were able to efficiently protect our border and did threaten or use expeditions to coerce, not only should we be losing day by day the most beneficial effects upon the national character, and generally civilising results, of their constant intercommunications with ourselves, but we should certainly find the Afridis gravitating towards Kabul and bringing a strain upon our relations with the Amir himself.

Certainly, if personal tribal subsidies were separated from the compensation for tolls, as I have recommended on previous occasions, Government might still maintain exclusive relations with a certain party in the tribe, who have hitherto done us most excellent service; but our influence would be weak compared with that which we retain when we support them in holding their Pass open to trade, and manage for them the large income realisable as transit dues and paid as compensation in lieu; and our well-wishers would be bitterly disappointed.

We must also recollect two other important points. In retaining 500 of the young blood of the tribe in a tribal if not Government Jezailchi corps for the protection of tribal interests, we are withdrawing these men from lawless livelihood and robbery, and are not losing the opportunity of disciplining many of the rising generation.

Further, had we hereafter at any time to re-occupy the Pass, though doubtless we could not be prevented from doing so, still there are obvious advantages in being able to advance to Lundikotal without having to obtain again the permission and consent of tribes.

Thus my conclusions are that, although trade might filter down by other channels than the broad Khyber road, which it does not absolutely require, and though we might, from fear of possible responsibilities and owing to difficulties raised by the Afridis themselves, withdraw without any breach of faith from negotiations for the keeping open of the Pass, we should be unwise to do so, and short-sighted in our policy.

The difficulty is to prevail upon the Afridis to accept the entire responsibility, or rather to reduce that of Government to a minimum, and yet retain our hold upon the tribes and strong and permanent relations with them.

As I have before said, to effect this every effort will be made.

Enclosure 6 in No. 8.

No. 2140, dated Lahore, 13th December 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting on the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis for the maintenance of exclusive relations with the British Government, and for the protection of the Pass hereafter.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the extreme difficulty of the subject on which you have given your opinion and advice in these letters, and shares with you the anxiety which your letters evince to place our relations with the Afridi tribes upon some permanent and satisfactory basis. If on some points his Honour has framed conclusions different from your own, he is not unaware that the success of the measures which he advocates must still be regarded as doubtful, and the preference which he has for these measures is due merely to the belief that they are more likely in the end to avoid complications and secure the object which you, in common with his Honour, desire to bring about.

3. The courses which you consider open to Government to follow, in order to effect the solution of this important question, are as follows:—

1st.—To hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops, and from Ali Musjid to Lundikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.

2nd.—To throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting the Pass, of which they are to take independent charge, and to continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.

3rd.—To abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, on which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

4. With reference to the question of retaining troops in the Khyber Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor would remark that what is required is the safety of the road through the Pass for our own purposes and for trade. The Government has no desire to occupy the lands of the Afridis, nor the road, for any other object. If, in order to secure the safety of traders in the Pass, it is necessary to occupy positions with troops, it would hardly be worth while to secure this end at so great a cost. In such a case, it would probably be more advisable to abandon the Khyber route altogether and resort to other and safer routes. The issue as to the best mode of securing safety in the Khyber Pass is therefore narrowed to the question how a protective force, not composed of British troops, can best be organized and maintained. The Jezailchi force, as at present constituted, is admirably suited for the purpose of such protection; and it is extremely desirable, if this force is to be maintained, that the present arrangements for its organization and disposition should be utilized, and the advantages likely to accrue from the continuousness of these arrangements fully secured. There would, of course, be no objection to our helping the Afridis to organize their own system of protection if they should determine to initiate an entirely new organization for the defence of the Pass; but the experience which has been afforded to them of the efficiency and good work done by the Jezailchi corps will probably lead them to desire no change of system, but rather to continue a method which has been adopted with so much success.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore thinks it most important that some trial should be made of holding the Pass with Jezailchis. His Honour thinks that this should be done in a way which may be easily altered if necessary, and in the way which is least likely to embarrass our relations with the tribes. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that these objects may be secured by retaining the present Jezailchi force on a somewhat different footing. These levies would no longer be considered as Government servants, or representatives of Government authority, but rather as a superior kind of tribal badragga, such as used always to be furnished by the tribes on payment for the safe conduct of traders going through the

Pass. It will no doubt be necessary that the Political Officer should see that the men are paid; but this will not make them Government servants. The money given to the Jezailchis as wages would form part of what would otherwise be paid to the tribes as compensation for the tolls the levy of which they forego, and as an equivalent for the protection of the road which it is the object of Government to secure. It is only reasonable that the Government should distribute this amount in such a manner as to ensure the proper performance of escort duty by the tribes.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor has a few remarks to add regarding the details of the arrangements which in his opinion would facilitate the maintenance of the Jezailchi force conjointly by the tribes and the British Government. It has generally been assumed in the correspondence on the subject that a *sine quâ non* of Government interference in Pass arrangements is the maintenance of perfect security and immunity from attack at all portions of the road and at all times of the day. But the Lieutenant-Governor does not regard this as in any way imperatively necessary. The tribes may be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves. Convoys may be collected and despatched once a day, or more or less often, under escort in such a manner as to minimize the trouble of guarding them, and the responsibility of the tribes will extend to the safety of such traffic as shall be so escorted. Cases might arise in which the tribes would still be held responsible, notwithstanding violation of the rules for traffic, but, generally speaking, the safety of convoys despatched under escort in accordance with arrangements definitely made and agreed upon would be all that need be demanded from the tribes who engage for the security of traffic.

If the Jezailchi guard is recruited solely from the tribal population, there will be less risk of escorts being attacked, for the reason given in paragraph 4 of your second letter, namely, the dread of incurring blood-feuds; while for offences committed by the escort the remedy will be to proceed against the tribal allowances.

7. For the above reasons, the Lieutenant-Governor would maintain the Jezailchi Corps on the terms and in the manner now described. If this Corps does not answer, it will still be possible to fall back upon the second plan which is proposed in your letter, and to leave the escort arrangements to be carried out solely by the tribes themselves. It will be easier to revert from the maintenance of the Jezailchi force to mere tribal escorts than, after abolishing the former and after the failure of the latter, to reorganize the Jezailchi Corps.

8. The opinion of Sir Robert Egerton upon the proposal to grant personal allowances to the maliks, independent of the consideration whether the Khyber Pass is kept open for traffic or no, has been already conveyed to you in a recent communication. His Honour does not think it would be prudent to grant such allowances unconditionally. It is doubtless advisable to keep men of influence in our interests, but, inasmuch as their influence is the consideration which Government requires in return for such payments, it must be exercised in the manner most useful to the British Government, namely, in the protection of the road through the Pass; and Sir Robert Egerton would not be willing to grant any allowances independently of the question whether the Pass were safe for traffic or not. The total amount of the allowances to be granted must depend upon the completeness of the arrangements which the maliks find it possible to make for the protection of the Pass during ordinary times for purposes of trade. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that Government should be advised to subsidise the Afridis, or to pay personal or other allowances to any of their maliks, for abstaining from attacks upon British territory. It has not been the custom of the British Government to pay for such exemption, and his Honour would be sorry to see such a system inaugurated. Whatever sum may be fixed for the tribal allowances, over and above the amount payable to the Jezailchis, would be a payment in part for the same object as that effected by the maintenance of the Jezailchi Corps, *viz.*, the safety of the road and the protection of travellers. The payment of both of these items should be no doubt affected by the general conduct of the tribes, not only in the Khyber Pass, but also on the border, and within British territory; but neither of them should be fixed with any reference to immunity from attack, or from the commission of offences, as though the Afridis possessed an inherent right of raiding upon British territory or committing offences therein. Not long ago, while the Khyber was perfectly quiet, a gross outrage was committed by some of the Khyber tribes in British territory. The daughter of a Police officer was kidnapped, and was not recovered until a ransom had been paid. The Lieutenant-Governor has not received any report of the measures adopted in this case, which is only quoted as an example of what may be expected to occur in future if some condition is not attached to the Khyber allowances which will secure good behaviour, not only in the Pass itself, but

also on the border generally. This subject therefore should not be lost sight of in the present negotiations.

9. In regard to the third alternative mentioned in your letters, you have previously acquainted the Government with your views, and the Lieutenant-Governor, acting upon your suggestions, has recommended that, as a measure of precaution, the alternative route from Lundikotal to Dakka, through the Shilman country, should be put into repair, for use in the event of the Khyber route becoming unsafe. But no definite proposals have yet been received for the adoption of a route which will entirely avoid the Afridi country. Should it be necessary to resort to an alternative route which does not lie through territory held by the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that they should no longer continue to reap the advantages which are contemplated in the event of their affording a safe road for traffic, and that their subsidy should be altogether withdrawn.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that any agreement which may be made with the Afridi tribes should reserve to the British Government the power of occupying the Pass with troops, should the British authorities desire so to do, and should the protection of trade through Afridi agency be found to be impracticable.

Enclosure 7 in No. 8.

No. 5,767 P., dated 24th December 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN continuation of my No. 5030 $\frac{1}{2}$, dated 9th November, reporting the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis, and with reference to your No. 2,140 of the 13th December in reply, conveying the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor upon the above reports and his directions for the continuance of the negotiations:

2. I have the honour to state that I had to a very great extent anticipated the instructions of his Honour, and to my proposals I had asked sanction in telegrams in which I endeavoured to give the substance of the arrangements to which I found the headmen of the Khyber tribes were finally prepared to agree, and which also approved themselves to me as likely to be in accordance with the views and objects of Government, and I asked sanction to place them before the deputations of the tribes assembled in Peshawur and numbering about 700 men.

I will first explain at some length the arrangements abstracted in the above mentioned telegrams, and I will then consider the subsequent instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

3. The proposals embodied in the following paragraph were the result of discussions and consultations extending over some months, and to which I found the headmen were finally prepared to consent. The suggestions are partly ours and partly theirs. They were put before the headmen in the form of questions, and their answers and remarks were separately recorded, so that there might be no room for doubt as to their knowing what had been proposed and as to our being assured of what they understood and accepted.

It was supposed that these proposals would hereafter find their place in an agreement* dulydrawn up, and would receive the seals and signatures of the headmen and, perhaps, also of the elders of the tribes. It was perfectly well understood that these proposals emanating from ourselves locally would be subject to modifications and alterations by the Government, but it was believed that little change would be found necessary.

4. The headmen expressed themselves as understanding the proposals to be much as follows:—

(1.) Relations will be maintained by Government with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, while, at the same time, their independence is to be fully recognized.

(2.) In consideration of their receiving certain allowances, the amount and distribution of which will be fixed hereafter, the tribes undertake the responsibility of preserving order, and affording security on the road.

(3.) All matters affecting the Pass arrangements, and especially the security of the road, are to be submitted to a combined jirgah of all the Afridi tribes. This council will arrange for the safety of the lives and property of all travellers, who use the Khyber

* For agreement finally signed see page 74.

road, without distinction; local traffic, by which is meant the traffic of the Atridis, Shinwaris, and other tribes living in or near the Pass, being entitled to protection, no intertribal or personal feuds will be allowed to be pursued near the road.

(4.) No goods or travellers are to be permitted to enter the Pass from either direction without an order authorizing them to proceed which will be furnished to them with a sufficient guard of men. Should it be considered by the tribal jirgah or council at any time that owing to the existence or likelihood of a disturbance on or near the road, it would be hazardous to allow a passage to either goods or men, they are responsible for closing the road, notice to that effect being given to the Khan of Lalpura and to the Political Officer, Jamrud, while careful provision must be made for the safety of any passengers or traffic that are already inside the Pass.

(5.) The arrangements which the tribes are to make for the maintenance of security on the road will be wholly independent of any material aid in the way of Government troops, and Government is at liberty to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure.

(6.) The tribes urge that Government must maintain a certain number of Jezailchis, who will assist the tribal badraggas or escorts to preserve the road from attack. It has been considered that these Jezailchis must at present number about 531 men, including the mounted levies for escort, &c., the tribes being responsible for providing the men. This corps will have its head-quarters at Jamrud, and will be under the supervision of the Political Officer, whose approval of all arrangements for the distribution of their duties will be necessary. It is understood that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, but are maintained, although at Government expense, yet merely for the better enabling of the tribes to keep their engagements. When it is desired to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the political officer must be obtained.

(7.) The tribes will agree that so long as they are paid the Khyber allowances, the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government, inasmuch as the receipt of a subsidy or allowances excludes all claim to any other payments.

(8.) All offences on the road will be dealt with by the united tribal jirgahs, whether committed by an individual or by a section of a tribe. Punishment will be inflicted according to the tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party. The measures taken are to be reported to the Political Officer, Jamrud, through whom any money, which he and the jirgah have adjudged as compensation, will be paid. Such sums are liable to be deducted by him from the allowances made to the tribes.

(9.) The tribes will continue to bind themselves as hitherto not to commit dakoiti, highway robbery, or murder in British territory, will agree to restore stolen property and pay compensation for such offences, their allowances being liable to forfeiture on their account.

(10.) Subject to the foregoing conditions, all details of management by which the tribes will insure the fulfilment of the responsibility which they have undertaken, are left to the discretion of the tribes who will have to secure the approval of the Political Officer. The tribes will be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves and the public. Convoys may be collected and despatched so as to minimise the trouble of guarding them, the responsibility of the tribes extending to the safety of all trade and travellers within the Pass.

(11.) With regard to the standing posts or chowkis hitherto kept up along the road by the tribes, and paid for from the allowances, these will be maintained; the tribal watchmen occupying them being still required either to guard certain localities or to form part of the escort of the periodical convoys.

(12.) Regarding the Government buildings in the Khyber the tribes will agree to take charge of some on behalf of Government, the remainder being dismantled.

With reference to Ali Musjid, the gate, as it were, or keep of the Pass; on the supposition that Government will be prepared to make a special allowance of 100 Jezailchis for the purpose of protecting and holding this fort, the tribes on their part agree to undertake this duty.

(13.) The tribes will also guarantee the safety of the Political Officers or any other official who may be required from time to time to visit the Khyber Pass; notice always being given previously of such proposed visit to the tribal jirgah who will have to make special arrangements for escort, &c.

(14.) They have been informed that the territory to which their responsibilities extend may be fixed from time to time by Government. For the present the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, or a little west of Lundikhana, will be considered the limit.

(15.) Arrangements will be made by the tribal jirgah by which any expresses or posts will be conveyed through at all times night or day.

(16.) The tribes may be considered ready to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid to Jamrud, at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of its troops from the whole of this road or any part of it, meanwhile, until such withdrawal has been effected and any new arrangements have been introduced, the tribes will agree to preserve intact their present obligations regarding the Pass and their relations with Government.

5. Turning to the views and instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, as contained in your letter, No. 2140, of the 13th December, it will be seen that it is proposed by me to retain the Jezailchi corps as at present existing, organised by the Political Officer, and paid through him, but recruited by, and, to some extent, under the control and management of the Khyber jirgahs.

The great advantage of this is that the Jezailchi force being representative of the various tribes responsible for the Khyber stands as the sign and perpetual reminder of their unity, combination, and mutual responsibility for maintaining the safety to all of the Khyber route. The corps will be placed on a different footing, and will be utilised in conjunction with the tribal watchmen as a special guard to convoys. This is understood to be what his Honour desires. The corps will further be almost entirely recruited from the tribes, a sufficient leaven of outsiders being perhaps maintained to make the organisation somewhat more reliable.

6. It had also been decided previous to the receipt of his Honour's suggestions that the convoys and caravans should be periodical; the details of their working can be laid down hereafter, but it seems at present advisable that general convoys proceeding westwards should only leave Jamrud about twice a week, halting one day in the Loargai Valley, and the next at or beyond Dakka. Return convoys eastwards in the same manner leaving the Loargai Valley for Jamrud twice a week only on fixed days. This will leave two bye-days to provide for accidents or possible delays, and will leave the Sundays as days of entire rest. This will be arranged in communication with the Khan of Lalpura, and is liable to alteration as found most convenient to the tribes and the public.

7. It will be always possible by not filling up the vacancies to reduce the numbers of the Jezailchi corps, when the system is in full working order, and if the force is found to be unnecessarily strong at first, a reduction can be made. The sudden withdrawal of all troops from the Khyber will give tribes and Jezailchis ample duties and responsibilities.

8. Regarding the personal allowances to the maliks and the separation of such allowances from the actual compensation for tolls, if the Government see objections to it, I admit that difficulties will not perhaps arise until the Pass arrangements fail, and this I do not anticipate. If the Pass should by any chance have to be closed, and the headmen are not held to be absolutely and personally responsible for their failure, there will not, perhaps, be any great difficulty in maintaining to them the personal allowances which they already enjoy in specified sums from the total amount now granted as the so-called compensation for tolls.

Government might still through such allowances be able to keep up their party among the Afridi tribes and retain sufficient influence to prevent the entire rupture of our political relations with the Afridis, although the Pass may be closed.

But it was never proposed by me that such personal allowances should be granted unconditionally, or in order to secure for British territory immunity from attack by the Afridis. In my opinion if our Pass arrangements were to fail, and the allowances were consequently forfeited, the tribes would at once become out of hand and would raid on British territory. The personal allowances might not save us entirely from this, but they would keep together in our interest the leading men and their immediate following and party, and facilitate the management of the Afridis generally, and the settlement of difficulties without recourse to coercion by the employment of military expeditions.

9. I have carefully considered whether it would be possible to make any reduction in the allowances to meet the charge for Jezailchis, and I am convinced that it is not so. The allowances are subdivided roughly under these heads: 1st, the personal allowances to the headmen for management for their services and expenditure on their followers; 2nd, the payments to the tribal watchmen and guards, representing each tribe within its local limits who protect the road and will have to assist in the guarding of caravans; 3rd, the balance that is distributed, at the discretion of the managing headmen, among the influential elders of the tribe who are neither headmen nor watchmen. These last-mentioned sums are all that fall to the majority of the tribesmen as compensation for their share in the profits from tolls and transit dues, not to say as their indemnity for abstention from plunder. There is no margin from which Jezailchis could be maintained. The share which any receive is exceedingly small and would not be reduced. And even if this deduction from the allowances hitherto received by them were forced upon the

tribes and they accepted the charge, I could not myself report that such an arrangement had my confidence, and that I considered it safe or satisfactory. The increased trade will offer too great temptations to Afridis holding the Pass without the restraining influence of British troops, and the tribes would begin to feel that the reduced allowances were no equivalent for the tolls and dues resigned. I do not believe that any arrangement which does not give the tribes their present allowances and also the Jezailchi force in support of their new tribal organisation could stand for a month. Nor do I allow that the Jezailchis so paid will have other than hard and harassing duties; but I believe that difficulties will be found in supplying the ranks.

10. I also assert that it would be far from wise to drive a hard bargain with the Afridis, and that it must still be our last recourse to throw them over and open up other routes to Afghanistan. The Afridis do not profess to enjoy any inherent right to raid or commit offences in British territory, but it is only the influence of their leading men that will prevent their offending, and these headmen require to be firmly attached to Government. They have no great fear of expeditions and retribution.

It has been a special condition attached to the Khyber allowances since my agreement with them in October 1879 that the tribes shall not commit murder, dakoitis, or robberies in British territory, and these conditions have been, in my opinion, so well observed as to give great promise for the future. The particular outrage alluded to by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the kidnapping of the daughter of a police officer, was committed by the Khusrogi section of the Zaka Khel; to coerce this section the Khyber tribes are now proceeding from Peshawur, but rupees 3,920 out of the allowances have been held back pending the settlement of this case with the tribe. It has not been forgotten, and the conditions regarding good behaviour upon the border generally again find their place in the proposed as in the former agreements.

11. With regard to what is spoken of as the third alternative, the using of other routes than the Khyber. Definite proposals for preparing the Shilman route for adoption were submitted to Government with my No. 5025 of the 9th November. I recommended the rough survey of this route with a view to the expenditure upon it of a small sum of money which would render it passable for laden camels. It has been reported upon both by Mr. Scott of the Survey and Mr. Merk, late Assistant Political Officer, and their reports are before Government.

12. The final direction of his Honour had been also anticipated, and the Afridis expressed themselves as prepared for the re-occupation of the Pass at any time by troops should they be temporarily withdrawn.

13. I now proceed to the expenditure. I propose that the allowances already sanctioned by the Government of India in 1879 should be continued unaltered. I see no grounds for reduction. It is of great importance to introduce as little change as possible, as the tribes are ready at any moment to bring forward antiquated claims to a re-distribution, and this would at once lead to difficulties. They amount monthly to Rupees 7,155, and yearly to - - - - - Rupees 85,860 with special sums liable to fall in at the death of the grantees of - - - - - „ 1,680

87,540

14. I also propose that the sum expended hitherto upon Jezailchis and mounted levies should be continued. This was sanctioned in the same correspondence as follows :—

Per mensem - - - - - Rupees 6,009
or per annum about - - - - - „ 72,100

I am proposing some slight alteration in the organisation, viz., a reduction in the mounted levies and a slight increase among the footmen in order to allow 400 Jezailchis for the road and 100 for the garrison of Ali Musjid. But by substituting a Native Commandant on Rupees 500 a month for the British officer, Captain Gaisford, now in command, the proposed expenditure remains almost exactly the same, or about Rupees 7,267 a month, or Rupees 87,392 a year.

I have already given in this correspondence my reasons why it would not answer to reduce their expenditure. It costs less than one Native regiment, and besides having to escort caravans and convoys through the Pass; it is supposed that if the buildings at Ali Musjid can be saved by a company of 100 men, it will be but a small expenditure compared with the results. This plan will prevent the quarrels of the Khyber tribes over their asserted individual rights in the place itself. It will hold directly for Government the place of most historical importance in the Khyber, and I hope it will save the buildings. I could not advocate their demolition. The effect would be unsettling upon the tribes. For the escorts I do not consider that less than 400 men will suffice, and a

few mounted levies must be retained for escorts and expresses, and to convey information quickly from post to post. The pay of the mounted levies will probably have to be raised from Rupees 18 to Rupees 25 a month, as no rations will be available.

I fully anticipated that their numbers and expenditure may be hereafter somewhat reduced when the present arrangements are in full working order, but not now. For the Native Commandant I desire to employ Ressaldar-Major Mahomed Aslam Khan, at present Native Assistant Political Officer at Lundikotal, on the pay of Rupees 500 a month, consolidated.

Regarding the political expenditure. It is proposed that the present Political Officer Major Conolly, and the Native Assistant Political Officer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, on Rupees 400 or 500 a month, should stand fast at Jamrud, together with their office establishment. The expenditure on the above account will be about Rupees 2,500 per mensem, or Rupees 30,000 per annum, as the staff will have to be somewhat strengthened. This expenditure again is liable to reduction at any time, but at the outset the above will be required. There will be much to organise, and to weaken the hands of the Political Officer will be to court failure.

16. Regarding the buildings in the Pass I propose, after the Government sanction has been received, to consult the Brigadier-General and the Engineer Department regarding the demolition of any which it may be thought unadvisable to retain in the hands of the tribes, or the wood-work of which it may be worth while to remove.

I may mention here that I doubt if it will be wise to stipulate in any way for the protection of cemeteries or graves. If it were desired to do so, a special charge would be required of about Rupees 10 a month at Lundikotal, which might save the gates of the enclosure and the headstones, but it is doubtful. The tribes will not, I believe, guarantee their safety from damage by individuals.

17. Regarding transit dues, I believe these should be taken a few months hence at Jamrud, but I leave this for future settlement, and will submit proposals. I do not desire to take their tolls at present for the following reason: I cannot be certain of the security of caravans, and I intend to avoid the responsibility that would attach to Government if I were to take these tolls. On the withdrawal of troops all trade and travellers will be referred by the Political Officer to the Khyber maliks for information as to the safety of the road, and I intend that these maliks should satisfy the public. When the system has worked safely for a few months we can take the tolls and accept the responsibility.

18. As I am finishing this report I have received your telegram No. 26 C. of the 23rd instant. With reference thereto, and a suggestion that a sum of Rupees 1,25,000 per annum might suffice for the Khyber expenditure, including Jezailchis and allowances, I feel unable to say that I believe such a sum will suffice at starting for such arrangements as either I or the Government could consider worthy of confidence. The sum of Rupees 1,25,000 said to have been paid as a subsidy forty years ago, during the first Afghan war, is specially called "traditional," but the details have never been discovered. It is supposed by some to represent in Kabul coinage the equivalent of the allowance in British rupees. There are no good grounds for supposing that this sum included the payment of any Jezailchis; and I suggest that it can help little to the settlement of the present expenditure. At that time Colonel Mackeson and his establishment were engaged in the management of the Khyber, and to it their pay, as now, would be justly debitable. Also I suggest that when that sum was being paid to the Afridis a European officer and troops occupied Ali Musjid and Dakka or Peshbolak, also Jezailchis held Loargai.

I doubt if any comparison between the two periods and circumstances can be a safe guide in determining the present expenditure.

It seems to me very important that failure and the consequent complications should be avoided; and on this account I suggest that the new management should be so started as to satisfy the tribes and the Government that there is every chance of success. If it succeeds, reductions can follow, and meanwhile the income from tolls or transit dues can be tested. It is supposed that these will cover most of the expenditure.

19. I solicit the acknowledgments of Government for the work of the Political Officer, Major Conolly, and his Assistants. They have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have brought matters to this point in the negotiations.

I enclose Major Conolly's estimates of present and future expenditure in the Khyber.

If Government accept my proposals, there is no local reason why the withdrawal of troops from the Pass should not at once begin.

Office to which Pro- position refers.	PRESENT SCALE.		PROPOSED SCALE.		PERMANENT.		Grounds of Pro- position.
	Authority.	Detail.			Increase per Mensem.	Decrease per Mensem.	
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.	Punjab Government, No. 1143 C., of 29th October 1879, and No. 1183 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.	1 Political Officer - - - - -	Rs. 1,616 0 0	1 Political Officer - - - - -	Rs. 1,616 0 0	-	-
		1 Native Political Assistant - - - - -	400 0 0	1 Native Political Assistant - - - - -	500 0 0	100 0 0*	-
		1 English Clerk - - - - -	80 0 0	1 English Clerk - - - - -	100 0 0	20 0 0†	-
		1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - -	40 0 0	1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - -	80 0 0	40 0 0	-
		1 Mohurrir - - - - -	-	1 Mohurrir - - - - -	40 0 0	40 0 0	-
		6 Orderlies - - - - -	-	6 Orderlies - - - - -	14 0 0	14 0 0‡	-
		1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - -	30 0 0	1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - -	30 0 0	-	-
		2 Mohurrirs to keep Jezailchi Accounts - - - - -	-	2 Mohurrirs to keep Jezailchi Account - - - - -	70 0 0	70 0 0§	-
		Total Rs. -	2,166 0 0	Total Rs. -	2,450 0 0	284 0 0	-
	JEZAILCHI CORPS.		JEZAILCHI CORPS.				
	1 Commandant - - - - -	924 0 0	1 Commandant - - - - -	500 0 0	-	424 0 0	
	1 Second in Command - - - - -	100 0 0	1 Second in Command - - - - -	100 0 0	-	-	
	2 Subadars at Rs. 60 per each - - - - -	120 0 0	3 Subadars at Rs. 60 each - - - - -	180 0 0	60 0 0	-	
	1 Jemadar " " 35 " " - - - - -	35 0 0	2 Jemadars " " 35 " " - - - - -	70 0 0	35 0 0¶	-	
	1 " " 30 " " - - - - -	30 0 0	1 Jemadar " " 30 " " - - - - -	30 0 0	-	-	
	2 Subadars " " 40 " " - - - - -	80 0 0	2 Subadars " " 40 " " - - - - -	80 0 0	-	-	
	2 Jemadars " " 20 " " - - - - -	40 0 0	2 Jemadars " " 20 " " - - - - -	40 0 0	-	-	
	20 Havildars " " 13 " " - - - - -	260 0 0	22 Havildars " " 13 " " - - - - -	286 0 0	26 0 0	-	
	20 Naiks " " 11 " " - - - - -	220 0 0	22 Naiks " " 11 " " - - - - -	242 0 0	22 0 0	-	
	452 Jezailchis " " 9 " " - - - - -	4,068 0 0	552 Jezailchis " " 9 " " - - - - -	4,968 0 0	900 0 0	-	
	6 Duffadars " " 25 " " - - - - -	150 0 0	4 Duffadars " " 30 " " - - - - -	120 0 0**	-	30 0 0	
	2 Lance do. at Rs. 21 each - - - - -	42 0 0	2 Lance " " 21 " " - - - - -	-	-	42 0 0	
	48 Sowars at Rs. 18 each - - - - -	864 0 0	26 Sowars " " 25 " " - - - - -	650 0 0††	-	214 0 0	
	Total Rs. -	6,933 0 0	Total Rs. -	7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0	
	MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.		MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.				
	1 Tent pitcher - - - - -	7 0 0	1 Tent pitcher - - - - -	7 0 0	-	-	
	1 Sweeper - - - - -	6 0 0	1 Sweeper - - - - -	6 0 0	-	-	
	Stationery - - - - -	30 0 0	Stationery - - - - -	30 0 0	-	-	
	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	25 0 0	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	25 0 0	-	-	
	Total Rs. -	68 0 0	Total Rs. -	68 0 0	-	-	
	SAVINGS.		SAVINGS.				
	English Political Assistant - - - - -	1,150 0 0	English Political Assistant - - - - -	-	-	1,150 0 0	
	Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - -	100 0 0	Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - -	-	-	100 0 0	
	1 Thanadar - - - - -	100 0 0	1 Thanadar - - - - -	-	-	100 0 0	
	1 English Clerk - - - - -	60 0 0	1 English Clerk - - - - -	-	-	60 0 0	
	Stationery - - - - -	10 0 0	Stationery - - - - -	-	-	10 0 0	
	Total Rs. -	1,420 0 0	Total Rs. -	-	-	1,420 0 0	
	PRÉCIS.		PRÉCIS.				
	1 Political Officer's Establish- ment - - - - -	2,166 0 0	Political Officer's Establish- ment - - - - -	2,450 0 0	284 0 0	-	
	2 Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	6,933 0 0	Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0	
	3 Miscellaneous Establishment - - - - -	68 0 0	Miscellaneous Establishment - - - - -	68 0 0	-	-	
	4 Political Assistants' Estab- lishments - - - - -	1,420 0 0	4 Political Assistants' Estab- lishment - - - - -	-	-	1,420 0 0	
	Total Rs. -	10,587 0 0	Total Rs. -	9,784 0 0	1,327 0 0	2,130 0 0	

Nett savings Rs. 2,130-1,327=803, or deduct Rs. 300 for contingencies, leaves a nett saving of Rs. 503.

Required to suit new proposed Khyber

* + 90 has however been applied for as travelling allowance, so real difference is only Rs. 10.
 † A good man will not stay except for a liberal salary.
 ‡ This extra pay in addition to Jezniachi pay is absolutely necessary to secure efficient orderlies.
 § Exclusive of savings as recorded further on.
 ¶ Increase one Subadar on Rs. 60.
 • Increase one Jemadar on Rs. 35.
 †† 2 Duffadars reduced and pay of remaining increased by 5 each.
 ‡‡ 26 Sowers at Rupees 25 substituted for 48 Sowers at Rs. 18.

Khyber,
The 21st December 1880.

(Signed) E. R. CONOLLY, Major,
Political Officer.

Enclosure 9 in No. 8.

No. 11 C., dated Camp, 4th January 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter, No. 2140, dated 13th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the Khyber tribal representatives, I am now desired to address you with reference to a letter, No. 5767 P., dated 24th December, from the Commissioner of Peshawur, on the same subject, a copy of which has been sent to you direct by Colonel Waterfield.

2. This communication contains the result of negotiations which have been recently held at Peshawur, in regard to the most prominent matters, the determination of which was required in your No. 2980, dated 31st August 1880. The elaboration of these arrangements, as far as some of the minor details are concerned, still remains to be accomplished, and these will be reported in due time.

3. Colonel Waterfield's letter describes fully the proposals which are made by him with a view to establishing, in the future, security to travellers and convoys in the Pass, and it is unnecessary to repeat at length the substance of them. They are based primarily upon the instructions of the Government of India contained in your letter above quoted; and secondarily upon the instructions of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time in letters and in various telegrams, of which copies have been furnished to the Government of India.

4. The points upon which Sir Robert Egerton has certain remarks to offer will be briefly noticed. The groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence. Colonel Waterfield's reasons for fixing the future subsidy at Rupees 87,540 per annum are, in his Honour's opinion, sufficient. The Lieutenant-Governor has never contemplated the possibility of reducing to any considerable extent the amount of these subsidies which are paid in cash. The reduction of the amount payable to each of the tribes or to sections of tribes would, without doubt, furnish to the minds of ignorant and grasping tribesmen abundant ground for seeking to overthrow the whole arrangement or for resorting to plunder in preference to a reduced maintenance obtainable by honest means. The alteration of the total amount would, moreover, involve a redistribution which, however closely it followed the proportions previously obtaining, would be likely to result in disputes and intertribal feuds. The amount, further, is not more than may fairly be held to represent the value of the tolls which are surrendered by the Afridis in virtue of the present agreement. This portion of the proposals is, therefore, recommended for sanction by the Lieutenant-Governor.

5. Regarding the establishment required for working Pass arrangements, and which comprises, first, the Political Officer's establishment, and, second, the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor does not feel able to support in the same way the proposals made by the Commissioner. The office establishment of the Political Officer is, in his Honour's opinion, on too extravagant a scale. The duties of the appointment will be diminished, rather than increased, under present arrangements. The increase to the pay of the English clerk and reader, as well as the new appointment of a writer on Rupees 40, seem to be unnecessary. For the two writers on Rupees 35 each, who are to keep the accounts of the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor would substitute pay Havildars enlisted in the force. To this extent the Lieutenant-Governor would reduce the establishment of the Political Officer, and an amended statement is accordingly attached to this letter, showing the strength proposed to be entertained.

6. The rate of pay of the Jezailchis themselves, Rupees 9 per mensem each, seems to be high for men serving so near their homes. It is more than the pay of a sepoy in a Native regiment, and there would ordinarily be no difficulty, his Honour believes, in obtaining recruits for this service on a lower rate of pay. The duties of the corps will be lighter than before, and the number of convoys, which will probably not exceed two in a week, will not give them much work beyond the duties of watch and ward. At the same time, considering that the pay of the Jezailchis is in reality a part of the subsidy granted to the tribes, and that some difficulty has no doubt been experienced during the past two years in retaining the men at their posts, on the pay originally sanctioned, in

so much that rations have had to be distributed for the past year on payment of a portion of the cost, similar to that levied from Native troops, the Lieutenant-Governor will not object to this part of the proposals; but for the present recommends that the rate, Rupees 9 per mensem, should be accepted as the pay of a sepoy of the Jezailchi force.

7. Sir Robert Egerton is unable to see any sufficient reason for not at once levying tolls on convoys escorted through the Khyber. Inasmuch as the British Government is now undertaking the regulation of the Khyber traffic, upon it must devolve the responsibility of safety of convoys, however impossible it may be to guarantee them against all attack. The headmen of the Afridi tribes are responsible to the Government, in virtue of their agreements, for the safety of this traffic; but the public will look to the Government through whose instrumentality these agreements have been procured, and the responsibility must be accepted. It would be better, in his Honour's opinion, to show from the first that this is the case, by levying tolls, and not to shake the confidence of the public in the new arrangements by referring traders to the headmen of the tribes, as is proposed by the Commissioner.

8. The views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject of the grant of personal allowances to the headmen have been expressed on previous occasions. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that those which have been hitherto paid should be continued; they are small in amount, and are doubtless looked upon by their recipients as a privilege which naturally results from any engagement which may be made with the British Government. But the Lieutenant-Governor is not disposed to recommend the extension of this system of personal allowances any further. Whether in case of failure of present arrangements the headmen should be absolved from responsibility, and whether it may be expedient in such an event to retain their influence on our side by continuing a portion of the subsidy to them as a personal allowance, are questions which, in his Honour's opinion, may well be left to be decided when the Pass arrangements shall prove to be deficient. It is undesirable at the outset of the new arrangements to do anything which will lead the headmen to suppose that they are separate from the tribe, either in their interests or their responsibilities. Every measure should be taken to promote tribal unity and cohesion, as it is upon this that the success of the arrangements must chiefly depend. Some malcontents there will be in every tribe, who can be kept in order only by the force of the general opinion of the tribe. The headmen are of use in leading such opinion, and for this purpose they must act with the tribes, and not separately. To allow the headmen to think that their allowances would be granted, even if the tribe misbehaved, would be to take away one of the most cogent motives which they have for working by means of their tribe, and in accordance with the general feeling entertained by the members of it.

9. The arrangements proposed by the Commissioner for the disposal of Government buildings are, his Honour considers, sufficient, and measures can be taken hereafter in accordance with his recommendations. As regards the cemeteries, which contain the graves of Europeans who have fallen during the campaign, it is probable that no engagement with the tribes will ensure their safe custody; and the result of a breach of such engagement could only be the infliction of a fine, which would be no real compensation for dishonouring the graves. Sir Robert Egerton, therefore, thinks that the gravestones should be moved to Jamrud or Peshawar, and the ground left without any memorial which could excite the fanaticism or cupidity of the ill-disposed; while the monuments would remain in a place of security as a record of the persons who have been buried in the Khyber Pass.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor desires to express his high sense of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., has conducted these negotiations. He has shown the utmost patience and forethought throughout a settlement which the Lieutenant-Governor thinks will ensure the safety of the Khyber, and will enable the Government to withdraw its troops from the Pass. This settlement will also have the great advantage of bringing the Khyber tribes within our influence more even than before, and will tend gradually to promote civilization among them.

11. His Honour would also bring to the notice of the Government of India the services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and his Assistants, who have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have acted in these negotiations under Colonel Waterfield's orders.

Enclosure 10 in No. 8.

No. 48.

(AMENDED.)

PROPOSITION FOR THE REVISION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER,
KHYBER, INCLUDING JEZAILCHI CORPS.

Office to which Proposition refers.	PRESENT SCALE.		PROPOSED SCALE.	PERMANENT.	
	Authority.	Detail.		Increase per Mensem.	Decrease per Mensem.
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division. Punjab Government, No. 1143 C, dated 29th October 1879, and No. 1183 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
		1 Political Officer - - - - -	1 Political Officer - - - - -		
		1 Native Political Assistant - - - - -	1 Native Political Assistant - - - - -		
		1 English clerk - - - - -	1 English clerk - - - - -		
		1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - -	1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - -		
		6 Orderlies - - - - -	6 Orderlies - - - - -		
		1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - -	1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - -		
		Total - - - - -	Total - - - - -		
JEZAILCHI CORPS.			JEZAILCHI CORPS.		
		1 Commandant - - - - -	1 Commandant - - - - -		
		1 Second in Command - - - - -	1 Second in Command - - - - -		
		2 Subadars at 60 each - - - - -	3 Subadars at 60 each - - - - -		
		1 Jemadar at 35 - - - - -	2 Jemadars at 35 - - - - -		
		1 do. at 30 - - - - -	1 do. at 30 - - - - -		
		2 Subadars at 40 - - - - -	2 Subadars at 40 - - - - -		
		2 Jemadars at 20 - - - - -	2 Jemadars at 20 - - - - -		
		20 Havildars at 13 - - - - -	22 Havildars at 13 - - - - -		
		20 Naiks at 11 - - - - -	22 Naiks at 11 - - - - -		
		452 Jezailchis at 9 - - - - -	552 Jezailchis at 9 - - - - -		
		6 Duffadars at 25 - - - - -	4 Duffadars at 30 - - - - -		
		2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each - - - - -	2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each - - - - -		
		48 Sowars at 18 each - - - - -	28 Sowars at 25 each - - - - -		
		Total - - - - -	Total - - - - -		
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.			MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.		
		1 Tent pitcher - - - - -	1 Tent pitcher - - - - -		
		1 Sweeper - - - - -	1 Sweeper - - - - -		
		Stationery - - - - -	Stationery - - - - -		
		Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - -		
		Total - - - - -	Total - - - - -		
SAVINGS.			SAVINGS.		
		English Political Assistant - - - - -	English Political Assistant - - - - -		
		Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - -	Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - -		
		1 Thanadar - - - - -	1 Thanadar - - - - -		
		1 English clerk - - - - -	1 English clerk - - - - -		
		Stationery - - - - -	Stationery - - - - -		
		Total - - - - -	Total - - - - -		
PRÉCIS.			PRÉCIS.		
		1 Political Officer's establishment - - - - -	1 Political Officer's establishment - - - - -		
		2 Jezailchi Corps - - - - -	2 Jezailchi Corps - - - - -		
		3 Miscellaneous establishment - - - - -	3 Miscellaneous establishment - - - - -		
		4 Political Assistant's establishment - - - - -	4 Political Assistant's establishment - - - - -		
		Total - - - - -	Total - - - - -		
Net saving Rs. 2,136 less 1,157 = 979 or deduct 300 for contingencies, leaves a net saving of Rs. 679.					

(Signed) E. H. L. CLARKE,
Assistant in charge, Camp Office.

Enclosure 11 in No. 8.

Telegram, dated 9th February 1881.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

In accordance with instructions contained in Punjab telegram 98 of 6th instant, the agreement, a draft of which accompanied my 576 of 24th December, and which has been slightly modified under instructions received, has been duly signed on the 8th instant by the Afridi headmen without any demur. A final paragraph had been previously added to the agreement as follows:—We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility, and this position we accept.

Enclosure 12 in No. 8.

No. 284, dated Lahore, 14th February 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, copy of a letter, No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881, from the Commissioner, Peshawur.

2. The heavier portion of the work of the Political Officer, Khyber, hitherto has been the direct result of the actual occupation of the Pass by British troops and the presence therein of British camps, bazaars, and camp followers. It appears to his Honour self-evident that the duties of the Political Officer will of necessity be greatly lightened by the termination of the military occupation of the Khyber, and for similar reasons the work of the Jezailchi corps will be less than formerly, and the Lieutenant-Governor sees no reasons to alter the views expressed on this question in my letter above quoted.

3. Nor does Sir Robert Egerton consider that there is any force in the arguments adduced by the Commissioner of Peshawur against the speedy imposition of tolls upon traffic in the Pass. There seems to be no object in making to merchants and traders the concessions proposed by Colonel Waterfield; nor would it in reality be a very substantial boon, seeing that, if we refrain from taking transit dues for that portion of the Pass which is managed by independent tribes under our Political control, the difference will be levied by the Khan of Lalpura at Dakka or by the Amir at Jellalabad; the merchants will probably pay the same as heretofore, while the loss will fall on the British Government.

4. With regard to responsibility for robberies within the Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that if traders suffer from raids in the Khyber, east of Lundikotal, they will naturally prefer their complaints to the British Government, which cannot be satisfied by referring them to the tribes, but should after the necessary enquiries award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. Unless some such arrangement is carried out, the Khyber may remain as insecure as in the days before the campaign of 1878, while the British Government will be paying for its safety.

Enclosure 13 in No. 8.

No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

I HAVE now received with your No. 11½ C., of the 4th January, a copy of your letter, No. 11 C., of the 4th January, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, forwarding my No. 5767, of the 24th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the representatives of the Khyber tribes for the future management of the Pass.

2. With reference to paragraph 5, in which his Honour expresses an opinion that the office establishment proposed for the Political Officer is on too extravagant a scale, I would suggest that we are not yet aware of the amount of work that will fall upon the Political Officer when taking up his new duties at Jamrud. I would invite attention to the enclosures of this office, No. 35 of the 5th January and the Political Officer's, No. 88 of the 20th January, forwarded in original with my No. 475 P., dated 25th January

1881, I think Government would be wiser to allow temporarily and subject to report six months hence the scale proposed by me, than to reduce the establishment now, in anticipation of possible diminution of work. If office difficulties and arrears of work are added to the anxieties of the Political Officer at Jamrud, I think that his health will give way, and that the new tribal management will not receive the attention and care that it certainly will require. I cannot, therefore, advise that a saving should be effected at the present moment in the staff of the Political Officer, who has lost some strength in the abolition of his European assistant Political Officer and his European Commandant of Jezailchis. I also doubt if trustworthy and educated pay Havildars are to be found among the Khyber Afridi tribes.

3. Nor do I think that the Government can be justified in any supposition that the duties of the corps of Jezailchis will be lighter than before; on the contrary, I think they may be increased, certainly during the winter half of the year, for I am inclined to think that two convoys a week will not be nearly sufficient for the traffic as it increases.

4. Again I trust that his Honour will reconsider the views expressed regarding the immediate taking of the tolls, or transit dues, by the British Government. Difficulties might arise which I would be glad to avoid at starting. The tribes will be more reconciled to the new arrangement if they see that we do not at once begin to reap any direct profit from it. A great impetus may be given to trade by the fact that the Khyber is at present free. It would be a kindly concession on the part of Government to the merchants and carriers, whose trade and profits have no doubt suffered much during the last two or three years. It will have a widespread and favourable effect if these transit dues are not immediately levied, and give perhaps an exaggerated view of the generosity of the new rulers. I suggest, therefore, that the levy of tolls should be suspended until the affairs of Afghanistan are more settled, until a general reconsideration of the whole question of such transit dues has been brought about, and perhaps a commercial treaty has been negotiated with his Highness the Amir.

Also, as the winter has so far advanced I do not think it is worth while to introduce the Khyber duties until at all events the opening of a new season in the autumn of this year. During the summer there is little or no trade, and the income would be exceedingly small compared with that of the cold season following. The above reasons are irrespective of those adduced by me in my previous report, to which I now turn.

5. With the greatest deference to the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, I am not able to see that upon the British Government need devolve the responsibility for the safety of traffic through the Khyber, because it has undertaken to regulate the traffic on behalf of the Khyber Afridis. I would throw the entire responsibility upon the tribes, and they will be all the stronger and better for it. I am quite prepared for the merchants and traders endeavouring to force this responsibility upon the Government, but I would refuse it, and hold the tribes entirely responsible for satisfying the public. It is quite possible that some large caravans may at starting decline to be satisfied by the assurances of the tribes, and take the alternative routes, paying for the same, but some will use the free Khyber and will pass in safety, and others will at once follow the example. As the security of the convoys without doubt can be absolutely ensured by the headmen and the tribes, for instance by their accompanying any specially valuable convoy in person and in large numbers, or by their taking hostages from malcontents, I am unable to see why Government should accept any responsibility whatever. I would maintain to the tribes that Government had nothing whatever to say to the public, but were in the interests of trade, and the public, endeavouring to make with the Afridis such arrangements as would give them (the public) sufficient confidence in the route, and that the penalty of failure on the part of the Afridis might possibly be the stoppage of the allowances, disbandment of the Jezailchis, and closing of the Khyber. As it is impossible for the Government to be certain of Afridis, I would leave the public, who are much more likely to be able to form an accurate opinion, to judge for themselves.

6. I would confine the duties of the Political Officers entirely to other matters. They should be the referees in all points of dispute, should see that the tribes are carrying out their arrangements in accordance with their agreements, should endeavour to hold the tribes together, smoothing over difficulties and advising them regarding the system which the tribes themselves approve and adopt. The officer commanding the Jezailchis would have as his special duty to see that the force was maintained to full strength, equipped, organised, and fittingly officered and armed by the responsible tribes, that the men were present for duty, sufficiently drilled, and that they regularly received the sums allowed by Government to the tribes for the maintenance of the corps. Without some such supervising authority the tribes could not be safely entrusted to carry out the duties they had accepted.

The work of the Political Officers should be in fact confined to supervision of tribal arrangements. It was this that I endeavoured to bring about, and the tribes understand it so and accept it, and the agreement which they are prepared to execute is in accordance with this view of the entire responsibilities of the tribes and the limited control of the Government.

7. Regarding the personal allowances to headmen, I have admitted that what I consider to be the defect of the system that has been approved by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will not be apparent until difficulties arise. But suppose the Khyber closed on account of opposition in Tirah with which the headmen have not at the moment been able to cope, and suppose an alternative route adopted, the headmen and their party among the Khyber tribes honestly doing their best, and though unable to keep the Khyber open, yet desirous of maintaining exclusive relations with the Government, of keeping themselves detached from Kabul, and of refusing all other influence or interference. If the subsidies of the headmen and the tribes disappear in the forfeited compensation for transit dues, what hold would Government have over those who may be considered really at heart of their own party? The latter would be irritated, and instead of making honest and what might appear to them fruitless endeavours to recover their position, would probably join with the opposition who had lost nothing, and endeavour to bring pressure to bear upon the Government by active hostilities upon the border, appealing to the Kabul ruler to re-accept their allegiance. The Khyber arrangements failing, it will be exceedingly difficult to make allowances to the headmen and the Government party without their concluding that we were more actuated by fears of their opposition than by any desire to treat them at the moment of failure with consideration on account of past service. I admit that I have not latterly pressed this point, because I remembered that the present allowances are to some extent subdivided into personal allowances to the headmen of Rupees 300 a month and Rupees 1,000 subsidies to each tribe, and I have always felt that if the difficulty came, for which I would now provide, the Government might forfeit the tribal irrespective of the personal allowance, and probably would do so. Government can be no more bound to keep up the personal allowance than the tribal subsidies in the case of misbehaviour or neglect, and I myself do not understand that the headmen would be any the less inclined to carry through the present negotiations, if they saw that by the payment of personal allowances the British Government was desirous of securing their personal allegiance and good conduct, as well as the safety of traffic through the Khyber.

Believing however as I do in the stability of the present arrangements, in the future disinclination of the Government to close the Khyber and throw over the Afridis, and in the improbability of any such crisis arising, I admit that I am more defending my proposal than anxious to carry my view against that of the Government as if it were of vital importance to the scheme.

8. Regarding the cemetery at Lundikotal, I think that the tablets may be removed to Peshawur, and perhaps be attached to some memorial near the church; that a careful plan of the cemetery should be made by which hereafter the position of every grave could be at once ascertained with certainty. The Loargai Shinwaris are not likely to allow of the destruction of the monuments and graves which will be left to their care, a watchman being specially remunerated for this duty, and I would leave them as they stand.

No. 9.

No. 44 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, March 14, 1881.

WE have the honour to inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of correspondence and other papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. These papers show the measures that have been taken, or are in progress, in prosecution of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of

the British troops from Kandahar at the earliest suitable opportunity, and for the establishment, if possible, within a limited time, of some settled government at Kandahar.

3. The substance of our correspondence with the Amir of Kabul has been transmitted to your Lordship, from time to time, by telegraph. On the 20th of February the Amir's letter, dated 10th February, from Kabul, was received in Calcutta. The Amir at last announced the departure of the confidential agent whom he had been repeatedly asked, since November last, to send to India; and from the tenor of his letter it is to be inferred that he has very willingly entertained the offer, made by the Viceroy in January, to place him in possession of Kandahar; but he represented that, owing to great deficiency in arms and material of war, his position, unless he should be aided in this respect by the British Government, would be very difficult. As the list of the different kinds of ammunition required, which accompanied this letter, was not easily intelligible, it was necessary to await the arrival of the Amir's agent, General Mir Ahmed, who reached Calcutta on the 25th February. It then appeared that Mir Ahmed's instructions were very simple and closely circumscribed; that upon the general political views and intentions of the Amir he was not empowered to deliver any message, and that his particular business was confined to obtaining the ammunition already asked for, and to receiving and transmitting any communications that the British Government might address to his master. In his conversation with the Viceroy the General declared his conviction that the Amir fully intended to send troops to Kandahar at once, but he admitted that this was his personal belief, and that he could state nothing on this point with authority. The result has been that the deputation of the envoy has effected little toward the removal of the manifold impediments by which, for the last five months, the progress of our arrangements with the Amir has been unavoidably hindered. The great delay inseparable from the interchange of letters between Kabul and India, and the consequent difficulty of establishing with the Amir the free and frequent communication so essential to a clear understanding upon an important and complicated subject, and to the speedy and accurate combination of plans and movements, had necessarily affected the conduct of our negotiations, which it had been hoped that the presence of a confidential agent would have much expedited. The ammunition required was, however, immediately supplied to the Amir's agency at Peshawar, so far as it could be given from the British arsenals (for much of it was of a kind not to be found in our military stores), and General Mir Ahmed has been informed that more will be placed at his disposal; but carriage is wanting beyond the frontier for the immediate conveyance of any large additional quantity to Kabul.

4. The particular business upon which the envoy had, apparently, been sent to India having been thus completed, there seemed to be no advantage in detaining him in Calcutta. On the other hand, as the Viceroy had been able, in two interviews, to explain to him the general wishes and intentions of the Government of India regarding the affairs of Afghanistan, especially the urgent importance, to the Amir, of an early despatch of troops from Kabul to Kandahar, it was advisable that the envoy should rejoin the Amir as speedily as possible. With this opinion the envoy himself altogether concurred; and he accordingly left Calcutta on the 8th March, carrying with him a letter for the Amir, of which a copy is herewith enclosed. We have taken, it will be seen, this opportunity of proposing to depute to Kabul a native representative of our Government, in accordance with the intimation conveyed to us by the last sentence of your Lordship's despatch, No. 48, of 3rd December, that Her Majesty's Government would be glad if this could be arranged.

5. In the expectation that the arrival of a confidential agent from Kabul would so far clear up and define the Amir's situation that the Government of India might be enabled to proceed with a full knowledge of his exact position and resources, we have, it will be seen, been disappointed. It became immediately manifest that we could risk the loss of no more time in ascertaining positively whether the Amir was able and prepared to act upon the Viceroy's letter to him of the 31st January, whereby Kandahar had been offered to Abdul Rahman, with assistance in money and munitions, but with the warning that he would be required to occupy it early in the spring. The Commissioner of Peshawar was therefore directed by telegram to despatch a letter by express courier to the Amir, informing His Highness that his agent had been received, that the ammunition asked for had been sent, and that troops from Kabul of sufficient strength for the establishment of the Amir's government should reach Kandahar some days before the 15th April next. The reply to this letter we are now awaiting. We have heard through private correspondence that the Amir is actually preparing a force for Kandahar, and that he hopes it may set off from Kabul about the middle of March. But we

thoroughly realize the difficulties of military equipment and organization against which the Amir has, in the present condition of his affairs, to contend; and we are ready and anxious to afford him every assistance. A sum of ten lakhs has been placed at his disposal for immediate expenses; and all possible measures will be taken to assist and strengthen his Governor and his troops on their arrival at Kandahar.

6. In the meantime Colonel St. John had been directed to consider carefully beforehand the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Kandahar in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on our offer. Colonel St. John's two letters, which are inclosed with this despatch, present an interesting description of the state and prospects of parties in South Afghanistan, and of the probabilities of the establishment at Kandahar of some settled government after our departure. The general effect of these letters is to produce the impression that, if the Amir Abdul Rahman can succeed in placing at Kandahar, before the withdrawal of the British troops, a fairly equipped force of about 4,000 men, and if he acts with judgment, energy, and promptitude, the task of bringing the Kandahar Province under his authority, and of establishing his government in all the cis-Helmand district, should not be difficult. It is of course impossible to forecast the course of events after our evacuation, or to calculate what external attacks the Amir may have subsequently to encounter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure I in No. 9.

No. 27, dated Kandahar, 15th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I REPORTED to you by telegram on the 10th instant that considerable excitement prevailed in the city in consequence of a rumour that orders had arrived for the immediate evacuation of Kandahar. This rumour was due to that passage in Reuter's telegraphic summary of Her Majesty's speech on opening Parliament which refers to Kandahar, and spread from the garrison through the Hindoos of the city to the population generally.

2. Your telegram of the 11th enabled me to inform the notables of the place at the usual morning public assembly yesterday that the report that orders had arrived for the evacuation was untrue, and that, though I could not assure them that we should not leave Kandahar, I could with truth declare my entire ignorance as to whether or not the army would be withdrawn before the coming hot weather, during which, as they knew, it was impossible for us to move troops to India. I further promised that all our friends should have ample notice in case of our quitting Kandahar, to enable them to make any arrangements they might desire for the convenience or safety of themselves or their families. This assurance allayed the excitement in the city, but the report of an immediate evacuation had gone abroad; and will, it may be taken for granted, increase the uneasy and excited feeling already existing in the Helmand districts. The despatch of a small force to Maiwand and its retention there for a few weeks, which I am to-day informed by General Hume has been sanctioned by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will, it may be expected, suffice to prevent the excitement spreading, and give the people time to quiet down.

3. It appears to me an object of much importance, both in our own interests and those of the Amir, should Kandahar be made over to him, that the Helmand districts, as well as the country immediately about the city, should remain tranquil as long as possible. The likelihood of the province being ceded to the Amir is very generally known and discussed; and the Western Duranis are, without exception, partisans of Ayub as against Abdurrahman, to whom they would, in their present temper, undoubtedly prefer our direct rule.

4. In the course of the last few days I have taken advantage of the uneasy feeling prevailing to ascertain as far as possible the ideas of the leading men as to the result of the evacuation of Southern Afghanistan should such take place in the course of the next three months. All are entirely unanimous as to the impossibility of the Amir holding his own in Kandahar without active support from us.

5. Reports, no doubt exaggerated, of the harshness of his rule, and the disfavour with which he regards Duranis, have been widely spread; and there are now but two parties in Southern Afghanistan, one hoping that we shall remain, the other ready to rise in favour of Ayub, but both equally opposed to Abdurrahman.

6. The two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Hosain Khan, brother and nephew of the Wali, who, having been implicated with him in his antagonism to Ayub, have naturally no prepossession in the latter's behalf, told me that, though they themselves would prefer Abdurrahman, as they would have no difficulty in coming to terms with him, it was impossible to deny that the Durani country generally was becoming more and more indisposed to accept him. They believe that, if we leave without establishing his authority by force of arms, a rising in favour of Ayub will take place before our rear guard has reached Pishin. They do not think he can himself leave Kabul or spare any considerable number of troops. The only chance they consider that he would have would be for us to hold Kandahar during the summer while he attacks Herat through Turkistan, an attack which would, in their opinion, be successful. As long as Herat remains in Ayub's power any attempt of Abdurrahman to hold Kandahar must, they consider, inevitably result in failure, with the probable consequence of his expulsion from Kabul.

7. Another Afghan of considerable shrewdness and a half-declared friend of Abdurrahman told me that the supremacy would probably lie with whichever of the two rivals was able to take the initiative. If the Amir contents himself with holding Kandahar after our departure, he will infallibly lose both Kandahar and Kabul. But if he comes with, or sends down to Kandahar, a sufficient force to garrison the city and advance straight on Herat, that place will fall before him, and he will remain undisputed master of the whole country.

8. The feeling of the principal men may be gauged by the fact that all are making preparations to send their families either to the remote northern districts, or the Hazara frontier, or to Pishin, in case of our leaving Kandahar, and I have reason to believe that the majority would hold themselves aloof from the struggle for supremacy which must inevitably ensue, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will at no distant date find itself forced to resume the direct rule of Southern Afghanistan.

9. Advices received to-day from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at Girishk appear to indicate that the country in the immediate vicinity of the Helmand is quieting down, though he speaks with some apprehension of the arrival of sowars from Farrah in Washir to levy revenue from the districts of Kandahar between the Khash and the Helmand. I do not think that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, to whom this movement is due, will persevere in it when he finds that the British garrison is still in Kandahar and making a show of force at Maiwand. From Tirin, Shirindil Khan reports, as telegraphed to you to-day, that a nephew of Anbiar Khan of Taiwara, by name Muhammad Khan, had arrived there with thirty-six sowars. They at first took refuge in a village, from which Habibullah Khan, a nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, tried to get the villagers to give them up; and at last succeeded in obtaining possession of the person of Muhammad Khan. A certain Yahiya, Akhunzadah, formerly governor on behalf of the Wali, and a man of considerable influence and ability, though no real friend of ours, got together some Ghilzais and rescued Muhammad Khan from Habibullah Khan. He and his sowars will probably arrive here in a few days.

10. Sirdar Shirindil Khan, who had instructions from me not to venture into danger, has crossed the Kotal-i-Paj into Nish. He writes that the Nish maliks are willing to submit and pay their revenue, but are afraid of the Tirin people, while the latter are divided into two parties, the Barakzais being favourable to him, and the Popalzais against him. He was, however, hopeful of a satisfactory settlement. The false report of our proximate departure, which will no doubt spread to Tirin, will probably have an unfavourable effect there; but a letter which I have sent Shirindil Khan to-day, announcing the early despatch of a force to Maiwand to support his authority on one side, and that of Gul Muhammad Khan on the other, will, I trust, arrive in time to counteract it.

11. I may add that there is but one opinion among the Sirdars and chief men as to the tranquillizing and healthy effect of the movement of a force to Maiwand.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

No. 96, dated Kandahar, 14th February 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq. C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

KANDAHAR and the neighbouring country remain fairly tranquil under the prospect now universally credited of a very early evacuation by our troops. The 16th proximo having been fixed by the military authorities as the date at which the return march to India may possibly commence, it is generally believed in the city, on the strength, it may be assumed, of information gathered from subordinates of the Transport and Commissariat Departments, that our final departure is arranged to take place at that date. A few Hindus (of Shikarpur) and a lesser number of Farsiwans have already left the city with their families; and a very general exodus of these two classes may be anticipated.

2. Public opinion is much divided as to the candidate to whom it is intended to make over the government, Ayub Khan, the Amir, Sharif Khan, and the ex-Amir, Yakub Khan, being all mentioned as our possible successors. The better classes, I believe, incline generally to the idea that the Amir will receive Kandahar from us, led thereto more by the inherent probability of the case than by the report of the Amir's letter to Muhammad Sadik, Khan of Kelat, which, however, was generally known and excited much comment.

3. The return of the column from Maiwand, on the 12th, completed an expedition for which, I think, entire success may be claimed. It has given nearly a month's rest to the overtaxed resources of the Commissariat by taking away two-thirds of the animals for which they had to find forage; and by opening the roads has enabled them to increase the amount of their purchases. A considerable reserve is now in hand, and the posts on the road are being gradually stocked for the march to Pishin. The presence of the force enabled me to get in some revenue that would otherwise have been lost, and to levy the fine of Rupees 5,000 on the villagers of Kushk-i-Nakhud. Mr. Merk, whose exertions in obtaining supplies deserve great praise, reports that not only were there no cases of ghazeeism, or attempts at annoyance, such as firing into the camp at night, but that not a single instance of serious dispute between the people and the soldiers and camp-followers was brought to his notice during the three weeks the force was absent. This would appear to indicate that the temper of the people is not at present dangerous. Nevertheless, an unfortunate occurrence at the other extremity of the province shows the risk of attempting to control the country whenever the people believe they are not liable to the presence of troops. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan had sent an accountant to Dahlah, north-east of Kandahar, with the local governor of the district. They went together to Tanachob, a village on the verge of the Hazara country, but inhabited by Duranis. Some report of the British leaving Kandahar appears to have reached the people, and the unfortunate writer (a Farsiwan) was shot in a mosque in the presence of the governor. His Farsiwan companions, five in number, who had been left at a little distance, escaped at the time, but were caught up the next morning, induced to surrender on their pursuers taking an oath on the Koran to spare their lives, and then brutally murdered, after being reproached with being the instruments of taxing the people for the Kafirs, who were themselves leaving the country.

4. After this experience it will, I think, be inadvisable to make any further attempts to raise revenue, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the city.

5. The result of the withdrawal of the force from Maiwand remains to be seen. As far as can be judged from the report of Sirdar Taj Muhammad Khan, Scistani, of whom more hereafter, Gul Muhammad Khan will be unable to remain at Girishk more than a few days longer, and the country, at all events, as far as the Helmand, will be entirely closed to traffic. Before Taj Muhammad's arrival I had written to Gul Muhammad Khan, telling him of our intention to leave Kandahar on or shortly after the Naoraz (the 21st March), and assuring him that, whoever succeeded us, his interests would be properly cared for. He will probably retire at once to his own fort of Jui-Sirkar, near Kalah-i-Bist, and remain there for the present. It is to be feared that the roads to Tirin and Nish, which have lately re-opened, will again be closed, and that we shall be dependent on the districts immediately round Kandahar for supplies. With the reserves now in hand these will be able to feed the force if too severe a strain be not thrown on the Commissariat by

the detention for political reasons of the extra carriage now on its way up to Kandahar from Sibi. It is timed to commence arrival about the 15th March, unless detained by bad weather, and should begin its return journey as soon after as possible. If a large amount of carriage be massed at Kandahar for weeks, or halted on the road, very serious difficulty in feeding it is to be anticipated; and it is thus of the greatest importance that the negotiations with Kabul for the occupation of Candahar should not be protracted. If the final evacuation of the place is not effected by the end of March, it may become absolutely necessary to move troops to the Helmand to obtain grain and forage.

6. The execution of the Alikozai Sirdars, Taimur Khan, Dost Muhammad Khan, and Behbud Khan, was not, I believe, a politic move on the part of Ayub Khan and his advisers. It will certainly still further estrange the Duranis of Herat from him, and may not improbably throw the Alikozais of Kandahar, the most numerous and powerful clan among the Duranis, after the Barakzais, into the ranks of his enemies. It is said to be strongly condemned by Hashim Khan. Yaluntush Khan, son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, has invoked the aid of the Saruk Turkomans, and is menacing the northern frontier of Herat. Much apprehension of an attack from Turkistan is also felt there. The Aimaks are, of course, ready to rise. The reports that Ayub's followers are industriously spreading over the country that we are about to make the province over to him may betoken conscious weakness; and altogether it may be that an immediate occupation of Kandahar, followed by a prompt initiative in the Herat direction, might place the whole country at the Amir's feet in spite of the ill-will of the vast majority of the Duranis.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

No. 102, dated Kandahar, 16th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd instant directs me to consider carefully and report by post on the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Candahar, in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on the offer made him to assume its government on our departure.

2. I have delayed submitting the conclusions at which I have arrived for some days, in order to consider the subject carefully in all its bearings, and ascertain as far as possible what measure of support the Amir is likely to receive from the leading men left in the country.

3. The main point is that he should act *effectually* on the invitation given him to assume the government; and I would define *effectually* to be the early despatch of a sufficient body of infantry to occupy Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Kandahar, and Girishk. The minimum number required at first would be 3,500 for Kelat, 1,500 to remain at Kandahar, and 1,000 to go on to Girishk. This total should of course be largely increased, as soon as possible, in view of an attack from or an advance to Herat; but would suffice to keep the country up to the Helmand quiet. It is clear that we cannot make over more to the Amir than we have chosen to take for ourselves, and it may, therefore, be convenient to commence by describing the extent and nature of our hold on the province. Over the outlying districts of Pusht-i-Rud and the Helmand we have no authority whatever, beyond the fact of the fort of Girishk being still occupied by Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, an occupation which may cease at any moment, and can hardly be prolonged till the arrival of the Amir's troops. Unless, however, it is occupied by Ayub Khan's regular troops from Herat, of which there would seem no danger, the place is not defensible against artillery, and can be occupied at any time by an adequate force from Kandahar.

4. Over the three northern districts of Tiri, Nish, and Dehrawud, we have likewise no authority. From the north-north-eastern districts of Jaldak, Mizan, and Dahlah, I have been able to obtain a certain amount of revenue, but the hold on them is very slender. Lastly come the home district of Kandahar and those immediately adjoining it, Kushk-i-Nakhud, Khakrez, Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, which are as yet entirely under my control.

5. The eastern half of the home district, together with Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, are governed by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, the Wali's brother; and its western half with, Kushk-i-Nakhud, by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, his nephew. Both of these consider themselves hopelessly compromised with Ayub Khan's party, and will attach themselves to that of the Amir as the nominee of the British Government. As regards the transfer of the districts now actually governed by us, there will, therefore, be no difficulty; Khakrez, the remaining district, is at present managed by Fath Muhammad Khan, a Popalzai chief, of whose family more hereafter, and who will follow any directions given him. The governors, duly warned beforehand, will simply transfer their allegiance to the Amir's representative; and, as far as the people are concerned, there need be no apprehension of overt resistance, always supposing that he is accompanied by an adequate force. The occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which must precede that of Kandahar, will suffice to establish the Amir's authority over the neighbouring districts of Jaldak, Mizan, while that of Dahlah is of comparatively small importance.

6. As regards the districts of Nish, Dehrawud, and Tirin, I am not prepared to give an opinion whether they will submit to the Amir's authority without a struggle. They will not, I think, attempt to resist an armed occupation; but will hold aloof until conclusions have been settled with their neighbours across the Helmand, the Alizais of Zamindawar, even if they do not actively join them in resistance.

7. The transfer of authority in the city will be as simple as it was in August 1879, when I made over charge to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. Our Kotwal, a Pathan Subahdar of native infantry, is the only official who will require to be replaced; all the others are natives of the city. Almost the only reform I have made in the revenue system is that the entire receipts are paid daily into the treasury, instead of running accounts being kept with the collectors as under the native government. The whole establishment will be paid up to the date of transfer and made over to the new governor.

8. The land revenue accounts are more complicated; but the fact of the late Wali's Mustaufi, or head accountant, being the Amir's unaccredited agent in Kandahar will render their transfer from my office comparatively easy. He will simply resume the position that he gave up only two months ago, the minor officials remaining unchanged.

9. It will be necessary to give the Amir's representative some pecuniary assistance towards carrying on the government till the next harvest; and this, taking into consideration that the total revenue of the province is only thirteen and half lakhs, I should be inclined to fix at a lakh of rupees to start with, and half a lakh per month for April and May, after which the annual revenue will again be falling due. This would be independent of any special assistance it may be advisable to give to aid in repelling an invasion from Herat, or for an advance in that direction.

10. Until the Amir's troops have actually reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai at least, it will not be advisable to proclaim him in Kandahar. It will not be necessary for our troops to remain in Kandahar for longer after the arrival of those of the Amir than will suffice for a detachment of the latter to occupy Girishk, say a week or 10 days. The interval would be profitably occupied in assisting the Kabul governor in making his arrangements for the nearer districts. If, as there is reason to fear, the Zamindawaris should seize Girishk in Ayub's name, it would be of great assistance to the Amir's authority were the troops sent there to expel them accompanied by a British column; but this would involve a further delay of a week.

11. As before-mentioned, the two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan, are prominently assisting me in the government of the country. Both are willing to lend their support to the Amir, and Muhammad Hasan's brothers, Shirindil Khan, Anwar Khan, and Roshndil Khan, would, no doubt, follow them. I have not thought it advisable to write to ask Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan for his views on the subject; but his antecedents make it certain that he would prefer Abdurrahman to Ayub.

Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, are also prepared to transfer their allegiance to the Amir.

Fathi Khan, the Chief of the Achakzais, is already in Kabul; and the most influential man of the clan now in Kandahar, Haji Sarbuland Khan, although no friend of Fathi Khan's, declares his willingness to support the Amir's government. Among doubtful men now here are the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan and Syud Nur Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister. The latter would, however, I am nearly confident, join the Kabul party.

Beyond the Helmand the Amir would find many supporters, Ahmad Khan of Lash Jowain, with all his tribe, the Ishakzais, the Biluchis of Chakansur, Kalah-i-Fath, and Sistan, with a majority of the Alikozais, besides the Char Aimak tribes. Of the latter

the Taimunis are already preparing to re-occupy Taiwara, whence the regular troops have been recalled to Herat, and it is reported that Yaluntush Khan, Jamshidi, has re-occupied his father's place of Kushk.

12. Thus the Amir, as our nominee alone, be it understood, would have a considerable party in his favour in Southern and Western Afghanistan. It would be for himself or his representative to secure its continued support. The line of conduct pursued by him towards the Duranis and others at Kabul will certainly not do this; but if, on the other hand, efforts are made to attach our friends to himself, and to conciliate the Duranis generally, many of the waverers in Herat as well as here will assuredly pass over to his side; and if, either by direct attack on Herat or by threatening it through Turkistan, he is able to stave off the attack by Ayub, which is sure to be attempted, he should have no difficulty in consolidating his rule.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th February 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 30th January 1881, which your Excellency was graciously pleased to address to me, asking me to depute an agent.

I wrote to your Excellency that a thoroughly confidential man, as your Excellency was well aware of the nature (of the people) of Afghanistan, did not exist in this country. But as your Excellency has again written that it is necessary to send a man for certain important matters, I have deputed General Amir Ahmad Khan, and entrusted him with certain important proposals. While I had not yet been informed by your Excellency of his arrival in India, I received your Excellency's kind letter regarding the taking over of the government of Kandahar. Having the well-being of the British Government and of Afghanistan in view, I have given publicity to the contents of your Excellency's letter. All the people wished success. I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency in writing the embarrassed condition of Afghanistan, and I again represent it now, as I find it necessary to do so.

Your Excellency has been pleased to say that arms, cash, and all necessary aid, will be given to my officials who will be appointed in Kandahar. May God ever keep your Excellency exalted. But the state of Kabul is this that when the British troops entered Kabul all the arms and ammunition that existed there were so completely destroyed that no vestige of any implements of war was found in the arsenal. Neither is one-hundredth part of the arms and ammunition forthcoming which was granted to Amir Sher Ali by the British Government.

Howsoever vigilant I may be, yet this world is the world of means. I have neither any good guns nor ammunition which may be usefully employed against an enemy. The muskets of every description that I have collected are without their usual accoutrement, and only exist in name.

I have given a brief account of my circumstances; and, unless the illustrious British Government helps me with ammunition, I should find myself in a very difficult position. Therefore it is necessary that your Excellency should kindly send me ammunition as per list annexed, either 100 cartridges per gun, or more or less, so that my weakness be not* exposed, and the troops have their proper equipment.

* Literally, screen may not be removed from the matter.

I have written what has occurred to me.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of an ABSTRACT of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 27th February 1881.

After Compliments.—I have received telegraphic orders from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to address a letter to your Highness to the following effect:—

His Excellency has, with much pleasure, perused your Highness' friendly letter, dated the 10th February 1881.

General Amir Ahmad Khan, your Highness' confidential agent, has arrived at Calcutta, and has had the honour of waiting upon his Excellency the Viceroy.

His Excellency understands from the said letter that your Highness accepts the offer of the British Government made to you in his Excellency's letter, dated the 30th January 1881, to occupy Kandahar. His Excellency also finds that your Highness is in great want of ammunition at Kabul. Conformably to his Excellency's orders, I write to inform your Highness that cartridges, the nearest possible to those described in your Highness' list, are held in readiness to be made over to your Highness' officials at Peshawur or at Khyber.

His Excellency says that your Highness may remember that it was stated in the previous letter that the British troops intended to abandon Kandahar at the commencement of the (next) spring, and that, as your Highness has accepted and still accepts his Excellency's offer, your Highness should despatch troops to Kandahar. His Excellency now informs your Highness that it is necessary that troops, which are able to uphold your Highness' kingdom, should reach Kandahar before the 15th April 1881, and that a governor should be appointed to accompany them, and should be empowered to take over the administration from the British officers. The British Government cannot undertake to keep Kandahar in possession for your Highness after the 15th April. If arrangements are not made by your Highness to take over the administration of Kandahar before the 15th April, the British Government will not hold itself responsible.

Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

Dated Fort William, 8th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

YOUR HIGHNESS will already have been prepared, by a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, for the return of your representative, General Mir Ahmad Khan, who has satisfactorily discharged the mission entrusted to him, and has obtained all the military stores mentioned by your Highness as immediately needed for the equipment of your Highness' troops.

He has also been made fully acquainted by me, in two interviews, with the views and proposals of the British Government regarding the immediate occupation of Kandahar by your Highness' troops. Under these circumstances it is considered very desirable that he should now return to Kabul with the least possible delay, and report in person to your Highness regarding the state of affairs in general, and the wishes of the British Government. He accordingly leaves Calcutta this evening for Peshawur, with the intention of proceeding direct to Kabul. If, after he has presented himself to your Highness, you desire that he should return to India, it will give me much pleasure to receive him again in Simla, to which place I shall myself proceed from Calcutta in a few days.

In proof of the friendship which now exists between your Highness and the British Government, I am desirous of sending to your Highness' court Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, a gentleman of good family and position, who is personally known to your Highness, and who, on the occasion of his deputation to Turkistan, was of much service in promoting the interests of the two Governments. He will give your Highness information on any matters of detail regarding which your Highness may wish from time to time to be informed; and his presence in attendance on your Highness in Kabul may be useful and advantageous in the transaction of any business with my officers in India.

Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

Dated 25th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

THE only event of importance that has occurred since the despatch of my letter of the 14th has been the arrival of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, who appeared somewhat unexpectedly on the 23rd.

The fact of their approach having become known in the city, a considerable number of people went out to meet them by the Herat gate, and I, therefore, had them brought

in by the citadel entrance. No demonstration, however, took place; but some excitement was caused by a servant of the Sahibzada's, who preceded them by some hours, shouting a religious war cry as he passed through the streets.

The envoys were accompanied by about seventy horsemen and thirty menial attendants. They are lodged in Sirdar Sher Ali Khan's house, which is close to that in which I live. At their own request city people are not allowed free access to them, but anyone they ask to see is permitted to visit them.

Owing to indisposition, I was unable to see them till yesterday (the 26th), when they called on me. They commenced by saying that they had particular orders to express the profound grief of the Sirdar at the death of Lieutenant Maclaine, which he did not hear of till some time after his arrival in Herat. They also affirmed that Lieutenant Maclaine could, if he wished, have gone to the British camp. They then presented Ayub Khan's letter, of which a copy, with translation, is attached. I made no comment on it, and after some conversation on ordinary topics they retired. There is reason to believe that without invitation they will not deliver the message with which they have been charged by Muhammad Ayub Khan; and I propose to ask them what they have to say next Monday, the 28th, when I shall see them again.

With regard to their mission, a correspondent in Herat writes on the 6th instant that when Ayub's messenger, Nihang, arrived, bringing my letter of the 14th December (a simple acknowledgment of his apology for Lieutenant Maclaine's murder), the Sirdar announced in Durbar that the English had written to say that they would give him Kandahar and ten lakhs of rupees; but that he was not satisfied with this, as twenty lakhs would not recoup him for all he had lost at Mazra, and that he also wanted the whole country as far as Quetta. His friends at Kandahar continue to write to him that the English are about to leave, and that, in spite of his defeat, he has a reputation among them greater even than that of the Wazir Muhammad Akbar Khan. His councillors represented to him that it will be to his advantage to send envoys to Kandahar under any circumstances, for, if they failed in their negotiations, they would be able to stir up the people against the English. This, of course, was to be expected, and indicates, I think, the advisability of not dismissing the envoys too hastily. Ayub's pretensions are, of course, mere swagger to cover the act of humility in sending envoys uninvited.

A letter from Hashim Khan to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, shows that he is uneasy, and that there are two parties at Herat, one consisting apparently of Hashim himself, the two envoys, and probably General Hafizulla Khan, in favour of coming to terms with us; and the other, whose prominent members are, it may be conjectured, the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan (who believes that his treachery to the Wali will never be forgiven by us) and the Luinab Khushdil Khan, whose proclivities are Russian, who wish to continue hostilities. It is also clear that great apprehensions are entertained in Herat of an advance of the Amir's troops through Maimenab. The Taiwara people also appear to be inclined to renew their rebellion; and between the two it would be very difficult for Ayub Khan to move any of his small force of regulars towards the Helmand for some time.

As anticipated, Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan has left Girishk, and gone to his own fort about fifteen miles to the south, though it does not appear that there was urgent reason for his doing so. The Alizais are, he states, assembling; but unless they stop supplies coming in to Kandahar, of which there is at present no sign, their hostile demonstrations, having no objective, are of little consequence. The fort of Girishk is not tenable against regular troops with artillery.

The only news from the Kabul side is that the Amir, having remitted the poll-tax on the Tarakis, they have submitted to his governor. The report of a considerable body of troops having arrived at Ghazni was untrue. I learn indirectly through the envoys that Asmatullah Khan, General Taj Muhammad Khan, and other Ghilzai chiefs, are in regular correspondence with Herat.

The long expected rain has fallen abundantly during the last week, and has removed all fear of a failure in the spring crops, though very little unirrigated land has been sown. The Commissariat has still no difficulty in obtaining supplies, though their increased demand for grain has during the last few days somewhat raised its price. They have not, however, as far as I can gather, more than a week's supply in hand beyond what is required to store the first three posts on the line of communications, which is to be done from Kandahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN to the RESIDENT, Southern Afghanistan, dated Herat, 2nd Rabi-ul-Awal, corresponding to 2nd February 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused, in original, the kind letter which you sent to my respected brother, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. From its contents, which display the signs of kindness towards me, I am sure that you have always been disposed to be kind and friendly. Nevertheless (consequently?), since both before this I was desirous of, and inclined for, the friendship of the British Government, and since now also I desire it, I take the liberty of sending to you, without delay, Hazrat Umr Jan Sahib and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, who possess my complete confidence, and are acquainted with the secrets of my private wishes; so that, while they have the honour and advantage of seeing you, they may also make known to you the representations and friendly wishes which I have communicated to them. And from these representations and sincere statements I have a hope that the bond of friendship between myself and the British Government will be satisfactorily restored. Please God, misunderstandings have come to an end, and the permanent friendship that may be arranged between us will remain firm and undisturbed.

Whatever my special messengers may tell you in regard to my wishes please consider to be the unmingled truth.

Enclosure 9 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 11th February 1881, in reply to my friendly epistle conveying thanks for Kelat-i-Ghilzai, has reached me, and made known to me your Excellency's benign and friendly sentiments. Your Excellency has written that it is the wish of the illustrious British Government that my authority should be strongly established in that place (Kelat) as speedily as possible. I also earnestly desire to attain this important object, (*viz.*) to organize fully and in the best way the government of the Kandahar districts with all possible despatch, with the friendly attention (assistance) of the British Government. And I hope to obtain such an aid from Her Imperial Majesty's Government as would suffice for the settlement of affairs in that direction. The affairs of Kelat, please God, will soon be arranged, and when a man (governor) is nominated by me to take over charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, it will be manifest that no mistake has been made. Your Excellency may rest assured.

No. 10.

No. 50 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated 14th March 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Amir of Kabul to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of the letter‡ from the Viceroy to His Highness.

* No. 44.

† Dated 6th March 1881.

‡ Dated 18th March 1881.

2. We also forward copies of a letter§ from the Resident at Kandahar, giving an account of his meeting with the envoys sent by Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the message delivered by them.

§ Dated 2nd March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 6th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your two friendly letters, dated the 25th and the 27th February 1881 respectively, which made known to me your friendly sentiments. Your first letter informed me of Amir Ahmad Khan's arrival at Peshawur and Calcutta, and set my heart at rest. The second letter, which contained a telegraphic communication from his Excellency the Viceroy respecting the Kandahar question, was fully understood by me.

With regard to the ammunition granted by the glorious Government, it is necessary that it should be made over to my officials at Lundikotal, (*viz.*) it should be brought through the officials of the British Government as far as Lundikotal, whence the men of the Governor of Jellalabad will take charge of it, and will, please God, bring it to Kabul quickly.

I have understood what you wrote that the British troops will abandon Kandahar early in spring; that his Excellency the Viceroy urges that my officers and troops should reach Kandahar before the 15th April, and that the British troops will not undertake to occupy it for me after the 15th April. But I do not know why and wherefore the representatives of the Sublime Government are so hasty and are going to abandon Kandahar so soon and in such a short time, and why they have placed me in such a

narrow circle.* I have not omitted and will not omit anything in respect to the administration of Kandahar. I gave wide publicity to the contents of his Excellency the Viceroy's letter

on the day it arrived, and notified to (all) far and near that the glorious Government has made over and granted Kandahar to me; and forthwith I employed myself in getting ready accoutrements for the troops appointed. I had no ammunition. I applied to the Sublime Government for it. I had no camels. I called upon Lughman, Jellalabad, and the suburbs of Kabul, to furnish each their quota. The hire of a camel used to be Rupees 7 per month formerly. I have promised to pay Rupees 40 for a month's journey. Men have been appointed to go in every direction to bring camels. The troops appointed are now ready and prepared; camels will also, please God, arrive; the ammunition will also be brought from Lundikotal to the capital, and the troops will march to Kandahar, where they will arrive five days before or after the 15th April. My affairs are confused and in a very bad state from want of material and resources. It is not that my affairs, like those of the British Government, are in good order, and that I am showing apathy and indifference. Such is the embarrassed state of Afghanistan, and such is the determination of the British officers! However, I will, please God, use my endeavours so long as there is life in the body. Rest assured. But I cannot guarantee the entry of my troops in Kandahar punctually and for certain on the 14th April. As soon as the camels arrive I will put the troops in motion. Should the officers of the British Government lay the blame upon me to-morrow (afterwards), saying that as my troops did not arrive at Kandahar within the fixed period the British troops gave up the possession of Kandahar, I shall not consider myself liable to blame. Should the British Government have anything else in view it will not also give me cause to grieve, nor will it hurt my feelings. I look upon the pleasure of the British Government as my own pleasure.

Although I wish my own advancement, and desire to see my State well administered, I wish more to maintain my good reputation and to be true to my word.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Khureeta, dated Umballa, 18th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

YOUR Highness' friendly letter addressed on the 6th March to the Commissioner of Peshawur has been forwarded to me. I reply to it direct, since, although on some occasions it has been necessary, to save time, that the Commissioner of Peshawur should be instructed by telegraph to send letters on my behalf, yet I take every opportunity of corresponding with Your Highness direct.

In regard to the ammunition, General Mir Ahmed has been already informed that not only has the supply required been despatched, but a further supply is available, if required. And if on the arrival of Your Highness' troops at Kandahar it is found that rifles and more ammunition are needed for the equipment of your troops there, these will also be forthcoming, in addition to the artillery already offered, at that place.

Your Highness will now, I trust, feel assured that the British Government is endeavouring in many ways to assist and facilitate your preparations for sending a force to receive charge of Kandahar. It has given me much pleasure to learn that the despatch of this force is only delayed by the want of transport, and that it will reach Kandahar within a few days before or after the 15th April; for, although it is not my intention to circumscribe too narrowly the time within which our joint arrangements must take effect, yet there are very strong reasons why they cannot be delayed.

In the first place, I desire to explain to Your Highness that the greater part of the British troops now in Kandahar must leave Afghanistan in time to march to India before the extreme heat begins; otherwise they will suffer greatly on the road, and Your Highness, who is experienced in military matters, knows the paramount importance of caring for the health of an army. It is solely through my solicitude for Your Highness' convenience that I have deferred the movement until the middle of April; and it is even now to be feared that some of the British troops will be exposed to grave hardship.

Secondly, there is a great and manifest advantage in giving effect, as speedily as possible, to whatever arrangements have been settled between the two Governments in respect to Kandahar. The determination of Her Majesty's Government to offer Kandahar to Your Highness cannot fail to become speedily known; indeed Your Highness has already announced it to your people; so that now the wise and prudent course is to act rapidly upon the plan that has been adopted, lest delay should be prejudicial to Your Highness' interest, and lest the minds of men should become unsettled and the solution of affairs should become less opportune.

I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will perceive that, in advising you earnestly that your troops should reach Kandahar by the middle of April, I have been actuated entirely by a regard for the joint interests of both States and by my sincere desire for the success of this important undertaking.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Dated Kandahar, 2nd March 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE this morning telegraphed to you the substance of the message from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, delivered to me yesterday evening by his envoys. As anticipated in my letter of the 26th, they did not attempt to give it until invited. I, therefore, asked them to visit me yesterday, and requested them to communicate any further message they might have from the Sirdar. Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, then said that the Sirdar had ordered them in the first instance to express his profound regret for Lieutenant Maclaine's murder, and, secondly, to give me the following message. That he considered that Yakub Khan was in the first place the lawful heir of their father, the late Amir; and that this was the view of the Government was shown by their making over the country to him. Fate so willed it, that, either on account of his faults or because Government judged it advisable in their own interests, he was deposed and deported to India. This being the case, Ayub Khan considers himself the next in succession and the rightful heir to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, he places his affairs unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, looking upon himself as its friend and servant; and will accept any measure of kindness it is pleased to bestow on him, whether it gives him the whole of Afghanistan, half of it, Kandahar only, or a village of Kandahar.* If the English Government accept his friendship, his endeavour and desire will be to do it service, and he will look upon its friends and enemies as his own.

* NOTE.—This would appear only an expression of humility without any definite meaning.

2. Umr Jan, Sahibzada, then said that he was not a person of official rank, but a poor man and a Mullah. Nevertheless, he was able, should the British Government come to terms with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, to exhort the people of his own race and faith to hold fast to the friendship of the British Government, and look upon its enemies as their enemies. For the British being a great Government and a

near neighbour to their country has power of good and evil over it. The interest of Afghanistan, therefore, lies in obtaining the good-will of the English Government.

3. I said to the Sahibzada that I was glad to see that he had so just an appreciation of the true interests of his country, by disregarding which the late Amir had brought about his own ruin. As regards the Sirdar's message, I told the envoys that they were, no doubt, aware that I could say nothing in reply on my own account, but that I would faithfully transmit it to his Excellency the Viceroy of India. They replied, begging my good offices with his Excellency, to which I gave no answer.

No. 11.

No. 51 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 39,* dated the 28th February 1881,

Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, No. 1104P., dated 21st February, 1881, and enclosure.

Letter to the Government of the Punjab, No. 479E.P., dated 12th March 1881.

we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted on the margin, regarding the arrangements finally concluded with the Khyber Afridis for the

future security of the Khyber Pass.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

From Lieut.-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 21st February 1881.

I HAVE the honour to forward two copies of the Pass Agreement with the Khyber Afridis, corrected in accordance with instructions and finally signed by them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

AGREEMENT with GOVERNMENT signed by the KHYBER AFRIDIS.

WE agree as follows :

1. On the understanding that the British Government maintain political relations with us, while at the same time our independence continues to be fully recognized, we are bound to exclude all other influence, and not to admit the interference of any other power between ourselves and the British Government.

2. In consideration of receiving certain allowances, the amount of which Government has engaged to fix, we hereby undertake the responsibility of preserving order and security of life and property within the Khyber Pass.

3. All matters affecting the Pass arrangements and especially the security of the road shall be submitted to a combined council of all the Afridi tribes. Through this council, arrangements will be made such as will provide for the security of the lives and property of all who use the Khyber road without distinction of class or race, local being entitled to equal protection with foreign traffic; and care will be taken that no intertribal or personal feuds are pursued on or near the road or posts.

4. No trader or travellers will be allowed to enter the Pass without an order authorizing them to proceed, which will be furnished by the persons responsible, together with a sufficient guard for protection.

Should any prospect of danger present itself, owing to the existence or likelihood of any disturbance on or near the road, we will be responsible for closing the Pass, giving notice to that effect to the Khan of Lalpura, and to the Political Officer at Jamrud, and will further make due provision for the safety of any trade, or travellers within the Pass.

* See page 34.

5. Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to reoccupy at pleasure.

6. We will provide such number of men as Government may direct to carry on the duties of Jezailchis, of whom some force is absolutely necessary to enable us to render the road secure.

These men, having their head-quarters at Jamrud, will be subject to the inspection of the Political Officer, and all arrangements which we make for the distribution of their duties shall be reported to him. Should we wish to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the Political Officer must be obtained.

We fully understand that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, and that, although maintained at Government expense, they are being allowed merely as an additional means of enabling us to fulfil our engagements.

7. So long as we are in receipt of the Khyber allowances the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government alone. We cannot claim any payments of traders or travellers.

8. All offences committed on the road shall be dealt with by the united council of all the tribes, whether individuals or sections of tribes are concerned.

The council shall inflict punishment after the manner of our tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party or parties.

The action taken on the commission of any offence or in regard to the punishment of the offenders shall be reported to the Political Officer, through whom any compensation that is awarded will be paid. If necessary, fines and compensation can be enforced by deductions from the allowances made by Government.

9. In consideration of the allowances of which we shall be in receipt, we further bind ourselves not to commit dacoity, highway robbery, or murder in British territory. Any transgression of this condition will make our allowances liable to forfeiture in payment of fine or compensation due on this account.

10. All arrangements that we make in fulfilling our responsibility for the protection of the road shall be reported to the Political Officer.

All convoys wishing to proceed through the Pass shall be despatched periodically under a guard, and we are responsible for all trade or travellers admitted within the Pass.

11. We will maintain until further orders the standing posts or chowkis which have hitherto been kept up along the road by the tribes and have been paid for from the allowances. The tribal watchmen who occupy them will be employed either in guarding their assigned localities, or in forming part of the escort on the periodical convoys.

12. Of the Government buildings situated in the Pass we consent to take some under our charge, guaranteeing their security; the rest should be dismantled by Government.

We engage to hold the fort of Ali Musjid, understanding that Government will grant an additional company of 100 Jezailchis for this special duty.

13. We undertake to guarantee the safety of the Political Officer, or other official who may have occasion to visit the Khyber Pass; provided that sufficient notice be given us beforehand.

14. It is understood that the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, west of Lundikhana, is the limit of our responsibilities. This is liable to subsequent alteration at the discretion of Government.

15. Permanent arrangements will be made by which posts or expresses can be forwarded at any time night or day.

16. We are prepared to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid, to Jamrud at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of troops from the whole of this road or any part of it. Meanwhile the tribes will preserve their present obligations.

17. We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility; and this position we accept.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 479 E.P., dated Fort William, 12th March 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of PUNJAB.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting the final arrangement which it is proposed to make for the future security of the Khyber Pass. I have already communicated with you by telegram regarding certain parts of the plan which required immediate orders, and I am now to convey to you the orders of the Government of India upon the whole subject.

2. The arrangements impose upon the Afridi tribes entire and exclusive responsibility for the security of the road which passes through the independent tribal territory where the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized. A subsidy of Rupees 87,540 per annum is to be given in allowances to different portions of these tribes, and a body of jezailchis is, in compliance with the wish of the Afridis, to be maintained at a yearly cost of Rupees 87,392 to the British Government. In consideration of these payments the Afridis undertake all responsibility for management of the Pass in accordance with their agreement, and are bound to occupy with the jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor has declared that the groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence, and this opinion, which of course carries, upon such a subject, great weight with the Government of India, the Governor-General in Council has determined to accept.

3. There were, however, certain points of detail which appeared to require special consideration. The correspondence submitted by you showed some divergence of views as to the expediency of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber. The Commissioner would have deferred for a few months the collection of these tolls, on the ground that by collecting them we assume a more direct responsibility than is contemplated by the agreement for the safety of the convoys traversing the Pass; while his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor sees no sufficient reason for not levying the tolls at once, observing that, whether we do so or not, the public will virtually hold the Government of India responsible for the safety of the Pass. The Governor-General in Council concurs with his Honour in preferring that the tolls should be levied at once. The terms of the agreement expressly reserve to the British Government the right of levying tolls, and it is possible that, if at the commencement this right is waived, it may not be altogether easy to levy them hereafter should it be thought advisable to do so; while the suspension of the exercise of our right may be interpreted as an indication of some uncertainty whether the arrangements made with the tribes will have effectually provided for the security of the road. Further it is hardly to be expected that the exemption from transit dues will procure any advantage to travellers and caravans using the road, as the tolls which we should forego would in all probability be exacted by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limit of these arrangements. Under these circumstances, the Government of India approve the recommendations of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on this point, and I am to request that the necessary orders may be issued at his discretion to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. A second question arises as to the responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass. The Governor-General in Council observes that the Commissioner of Peshawur would throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the Pass, and would decline, on the part of Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses. If robberies occur, the complainants are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy, while the British officers assist them by their influence and advice, and reserve the power, in case the tribes fail to act up to their agreement, to withhold the allowances, disband the jezailchis, and close the Pass. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor would, on the other hand, authorize the Political Officer to enquire into individual complaints, and, after the necessary enquiries, award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. After attentive consideration of the opinion of his Honour upon this particular question, the Government of India have formed the conclusion that it is most expedient, on first bringing these arrangements into operation, to follow strictly the procedure laid down in the agreement, and to refer all complaints in the first instance to the jirgahs. Article 8 of the agreement entrusts the jirgah with the power of award and of levying penalties, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. If in

any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgah of all the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance by the British Government of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. In a previous communication from you, and in the telegrams from this Office, the advisability of retaining a body of jezailchis for service within the Pass has been discussed. In sanctioning the retention of the force, the Government of India has been mainly influenced by the argument used in your letter to the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 2140, dated 13th December 1880, and in the letter of the Commissioner to which it is a reply. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties more than 600 men, who might otherwise be disposed to plundering and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. The sanction of the Government of India under certain conditions has already been conveyed to you by telegraph, but I am now to repeat that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council assents to the establishment of the jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men, and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize the force. But it is understood that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice, and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council would again point out that the essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

6. I am to inform you that his Excellency in Council agrees with Sir Robert Egerton in thinking that it is not possible, at any rate for the present, to reduce to any considerable extent the amount of the subsidies to be paid in cash to the Afridis for the protection of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council feels that the arrangements must, to a certain extent, be regarded as experimental. The objects of the Government of India are to keep the Khyber Pass secure and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands. If the arrangements adopted work well and succeed in securing these objects, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the money payments which may be necessary are well worth making.

7. You also treat of the establishments required by the Political Officers in charge of the Khyber Pass arrangements, and of the rate of pay of the jezailchi force. With reference to the latter point, I am to inform you that the Government of India accepts his Honour's recommendation to retain for the present the rate of Rupees 9 per mensem as the pay of a sepoy in the jezailchi force; and will be glad to receive your further proposals on this subject. As regards political establishments, I am to remark that the estimates submitted by you seem to be capable of material reductions; but the Governor-General in Council will reserve the whole subject for separate consideration.

8. In conclusion, I am to inform you that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council fully concurs in the high estimate which Sir Robert Egerton has formed of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., the Commissioner of Peshawur, has conducted these negotiations. The settlement which he has effected by the exercise of great patience and address in dealing with the tribes will, if it proves stable and otherwise permanently successful, be a lasting memorial of valuable services rendered by Colonel Waterfield in his political administration of the frontier of the Peshawur Division of the Punjab.

9. I am also directed to acknowledge the good services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and of his Assistants, and I am to inform you that the work done by them will be borne in mind.

No. 12.

No. 54 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 3, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated 27th March 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul, and of two letters, dated, respectively, 12th and 16th March 1881, from the Amir to the Commissioner.

* No. 50.

† Dated 8th March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a Copy of an Abstract of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 8th March 1881.

After compliments.—A telegram, dated the 7th March 1881, has been received from the Foreign Secretary to the effect that, according to his Excellency the Viceroy's command, I should address a friendly letter to you, intimating that General Amir Ahmad Khan has discharged the duties entrusted to him satisfactorily, and has become well acquainted with the views and sentiments of his Excellency the Viceroy, and has succeeded in obtaining the ammunition, mention of which is made in your Highness' friendly letter. It is now deemed advisable that the above-named General should wait in person upon your Highness and represent minutely and in detail the conversations that he has had with, and all that he has heard from, his Excellency the Viceroy respecting matters in general. His Excellency the Viceroy intends leaving Calcutta for Simla in a few days, and so the General has quitted Calcutta this day, the 8th March, with the object of proceeding direct to Kabul to wait upon your Highness, provided he receives no further orders from your Highness on the road. Should your Highness again depute him to India after he has waited upon, and paid his respects to, your Highness, his Excellency the Viceroy will receive him with pleasure at Simla.

His Excellency the Viceroy's friendly letter to your Highness has been made over to the General, who will deliver it to your Highness when he waits upon you.

General Amir Ahmad Khan will reach Peshawur on the 13th March, if he is not delayed on the road.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of Copy of LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 12th March 1881.

After compliments.—I wrote to your Highness in my previous letter of the 27th February 1881 that cartridges, the nearest possible (to the descriptions given), were held in readiness to be made over to your officials either at Peshawur or at Khyber. Mulla Abu Bakr and Muhammad Akbar accordingly got the camels, received the cartridges from the Peshawur Arsenal, and sent off 202 camel-loads on the 3rd March 1881, and 153 loads on the 6th idem. These were convoyed as far as Lundikhana by a British guard, and thence they were taken over by the men of the Khan of Lalpura, who sent them on.

The detail of the descriptions of the cartridges, &c., will be learned on a perusal of the list enclosed and of the receipt of the above-named persons.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 16th March 1881.

A FRIENDLY letter from you, dated the 8th March, came to hand on the 13th. This letter announced that General Mir Ahmed Khan, after the conclusion of all necessary business, had taken leave of his Excellency the Viceroy. Whatever his Excellency communicated to him and enjoined on him will, no doubt, be a source of benefit for both powers.

Whereas it is necessary to inform the representatives of the British Government regarding the appointment of the Kandahar troops, their officer in command, and his subordinates, I write that 1,000 cavalry, 4,000 infantry, artillery, and khasadars, in all 5,000, have been appointed to proceed in that direction (Kandahar). Of these the cavalry leaving here on the 20th Rabi-ul-Sani (21st March) will arrive in Kandahar between the 2nd and the 5th of Jamaat-ul-Awwal (2nd and 5th April), while the infantry and artillery and khasadars will proceed by regular marches to their destination.

With regard to the governor, the General, and other subordinate officers, General Amir Ahmed Khan was instructed by the representatives of the sublime Government that only such men should be selected to fill these posts who are wholly free from any charge of wrong-doing and have no designs of their own. Accordingly, after thinking the matter over very carefully, and giving one preference over another, I have decided on appointing my cousin, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the son of my uncle Amir Azim Khan, as governor, and nominated Sirdar Shams-ul-din Khan Muhammadzai, Ghulam Hyder Khan Sahibzada, Kazi Said-uddin Khan, and several others, for the subordinate posts of government. General Ghulam Hyder Khan, Tokhi, Commander-in-Chief of the God-granted Government, has been appointed to take charge of the troops.

These men, please God, will serve as an excellent guarantee for the good management of the country. Anything that the officers of Government leave in Kandahar in the way of money, material, tools, and arms, and entrust to my agents, will be made over to these men whose names I have mentioned above. They will arrive with the cavalry first, and General Ghulam Hyder will come up afterwards with the infantry and artillery.

I also write to inform you previously I had appointed Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan in the place of Muhammad Hashim Khan as governor of Kandahar, but the officers of the God-granted Government, and those who were intended to proceed to Kandahar, unanimously voted that Yusuf Khan was not fit for a post of such responsibility and importance, and the only result of sending him will in all probability be a complete failure. His appointment was therefore cancelled.

No. 13.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 13.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, April 8, 1881.

IN conveying to you, in my Despatch of the 19th of November last, the assent of Her Majesty's Government to your recognition of the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the Khyber Pass, after the withdrawal from that position of the British troops, I informed you that I left the details of the arrangements to be thereupon made with those tribes with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency's Government.

2. You now report those details in your letter, No. 39 of the 28th February last, from which I learn that you have concluded a formal agreement with the headmen of the Pass which concedes to their tribes a proper independence within recognized limits, admits the exercise of our own influence over them to the exclusion of that of any other power, invests them with the sole responsibility for the future management of the road, reserves to Government a proper discretion as to withdrawal or possible re-occupation of the Pass, and places the future security of the Khyber on a clear and recognized basis.

3. To effect these objects you have, whilst retaining in your own hands the right of collecting tolls in the Pass, consented to grant annual allowances to different sections of the Afridis to the amount of Rs. 87,540, and to allot a further yearly sum of

Rs. 87,392 to the payment of a corps of Jezailchis which the tribes desire to maintain. You have further arranged to withdraw the British garrisons from the Pass at an early date after the survey of certain alternative routes to Lundikhana and Dakka.

4. Your proceedings appear to be well calculated to effect the objects which Her Majesty's Government have at heart, viz., the proper security of the Khyber Pass and a safe transit through it, with the least possible interference on the part of Government. I have, therefore, to intimate to you their full approval of those proceedings, and their sense of the care with which the arrangements have been conducted and completed by Colonel Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 14.

No. 57 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 10, 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 3rd April 1881, we have the honour

* No. 54, Secret.

† No. 162.

to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Resident at Kandahar, dated the 22nd March,† enclosing letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub

Khan and the Amir of Kabul, and submitting remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the preceding three weeks.

2. We forward also copies of papers and telegrams relating to the instructions issued for the evacuation of Kandahar and to the transfer of the civil administration to the governor appointed by the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that letters have been addressed to the Amir of Kabul, commending to his care and protection the Sirdars and other persons who have served or otherwise assisted the British Government during the occupation of Southern Afghanistan, and who will remain at Kandahar; and that instructions on the same subject have been simultaneously sent to Colonel St. John.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

No. 162, dated Kandahar, 22nd March 1881 (Extract).

FROM Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN forwarding the enclosed copies of letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan to me, from myself to his Highness the Amir, and from his Highness to me, I take the opportunity of submitting a few remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the past three weeks.

2. After the interview with Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, of which I had the honour to give an account in my letter of the 2nd March, I refrained from seeing them until the receipt of your telegram of the 20th ordering their dismissal. No restraint was placed on their movements, but they voluntarily remained in the house placed at their disposal, fearing, at least so Abdulla Khan stated, that their presence in the streets or mosques might occasion disturbances which would prejudice the cause of their master. It was not till the 17th that Sahibzada Umr Jan asked leave to visit his father's grave, situated in a garden outside the town. His passage through the streets, being unexpected, excited little curiosity or comment, and the next day (being Friday) he requested permission to say his prayers in a neighbouring mosque. But the envoys' followers,

circulating freely in the town, brought to them the rumours which have been current for some days past of the approach of the Amir's troops, and for the last week they have been very uneasy as to the success of their mission.

3. After receipt of your telegram of the 21st on the same day, I sent at once for the envoys, and told them that Her Majesty's Government, after careful consideration of the circumstances, believed that the best course in its own interests and those of Afghanistan would be to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on the Amir Abdurrahman Khan; that they had therefore invited him to send a representative and troops to Kandahar as soon as possible, shortly after whose arrival the British army would retire across the Khojak. The envoys stated that the rumour current in the town had prepared them for the announcement I had made; to which I replied that, with the exception of myself and themselves, no one in Kandahar was aware of the settlement made with the Amir, and that I had not lost a day in communicating it to them. Abdulla Khan said that they regretted the decision of Government, both on account of their country and the English, as it would have been a far preferable arrangement to have left Abdurrahman in possession of Kabul and Turkistan, and to have acknowledged Ayub Khan as ruler of Kandahar and Herat. I replied that there could be no use in discussing the matter now; and that for the present the only advice I could give them was to refrain from any attempt to create disturbances, which could only result in detaining the British troops in the country, and to recommend Sirdar Ayub Khan to come to terms, if possible, with the Amir. The envoys then asked when they should leave. I told them that it depended entirely on themselves; and, after a short discussion, it was agreed that they should start to-morrow, the 23rd.

4. The very seasonable and abundant rain which has fallen during the last three weeks has dispelled the apprehension I expressed in former letters of the difficulty, or even impossibility, of feeding the large number of transport animals massed here to provide for the movement of the force on the 15th April. The green crops and young corn, which is here cut for forage, are not only more abundant, but a full fortnight earlier than usual; while the prospect of a good harvest has made sellers anxious to bring their corn to market as soon as possible.

While on the subject of supply, I may mention that the existing contract machinery of the Commissariat should enable them to feed from Kandahar and the neighbourhood a considerable force at Gulistan Karez and Kilah Abdulla, and materially lessen the necessity of bringing large supplies from India for the troops at Quetta.

5. The town revenue, which fell from Rupees 61,000 in December to Rupees 29,000 in January, and again to below Rupees 20,000 in February, is now showing signs of recuperation, the collections for the first 21 days of the current month amounting to nearly Rupees 20,000.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN, dated 10th Rabi-ul-Sani=
11th March 1881.

After compliments.—On the evening of the 7th, I received the kind letter of 26th instant (ultimo?) which you sent me by Yar Muhammad Khan, Peshkidmat. I was very glad to hear that you were well and in good health. The account you give of the honourable treatment you were good enough to show towards my special envoys tends still more to the increase of friendship. It is certain that a man, who puts his hope in, and trusts himself to, the great Government, will succeed in gaining their friendship, and will obtain proper treatment and perfect comfort. Now that Rubullah Khan, Peshkhidmat, is going in your direction, I trouble you with this letter to say that, please God, from your display of hearty kindness, the important business (now in hand) will be settled, and the bond of friendship made strong and enduring. I have nothing else to trouble you with. You will always make me happy by the news of your good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Lient.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar, to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of Kabul, dated Kandahar, 19th March 1881.

After compliments.—Having informed Sirdars Muhammad Husain Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and others of the descendants of Sirdar Mihrdil Khan that the British

Government has it in contemplation to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on your Highness, these Sirdars ask me to forward the enclosed letter to your Highness, and I trust that your Highness will return them a speedy and kind answer. They have faithfully served the British Government, and, if treated with kindness and consideration, will, I have no doubt, be equally loyal to your Highness.

Time does not admit of my communicating with Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, grandson of Sirdar Kohindil Khan, who is in the neighbourhood of Girishk, but I have no doubt that he will welcome your Highness' accession to power here and do good service as he has done to the British Government. Other supporters upon whom your Highness may count are the Popalzai Chiefs, Taj Muhammad Khan, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan, Shahghassis Sarwar Khan and Sarbuland Khan, Achakzia. In the direction of the west, many people are prepared to welcome your coming. Ismail Khan, Taimuni, brother of Anbia Khan of Taiwara, is with me in Kandahar, and his brother writes that he is ready whenever I give the word. Abdulla Khan, Taimuni, is also here; and it is probably known to you that the Chiefs of the Firuzkohis, the Jamshidis, and the Hazaras are all in rebellion. Sirdar Ahmad Khan, Ishakzai, of Lash Jowain, Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, of Chakansur, Sharif Khan of Kalah-i-Fath, are all devoted to the British Government and ready to support its friend. Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, is also here with me. It would be well if your Highness wrote letters of kindness and consideration to all these people, so as to bind them to your interests. About other people, such as the Alizais of Zamindawar and other Duranis, as well as the Mullahs, Mustaufi Abdul Ghias Khan is writing to you.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR to the RESIDENT, Kandahar, dated
25th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have to inform you that I have received a despatch from his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 30th January 1881. With great kindness he has given me the news that I am to have the government of Kandahar, and has informed me that the English Government will support me with money and munitions of war. He also urges me to make speedy arrangements for the affairs of that province. I have made known the Viceroy's joyful communication to all the people in Turkistan and Afghanistan, and it also seemed necessary that I should write and send letters to the people of Kandahar and Pusht-i-Rud, and inform them of the real object of the Government, and of its kindness towards me. Therefore I have written friendly letters to all the nobles and great people of the province, and sent them by my own messengers, and I have ordered Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, son of the late Khushdil Khan, and Mirza Abdul Ghias Khan, son of the late Mirza Ahmed Khan, to distribute them to the individuals and tribes concerned. For messengers to carry these letters to Pusht-i-Rud, Pishin, and other districts, they will require some money, so (I hope) you will give them Rupees 2,000 from the treasury. Please God, henceforth I will inform you from time to time of any arrangements I may make for the government of the country.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Specimen (*translated*) of Amir's circular letters.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER addressed by AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to SYUD SHERDIL and SYUD MARWAND of Kandahar, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Certainly you are aware that I set foot in Afghanistan at a time when the misfortune and trouble of the tribes and the people of Afghanistan had reached their zenith; and that for the well-being of the people I laid the foundation of sincere friendship with the sublime British Government, so that the people of Afghanistan might benefit by any advantages to be derived from (the friendship of) that Government. During the last seven months of my rule in the capital, Kabul, you have surely heard of the remission of "Sarmarda"* and other remissions granted to the Ghilzais, the Kohistanis, and the other tribes, as well as of the abolition of arbitrary exactions and of other favours and benefits conferred by me.

* Capitation-tax on men.

The sublime British Government has recently handed over† the government of Kandahar to me. It is therefore necessary to gratify and gladden you by communicating this happy news to you, and to acquaint you with my intentions and wishes. Whereas I look upon you as my devoted well-wishers, whose interests are identical to mine, I intend to spend these few days of my life in promoting your happiness and welfare and in sympathizing with you. For the purpose of defending your honour, and enhancing your reputation and dignity, I deem it advisable and expedient to administer Kandahar. Rest assured that, as long as you live, you will enjoy happiness, comfort, and prosperity, under the shadow of my kindness and mercy. No doubt you will reply to this speedily; and, in doing so, you will also write regarding your own circumstances.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

Khureeta, dated Simla, 2nd April 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

THE city of Kandahar has now been for more than two years in the occupation of the British troops. During this period the British officers have received assistance in various ways from different Sirdars and other persons residing in the country, who have given their services in the maintenance of good order in the town and the adjacent districts, and who have generally shown their friendship and good-will toward the British Government. And since the administration of Kandahar is now to be made over to your Highness' officials, the security, in person and property, of all people in whom the British Government is thus interested, and who will remain at Kandahar and in the neighbourhood after the withdrawal of the British troops, becomes a matter of particular concern to the Government of the Queen-Empress.

I therefore write this letter to commend earnestly all such persons to your care and protection, and to request that your Highness, regarding as your own friends all friends of the British Government, may be pleased to issue speedily the necessary instructions to your governor at Kandahar, enjoining him to consider under his special charge, and to treat with proper consideration, all persons on behalf of whom my representatives there may desire his good offices.

Colonel St. John, who is the British Resident at Kandahar, has been directed to communicate upon this subject with your Highness' governor as soon as he shall have arrived at that place.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

No. 618 E.P., dated Simla, 3rd April 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information and guidance, copy of a letter addressed by his Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir of Kabul. You will observe that his Highness has been asked

Dated 2nd April 1881. to lose no time in issuing instructions to his officers at Kandahar for the proper protection, in person and property, of Sirdars and others who have adhered to the interests of the British Government during the period of our occupation of Kandahar, and who will remain there after the administration shall have been transferred to the Amir.

2. I am to request that you will communicate the substance of this letter, in anticipation of orders from Kabul, to the Amir's representatives at Kandahar, that you will impress upon them the importance attached to the matter by the British Government, that you will consider what arrangements may be best adapted for giving effect to the Viceroy's wishes, and that you will submit a report of your conclusions. It is not probable, under the circumstances, that any persons in South Afghanistan who may have identified themselves with our administration will find it necessary to withdraw with our troops, but for such cases, if they occur, you are authorised to make proper temporary provision.

3. I am also to instruct you that all practicable measures should be taken for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers at Kandahar and elsewhere in the vicinity.

No. 15.

No. 60 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 17, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated the 10th April 1881, we have the honour
to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,
* No. 57. copies of three letters from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency

the Viceroy, dated, respectively, the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April, and of the
Viceroy's reply to his Highness.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency
the VICEROY, dated 28th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 18th March 1881, corresponding to the 17th Rabi-ul-Sani. The benign expressions contained therein have gladdened my heart. It is indeed an excellent (arrangement) that your Excellency on certain occasions, in order to save time, telegraphs your Excellency's messages to the Commissioner of Peshawur, who communicates them to me. I too find it necessary in some matters to write to the Commissioner to report them to your Excellency by telegraph.

Regarding the ammunition, your Excellency has written that, besides the quantity requested by me, which has already been sent, if I want any more, it is also ready and available. Your Excellency is very kind indeed. The quantity of ammunition I asked for, and which your Excellency sent, I required for the muskets I had in my possession.

Now that I consider it incumbent upon me to organize Kandahar and strengthen that province, while the affair of Herat stares me in the face, and should not be lost sight of, or be easily passed over, the things that I require and are indispensably necessary are

12,000 rifles and two batteries of breech-loading* guns
of superior English manufacture. Out of the number
12,000, 3,000 should be cavalry carbines and 9,000
infantry muskets. Therefore I beg to apprise your

Excellency, who is my kind benefactor and who sympathizes with me, that if this my object is fulfilled, *viz.*, guns and rifles are granted, I hope, by God's grace, that all the affairs of Afghanistan will be completely arranged, and that all difficulties will be solved. The fulfilment of this important object is in your Excellency's hands. Your Excellency has the power to grant as many (rifles, &c.) as you like, more or less (than the number requested). The artillery will prove useful and be very acceptable, wherever Your Excellency may be pleased to grant it, whether at Kabul or at Kandahar. The equipment of an army, which I can move and march personally, and which may be equal to great occasions, depends upon muskets.

In regard to the taking over of Kandahar from the British authorities, I have despatched my governor and other civil and military officers with 5,000 well-equipped troops. The cavalry will arrive at Kandahar first, and the infantry, the artillery, and the Jezailchis, afterwards. It is hoped that my troops will enter Kandahar in good condition, and that the British forces will leave it cheerfully and successfully at the appointed time for their destination.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th March 1881.

After compliments.—Whereas it is absolutely necessary to arrange the affairs of Kandahar, and the question of Herat is one that, under all circumstances, must be faced,* all my attention and energy must, with the divine help, be devoted to that quarter, so that we, who have the same interests and cares,† may be relieved from anxiety by the completion of its arrangements. But large sums of money will be expended on the materials (required) and on the said arrangements. The five lakhs of rupees, now available at Peshawur, will have to wait there for some time owing to the want of order in the Khyber‡ Pass; but they will shortly arrive by hundis (bills). The five lakhs payable at Kandahar will not be sufficient for the arrangements I have in view. I hope that fifteen lakhs may be granted to me on (my)§ arrival at Kandahar from the Government Treasury. These fifteen lakhs, with the five lakhs payable at Kandahar, will answer all important purposes. All expenses (of the march) from Kabul to Kandahar will be defrayed from the money I have in Kabul. In short, I have acquainted your Excellency with the real state of my affairs, so that at the time of carrying out important projects I may not find myself arrested and embarrassed, and that I may commence the business and engage in the project with my mind at ease.

* i.e., demands immediate attention.
—A. C. L.

† This hints that the two Governments have equal cause for anxiety.—
A. C. L.

‡ The money passed at once through the Khyber, which is in complete order.—
A. C. L.

§ May be, arrival of my troops.—
A. C. L.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 1st April 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter of the 8th March 1881, sent by the hand of General Amir Ahmad Khan, who also communicated to me your Excellency's verbal orders. I have been extremely pleased at your Excellency's kindnesses.

With regard to Kandahar I have been, and am, day and night, busy with preparations and arrangements for despatching troops there.

I divided the troops into three parts. I sent the cavalry, 1,000 strong, with the governor and experienced men first. I then despatched General Ghulam Haidar Khan with three infantry regiments, 600 strong each, and five pieces of artillery, and Sikandar Khan with 1,000 khasadars (irregulars) on the 24th March; and I shall wait myself till the arrival of the first division. I will let your Excellency know what I think proper to do hereafter. I shall take with me to Kandahar as many troops as I can provide with transport and other equipment, as also all the tribal Chiefs of Kabul, whose presence here may be considered injurious, and shall leave faithful servants and conscientious officials at Kabul.

Also your Excellency has been pleased to propose that your Excellency's agent, Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, Suddozai, should reside at my court. This is very considerate of your Excellency. The immediate presence of your Excellency's agent will have no other effect but to conduce to my welfare, to the good management of the affairs of Afghanistan, and to the prosperity and peace of this country. There are many advantages in the presence of your Excellency's agent (here). It will stop the tongues of the enemies from slander and idle talk. But the ignorance of the evil-minded persons, the unwisdom of the principal persons in Afghanistan, and the short-sightedness of this nation, are manifest. They incite the people to tumult and commotion, and drive them out of the path of humanity. A wise man is unwise in their sight. They lead people astray, and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. For, when there is an established ruler in the country, they cannot serve their own ends and cannot make heavy purses. From these ill motives they do not love peace, and prefer disquietude and confusion. For their own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and ruined. From their ignorance they do not know and see what would tend to their lasting comfort.

For all these reasons, and at this time, when the name of Herat still exists,* and the affair of Kandahar is not yet settled, I feel apprehensive lest something should proceed from the ignorance of the people of this country, in consequence of which the labour of the British officers and my exertions, and the pains I have taken during the last eight months, may be, God forbid, utterly thrown away. In my opinion it would be appropriate, advisable, and advantageous, if your Excellency would kindly defer this matter till I go to Kandahar, and, having arranged its affairs, despatch troops to Herat. Then on my return to Kabul I will bring Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan with me, and, God willing, all matters will (then) be properly arranged. Should your Excellency even now think Muhammad Afzal Khan's presence at Kabul beneficial to the interests of your Excellency's Government, I have no objection. He will be received at Kabul with all due respect. I have written these few remarks as my judgment and reason have directed me. As I am only one person, this is all that my mind has suggested to me. The illustrious British Government has many intelligent and experienced men. Should they think otherwise it will not also be far from right; for they have seen and tried the Afghans well, and are well versed in civil and military affairs. I will agree to whatever they think right. I have expressed my opinion in the matter. I trust, by God's grace, that I shall always be true to my word, that your Excellency will continue to be kind to me, and that I shall maintain my good reputation.

I have postponed deputing General Amir Ahmad Khan (to India) till I hear from the Commissioner of Peshawur. Should your Excellency wish him to come, your Excellency will be good enough to ask the Commissioner by telegraph to let me know, and I will send him.

Further, I continually pray to God for your Excellency's good health.

P.S.—After I finished this letter it occurred to me that your Excellency might suspect that I do not like to receive Muhammad Afzal Khan, and so I assure your Excellency that there are no other reasons than those mentioned above for not receiving him. Should your Excellency depute the Sirdar alone for a week, so that he may interview me and then go back, your Excellency can do so.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Khureeta, dated 16th April 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving lately three letters from your Highness, dated respectively the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April 1881, concerning the affairs of Afghanistan, and particularly in regard to the measures which you have adopted for the establishment of your government at Kandahar.

2. It is a matter of much satisfaction to the British Government that the arrangements for the despatch of your Highness' troops to Kandahar have been ordered with vigour and promptitude. I have issued the necessary instructions to my officers to make over to your Highness' Governor the administration of that city; and the time for the final withdrawal of the British troops has been so fixed as to allow time for the arrival of your Highness' troops from Kabul.

3. With regard to your Highness' representations regarding arms and ammunition, and a further subsidy of money, they have received my careful attention, and I have had much pleasure in making some provision for your Highness' present requirements at Kandahar. Three batteries of artillery and a number of rifles with ammunition are now being sent from India to Kandahar for the equipment of your Highness' forces at that place.

4. I have also caused your Governor at Kandahar to be informed that, besides the five lakhs already given to him there, his resources will be supplemented by a temporary allotment from the British Government of Rupees 50,000 monthly for his expenses in establishing his administration. The question of additional pecuniary assistance hereafter will be fully considered, although in regard to arms the matter is not free from difficulty, and I am at present disposed to recommend your Highness to use every endeavour to purchase arms within Afghanistan itself.

5. I observe that your Highness entertains some doubt as to the expediency of Sirdar Afzal Khan's deputation at the present time to Kabul. Under existing circumstances,

I am willing to defer to your Highness' judgment and to your experience and appreciation of the present condition of Afghanistan. Therefore, since your Highness considers that it will be good policy to adjourn for the present the Sirdar's deputation to Kabul, I agree that the arrangement may be postponed until the settlement of the country shall have been more completely accomplished.

6. In the meantime, as it appears from your Highness' letter that the return of General Mir Ahmad Khan to India is adjourned until you shall have heard again upon the subject, I reply that I shall be happy to receive again in India Mir Ahmad Khan, or any other representative whom your Highness may depute to reside near my government.

No. 16.

No. 64 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 24, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated the 17th April 1881, we have the honour
to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a
*No. 60. letter from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated the
12th April 1881.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPS
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure in No. 16.

TRANSLATION OF LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to His Excellency the VICEROY and
GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 12th April 1881.

YOUR Excellency's kind letter, dated April 2nd, recommending the Sirdars and other residents of Kandahar who have rendered service and aid to the British Government during the last two years, to my protection and care, has been received and perused by me, and I have fully understood its contents.

Your Excellency may rest quite assured that I have no other than kindly intentions and benign feelings towards the Sirdars and Chiefs and nobles, and all the people of Afghanistan, especially towards those people of Kandahar who have made themselves conspicuous for their friendship and assistance to the British Government. I have every wish to show consideration and sympathy for them; but with regard to the Sirdars and Chiefs of Kandahar one condition is necessary, namely, that they should show me such devotion and sincerity as cannot be surpassed, for they have been friends of yours as am I, and I sympathise also with them. If under the cloak of friendship they plot mischief and work enmity against me, then shall I, without doubt, punish and chastise them. I will leave no source of disturbance in my kingdom. And as the representatives of the sublime British Government have bespoken my good offices for them, so I hope they too may be directed to practise sincerity and obedience to me, and not to allow vain thoughts or absurd ideas to enter their heads. Please God, provided they obey me and act in concert with me, they will be treated with the greatest consideration and kindness. A list of those persons who have done service for both Governments should be sent to me, so that they may be recognised and treated with kindness.

No. 17.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 20.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, April 29, 1881.

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of letters of your Excellency's Government, Nos. 21, 35, and 40, dated respectively the 2nd, 21st, and 28th February, reporting the measures adopted or proposed by you, with the object of giving effect to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in respect to Kandahar and the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi, and transmitting minutes recorded by some of your Excellency's colleagues on the subject.

2. It may be necessary for me, on a subsequent occasion, to make some observations on the minutes above referred to. If I abstain from discussing them in this despatch, I adopt that course from no want of respect to the writers, or from a failure to appreciate the weight attaching to many of the arguments adduced. No good purpose, however, would be served by prolongation of controversy upon a question which had of necessity to be finally determined upon the responsibility of the Home Government, in regard to which much conflict of opinion was known to exist amongst the advisers of your Excellency, and upon which the ultimate decision was not formed without the most attentive consideration of the arguments on both sides, and of the views of the dissentient members of your Government, with the general nature of which your Excellency had taken care to make me acquainted in an unofficial form. As regards Kandahar, moreover, the most authoritative objections appear to me to be less to the principles of the policy enjoined than to details of its execution; while the question of Pishin has, I think, been discussed under some degree of misapprehension as to the immediate purpose of Her Majesty's Government.

3. The question of greatest urgency at the date of my despatch of the 11th November was that of the disposal of the city and province of Kandahar. That despatch, while stating at length the reasons which led Her Majesty's Government to regard as highly impolitic either the annexation of the city and adjacent territory to the British dominions, or the maintenance of a British garrison in support of a native ruler, suggested the transfer of the province to the Amir, Abdul Rahman, as the arrangement which seemed to offer the best guarantees for permanence, and the avoidance of internal dissensions. In opening communication, therefore, with the Amir, in view to an early assumption by him of authority over the city and dependent districts, your Excellency in Council adopted a course which was in complete harmony with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, who equally approve of your determination that the retirement of the British forces, having been decided upon in principle, should not be postponed beyond the date when the movement could be effected without grave risk to the health of the troops.

4. I reserve for a later period, when the movements now pending shall be completed, such remarks as may be required upon the course of the correspondence which has passed with the Amir, and in regard to the arrangements connected with the occupation of Kandahar by his Governor and troops. I content myself at present with expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that, notwithstanding indications to the contrary, the Amir should ultimately have found himself able to collect and despatch a force, sufficient, apparently, for the immediate purpose, within the period specified by your Excellency, and that, so far as appears from the latest telegraphic reports, the actual transfer has been effected without difficulty or disturbance. Her Majesty's Government feel that the tranquillity which at present prevails can scarcely be expected to remain unbroken, but if, as they trust will be the case, the character of the Amir's internal administration is such as to render the people disinclined to afford active support to attempts that may be made to subvert his authority, his Highness, with the liberal aid in money and material which he will have received from the Government of India, should be enabled to maintain and consolidate his power.

5. As regards Pishin and Sibi, which were assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of Gandamak, and have since been administered by British Officers, my despatch of the 3rd December last stated shortly the reasons which seemed to Her Majesty's Government to recommend retirement from those districts, as from Kandahar, and deprecated the "continuance of any part of an alternative policy which was not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consisted in its forming part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which had been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers;" but no such positive instructions were conveyed to your Excellency in Council as to preclude you from full consideration of the

question on its merits, or from expressing to Her Majesty's Government your deliberate views in regard to it; and you have rightly understood them as leaving to the Government of India a large discretion as to the time and manner of giving effect to the policy which Her Majesty's Government were desirous should be pursued.

6. From paras. 5 and 6 of your letter of the 2nd February, and from the papers enclosed in subsequent communications, I learn that, while accepting in principle the severance of our political connection with Pishin and Sibi when circumstances permit, your Excellency and the majority of your colleagues are decidedly of opinion that our occupation of those districts cannot immediately be terminated without risk of great injury to the interests of the people, and that its continuance for the present, while of no disadvantage to the British Government, need not involve the serious political embarrassments contemplated in my despatch of the 3rd December. Representations in the same sense have been made to me by Sir R. Sandeman, your Excellency's Agent in Beluchistan, who is now in this country.

7. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change their opinion as to the inexpediency of the permanent retention of the assigned districts, they recognize the difficulties in the way of immediate or early withdrawal from them, and they are fully sensible that, in this respect, their policy must be influenced by considerations which did not apply in the case of Kandahar. At no time were the people of that province led to expect the maintenance, in any shape, of direct British rule; while such pledges as were given in regard to the future native government of the country were subject to conditions which were almost immediately violated. In Pishin and Sibi the case is different. The people have no doubt, as your Excellency in Council observes, been encouraged to believe that British rule would continue; their relations with our officers have been conducted upon that assumption; and their behaviour has been generally good. While, therefore, it is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that retirement from these districts, as from the rest of Afghan territory, may take place at no distant date, the decision on the question must evidently in some degree depend upon the course of events at Kandahar. As under these circumstances the existing administrative arrangements will have to be maintained for the present, it is not desirable that the minds of the people should be disturbed by anticipations of immediate change; and I, accordingly, on the 14th instant, authorized your Excellency by telegraph to abstain from any announcement of final retirement, unless you deemed such an announcement to be expedient.

8. In thus communicating to you the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the postponement of the relinquishment of Pishin and Sibi, I rely on your Excellency to take care that no step will be taken which might place any permanent obstacle in the way of the ultimate fulfilment of the policy indicated in my despatch of the 3rd December last. I shall be glad to be furnished at an early date with a full statement of the measures which you propose to adopt for the temporary administration of the districts, with details of the arrangements for their military protection, and that of the line of communication, together with a statement of the estimated cost of those arrangements and of the civil administration, as well as particulars of the extent of the country to be temporarily retained under British control. Upon none of these points have I received any information, either in the political or the military department. From your Excellency's telegrams I learn that Her Majesty's troops will continue at present to hold the positions commanding the passes of the Amran range, by which I understand positions on the western side of the Khojak. I should wish to be informed whether it is contemplated that this arrangement will be necessary for any length of time, and which of the posts to be held are within the recognized limits of Pishin. The strength of the force which, according to apparently authoritative statements in the public press, has been detailed to remain at Quetta and along the line from Chaman to Sibi is largely in excess of what Her Majesty's Government had anticipated would be required, even temporarily, and seems to be inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers under acknowledgment as to the facility with which the assigned districts could be held. The retention, therefore, beyond the frontier for any length of time of a force not required for objects of a purely local character, such as from the tenor of your Lordship's despatch you appear to have had mainly in view in desiring to postpone the evacuation of the territory in question, might tend to a belief that it is designed for purposes of possible future intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which are no less opposed to your Lordship's views and intentions than to those of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 18.

No. 68 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 1, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 24th* April, we have the honour to
forward copy of a letter† from Lieut.-Colonel St. John,

* No. 64.

† Dated 15th April 1881, No. 211.

submitting, with reference to the instructions sent him
on the 3rd April, a report on the measures adopted by
him in regard to the proper protection, in person and
property, of Sirdars and others, remaining in Kandahar, who have adhered to British
interests during our occupation of the province. It will be seen also that Colonel
St. John has taken steps for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers,
and for the care of the cemeteries at Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 211, dated Kandahar, 15th April 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 618 E.P., of the
3rd instant.

2. After announcing to the Sirdars and other notables that the administration of the
province has been committed to the Amir's representatives, I took the opportunity of
stating publicly that His Excellency the Viceroy had written to His Highness the Amir,
commending to his protection and favour all our adherents of every rank in Kandahar.
Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan replied that he had special instructions from His Highness
not only to afford full protection to all friends of the British Government, but to treat
them with marked favour and distinction.

3. I have no doubt of the sincerity of this declaration, and as long as the Amir's
authority is recognised in Kandahar I believe that our adherents will have nothing to
fear. The best proof of this is in the action of the people themselves, the majority of our
adherents deliberately preferring to remain in Kandahar instead of accompanying us to
Pishin. The only exceptions are a few individuals who, having amassed large sums as
contractors or employés of the Commissariat, prefer placing themselves and their
fortunes in perfect security by retiring with the army to Quetta. It may also be
surmised that they have future profits in view, and will continue their trade as purveyors
to the army as heretofore. This class does not deserve any particular consideration
at our hands. The only other emigrants are certain of the Farsiwan Mirzas, who have
been in the confidential employ of the political department as writers and collectors of
revenue, and consider that they have made themselves particularly obnoxious to the
Afghans. All are people of substance, and for some I shall be able to find employment
in Pishin. None are however permanently breaking off their connexion with Kandahar;
but are leaving members of their families in charge of their property, alleging a pilgrimage
to Kerbala or their duty to us as excuses for leaving the country. A year or two hence,
or less, when Afghanistan has settled down, they believe that they will be able to return
without risk.

4. The following measures appear to me advisable for the protection of their
property. I am having a list made out of all persons, natives of Kandahar,
who have obtained permission to retire with the troops to Quetta, with a statement
of their property and the names of the agents left in charge. This I propose to

forward to the Amir's governor with a letter informing him that Her Majesty's Government expects him to protect the property of the individuals therein named, as well as to secure any person in Kandahar from suffering injury or oppression on account of any part he may have taken on our side in the events of the last two and a half years.

5. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's verbal assurances leave no doubt that the answer to this letter will guarantee to the utmost power of the Amir's officials the safety of the lives and property of adherents of the British Government. I am in addition giving letters of recommendation to all those of our friends remaining in Kandahar.

6. The subject of the conservation of the graves of British officers and men has for some time engaged my attention, and has recently formed the subject of correspondence between General Hume and myself. Six places in Kandahar have been used at different times for the interment of Christians of the force. A detailed description of them will be found in the Appendix attached. The first three are in public land. The next two, in which the victims of the sortie of the 16th August are buried, are on private property. I have therefore bought the land from the owners, and obtained formal deeds of sale from them in duplicate. One copy will be left with our agent here, and the other deposited in the records of the office of the Agent to Governor-General at Quetta. Besides the ordinary formula for the transfer of land, the deeds set forth that the ground, being consecrated to a purpose considered holy by Mussulmen and Christians alike, is "wakf," and the fact of its being so is attested on the deed by the principal mullahs of the town. The graves of Colonel Nicholletts and Lieutenant Widdington at Kokeran are on the private property of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. This is at present confiscated, and as long as it is so the graves will be looked after in the same way as those elsewhere. Should the owner return, I do not think that there is any fear of his not protecting the graves from desecration.

7. All the cemeteries in Kandahar are carefully walled in, and will be committed to the care of the agent left here. Before leaving I intend visiting them all in company with the deputy governor to commit them formally to his charge. I have also asked certain respectable merchants to visit the cemeteries from time to time and inform me at Quetta if they are not respected.

8. I have no fear of the burying places being desecrated except in case of an early popular outbreak against the Amir's rule, in which case fanaticism might take the form of destroying the monuments over the graves of the infidels who made the country over to him. But this is hardly probable, and I trust that the measures taken will be efficacious in preserving the graves and monuments from injury and desecration.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

LIST OF BURIAL PLACES AT KANDAHAR.

1. PRINCIPAL cemetery. This is situated about a thousand yards north of the city, exactly opposite the Idgah gate, and near the middle of the large area taken up by Muhammadan grave-yards. It encloses the site of the cemetery used by General Nott's force in 1839-42, which was discovered without difficulty by us in 1879. The surrounding wall had been levelled, and the monuments, if there were any, destroyed; but the graves themselves had not been disturbed, and were easily recognisable by their lying east and west, instead of north and south. This cemetery now contains 437 graves, including those of the following officers, as shown by inscriptions:—

Lieutenants Farrington and Harris, 15th Foot.
 Surgeon Walsh, B.M.D.
 Captain Weigall and Lieutenant Bishop, 11th Foot.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers.
 Captain Chisholm, 59th Foot.
 Surgeon-Major Bolton.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, 72nd.
 Captain Frome, 72nd.
 Captain Stratton.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Shewell, Bombay S.C.
 Lieutenant Anderson, 25th P.N.I.
 Major Powys, 59th Foot.
 Captain Sargent, 78th Foot.

There are also monuments to 5 officers and 64 men of the 7th Fusiliers, killed or died of wounds or disease in Afghanistan; and to 2 officers, 7 sergeants, 5 corporals, 3 drummers, and over 100 privates of the 11th Foot, died of disease.

The cemetery is enclosed by a high wall with a solid gate.

2. The second cemetery is in the open ground inside the city, west of the citadel, now used by the Commissariat as a store-yard. It contains 62 graves, including those of Lieutenant Hennell, B.S.C., and Lieutenant Lendrum, R.A.

3. The third burial place is the garden of the citadel, in which are interred the bodies of Major Reynolds, Sind Horse, and Lieutenant Willis, R.A.

4. No. 4 is a piece of ground on the south side of the city, and was taken up as a burial place during the siege. It contains 26 graves, including those of—

Major Vandeleur, and Lieutenant Wood, 7th Fusiliers.

Major Trench, and Lieutenant Hayner, 19th Bombay N.I.

Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., and the Rev. Mr. Gordon.

I have purchased the ground and enclosed it with a wall.

5. No. 5 is a spot about 700 yards outside the town, and 300 from the village of Deh Khoja. It contains but two graves, in one of which are buried the bodies of the Englishmen, and in the other those of the natives of India left behind in the retreat from the sortie of the 16th August. They were discovered on the 25th, and buried the same afternoon in the nearest convenient spot to where they fell. Among them are Lieutenant-Colonel Newport, 28th Bombay N.I., and Captain Cruickshank, R.E. The graves are covered in with masonry, and I am now having them surrounded by a substantial wall.

6. The only graves out of Kandahar are those of Colonel Nicholletts, 29th Bombay N.I., and Lieutenant Widdington, 10th Bombay N.I., which are on the estate of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan at Kokeran, seven miles from Kandahar. They are about 60 yards in front of the main entrance of the Sartip's house.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 19.

No. 80 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 22, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,

* Dated 13th May 1881. copies of two letters from the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy, dated respectively the 29th April 1881 and the 3rd May 1881, and of his Excellency's reply* to the first letter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th April 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 16th April 1881, corresponding to the 16th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1298 H., has reached me; and I am exceedingly gratified at your Excellency's conspicuous favours and befitting kindnesses. I have fully understood all that your Excellency has written in reply to my epistle regarding my want of arms, of ammunition, and of money, (viz.) that at present three batteries of artillery and a certain number of rifles with ammunition have been made

over to my officials; and that, in addition to the five lakhs of rupees, a monthly subsidy of Rs. 50,000 will be granted for expenses to the governor of Kandahar for some time; and with regard to the arms your Excellency intimated that I should use my best efforts to procure them within Afghanistan itself.

I have also understood what your Excellency wrote, that you have, agreeably to my opinion (wishes), deferred deputing (to Kabul) Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan; and that I should appoint an agent to reside near your Excellency's Government in India.

My real object and chief aim in cultivating a sincere friendship and a cordial affection with the sublime Government is to secure credit and character for veracity, faithfulness, and a strict observance of the duties of an engagement. I have never the eye of cupidity and covetousness fixed on worldly pomps and pageants. Had not the resources of Afghanistan (collected) in 100 years been destroyed, and had the old house of our forefathers remained in a flourishing state, I should never have troubled the representatives of the sublime Government about pecuniary aid and the munitions of war. Now that all that constituted the glory and lustre of the Afghan empire has vanished, and that all the accoutrements of the army have disappeared and fallen into many hands, it is impossible to collect the arms that have dispersed and to recover the property that has been plundered and is scattered in the highlands and the outlying districts. Whereas the two Governments have joint interests, I wrote previously what I am writing now, and I write (again) that money, guns, and ammunition, are not such things as can be procured with ease and facility and in a short time in this country. It is absolutely necessary to administer the affairs of Afghanistan (at once), and so this matter cannot be kept in abeyance and deferred to a future time. Further, the matter rests with your Excellency. The more your Excellency attends to, and thinks with care of, the welfare of Afghanistan, the more beneficial it will be to the interests of the two States.

In compliance with your Excellency's wishes, I will certainly appoint a confidential agent to India with the greatest pleasure, and I will shortly arrange this matter. What more can I write than the professions of friendship?

P.S.—Whereas the officers of the sublime Government have, by making over to me the administration of Afghanistan, imposed an important duty on me and entrusted me with a grand project to carry out, of which they and I are well aware, my urgent solicitations for putting to rights the affairs of this country are not for (the exigencies of) to-day, but they are made with regard to the future. The reason why I write so frequently and repeat the subject is that I feel apprehensive for the future, lest, peradventure, when the honourable (British) officers call upon me to perform that important service, I should fail to acquit myself well. The people of Afghanistan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection and aspire to the position of rulers.

Under these circumstances, and with such people, and having regard to my solicitude for the morrow, my demand is not out of place.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 3rd May 1881.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that from the day of the arrival of my Sirdars, officials, and troops, at their destination, Kandahar, up to the moment Her Imperial Majesty's forces marched away and departed from that city, whatever friendship, the community of interests, affection, and concord required was done to the officials of this God-granted Government through the friendly exertions of Colonel St. John, the Resident of Kandahar, and of Nawab Hasan Ali Khan, his assistant; and that the officials of this God-granted Government express themselves, in their letters received by me, pleased and satisfied at the civility and courtesy shown to them by the above-mentioned two officers. Therefore, relying upon (the contents of) those letters, I express what I have in my mind, and write to inform your Excellency that I am exceedingly pleased and satisfied with the Colonel and the Nawab alluded to above, and my pleasure will undoubtedly cause joy and delight to your Excellency's benevolent heart.

Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

Dated Simla, the 13th May 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

After compliments.—I have received and given careful consideration to your Highness' friendly letter, dated 29th April.

I learn with pleasure that your Highness proposes shortly to arrange for the deputation of a confidential agent to India.

It has been a matter of gratification to me that I have been able to inform Her Majesty's Government that, on the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar, the administration of the province was placed in the hands of your Highness' governor, and that the city was left in the occupation of your Highness' troops. And since the expenses incidental upon the rapid despatch of a force from Kabul to Kandahar, and upon other arrangements necessary for the assumption of the government of the province, may have caused some temporary pressure upon your Highness' finances, I have directed the sum of 5 lakhs to be placed at once at the disposal of your Highness at Peshawur. The Commissioner will await your Highness' instructions regarding the money.

I trust your Highness will accept the assurance of my sincere wish for your welfare and for your success in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan.

No. 20.

No. 84 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 3, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, dated the 29th April, upon the subject of the retention under British administration of the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi.

2. In the second paragraph of this despatch, some doubt is expressed whether, when the question of Pishin was discussed in your previous despatches, the immediate purposes of Her Majesty's Government had been rightly apprehended. We understand, however, that your Lordship is nevertheless generally disposed to approve and to acquiesce in the views and arguments submitted by our letter of the 2nd February. Her Majesty's Government, while adhering to the policy laid down by your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd December, and while looking forward to the retirement at no distant date of the British troops from these districts, recognizes the difficulties in the way of early withdrawal, and the necessity of maintaining for the present the existing administrative arrangements. And your Lordship desires to be furnished at an early date with a full statement containing all the details of the military and political measures proposed by the Government of India for the temporary administration of the country to be thus retained.

3. Before proceeding to lay our proposals before your Lordship, we think it may be convenient to dispose of a subsidiary point, which is touched upon at the close of your despatch now under acknowledgment. It appears to us important to explain that the retention at the present moment of a force of considerable strength at Quetta, and along the line from Chaman to Sibi, is in no respect inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers to which your Lordship has alluded.

4. When, in the minutes transmitted with our despatches of February, the opinion was expressed that Pishin might be held with comparative facility, the subject-matter then under discussion was undoubtedly the indefinite retention under assignment of that district. And although in the sixth paragraph of our 2nd February despatch the view taken was that our political authority might be upheld temporarily in Pishin by a detachment supported from Quetta, yet neither in the minutes nor in the despatch were the references to this question intended to have any bearing upon the state of affairs that might immediately ensue upon the withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar to the Kojak line. It would have been impossible, we submit, to calculate early in last February what proportion of the troops returning from Kandahar might be detained in Pishin and about Quetta during the summer, and, as a matter of fact, the attempt was not made. For, in the first place, if Pishin were to be held at all (and our despatches

assumed that Kandahar and Pishin would not be simultaneously relinquished), the precise strength that might be required in the district was obviously a military question, connected with the general operation of retirement, and dependent, as a mere measure of precaution, on the course of events that might immediately follow our evacuation of Kandahar. In the second place, it was not then practicable to calculate whether there would be time for withdrawing a large proportion of the troops through the Bolan pass and the Sind desert in the spring and early summer. The date at which the evacuation of Kandahar could begin was then far from settled; it had to be adjusted, within certain limits, to the movement of the Amir's troops from Kandahar, and, as the Amir's preparation required all the time that could be allowed, the contingency that a large portion of the Kandahar troops might be unable to reach India before the extreme heat set in had from the first caused much anxiety to the Government of India. The project of withdrawing our surplus regiments by the higher and cooler route of Thal-Chotiali was at one time entertained, but the re-appearance of a force on that line seemed likely to create disquietude among the tribes, so that for this and other reasons the plan was dropped. Meanwhile the state of the weather and the tardy arrival of the Amir's garrison delayed the evacuation until late in April.

5. In these circumstances we decided that sanitary exigencies required us to detain for the summer a large proportion of the force on the high plateau of Pishin and Quetta, and that only those regiments could be brought back at once to India whose passage through the Bolan could be conveniently and prudently managed. That these regiments have fortunately reached India with little or no loss or suffering from the extreme heat is due mainly to the excellent arrangements of the military and the railway authorities concerned.

6. We trust that the foregoing explanation may have satisfied your Lordship that the reasons which determined, in April, the present temporary disposition of our force above the passes are not inconsistent with the opinions recorded in February regarding the ordinary garrison of Pishin. We are anxious that a clear appreciation of these reasons should leave no room for such a misapprehension of the situation as would be involved in the supposition that the strength at which this force happens to be now maintained has any connexion with the future maintenance of an advanced military position towards Afghanistan. Such a supposition would be altogether inconsistent with our view of the policy which should be followed, and would be entirely foreign to the real considerations upon which we desire that our proposals, and the decision of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the retention of Pishin and Sibi, should be understood to proceed. These considerations, so far as they were stated in our letter of the 2nd February, have been already approved by your Lordship's despatch now under reply, so that we need not again enlarge on the responsibilities imposed upon us by our past relations with the people of the two districts. It is sufficient here to repeat that both districts were taken under our Government at the end of 1878, that they were formally assigned to us by treaty in 1879, and that consequently the inhabitants, who have been frequently assured that they might count upon our protection, have every right to expect that, as to the time and manner of their restoration to Afghan rule, their wishes and interests shall be carefully consulted. The question of ultimate retirement cannot, as your Lordship has observed, be disconnected from the course of events at Kandahar, and the actual condition of parties in South Afghanistan certainly does not yet authorize us to anticipate unbroken tranquillity in that quarter. If a settled and friendly government establishes itself at Kandahar, there will then be no difficulty in concluding such arrangements for the administration of this district as may be deemed advisable; but if affairs take a different turn it cannot in our judgment be either to the interests of Pishin or to our own interests and credit that we should choose such a time for abruptly abandoning this district. Our departure would expose the country to disorder, and our friends to the consequences of having dealt faithfully with the British Government. All the considerations of this nature, by which the British Government was induced to prolong, at some risk and much expense, the occupation of Kabul, of Kandahar, and of Kuram, appear to us to apply with redoubled force to the case of the districts now in our possession in South Afghanistan.

7. Moreover, we are bound to recollect that our responsibilities for the protection of friends and allies from the possible consequences of any confusion that may follow directly upon our recent withdrawal are not confined to Pishin. From the Khan of Kelat and from his leading Sirdars we have received the most unreserved and valuable support during the whole of our operations across the Afghan frontier of Biluchistan. That frontier has a long border line with the lands of Pathan tribes; while Quetta

itself is more or less surrounded by Afghan or independent territory. It is thus of importance that at Quetta we should, for the present, be in a position to assist effectually in keeping the peace and in securing the Khan's territory against incursions or reprisals; and for these objects the advantages of continuing our military and political occupation of the broad valley which interposes between Quetta and the Amran range appear to us incontestable. Our attitude will be entirely precautionary and defensive, but if any troubles are impending in Afghanistan we shall be far better able to hold ourselves clear of complications by confining all disorder to the western side of the range than by allowing it to overflow up to the Biluch frontier.

8. In short, we consider that some prolongation of our present tenure of Pishin and Sibi is necessary, not only for the acquittance of our obligations to those districts, but also in order that during a period of uncertainty we may be able to retain our present influence over the tribes of that frontier, and generally to fulfil the treaty engagement whereby, in return for the subordinate co-operation which we have a right to demand from the Khan of Khelat, and which he has very freely given to us, we are bound to protect his territories from external attack.

9. With regard, therefore, to the extent of country to be temporarily retained under British control, our proposals are to keep the districts of Pishin and Sibi, with any strip of intervening territory that may be clearly necessary for maintaining the communication between the two districts. Their administrative boundaries are so inaccurately defined, and have so often varied, that it is not possible to determine positively whether the two areas actually meet at any point. But in the records examined at Kandahar the Sibi district is described in leases as Zawa Sibi and Thal; while the Barozai Sirdars, who have long been the grantees of Sibi, always lay claim to Hurnai and Thal-Chotiali. The Zawa of the Kandahar records is the valley stretching from the lower end of the Chappar mountain by Spin Tangi down the Nari river. As a matter of fact, however, the Afghan government had, for many years before our latest occupation of Sibi, exercised little or no jurisdiction in the district; the constant incursions of the Marris, and the lawlessness of the lesser tribes, kept the upper valley in confusion, and the lower valley suffered greatly from their depredations. But since the British Government took possession of the district in 1878 our posts have been established along the open tract which runs by Spin Tangi, Hurnai, and Kach, up to where the Chappar hills close in upon it. This tract has now been brought regularly under our administration, and its revenue is quietly collected; while the position of our posts along the northern border of the district, in a climate healthy for the troops, maintains order among the petty Pathan tribes beyond the line, keeps the peace in the country within it, secures our communication with Pishin and Quetta, and effectually preserves the Bolan pass from molestation. The occupation of this border has also opened out an excellent road from India by Sibi toward Pishin and Kandahar, which is already very largely used by traders in preference to the Bolan route.

10. We consider it advisable, for these reasons, to retain our posts upon the Hurnai line, and to treat as included within the Sibi district, for the purpose of temporary control and management, the plain country up to the foot of the hills beyond that line, and all the country within it, over which we now exercise jurisdiction. The appended sketch map will show roughly the northern boundary up to which it seems necessary, for the proper protection of Sibi and the Bolan pass, for restraining the Marris and other border tribes, and for the general political supervision of the Biluch frontier toward Afghanistan, that our authority should, for the present, be maintained. It will probably be found difficult to withdraw, for some time to come, the troops now stationed at Thal and Chotiali on the frontier of Sibi toward the north-east. But the object of these posts is exclusively to check and coerce the powerful Marri tribe, by taking up points whence their country can be easily entered, and their retreat cut off, if they attempt any marauding expeditions. And as the arrangements for controlling the Marris must be settled with reference not only to the Sibi administration, but also to the proper system of defence for the Indian border, and the Khan's territory adjoining the Marri country, it would not be convenient in this letter to deal finally with the question of keeping stations at Thal or Chotiali. From your Lordship's despatch upon the subject of the settlement recently made with the Marris, we infer that our intention to postpone final decision upon these provisional arrangements, until our general position upon the border shall have been permanently determined, will be approved.

11. The measures at present in operation for the civil administration of the districts of Pishin and Sibi will not require immediate material alteration, and their cost will not, so far as can be judged from the accounts now before the Government, exceed the revenues collected. For the last two years and a half the administration of these districts has been carried on under the superintendence of the officers of the Biluchistan Agency, to the staff of which one European and one Native officer have been added to provide for the efficient performance of the additional work entailed by the extension of the jurisdiction of the Agency. Revenue and police establishments on a moderate scale have been entertained for the purposes of civil administration, and certain payments have been made to the chief men of the more important tribes—partly in consideration of the lines of road and telegraph being kept free from molestation, and partly in lieu of allowances formerly made to the more turbulent tribes by the Afghan rulers. The sum total of expenditure incurred on these accounts, *viz.*, the addition of officers to the strength of the Biluchistan Agency, the entertainment of revenue and police establishments, including the cost of police on the open line of railway between the Sind border and the Bolan, and the tribal payments referred to—amounts to about Rupees 1,30,000. This expenditure, however, is more than covered by the revenue collected in the districts, the total collections during the past financial year amounting to about Rupees 1,50,000. The tribal payments in Pishin, we anticipate, will now be very largely reduced, while quiet times and the extension of cultivation in the more fertile tracts of Sibi will result in some increase of revenue. In Pishin, owing to three consecutive years of drought, and partly, no doubt, owing to want of careful supervision, caused by the necessity under which our officers laboured of devoting their principal attention to supplying the wants of the army, the revenue collections during the past three years have shown a slight falling off; but in Sibi the revenue realized in 1880–81 was more than double that of 1879–80, the additional collections having been very largely drawn from increased cultivation. To the feeling of security produced among the people by the recent submission of the Marris, and by the belief that they will henceforward be kept within bounds by a strong hand, this rapid spread of cultivation may undoubtedly be attributed.

12. In regard to the force required for the military protection of the country which, as has been above explained, is to be temporarily retained under British control, it is possible that this may depend, at first, upon the further development of the actual political situation in South Afghanistan. But it is our desire and intention, if political circumstances permit, to reduce the force to be maintained at Quetta and in Pishin, after the next cold season shall have set in, to a normal strength of—

1 Battery garrison artillery.
1 Do. mountain do.

1 Regiment cavalry.
3 Regiments of infantry, of which one would be European.

The precise distribution of these troops would be a detail for future determination; though we may state, with advertence to your Lordship's observation upon this point, that we do not contemplate retaining, beyond the end of this autumn, any positions on the western side of the Khojuk, and that all the posts to be held under the arrangements now proposed will be, as in fact they now are, within the recognized limits of Pishin. With regard to the line of communications, the military authorities attach great importance to the stations on the road *viâ* Hurnai, because, as has already been explained, it turns, covers, and protects the Bolan pass, besides offering easy access at all seasons from Sibi to Quetta and Pishin. For the present, therefore, a regiment of infantry and three troops of cavalry would be detailed to occupy and guard this line; though hereafter a large part of the duties involved might be transferred to a local police force. There is now in Biluchistan the corps of Biluch guides, an irregular corps of about 400 horse, which has performed much useful service during many years past on the Biluch frontier. The present cost of this corps, including the staff pay of the Commanding Officer, amounts to Rupees 10,000 per mensem, and has been defrayed from Indian revenues. We anticipate, however, that it may be found advisable to improve the position and organisation of the corps to some extent, and probably to add to it some footmen in order to provide a local military police such as may relieve the regular troops of various harassing duties.

13. Some troops will also be kept, for the present, at Thal and Chotiali; but for the reasons already mentioned the detachments at these stations are not included in the garrison detailed in the foregoing paragraph; since it is more convenient to deal with them in considering the question of arrangements for the permanent protection of the Sind border.

14. With respect to the cost of the troops to be maintained in Pishin and at Quetta after the beginning of next cold season, we may observe that in any event the regular garrison of Quetta ought to be excluded from the calculation. Assuming the strength and composition of this garrison to be the same as before the war in Afghanistan,* the additional expenditure involved in the arrangements described in paragraph 12 will be represented by the extra charge of maintaining one regiment of European infantry, part of a regiment of cavalry, and one battery garrison artillery, in these districts instead of in India. The troops now stationed beyond the Sind Frontier are in receipt of certain fixed allowances, which it is intended to discontinue so soon as the force shall have been reduced to its normal strength.

* Garrison of Quetta, 1st July 1878.

2 Regiments native infantry.
Detachment of cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

No. 21.

No. 88 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 10, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in

* No. 249, dated the 31st May 1881.

Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

No. 249, dated Quetta, 31st May 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, Quetta, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a free translation of letters just received from Kandahar, a summary of which was forwarded to you to-day by telegraph.

2. With reference to your request that I should, if possible, continue my diary of political events as in Kandahar, I regret to say that I have not found it convenient to do so owing to the intermittent character of the correspondence. Originally I intended to have all letters received from Kandahar literally translated by a native assistant here and submitted to your office with a covering letter of remarks. But this has not worked well; and I find it better to make a free translation of the letters myself directly they arrive, and forward it to you at once with marginal notes and comments, after transmitting a summary by telegraph. This system I have commenced to-day, and I trust it will meet with your approval.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

KANDAHAR NEWS.

May 31st.—Regular post arrived from Kandahar with letters of 27th.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes that a trustworthy person just arrived from Herat has brought him intelligence of affairs there which he has communicated to Mir Hashim for transmission to me. Encloses a circular letter from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan to the Chief of Zamindawar. Begs that any news reaching me from Meshed may be sent to him at once.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's letter, which is addressed to Sahib Khan, runs as follows:—

"*After compliments.*—By God's favour I have arrived in this place (Farrah) on the 17th Jamad-es-Sani (16th May) with one thousand Herati horsemen. One day I shall halt, and the next, the 18th, I shall advance at the head of two thousand Herat and Farrah horsemen. On the same day his Highness Muhammad Ayub Khan will leave Herat with guns and troops. Under any circumstance, be assured that I shall arrive in your country without delay."

* It is worth remark that both seals are purposely blurred and imperfect, a common practice among Afghans when writing on political matters. It is supposed to facilitate repudiation of the authorship, if advisable.—O. St. J.

This letter* is also sealed by Muhammad Hasan Khan.

Mir Hashim writes as follows:—

"A man whom I had sent to Herat returned to-day, having been 14 days on the road. He states that five Herati regiments were present in the city, of which two had been deprived of their arms some time previously, but had since had them returned. There were two regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis, each 400 strong. Four iron guns had been made, of which one was complete, the other three unfinished. Three batteries of smooth-bores were also complete. A thousand sowars had been ordered with Muhammad Hashim Khan to Farrah, but only 500 had gone. Muhammad Hashim's orders were to halt only one night at Farrah, and push on to the Helmand at once. It is probable however that he has not come further than Bakwa. Muhammad Ayub Khan was very apprehensive as to affairs on the Turkistan side; and had sent men there to give timely warning of any events that might cause disturbances in Herat. Ayub Khan was intending to leave Herat for Zamindawar on the 10th Rajab (8th June). He had not as yet issued any pay to the regiments. He had reminded Hashim Khan and the Waliahd's mother of their promise to provide him with funds, but they had taken no notice of the reminder. It had been settled that Muhammad Hashim's wife and the Waliahd's mother should go to Anardareh, on account of the heat of the weather it was said; but the real reason is fear of an advance of the Amir's troops from Kandahar.

"The following is the news of Kandahar:—The cavalry regiment ordered to Girishk with two guns and an infantry regiment arrived there on the 26th May. The guns and infantry halted at Sinjiri for some days, but have now gone on. On the 28th Kazi Saad-ud-din was to leave for Girishk with 400 sowars enlisted in Kandahar, to be followed in three days by two guns and an infantry regiment. Six hundred regular cavalry, three infantry regiments, and six standards of Khasadars were to leave Kelat-i-Ghilzai for Kandahar on 28th.

"As regards Herat affairs, if the regiments leave Kandahar for the Herat direction quickly, and a simultaneous movement is made from Turkistan, Muhammad Ayub Khan's position will be very difficult; but if there is much delay, his affairs will wear a very different aspect. A certain Sayyid Hussain who was in Ayub's camp bazaar before Kandahar has been accused by him of sending news to Colonel St. John, and his property confiscated. He himself fled to Meshed. Ayub Khan had declared in the public assembly that the Kabulis were Kafirs. The Heratis say that, if it were a case of fighting against the English, they would not fire a shot; but as they have suffered much at the hands of the Kabulis, they will fight them willingly. This is the talk of the common people. Men of wisdom and experience are in favour of the Amir. There is a certain Muhammad Umar of Ghorian. This man was sent by Ayub to the Wali of Maimanah to ask for assistance in men and money. The Wali replied that he could give neither; for if an army moved from Turkistan, it would be as much as he could do to keep his own purdah (*i.e.*, defend himself). Naib Hafiz-ullah Khan had been named

general-in-chief, but the Duranis are much discontented at the appointment. The Herat news communicated by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan is given separately.

"As regards Kabul, it appears that the Amir was to leave Kalah-i-Kazi* on the 26th May. He was intending to bring all the Ghilzai Khans and Maliks with him. The Turkistan army was at Shibarghan.

* A camping ground, a few miles out of Kabul.—O. St. J.

"Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, at a recent meeting of chiefs at his house, warmly extolled the kindness and generosity of the British Government towards the Amir." He has asked Mir Hashim to arrange for the payment of the third monthly subsidy of 50,000 rupees through the Hindus of Kandahar.

The account of Herat affairs given by the man mentioned in Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's letter is as follows :—

Troops.—There are nominally three regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis in Herat;

† This nearly tallies with number given by the other informant, viz., 800 men.—O. St. J.

The discrepancy between this account and that of the other informant as to these Herati troops is inexplicable; but I am inclined to believe that they have been re-assembled and re-armed. — O. St. J.

command of the troops in the hope

‡ Here again is another discrepancy. I doubt Ayub's having so many guns equipped as the first informant says; but he certainly has some.—O. St. J.

but two of them number only 330 men each, and the third 150 to 200.† These had no arms. There are no Herati troops in Herat, the three regiments brought from Kushk having been disarmed and dismissed to their homes. There is a cavalry regiment, but it has less than 200 men. There were 17 smooth-bore guns, new and old, and two iron guns had been made; but none had horses or equipment.‡ Kazi Abd-es-salam had been given of his paying them something out of his own pocket, but he gave nothing, so was dismissed, and Naib Hafizulla appointed in his place,§ but the Kandaharis were not pleased with him, and for fear of them he had surrounded himself with a body-guard of 70 Kabulis.

After his return from Kandahar,

§ Both informants are unanimous in this point.—O. St. J.

Sahibzadah of Siah Oshan had been sent to Maimanah for help in men and money, but he came back empty-handed, or with only three horses and a postin. Ayub had summoned Hashim Khan from Farrah to get money from him; and it is said that he brought some with him and gave it to Ayub. Khan Agha's brother has been appointed chief of the Jamshidis; but Ayub is aware that the Jamshidis, as well as the Alikozai and Ishakzai Duranis, are his enemies. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hassan Khan have left for Farrah, but informant saw their tents, and there were only 12. He does not believe they had more than a hundred horsemen with them. Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan was at Sabzwar, having left a few regular infantry at Taiwara. It is said that Anbia Khan has assembled a strong force and is on his way to attack them. It was currently reported in Herat that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan had occupied Maimanah, and was moving on Herat, and people looked on Ayub's cause as lost. News had arrived from Kandahar that the English had left, and the Amir's troops arrived; it was also reported that Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan was treating the Kandaharis liberally, and paying the soldiers well. This has excited the hopes of the Heratis in the direction of Kandahar.

Thirty Kandahari soldiers belonging to Maruf, who had gone to Herat for service, saw the state of affairs there and returned. This latter piece of information appears to have been given by Shams-ud-din Khan.

There is not very much of importance in this news. Neither side appears to be showing any remarkable energy, though both are preparing to make the right bank of the Helmand the battle-field. Delay for the present is doing the Amir's cause no harm, but if he has not sufficient force at Girishk to overawe the Alizais when Hashim arrives there, they may rise *en masse*. It is clear that Ayub is very weak, and that the Duranis generally are wavering. Nothing but the most culpable inertness on the Amir's part can prevent his success in establishing himself.

From travellers I learn that the number of *talibs* in or about the city of Kandahar has noticeably increased, in spite of many having left for Zamindawar. This is supposed to portend a rising in Kandahar in case of the Amir's arms suffering a reverse on the Helmand. It is also said that the five lakhs of rupees given to the Amir's representatives have been kept almost, if not quite, intact.

The postal arrangements with Kandahar are working well, letters arriving in three and a half days. Private parties are beginning to avail themselves of the post.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN,
Lieut.-Colonel.

Biluchistan Agency,
S. Afghanistan Office,
May 31, 1881.

No. 22.

No. 92 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 17, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the diary of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, from the 15th to the 27th April 1881.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

No. 252, dated Quetta, 1st June 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan,
to SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

IN forwarding the diary of the Kandahar Residency for the last few days of its existence, I have the honour to make a few remarks on the circumstances attending the transfer of authority to the Amir's representative.

2. The first of the Amir's officials, the Kotwal, made his appearance on the 1st April, followed on the 5th by the deputy governor, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, who is practically at the head of affairs, the governor, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, being a lad of 19 or 20. He remained encamped with the troops 20 miles east of the city.

3. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, who has been Kazi of Kandahar during our rule from January to July 1879, was with Shams-ud-din Khan, and our former connexion, as well as the Kazi's straightforward and sensible character, much facilitated the transaction of business.

4. On Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's arrival, he at once attempted to induce me to permit him to assume charge of the town, alleging that it would show the people our confidence in the Amir, and the mutual trust and friendship existing between him and the British Government, while if we continued to administer it, and levy customs and other taxes, his cause would suffer serious injury. He also asked whether it could possibly be true that I was collecting the land revenue for the year now just commenced. I may remark that I was doing so for two reasons; *first*, to balance the Kandahar accounts, which, owing to entire cessation of land revenue and diminution of proceeds of customs during the winter months, showed a considerable deficit, and *secondly*, to show the people that we were still masters, and intended to be so up to the last moment. On Shams-ud-din Khan making these remarks, I took the opportunity of explaining the situation to him frankly, pointing out that the Amir had absolutely no right whatever in the matter, and no friends among the people, that Kandahar was a pure gift from the British Government to him, and that it was for me as the representative of Government to settle the time and manner of making over charge of the administration. As far as was consonant with our own interests, every regard would be

shown to those of the Amir, which would, however, best be served by showing that he was dependent upon, and not independent of, the British Government. The Sirdar, I said, must be aware that the Amir himself had no power or influence in Kandahar, except as the friend and ally of the British Government, whose material aid alone would enable him to hold his own over the Duranis, who were extremely ill-disposed to acknowledge his authority. As soon as the time had come for our actual departure, and he should have force at his disposal to hold the country, it would be made over to him; but that, as long as any British soldiers remained, I intended to retain the administration of the city in my own hands. As regards levying taxes, it was hardly proper that the Amir receiving lakhs from the British Government should object to their taking thousands from a country of which they were paying the expenses. This lecture had the desired effect, and beyond one or two attempts to persuade me to allow him to collect the customs dues, I had no more trouble with Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

5. On the 12th April, the march of the British troops being finally fixed, I formally transferred the administration of the province to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, informing him in the presence of the Barakzai Sirdars and others that I should retain charge of the city till the actual withdrawal of the troops.

6. On the 16th the greater part of the cavalry which had accompanied the Amir's officials from Kabul marched to Kohkaran, which had been evacuated by our troops the previous day.

7. The same day Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan came into the city and exchanged visits with me. In the evening he also visited General Hume, who returned the visit the next morning, after which the Sirdar rejoined the cavalry at Kohkaran.

8. On the 20th I made over charge of the customs and octroi to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

9. The next morning, the 21st, the cantonments and citadel were finally evacuated. Between ten and noon all guards on the city and citadel gates were relieved by Kabul Khasadars, and at the latter hour precisely the British flag was hauled down under a salute of 31 guns. Thus closed the second period of direct British administration of Kandahar, lasting nearly seven months from the defeat of Ayub Khan on the 1st September.

10. The next morning, the 22nd, the rear column of the garrison marched for Chaman, which it reached on the 27th without an incident worthy of notice.

11. Nothing could have been more quiet and orderly than the transfer, which was carried out from first to last without the smallest incident worthy of remark. I had no reason to anticipate any serious disturbance, but the result went beyond my expectations, and cannot be regarded as otherwise than very satisfactory, both in the interests of the Amir and our own.

12. As soon as it became known to me that the government of Kandahar would without doubt be transferred to the Amir of Kabul, I did all in my power to pave the way for his reception by the Durani tribes, who were certainly ill-prepared to welcome him. Some weeks have now passed. As yet all is going well, and the Duranis have acquiesced in, and are apparently becoming reconciled to, his rule. Whether they will accept it finally depends, I believe, upon his ability to prevent Ayub Khan from invading Kandahar territory, or, at least, from crossing the Helmand. If the Amir has not sufficient power and energy to block his rival's road to the Helmand, he will, I fear, lose Kandahar, it cannot be said undeservedly.

13. In conclusion, I beg to bring to the notice of Government the valuable assistance afforded me by my assistants, Major the Honourable G. Napier, Captain Yate, Captain Muir, Mr. Barnes, C.S., and Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, Nawab.

14. I also venture to record the obligations I am under to Major-General Hume, C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan, for his kind co-operation on every occasion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

DIARY OF THE SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN RESIDENCY from the 15th April.

15th April.—The 11th Foot and Major Crawford's heavy battery marched to-day for Chaman.

Received a letter from a private correspondent at Kabul, dated 8th March, giving the following news:—Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan has not yet occupied Maimanah, but the Wali has sent him presents. The Amir is treating the people of Kabul with justice and moderation, but he is not making himself liked by the nobility. The people of

Jellalabad, Ali Khel, Kurram, and Zurmat are all more or less in rebellion. The Amir has recalled the force he had sent against the Shaikh Ali Hazaras. It is reported that he is about to go to Kandahar, and that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan will come to Kabul, but others say that Turkistan cannot do without him. Letters from certain Kabuli Sirdars to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan had been intercepted, and the writers sent in confinement to Turkistan. The Amir had summoned all the notables of Kabul to a banquet at Shah-Mardan, at which he made a speech asking if they were content with his rule, to which they answered unanimously in the affirmative. It is rumoured that the Amir of Bokhara is dead, and that the Russians have occupied the city. A rumour was also current that Yakub Khan, having been released by the English, had arrived in Kandahar.

A servant of the Amir's mother, writing to his relations at Kandahar, mentions that he is about to start with her for Turkistan in a few days.

16th April.—Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the governor, came into the city at 10 this morning. He was met outside the town by the Muhammadzai Sirdars and other notables. Captain Muir received him at the Kabul gate, beyond which a battery of artillery was drawn up, and fired a salute of 15 guns; the street as far as his house was lined with troops; and in the court-yard a guard of honour was stationed.

An hour later he paid me a formal visit accompanied by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din. Shams-ud-din Khan informed me that they had received instructions from the Amir to take over from me 18 field guns, and 3,000 rifles with ammunition. I replied that the guns were on the road, and would be made over before our departure, but that I had no instructions about rifles. He whispered to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan to tell me that the Amir had written to him to ask me to permit him to levy the customs dues and city taxes during the remainder of our stay. To this I answered through Hasan Ali Khan that those who received gifts should not make conditions; that it was highly inadvisable to separate the collection of taxes from the general control of the place; and that as long as we paid the expenses and thought it advisable to retain the government of the country so long should we continue to collect the ordinary dues. As regards the soap and other monopolies they had already been made over to him.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan delivered a letter from the Amir, stating that his officers had informed him of my advice that his troops should proceed at once, without waiting for our evacuation of Kandahar, to occupy Girishk and Zamindawar. To this he did not agree, thinking it inadvisable that his troops should come in contact with the people till Kandahar was in the hands of his representative.

In the afternoon I returned Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's visit. He is a heavy-looking youth of twenty or thereabouts, and his manners bear traces of his country education. Later on the Sirdar with all the Amir's officials paid General Hume a visit in cantonments.

Ahmad Jan Khan, brother of Sahib Khan, Alizai, returned with an answer to my letter informing him of Kandahar being made over to the Amir, and recommending submission. He excuses himself from coming to Kandahar at once on the plea of awaiting important news from Taiwara.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk that a brother of Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan has come to Kulistan to collect revenue, whence he had gone on to Dunsang in Kandahar territory, and was waiting there to intercept the nomad shepherds on their way back to the hills, and levy the sheep tax on them. One of his men had entered Zamindawar, and was spreading mischievous reports.

17th April.—The 8th Bengal Cavalry, the 4th Bengal, and the 10th Bombay N. I. marched this morning under command of Brigadier-General Henderson.

Major-General Hume and his staff visited Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. A number of Barakzai Khans and Maliks living in the neighbourhood of the city came to pay their respects to the Sirdar. They were persuaded to do this by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, who is very active in the Amir's cause.

18th April.—The 7th R. Fusiliers and field battery Royal Artillery marched this morning. Mr. Barnes, C.S., accompanied them.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk mentioning that reports had reached him from Farrah, from apparently authentic sources, that a fight had taken place near Herat between the Sartip and Muhammad Hasan Khan on the one side and Ayub's on the other, in which the former was totally defeated. Muhammad Hasan slain. The Sartip, it was declared, had taken sanctuary.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Amir's forces, writes renouncing his arrival at Gach in the Arghastan. In reply I wrote to him that his troops

should be at Momand, one march from Kandahar, on the 22nd, and that he should send four hundred infantry under a reliable officer to Deh Khwaja on the 20th, to be ready to take over charge of the gates and citadel on the 21st.

To-day I make the following presents :

	Rs.
To Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan - - - - -	10,000
To Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan - - - - -	5,000
To Sirdar Shirindil Khan - - - - -	5,000
also to Sirdar Anbia Khan of Taiwara, through his brother, Ismail Khan -	10,000

19th April.—To-day I requested Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan to appoint some one to take over charge of the customs from to-morrow morning.

Four troopers of the Amir's regular cavalry have deserted from Kohkaran, and are said to have gone to Herat.

This evening I took Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din with me to visit all our cemeteries and burying places, and committed them to their charge. Sayyid Mir Hashim was also with us.

20th April.—Letter, translation of which is attached, was sent to Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, regarding the treatment of our friends in the province.

This morning the 78th Foot, 17th Bengal, and 1st Biluch Regiments with 2nd field battery, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Penton, marched for Pishin.

Letters were sent to Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, governor of Girishk, Muhammad Sadik Khan, governor of Kelat, and Sahib Khan, Alizai, of Zamindawar, informing them of our departure, and recommending them to be faithful to the Amir.

400 smooth-bore muskets belonging to the Wali's troops, and collected in the villages were made over to the Amir's people.

The octroi and customs were to-day made over to Shams-ud-din Khan.

21st April.—Eighteen field guns were this morning made over to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

At 10 A.M. the field officer of the day commenced withdrawing the guards on the city gates, each being in turn occupied by a detachment of the Amir's Khasadars. Charge of the entrance from the city to the citadel square was then similarly transferred, and at noon precisely the union jack on the central tower was hauled down under a salute of thirty-one guns, after which the guard on the north or citadel gate was withdrawn, all remaining troops having previously quitted the cantonment and citadel and camped on the plain to the north.

I remained in the city till half-past three, when a considerable number of Sirdars, chiefs, merchants, and others assembled to wish me good-bye; after which I rode through the streets and the citadel to the camp. Except that the gates were closed, and that the Indian camp-followers, usually so numerous in the bazaars, were wanting, the town wore its accustomed appearance. It was noticeable that not the slightest demonstration either of joy or sorrow at our departure was made by the crowd, for, a few minutes before the flag was hauled down, I had walked through the greater part of the bazaars on foot, when I received even more salaams and greetings of respect than usual, accompanied in many instances by expressions of sorrow or good-will; one man only ejaculating a thanksgiving that the rule of the infidel was at an end.

22nd April.—At 7 o'clock Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and others of the Amir's officers, accompanied by the Kandahari Sirdars, came out to bid me farewell.

The rear guard moved off at 8 a.m., and I waited with them till it had marched. They rode with me a short distance, and then returned to the city. The gates were kept closed, and our departure was only witnessed by a few villagers, who were perfectly quiet and orderly :—

The troops forming the column are—

D.-B. R. H. Artillery.	6-8 Royal Artillery.
13th Hussars.	63rd Foot.
Poona Horse.	3rd Bombay Native Infantry.
9th Bombay Native Infantry.	

A caravan from Herat arrived in Kandahar yesterday. The merchants with it state that there was no truth in the rumour of fighting there. Ayub Khan had ordered the Adraskand and Sabzwar sowars to collect and accompany Hashim Khan to Zamindawar.

23rd April.—Marched from Mund-i-Hisar to Takht-i-Pul. Before leaving, the fortified post was made over to an officer of the Amir, who accompanies us for the purpose with one hundred Khasadars.

24th April.—Marched from Takht-i-Pul to Mel Karez. Post made over as yesterday.

Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar that all has been quiet there up to the present. The day after we left some *talibs* got into the cemetery outside the Idgah gate, and damaged some of the tombs. He immediately informed Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, who put guards over the cemetery and promises to repair the damage.

Sent a letter to Amir through the Kandahar authorities, informing him of the evacuation of Kandahar on the 22nd, and bringing to his notice the skill and courtesy with which his agents, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din, had conducted their share of the transfer to his government. He was also informed that five lakhs and fifty thousand rupees, with 18 field-guns and about 400 muskets, had been made over to his representatives. The arrival of 3,000 rifles at Chaman for him was also notified to him, as well as the appointment of Sayyid Mir Hashim as agent at Kandahar. He was told, moreover, that the fortified posts on the road to Chaman were being made over to guards sent from Kandahar.

A follower of the Poona Horse who had lagged behind sick is reported by the Amir's people with us to have been picked up by them and left in the Mel Karez post in charge of their Khasadars.

25th April.—Marched from Mel Karez to Dabrai.

26th April.—Marched from Dabrai to Gatai.

Six Nurzai Maliks recommended for good service by Major Westmacott, Road Commandant, were given 100 rupees each. They were told that they would find a good market for their grain at Chaman if they would bring it there.

27th April.—Gatai to Chaman. British troops quitted Afghan soil.

The march from Kandahar was entirely undisturbed, save by a few attempted robberies at night.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

Quetta, May 20, 1881.

Enclosure 3 in No. 22.

True translation of Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel O. ST. JOHN to SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN, Kandahar, dated the 20th April 1881.

After compliments.—I have the honour to send herewith a list of persons, natives of Kandahar, who remain in the employ of the British, or wish for their own purposes to retire with the army to Quetta. They are leaving property behind them in Kandahar, and I wish to impress on you the very great importance of protecting it and their families during their absence. If any harm is done by ill-disposed persons to the property of friends and adherents of the British Government, it will weaken the bonds of union between the Government and His Highness the Amir. I beg, therefore, that the persons and property of all our friends absent or present may be carefully and diligently looked after. Particularly I commend to your care the property in houses and land of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, which he has entrusted to his nephew, Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan.

No. 23.

No. 94 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 24, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John,

* No. 256, dated the 6th June 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in

Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

No. 256, dated Quetta, June 6, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., R.E., Resident, Southern
Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward précis of news received to-day from Kandahar from
independent sources.

Kandahar News, Sunday, June 5, 1881.—(Extract.)

A correspondent writes from Kandahar on the 30th ultimo that the son of an old
servant of their family who died lately at Herat has just arrived from that city,
and states that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had been appointed to muster the Herat
sowars and despatch them in the Kandahar direction. It was reported that there would
be between four and five thousand of them. Four Herati regiments, two-and-half of
Kabulis and Kandaharis, with the artillery, were encamped at Pul-i-Malan. Three

† Sic in original. But there can be no doubt
that Heratis are meant.

regiments of *Kabulist*† had had their arms taken
away and been dispersed among the cavalry as
grooms. As informant came along the road

from Herat to Farah and Farah to Washir, he passed parties of 50 and 100 horsemen at
every stage. Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan was on the point of moving from Herat
when informant left. It was said that Muhammad Ayub Khan declared that he had no
intention of attacking any one except the English in Pishin, but that of course if any
one tried to stop him he would fight them.

When informant was at Girishk the brother of General Ghulam Hyder Khan, who is
there with a cavalry regiment, searched the caravan with which he was, and found two
men on whom were 150 letters from Muhammad Ayub Khan and Khan Mullah Khan
to the people of Kandahar. On this the General's brother ordered the caravan to be
plundered, but on the merchants declaring their innocence countermanded his order and
contented himself with imprisoning the two messengers.

Kazi Saad-ud-din with one regiment had left Kandahar for Girishk. It is reported
that Amir is on his way to Kandahar.

The son of Muhammad Umar Khan, son of the late Mardan Khan, the Nurzai Chief
of Farah, is in Kandahar under surveillance, but it is not known why he came.

Merchants from Kandahar who arrived in Quetta to-day state that a caravan has
arrived from Herat and another gone there. They also say that the reinforcements
moving to Girishk under Kazi Saad-ud-din consist of one regiment infantry, one of

cavalry, and two guns. There is no traffic with Kabul, merchants being afraid to risk their goods on the road. The Andari and Taraki Ghilzais and the Wardaks were said to be in a very discontented state.

O. B. C. ST. JOHN, R.E.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 24.

No. 105 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's
No. 261, dated 24th June 1881. Government, a copy of the letters cited in the margin,
263, " " from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in
Biluchistan, forwarding *precis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

No. 261, dated Quetta, June 24, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and
Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the *precis* of Kandahar news received on
the 16th instant.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, Camp Kach, June 16, 1881.

Letters arrived from Mir Hashim, Agent at Kandahar, dated the 6th and 9th
respectively.

In the first he writes that he has not yet been able to get an accurate account of the
Girishk affair from private sources, but sends a copy of the letter received by Sirdar
Shams-ud-din Khan from the officers there. From it will be seen that Sirdar
Muhammad Hashim Khan was not in the fight, but had remained behind with some
horsemen in the Karezat (20 miles off). It is not yet known whether he retreated to
Washir, or has remained in the neighbourhood of Girishk; but he (Mir Hashim) has
sent a man to Washir and those parts to ascertain the actual state of affairs. It is not
true, as reported last week, that Abubekr, the thief, has been captured; and the son of
Majid Khan was wounded, not killed. As regards the affairs of Kandahar, Mir Hashim
remarks that the Amir appointed four persons for its government, namely, Sirdar
Muhammad Hashim Khan, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, Kazi Saad-ud-din, and
Sahibzadah Ghulam Haidar. All letters from the Amir are addressed to these four
persons collectively; but Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan acts on his own responsibility without
consulting the others; and gives khilluts to Khans and others as from himself. The
cultivators are much annoyed by the manner in which they are being treated in the way
of robbery of supplies by the soldiers; on this account they are inclined to support
Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who has much improved since his arrival and treats
people properly, and shows much intelligence. For instance, he considers that the
Girishk force, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, three of infantry and 10 companies
of Khasadars, with a battery of artillery should be pushed on to Washir at once to
prevent any of Zamindawar people from joining Ayub Khan, &c., but Shams-ud-din
Khan will not agree to it. Both have written their views on the subject to the Amir.
Sirdar Muhammad Hashim asks Mir Hashim to beg me to write to him and enclose the
letter to Mir Hashim.

The following is a translation of the despatch from Girishk alluded to by Mir Hashim —

Last Friday at eight in the morning Muhammad Hasan Khan attacked Girishk bringing his force to within a mile of the fort. We, therefore, found ourselves obliged to sally out and draw up our forces and engage him. The Herat horsemen began the attack in their own fashion. We fought in military order and drove them back fighting for a distance of 16 miles when they fled with a loss of 40 or 50 killed. Their horses and arms were plundered by the villagers. Those of their infantry who were killed had three grooved rifles (Enfields). They had about 1,500 horsemen and 500 infantry, all Zamindawaris; but among the horsemen the majority were Heratis, only a few were Zamindawaris. The day before Sirdar Muhammad Hashim had arrived at Khoja Ahmed-i-Naozad and had received there a letter from Muhammad Hasan Khan asking him if he was tired and unable to come on, to send as many horsemen as possible. Muhammad Hashim accordingly sent the greater part of his men to Muhammad Hasan under command of Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, and they were in the fight; on the Amir's side only one cavalry soldier, one Khasadar, and four horses were wounded. On their side it is said that the son of Majid Khan, Alizai, is very badly wounded, as is Muhammad Mir Khan, son of Musa Khan, and grandson of Sultan Muhammad Khan. Two of their men were killed by cannon shot.

Mir Hashim's letter of the 9th states that his messenger from Girishk has returned, and says that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan had rallied his men at Kadanak, and had detached Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan with 300 horse, who had crossed the Helmand and occupied Sangbur. Sayyid Amir Jan, son of Sayyid Kala, with a few horsemen, some 20 in all, were going from Kandahar to Girishk and halted his men at Miskarez. They were surprised by the 300 horse from Sangbur; Sayyid Amir Jan and one or two others taken prisoners, and one killed. The rest fled to Kandahar. Some kasids, too, were taken prisoners with letters from Kandahar to Girishk. On returning to Sangbur the sowars boasted in the villages that they had defeated the Amir's army. They have established themselves at Sangbur, and are raiding on all sides. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was intending to fall back from Kadanak to Khinjak, and collect his forces there. It was currently reported in the Kareat district that troops were on their way from Herat to reinforce him. One regiment of infantry and one of cavalry with two guns, all from the Amir's force at Girishk, were proposing to march to Kalah-i-Gaz and from there make a sudden attack on Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan.

On the 10th a regiment of infantry marched from Kandahar for Girishk. Two hundred regular cavalry, five companies of militia, with as many Kandahari sowars as could be collected, the whole under Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Sirdar Khusdil Khan, have been ordered to march to Sangbur and Miskarez to drive out the Heratis. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the latter numbering three squadrons have recrossed the Helmand and rejoined Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. Mir Hashim says that he is not sure of the accuracy of this statement. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan also states that 200 regular cavalry, two infantry regiments, and two guns have arrived in Shahr-i-Safr (40 miles from Kandahar on the Kelat-i-Ghilzai road). There is no grain to be bought in the city.

17th June.—Wrote to Mir Hashim acknowledging receipt of letters of 6th and 9th, and informing him of news telegraphed from Teheran on 14th. Wrote also to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan giving him the same intelligence, also that the Amir had (as telegraphed to-day by Foreign Secretary) announced his intention of leaving for Kandahar on the 16th.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Agent Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks on above.

It is not yet clear to me whether Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan's object was merely a feint to ascertain the strength of the garrison of Girishk, or whether unaware of its having been reinforced by regular troops he made a real attack. Anyhow it was repulsed, though his loss, even as stated by the Amir's people, was not serious. That he was not much discouraged is shown by his later daring raid across the Helmand.

The bad feeling between the Amir's officials is evidently increasing, and if he does not appear on the scene himself will alone suffice to ruin his cause.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

No. 263, dated Quetta, June 24, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the précis of Kandahar news received on the 20th instant.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, dated Camp Kuwas, June 20, 1881.

Kandahar post reached me with letters from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 10th and 12th June. In his letter of the 10th, Shams-ud-din Khan, after acknowledging receipt of my letter authorising him to draw on me for 50,000 rupees, and stating that he has done so in favour of Hajji Zaman, says that he has, according to the intention expressed in his last letter, sent to Girishk the Tokhi horse, 1,000 militia, a regiment of infantry, and two guns. After them went a regiment of cavalry, 200 militia, and the Kandahar tribal horse. Yesterday (the 9th) 400 infantry, two field guns, one troop of cavalry and 200 militia also started for Pusht-i-Rud.

To-day (the 10th) news arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan with a number of horse and foot had come to Wakhar. Shams-ud-din Khan had also heard that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two infantry regiments and four guns, had arrived in Washir, and that Muhammad Ayub Khan was following him and had reached Farrah. On this account he (Shams-ud-din Khan) and General Ghulam Haidar Khan, with 800 regular infantry and eight of the guns presented by the British Government with stores and ammunition, also Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan and the Kandahar horse, were intending to start for Pusht-i-Rud on the 13th. 400 regular infantry and 300 police were to be left in the city with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and Sahibzadah Ghulam Haidar.

Shams-ud-din Khan's second letter runs as follows :—

Yesterday, the 11th of June 1881, Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, with their levies of horse and foot, were at Karez-i-Safed. Two regiments of cavalry, one of infantry, and two mountain guns, attacked them. They came on to meet the attack, but were defeated. Sirdar Abdulla Khan was killed, and his body left on the field. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was wounded, but carried off by his men; but it is said that his wound is so severe that it has probably proved fatal. 103 others of their horsemen were killed or wounded and 53 taken prisoners. Their baggage and tents with three standards and a pair of kettle-drums fell into the hands of the Amir's soldiers. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim did not go into the fight, but kept on one side and fled, hotly pursued by the victorious troops. How far they have gone is not yet known.

It is said also that Abubekr Alizai, Akhtar Khan, Achakzai, Colonel of the Heratis, and Abdul Azim and other leaders of the Heratis have been killed. But whether this is true or not will be written in the next letter.

Two letters from Mir Hashim were also received. The first dated the 10th June 1881 gives information that Sayyid Amir Jan, taken prisoner by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan at Miskarcz, had been released, after his arms and horse had been taken from him. When Kazi Saad-ud-din was on his way to Girishk he left at Kushk-i-Nakhud 50 militia to collect supplies. They went after a time to Sangbur, where they were all taken prisoners by the Herati horse, and their arms taken from them. Sirdars Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Husain Khan, and Shirindil, Kandaharis are ordered to go with one regiment to Kushk-i-Nakhud and to station the Kandahari horse at the fords of Kalah-i-Gaz and Dahana-i-Doab. 700 horse (Kandahari) were appointed to go with Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but only 100 horse joined him. There is a report in the bazaar that Sirdar Abdul-Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzul Khan, is ordered to come through Dehrawud to Khakrez, and so on to the Arghandab districts, but no dependence is to be placed on it. There is no proper system in the management of affairs at Kandahar, and it is impossible to say how they will end. A man arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at 1 p.m. of the day, the letter is dated (the 10th), and brings news that four regiments and two guns from Herat have assuredly arrived in Washir, and it is said in the bazaar that Sirdar Ayub Khan is at Rozabagh.

The second letter is dated the 12th, and says that a messenger from Gul Muhammad Khan with a trooper of the cavalry arrived to-day at noon, and states that, on the 11th about 600 cavalry, two guns, and the Pusht-i-Rud horse

* Shoraki is a district on the Helmand between Girishk and Kalah-i-Gaz. Kadanak is 15 or 20 miles due north.

started from Shoraki* in the direction of the enemy's force, which under Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan was encamped at Kadanak. Leaving their camp they advanced to Karez-i-Safed. The Amir's cavalry on perceiving them charged sword in hand. The fight lasted three hours, after which the Herati force broke and fled. 104 prisoners were taken, of whom 57 were wounded. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, was killed. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan fled, wounded. Two Kandahari Sirdars who were on that side are prisoners, one of them being wounded. Two leaders of the Herati horse are also wounded and prisoners. Abubekr, Alizai, is said by some to be wounded, by others to be killed. 60 horses and 60 guns were captured. The arms and accoutrements of Sirdar Abdulla Khan have been sent to the General by the Kabul cavalry. 12 letters written by Ayub to the Zamindawaris were taken out of his pouch. With them was a letter from Ayub to Abdulla Khan himself, reproaching him with slow progress towards Kandahar, and ordering him to push on. The letters to the Zamindawaris directed them to join Abdulla Khan and advance on Kandahar; Ayub promising to follow them himself with his whole army.

On the 10th, hearing a number of persons had assembled in the house of Sayyid Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister, Nur Muhammad Khan, for treasonable purposes, Mir Hashim gave information to the authorities, who arrested and imprisoned Sayyid Muhammad Shah. The others were, Mir Alam Khan, late Kotwal, the son of the Mustaufi, Hajji Gul, Barakzai, Ghulam Muhai-ud-din Khan, Achakzai, and Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai. They are still at large. Their plan was to raise a tumult in the city as soon as Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan should leave, and seize it on behalf of Ayub.

A letter has arrived from the Amir to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan that the son of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, had written to Ayub a letter, which was intercepted. The Amir summoned the Kohistani Chiefs to his presence, and asked them why, having accepted him a ruler, they turned against him. They denied any wish or intention to do so, and declared that, if any one of them should be found to be a traitor, he ought to be punished. The Amir then showed them the letter of the son of Abdul Karim Khan, on which they set on the latter, and killed him.

The following news has arrived from Taiwara:—Anbia Khan had sent a message to Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan to leave his country, or take the consequences. The Sirdar with 400 infantry, 60 horse, left the fort of Taiwara, moved towards Kalat-i-Nakshi, where Anbia Khan was, and attacked him. About 80 men were killed on both sides. The Sirdar was defeated and retreated to Taiwara, where he is now besieged by Anbia Khan.

A postscript adds that the writer has just heard that, before the fight at Girishk, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, with his servants and baggage, and 100 horse, left for Naozad, in which direction the defeated Heratis fled, pursued for eight miles by the Amir's cavalry, which had only four wounded. The Amir writes that he is sending at once from Mushaki two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and six guns. The Amir himself was to leave Kabul on the 11th. A standard and a pair of kettle-drums were taken in the fight at Girishk. The corpse of Abdulla Khan and the prisoners are expected in Kandahar in a couple of days. The prisoners are said to declare that there was no force from Herat following them. A report is current that Ayub Khan has put to death Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, on account of his son having come in to Kandahar.

June 21st.—Acknowledgments of the above were written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Mir Hashim; and the latter was told to inform the authorities that no restriction was placed on Sirdar Muhammad Alam Khan's movements but that Colonel St. John had strongly advised him to go to Kandahar.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 25.

No. 107 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 268, dated the 30th June 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 25.

No. 268, dated Quetta, June 30, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 29th instant.

Kandahar News.

June 22nd.—Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes on the 16th, acknowledging receipt of my letter about Azad Khan of Kharan, and encloses a letter to that chief. States that, as directed by me, he has drawn a bill on the Quetta treasury for Rupees 50,000, as subsidy for June. The body of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmad Khan, has been brought into Kandahar and buried. The prisoners taken in the battle are expected in Kandahar immediately, and will be sent on to Kabul. Shams-ud-din had given orders for troops to be sent on to Naozad to drive out Muhammad Hashim in case of his having halted there, but news of their having marched has not reached him. In a former letter, Shams-ud-din Khan says he told me that General Ghulam Haidar Khan and himself were about to start for Girishk, in anticipation of Ayub Khan's advance in person. He does not now consider it necessary to do so, but will wait till the reinforcements arrive from Kabul.

Received letters from Kandahar agent, dated 14th June. He writes that the coffin of Sirdar Abdulla Khan has been brought to the city without any mark of respect. It was carried through the bazaar, and stopped in several places, so that the people might have the opportunity of recognising the body. It is now known for certain that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was not present in the fight. Indeed, he tried to prevent Abdulla Khan from fighting, but finding the latter determined to do so, gave him all his horsemen, except 50 or 60, with whom he went to Naozad. It is reported that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan has died of his wound. One regiment of cavalry, one of infantry, and two guns, have marched to Naozad, and will go on to Siah Pushteh. The report of Herati troops having arrived in Washir is false.

The Amir has written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan not to leave Kandahar till he knows for certain that Ayub Khan has left Herat. Whilst agent was writing the letter, the prisoners taken at Girishk reached the city. There are fifty-two of them. Others who were Barakzais were kept at Girishk by Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan. The prisoners state that only 500 sowars from Herat and 400 from Farrah were with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. The people of Naozad plundered the baggage of Hashim Khan when he was retreating through their country. He himself fled with a few sowars in the direction of Siahband. This was before the arrival of the Amir's troops at Naozad.

A second letter written by Mir Hashim, dated the 16th and received with the last, states that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan complains that Shams-ud-din Khan conceals from him the news sent from Quetta, and adds that he does not let him (Mir Hashim) know the true state of affairs in Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan is not properly treated by Shams-ud-din Khan, who is seizing his and other people's bullocks, without payment, for the artillery. Muhammad Husain Khan says that he thinks of asking Colonel St. John's permission to go to Mecca.

A correspondent writes to me from Kandahar that nothing certain is known of the real state of affairs in Herat, but that he expects accurate intelligence to reach him about the 3rd of next month, which he will not fail to communicate. The Amir's officers at Kandahar are not acting on any fixed plan. Orders and counter orders are always being issued, and they are doing their best to spoil their own business.

June 24th.—A person, formerly in our employ at Kandahar, writes to Mirza Yakub Ali Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim's private Mulla has arrived in Kandahar. His alleged object is to obtain possession of the corpse of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, and take it to Herat or to bury it in Ahmad Shah's tomb. His real business is to obtain terms for Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who, since his defeat, is turning his eyes towards the Amir. "Inshallah," he will now join him. If he does, Ayub's cause will be ruined in Herat. All the Pusht-i-Rud people who had joined Hashim have either come into Kandahar, or gone to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan at Girishk, or are on their way. Those chiefs who had joined the Amir's party are now quite confirmed in their allegiance. The Amir's army had advanced to Naozad. Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan crossed the Khash after the defeat with three or four hundred sowars.

In the evening a second post from Kandahar arrived with letters from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, governor of Kandahar, and from the agent. The former contains nothing but compliments and a request that I will write to him occasionally. Mir Hashim writes that Shams-ud-din Khan wishes to send the Farrah and Herat prisoners to Kabul, that they may be seen by the people; but Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and the General advise that they should be given presents and allowed to return to their homes. The matter has not yet been settled. The Amir has written to the General and Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan to take the troops now on the way from Kabul to Kandahar with them to Girishk immediately on arrival, sending on the force now there to Washir. It is not true that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was killed or wounded. He fled with two or three sowars to Siabband. A caravan from Herat reports having met Hashim Khan making his way to Farrah, with thirty sowars. The prisoners state that they lost 170 killed, and three hundred horses fell into the hands of the Amir's troops. There are fifty-four prisoners, thirty of whom are Farrah men, the remainder Heratis. A Tokhi horseman, in the service of Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, deserted and came to Girishk. He states that Hashim Khan had no idea of fighting, but had proposed to Hasan Khan and Abdulla Khan to take the sowars with them and go to Kabul by the Dahlah road avoiding Kandahar, and place their services at the Amir's disposal. Twelve camel loads of cannon shot have arrived from Kabul. Four men were killed on the Amir's side in the late action.

Mir Hashim gives the following news brought by his messenger from Herat. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two regiments of infantry and six guns, has reached Sabzwar. Three Kandahari regiments, two troops of cavalry, and thirteen guns are in camp at Pul-i-Malan, ready to accompany Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who, however, had not then left the city. Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan had refused Ayub's first summons to Herat. He has now sent a second messenger, and it is reported that Mir Afzul has consented to come. Ayub Khan was publicly announcing his intention of advancing on Kandahar at once, but really intends to wait and see the success of the expedition under Hashim Khan, whether he is joined by the Kandaharis or not. The news of the defeat had not reached Herat when informant left. He was fifteen days on the road.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

THE defeat and dispersal of the force under the three Sirdars seems to have been complete. The failure of this advanced expedition appears to have been mainly due to the small support given it by the Zamindawar and trans-Helmand Duranis. Had Ayub come himself or sent a force of regular troops with guns under one of the Kandahari

Sirdars, the case might have been different; but a thousand Herati irregulars under three Kabuli Sirdars, strangers to the people, could hardly be expected to form a sufficient nucleus for a general rising against the Amir's regulars and artillery. It appears certain that Hashim Khan was averse to fighting, as he is not wanting in personal courage; but I am inclined to doubt the fact of his having proposed to the others to desert Ayub and go to Kabul, or to be thinking of making terms for himself.

It is difficult to say what will be Ayub's next move; but I am inclined to believe that he will not attempt to leave Herat.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 26.

No. 109 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 22, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 277, dated the 6th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 26.

No. 277, dated Quetta, July 6, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 6th of July 1881.

Kandahar News.

1st July.—Kandahar regular post arrived with letter from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 27th June. He writes that the people of Washir, Fulad, Naozad, Siah Pushteh, and Dusang, who had joined Hashim Khan, have come into Kandahar to ask pardon for their offences. They have been forgiven, and after receiving khilluts, have been dismissed to their homes.

Private letters state that the families of Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan and Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan have been sent from Herat to Farrah by Ayub Khan. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa collecting revenue.

4th July.—Letters arrived from Kandahar Agent, dated 30th of June. A letter had arrived that day in Kandahar from the Amir addressed to Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan, Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan and Sahibzada Ghulam Haidar Khan, exhorting them to work in unison, and not to quarrel among themselves. If the Amir writes, one of them should do a piece of notable service without the knowledge or against the wish of the other three, he would be displeased, but no misfortune accruing from the joint act of the four would be considered worthy of censure. The previous day a violent quarrel had taken place between Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan on the subject of unauthorised payments made by the latter, and khilluts given

without Muhammad Hashim's knowledge. Four minor officials send private information regularly to the Amir, and in Mir Hashim's belief he is much misled by them as to the true state of affairs. The following news has arrived from Naozad. The leadership of the Kandahari sowars and khasadars has been entrusted to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but the money and presents in his charge are only given out under the seal of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, who has control over the Pusht-i-Rud and Helmand districts, including the command of the levies from them. The regular troops are under the command of their own officers, but in case of a fight the chief command is to be vested in Gul Muhammad Khan. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has been very insubordinate to Gul Muhammad Khan, and in consequence the latter was very angry and threatened to return to his country house east of the Helmand, but was dissuaded by the officers of the army. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has been ordered to the front to take supreme command in both military and civil matters. Three of the Amir's sowars are said to have been murdered by the people of Naozad. The murderers have not discovered. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has sent a messenger to Kandahar complaining of the conduct of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan. Sultan Muhammad Khan has been sent for by the Amir, and has started for Kabul. The son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan is also going to Kabul. A regiment is expected to arrive at Kandahar from Kabul on the 2nd July. Letters have been intercepted from Ayub's mother to him pointing out that he is not now able to contend successfully with Abdurrahman, and begging him to keep quiet for the present until she has made arrangements for a rising in his favour at Kabul. These letters were sent to the Amir at Kabul, and Ayub's mother has in consequence been placed under strict supervision. Sayyid Muhammad Shah has been released from confinement the Sahibzada of Zakird having stood security for him. Orders have arrived from the Amir concerning the persons alleged to have been implicated with Sayyid Muhammad Shah. He orders the Mustaufi to be degraded to the second place in the account department. The others are to be allowed to go free for the present. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the reinforcements left Kelat for Kandahar some time ago, but there is no appearance of them.

The following letter has been received in Kandahar from the Amir written after receiving news of Muhammad Hasan's defeat. He orders the troops to be pushed on into the Farrah borders, and directs that arms, horses, and tents be given to the Char

* Ismail Khan, brother of Anbia Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Taimuri.

Aimak Chiefs* in Kandahar, and that they be sent with 500 Kandahari sowars to the assistance of Anbia Khan to combine with him in a raid on the Herat valley. Money and khilluts are also to be sent with them for the Herat chiefs. He notifies the despatch of a regiment armed with breech-loaders from Ghazni for Kandahar and states that another regiment of infantry, one of cavalry, and six guns will leave Kabul as soon as carriage is ready. He gives information of a message from the Char Aimaks and other tribes of Herat begging him to expel Ayub from the country. The governor of Tashkurgan, Kudus Khan, has been accordingly directed to take a lakh of rupees and five hundred sowars and proceed to the Char Aimak country. The Hazaras of Dehzingi, &c., have been into Kabul and received presents. They promised to collect 5,000 men and attack Herat. Thus Herat will be attacked on four directions, and the officers in Kandahar are exhorted to push on without delay.

6th July.—Merchants from Kandahar state that, though the alarm prevalent before the defeat of the Heratis is much diminished, the fact of the Amir's troops having gone on to Naozad leads people to believe that a collision between the main armies is imminent, and that trade is consequently at a stand-still.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

Private letters from Kandahar give information that the son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan has been sent for by the Amir.

Note.—The jealousy and ill-feeling between the Amir's officials is apparently on the increase and is most unfortunate. Nothing else was, however, to be expected from the arrangements the Amir chose to make for the administration of Kandahar. To entrust the government to a committee of four persons, the chief of whom is a mere lad, was to invite dissension and disaster. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has now gone to the front with supreme authority, and this is, no doubt, a step in the right direction. But it remains to be seen whether he is able to control Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi

Saad-ud-din Khan. If these two take umbrage and leave him, they will be followed by all the trans-Helmand Duranis with whom they have great influence. It is to be hoped, however, that their common hatred to Ayub, which is undoubted, may keep them loyal to the Amir for the present.

I do not exactly know the strength of the Amir's force beyond the Helmand, but believe it to consist of 2,500 to 3,000 regular infantry, 1,000 regular cavalry, with 1,000 Kabuli khasadars, and about 2,000 Durani horse, whose fidelity of course is doubtful. Ayub's four regiments are certainly not more than 400 strong, and his cavalry, including that defeated under Hasan Khan, would not exceed 2,000. The quality and armament of his troops are also probably inferior.

6th July 1881.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 27.

No. 111 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Post from Kandahar arrived last night with news, heads of which are telegraphed from Chaman:—On 19th Ayub had reached Seh-ub or Siabb, thirty-three miles west of Khashrud. General Ghulam Haidar had left Kandahar. Agent writes that there are five regiments at Kalah-i-Gaz. Another informant says four only. There is one regiment in Kandahar and vicinity. Shams-ud-din declares reinforcements have left Kabul, and will arrive about 21st; but impression prevails that they are further off and less numerous than he asserts. Nothing is written about Gul Muhammad Khan; but it is stated that Sahib Khan alone among Alizai Chiefs is with Amir's army.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Muhammad Hasan Khan writes that Amir's officers are in much anxiety, and that Ayub is increasing (*sic.*).

It appears to me that much depends on strength and timely arrival of reinforcements said to be on the road from Kabul. If they are few and cannot be brought to Girishk in time, I am inclined (?) to believe that Ghulam Haidar Khan will not risk a battle, but will fall back on Kandahar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SHAMS-UD-DIN writes late on Sunday night that Ayub Khan having arrived in Naozad has sent inviting Kazi Saad-ud-din to meet Hashim Khan half-way between two camps, and settle terms of peace between him and Amir. Shams-ud-din considers this only an artifice to gain time, and has therefore requested Ghulam Haidar to attack Ayub at once after answering that he cannot treat with Ayub except in Herat.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 22, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

No news from Kandahar to-day, but from another source I hear that Sartip was at Farrah with Ayub, and not, as often reported from Kandahar, in advance with a separate force. If Ayub was really in Naozad when message was sent in his name he must have preceded his troops, who could hardly have marched 300 miles from Herat in twenty days. Proposition to treat was probably made to gain time for guns and regulars to come up, and to induce Duranis to join him.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 24, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing on 20th, reports all well there. No fighting had yet taken place beyond Helmand. Shams-ud-din Khan asserts that Ayub has written regarding terms of peace, and that he has replied that peace cannot be made unless Ayub retires one march. Nothing fresh from Tirin.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 25, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING summary of intelligence, dated Kandahar, 22nd, telegraphed from Chaman:—

Ayub Khan, having arrived with his army at Khawaja Ahmad-i-Naogan, is negotiating for peace through Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan.

Amir's force on Helmand numbers three Kabuli regiments, one raised at Kelat, and one at Kandahar, one thousand three hundred khasadars, two cavalry regiments, eighteen guns, and two thousand irregular horse. One Kabuli regiment is in the city with eight guns. Three regiments of infantry, one cavalry, eight guns, and eight companies of khasadars are on the way from Kabul: one regiment is said to be either at Khel-i-Akhund, or Jaldak, between Kandahar and Kelat, and the remainder at Mukur.

Habibulla Khan, Muhammadzai, has fled from city to Tirin, spreading false reports of defeat of Amir's army. Ghulam Muhai-ed-din is the only surviving son of Kohndil Khan, and has been at Meshed with Mir Afzul for last year and a half. Habibulla Khan is a nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad, and a notorious intriguer. He has much influence in Tirin.

Khawaja Ahmad-i-Naogan is two marches north of Girishk.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 26, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Shams-ud-din Khan writes from Kandahar, on 22nd, that Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan has written to Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that, hearing British Government had made over Kandahar to Amir, he was on his way there when he met Ayub and was forced to accompany him. He deplores approaching conflict as contrary to the interests of the family, and asks Shams-ud-din to aid him in bringing about peaceful settlement.

Letter was sent to Shams-ud-din, who answered on the 21st that he could not open negotiations as long as Ayub and his army remained on Kandahar,* but would
* *Sic.* do so if he retired to Khash. If he remained where he was, he would be attacked.

Ayub's army is reported to be very weak and ill-provided. It is so deficient in transport that each sowar is made to carry two cannon shots.

Shams-ud-din, in answer to a question in my letter, gives Amir's army on Helmand at three thousand regular and one thousand two hundred irregular infantry, one thousand regular cavalry, and eighteen guns, with 1,200 Durani horse.

Other letters, though not explicit, give the impression that the Amir's people are wasting valuable time.

It does not appear that any Durani chiefs or any number of people have yet joined Ayub, but his partizans are actively and openly at work in the districts stirring up the Duranis to join him.

Nothing certain seemed known of reinforcements from Kabul. Shams-ud-din says that he is afraid to leave the city till they arrive, though very anxious to go to Pusht-i-Rud.

There is a rumour that Ayub has returned to Herat in consequence of sickness, or an attack on city by Khan Agha's son.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 27, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing 24th, says that General Ghulam Haidar has sent information that Ayub's army marched on evening of 20th from Karez-i-Safed towards Girishk. On hearing news he followed, but has not come up with it. Ayub is believed to have crossed river below Girishk, and to be marching by Balakhana and Band-i-Taimur. His people are reported to give out that they have no wish to fight the Amir, but only the English. He probably hopes to take Kandahar, which is very slenderly garrisoned, by a *coup de main*, assisted by rising of inhabitants.

I have sent camp to Khojak, and intend riding direct there on Friday.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from Chaman:—Kandahar Agent just arrived says action was fought yesterday morning at Karez-i-Atta. Amir's forces totally defeated, eighteen guns taken, all baggage, and five lakhs rupees. The Kelat regiment and Kandahar sowars went over to Ayub.

Ghulam Haidar has fled towards Kabul with 80 sowars. Sirdar Shams-ud-din is still in Kandahar with 400 men of Kabuli regiment and 400 police. *Ends.*

I leave for Chaman to-morrow.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDARS Muhammad Hasan and Shirindil have arrived at Chaman, having ridden straight from scene of action, which began at 8 a.m. and lasted till 11. Kabuli regiments fought at first, but after action Khanabad regiment went over in a body to Ayub. The other three dispersed and fled. They heard firing in Kandahar direction last night, and again this morning. General Ghulam Haidar went first to city before starting for Kabul. They estimate loss at 300 to 400 on both sides. I believe the Khanabad regiment to be a Turkistan corps.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

FROM AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from Lieutenant Austin, Chaman :—*Begins.*

Chaman, 28th July.—Details as far as can be gathered as follows: Ayub's force took up a position on rising ground at Karez-i-Atta facing north, guns in front and cavalry on left of position. Amir's force facing south, drawn up in column with guns in front, cavalry on right; baggage, treasure, &c., to right rear of infantry. Ayub sent his cavalry round right flank of Amir's force to attack the baggage. Amir moved his cavalry to his left, faced them about, and engaged Ayub's cavalry, who had got completely round the right flank and were to the right rear of baggage. In meantime Ayub's infantry had come into the plain in line, and his right was attacked and driven back by two of the Amir's regiments; but being reinforced he in his turn drove back these two regiments on to guns. The other two regiments in reserve do not appear to have been engaged; and the repulse ended in a general flight. *Ends.*

No. 28.

No. 113 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the Amir of Kabul, dated the 7th July 1881, enclosing one from the Officiating Governor-General of Russian Turkistan, regarding the safe arrival at Kabul of His Highness's family.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the ADDRESS of the SECRETARY,
dated July 7, 1881.

After compliments.—I have just received and perused a friendly and complimentary letter from Lieutenant Kolpakofsky, who is officiating as Governor-General of Turkistan. I send you the original letter for the perusal of the representatives of the illustrious British Government, keeping a copy of it with myself.

Let it not remain concealed that, in my opinion, it is useless and unnecessary to send a reply to the letter, nor will one be sent, unless you deem it fit and expedient to do so, in which case a complimentary letter in reply will be drafted and transmitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the OFFICIATING GOVERNOR-GENERAL of RUSSIAN
TURKISTAN to the AMIR of KABUL, dated Tashkand, May 30, 1881 Russian,
corresponding to the 16th Rajab 1298 H. (June 14, 1881).

After compliments.—Be it known to your Highness that the letter you addressed to the Adjutant-General Von Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkistan, on the

13th Jamadi-ul-Awal (13th April 1881) expressing your Highness' satisfaction and pleasure at the (safe) arrival of your wives and children, reached me at a most auspicious moment. Whereas the Governor-General (Kaufmann) had gone to sleep (had been confined to his bed) on account of a serious illness, I opened your Highness's letter and read it. Having informed your Highness of the above-mentioned event, I beg to express my sincere devotion to your Highness and my constant desire that the Most High God may prosper both your Highness and your Highness' illustrious Government. I have no other wish but that the relations of friendship and amity (between us) may continue to increase.

The Officiating Governor-General put his signature, and affixed the Government seal on the original letter.

No. 29.

No. 114 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter No. 279, dated the 11th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 29.

No. 279, dated Quetta, July 11, 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, Offg. Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of the Kandahar news received up to the 11th instant.

Kandahar News.

6th July.—Shams-ud-din Khan writes to me, dated 2nd, that he hears from his advanced posts beyond the Helmand that there are no signs of movement from the Herat direction. Ayub Khan had pitched his tents at Pal-i-Malan with the intention of moving towards the Helmand, but now after the defeat of Muhammad Hasan, and the death of Abdulla Khan, it is impossible to say what he will do. The people of Dehrawud, Baghran, Siah Pushteh, Naozad, Washir, and Dusang, who had not before come to Kandahar, have now done so. Khilluts have been given them, and they have been dismissed to their homes. Shams-ud-din Khan asks for the subsidy of 50,000 rupees for July.

A private letter of same date gives information that a regiment of infantry, 600 strong, with 200 khasadars, arrived in the city of Kandahar from Ghazni on the 1st. General Ghulam Haidar Khan was expected to arrive in Kandahar from the Helmand. He went to inspect the troops. The Amir's letter appointing him to the government of Pusht-i-Rud arrived after he left Kandahar; when he sees it he will doubtless return at once. A Barakzai traveller from Pusht-i-Rud says that Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa, and his cavalry in Khash. Two infantry and one cavalry regiment from Herat had reached Farrah. General Taj Muhammad Khan (a Ghilzai who was with

Ayub last summer) has been in 'Tirin, trying to collect a party to raise disturbances. While there he heard of the defeat of Muhammad Hasan Khan and the death of Abdulla Khan, and immediately started for Herat with a few followers. But he could not make his way through the Siahband country, and returned to Tirin. He is at Chimerak. Shah Aghassi Salu and other Popalzais and Ghilzais have joined him. Shams-ud-din Khan is thinking of sending some troops to Tirin to disperse them, but nothing has been yet done.

9th July.—Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar on the 3rd that a firman had arrived giving Ghulam Haidar Khan the rank of Sipah Salar, and ordering a medal to be struck in Kandahar for the officers of the troops engaged at Karez-i-Safed. General Ghulam Haidar Khan, who arrived in Kandahar on the 2nd, has recalled the troops sent on to Naozad, and encamped them at Kalah-i-Gaz. He says that the troops are full of confidence, and declare that they are ready to go on to Herat without reinforcements. He is much pleased with the troops and with the Alizais. As regards the quarrel between Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din, the General considers that both are in fault, but believes that he has reconciled them.

Yahya Khan, Akhundzada, writes from 'Tirin that several persons who had taken letters from Herat to Kabul, were now on their way back with answers, but they were in a place where he could not get at them. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan has sent sowars to seize these persons and bring them to Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim wishing to inspect the regiment lately arrived, asked the Colonel to parade it. He did so, when the Sipah Salar coming on the ground, ordered it to be dismissed. Shortly afterwards Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan appeared and ordered the regiment to be paraded again. The colonel refused to do so. This has caused a bad feeling between the civil and military officers. The kotwal of the city having taken offence at some of his people having been punished by Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, withdrew all the police from the streets. On hearing this Shams-ud-din Khan sent for the kotwal and soothed his wrath. The police were then sent back to their posts. Two stacks of wheat belonging to Farsiwans in the neighbourhood of the city have been burnt. Yahya, Akhundzada, has written to Shams-ud-din Khan from Tirin that General Taj Muhammad Khan, son of Arsala Khan, Ghilzai, has arrived there and gone on to Herat. He, Yahya, was unable to stop him. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Khushdil Khan, has been appointed muster master of the tribal sowars and to the charge of local affairs. Letters from the Amir have arrived conferring supreme authority in civil matters in Kandahar on Shams-ud-din Khan, and military authority on Ghulam Haidar Khan. Inaiyat-ulla Khan,* Sadozai, has been ordered to Kabul.

* *Note.*—This is the man who probably prompted Hashim Khan to assert his authority, and quarrel with Shams-ud-din.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, if he has not already been formally deprived of the government, will be so shortly. Part of

Ayub's army is said to have arrived at Farrah under command of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim and Muhammad Hasan are said to be at Bakwa, and Ayub to have left Herat. These are bazaar reports. The return of the Amir's troops to Kalah-i-Gaz has caused much excitement and alarm in the city. It is very unlikely that Shams-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan will get on together.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Note.

It is not easy to understand Ghulam Haidar's motive for bringing back the troops to the Helmand, except it was to vindicate his authority, the advance having been ordered by his civil colleagues. He had not, however, then received the Amir's order to go on to the Farrah border. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was evidently intriguing to get rid of Shams-ud-din Khan, and the latter in consequence appears to have made representation to the Amir, which has ended in all power except over the troops being entrusted to him, thus putting an end to the absurd committee of four in which the administration has hitherto been vested. An insurrection seems likely to take place in Tirin, where Taj Muhammad Khan, one of Ayub's generals, who after the 1st September fled to Kabul, is collecting a gathering.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Quetta, July 11, 1881.

No. 30.

No. 115 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a communication from the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 199, of the 15th July 1881, enclosing the translation of a statement made by a messenger sent from India regarding the aspect of affairs at Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 30.

No. 199 (Camp), dated July 15, 1881.

From J. G. CORDERY, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to
SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

HAS the honour to forward the translation of a statement made by a trustworthy messenger regarding affairs at Kabul.

STATEMENT of a MESSENGER sent from PESHAWUR on the 12th June, reached KABUL on the 21st, and having left KABUL on the 4th of July returned to PESHAWUR on the 12th July 1881. (Extract.)

I REACHED Kabul on the 21st June, and on the 26th June His Highness the Amir called a whole regiment before him and asked them to swear loyalty to him, and to bind themselves by an oath to fight against his enemies, otherwise, he said, if they were inclined to join his enemies, they might depart, provided that they left their arms behind them. They all took the oaths required of them. The Amir called up the other two regiments on the second and third day respectively, and exacted similar promises from them. Each regiment, as it was dismissed, received three months' pay, an extra month's wages being given as a present, and left at once for Kandahar. Some 400 horsemen have also lately started in the same direction, armed with the carbines lately sent from Peshawur.

At present there are 1,000 horsemen, three regiments, and seven guns in Kabul; recruiting goes on daily.

The dāk which arrived in Kabul on July 1st had been robbed somewhere between Kabul and Kandahar.

Five days before my arrival a kafila of merchants was robbed in the neighbourhood of Mukr.

A large quantity of copper has been received from India for the gun manufactory.

All transport animals are most expensive in Kabul. A pony was sold in Peshawur for 45 rupees, though in Kabul the owner had a short time before refused 150 rupees.

Though all are afraid to speak openly in Kabul, yet the strength of Ayub Khan is much discussed, and the general impression is that the Amir's troops were defeated in both the two recent engagements.

People also say that Ayub intends to march for Ghazni through Hazara.

A man named Sultan, who came to Kabul from Kurrachee, was arrested on the suspicion that he was a servant of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, governor of Kandahar. He was confined for three days, and then released.

The Amir holds a public Durbar up to 10 o'clock, when he often distributes presents to the chiefs of the neighbouring districts. After this hour he receives people privately.

A man was brought before the Amir on the charge of having insulted the Mahomedan religion. The Amir made him over to the Kazis, who sentenced him to death by stoning; the Amir, however, released him after fining him 3,000 rupees. On this the Kazis said that the Amir had rendered himself liable to be stoned to death, and soon after the man was again arrested and imprisoned.

While I was in Kabul a convoy arrived from Turkistan under a guard of Jezailchis. The road is threatened by the relations of Muhammad Afzal Khan.

The dâk is despatched twice from Kabul; no stamps are sold to the public; every letter is delivered into the hands of the postmaster with five Kabuli pices. All letters are examined by the Kotwal, and no one is permitted to receive or to send any letter, except through the dâk.

The dâk is examined at four different places; first at Butkhak, then at Kotal Lattaband, next at Gandamak, and lastly at Jellalabad.

(Signed) G. C. WALKER,
For Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Peshawur, 15th July 1881.

No. 31.

No. 116 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department—Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of letters, Nos. 286 and 287 of the 16th and 19th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting *précis* of Kandahar news.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

No. 286, dated Quetta, July 16, 1881.

From Colonel O. ST. JOHN, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan,
to SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of the Kandahar news received up to date.

Kandahar News.

11th July.—Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar on the 7th that Shams-ud-din Khan informs him that he has heard that Sahibzada Udran, Sahibzada Umr Jan, and other Sayyids have stopped Ayub's army at Farrah and are on their way to Kabul with a copy of the Koran and the young Sirdar Musa Jan to make submission to the Amir. Mir Hashim himself hears that two regiments have arrived in Farrah from Herat, two more are in Sabzwar, and two at Pul-i-Malan with 13 guns. The sowars beaten at Karez-i-Safed are at Kalah-i-Saki beyond the Khash with an outpost of 100 men on the river. Sirdars Muhammad Hasan and Hashim are at Farrah. The Kotwal tells Mir Hashim

that negotiations which were in progress between Hashim and Shams-ud-din have come to nothing. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, reported in the last letter to have been placed in charge of local affairs, was not so placed in accordance with instructions from the Amir, but by Shams-ud-din Khan on his own responsibility. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan had received a letter from the Amir telling him that all the business of the country was in Shams-ud-din's hands, and that he should not attempt to interfere with it, but that petitions and quarrels might still be referred to him. "From the first," the Amir says, "I exhorted you four persons to work in unison. If you cannot do this, at least refrain from meddling with each other's business." In another letter the Amir writes to Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan reminding him that he is his eldest son and of the same blood, and pointing out that this is no time for quarrelling, that he, Muhammad Hashim, is an inexperienced lad, and that Shams-ud-din Khan has on this account been placed with him to direct affairs; and that as it was necessary that Shams-ud-din's authority should be recognised by the people of Kandahar and Pusht-i-Rud, he was right to give them khilluts in his own name. The Amir goes on to exhort him not to be angry, for what is for the good of the State is his own good, but to remain quiet till the Amir's arrival in Kandahar, the present, with the enemy in front, being no time for disputes.

A thief caught breaking into a shop has had one hand cut off.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan is preparing to start for Girishk, taking the lately arrived regiment with him. The merchants with a caravan just arrived from Farrah declare the story of the Sahibzadas and Musa Jan to be a fabrication.

12th July.—Letter arrived from the Khan of Kelat, dated the 6th July, acknowledging receipt of my letter informing him of the defeat of Muhammad Hasan Khan and the death of Abdulla Khan. He expresses his pleasure at the news.

* * * * *

A third letter from the Khan, dated 7th July, informs me that he sent a spy to Kharan some time ago. This spy has returned, and reports that Muhammad Yakub Khan having escaped from India, has passed through Kolwah to the house of Baluch Khan, Naushirwani. The latter sent his brother with him to Azad Khan at Kharan, whence Azad Khan sent him escorted by a force under his son to Herat. The Khan regrets that he was not informed of Muhammad Yakub Khan's escape that he might have taken measures to seize him. He also points out that if he had been permitted to

attack Kharan as he wished, he would not only have punished Azad Khan, whose villany is patent to all, but also have seized the fugitive Sirdar.*

*Whether this story is a deliberate fabrication or not is difficult to say. Probably the spy heard or saw something of Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, or some Afghan Sirdar may have passed through Biluchistan from the coast to Kharan *en route* to Herat. The Khan's object is sufficiently clear. He wants leave to attack Kharan.

Letters arrived from Mir Hashim, dated last Friday, the 8th. He writes that General Taj Muhammad Khan, who has been trying to collect a gathering in Tirin, has been seized by the people with 16 others, and is being sent to the city.

A trustworthy merchant had just told Mir Hashim that Muhammad Ayub Khan with six regiments, 1,500 cavalry, and 13 guns was at Farrah. This news has caused great excitement in the city. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan says that on the third day hence he will leave for Pusht-i-Rud. It is not yet known who will accompany him, and the Sipah Salar. There is much talk about the falling back of the Amir's troops from Naozad to Kalah-i-Gaz. The news of Ayub having himself left Herat has produced a great impression on the people, and the Duranis in and about the city are much excited. Kazi Saad-ud-din has written to Shams-ud-din Khan that Ayub has moved from Herat. Abdul Wahab Khan is said to be besieged in the fort of Taiwara by Anbia Khan. The regiment lately arrived has marched to Girishk.

Instructions sent to Mir Hashim to send a summary of intelligence to Lieutenant Austin at Chaman for translation and transmission by telegraph.

16th July.—Kandahar post arrived with letters from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 10th and 11th. In the first he acknowledges receipt of my letters informing him of Ayub's march. On the same day he heard of his arrival in Farrah. On the 7th July he sent a regiment of infantry with six guns to Pusht-i-Rud, and on the 10th a second also with six guns was going. The Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan would leave on the 11th. Three regiments of infantry and six troops of cavalry have been sent from Kabul. One regiment is in Kelat, the others between Ghazni and Kelat. They should arrive in a few days, and when they do, Shams-ud-din will take one regiment and the cavalry with him to Pusht-i-Rud, leaving the other two and the khasadars to garrison the city. He feels no apprehension at the approach of Ayub Khan. General Taj Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, had fled from Kabul and come to Tirin. Yahia Khan,

Akhundzada, and Zainulabidin Khan, Muhammadzai, thereupon took him prisoner. They have been ordered to send him into Kandahar.

The second letter sent by a different hand to Chaman repeats the same news. The second regiment of infantry marched on the 10th as intended, but Ghulam Haidar has put off his departure for a few days. The letter ends with expressions of complete confidence in the ability of the Amir's forces to beat Ayub Khan.

A private letter states that it is now currently reported in the city that Ayub Khan is in Farrah with six regiments, each 400 strong, twelve guns, three troops of regular cavalry, and 1,500 irregular horse. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan, with Kazi Abd-es-salam were at Dilaram collecting supplies, and declare that Ayub will soon follow them. Kazi Abd-es-salam has been writing letters to the Pusht-i-Rud people, who have brought them to Shams-ud-din Khan. The opinion in Kandahar is that if Ayub reaches Pusht-i-Rud, the majority of the Chiefs will join him. The son of the late Majid Khan, Alizai, the only Alizai Chief of importance who joined Hashim Khan, has sent in to Shams-ud-din asking pardon.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Note.

I cannot exactly make out what force of the Amir's troops is now on the Helmand. Six regiments were said to have left Kabul for Kandahar in March. Of these three were halted about Ghazni, and three reached Kandahar the day after we left. The three first were ordered on at once, but I believe only two arrived in Kandahar until the beginning of this month, when the sixth made its appearance. But this was said to be a regiment fresh from Kabul armed with breech-loaders, and may be in addition to the six first. Each is 600 strong, in reality, not on paper only, and the regular infantry thus numbers 3,600 to 4,200 men. All seemed to be on the Helmand. In addition there are 1,000 or 1,200 Ghilzai khasadars, good irregular troops, about 1,000 regular cavalry, some Ghilzai tribal horse, besides the Kandahar levies. Ghulam Haidar Khan brought six guns with him and appears to have equipped 12 more in Kandahar. Ayub Khan has, according to the Herat correspondent, only four regiments, but two others may possibly have been sent on before to Farrah. Each is 400 strong, and his infantry force is thus 1,600 to 2,400. He has nine guns only, 200 regular cavalry, and 2,000 to 2,500 irregulars. His force is thus decidedly inferior to the Amir's, and the disproportion may suffice to keep the Duranis loyal to the Amir or at least neutral. The seizure of General Taj Muhammad Khan by Yahia, Akhundzada, and Zainulabidin Khan (a nephew of the Sartip) is a good sign, both being among the least trustworthy of the Duranis. But it must not be forgotten that Taj Muhammad is a Ghilzai, and therefore an enemy of all Duranis.

The sentiment in favour of Ayub Khan throughout this part of the country is universal among Brahuīs as well as Pathans, and confidence in his ultimate success as yet quite unshaken. Part of this may be due to the prestige of his father, and part to the antagonism of south against north; but I suspect that the greater part is due to the fact that he is looked on as the enemy, and the Amir as the creature of the British Government. This seems to me quite natural, any opponents of constituted authority being, in a state of society such as this, looked on as a popular champion, and is quite compatible with a sincere wish to remain under British rule. It is not therefore, I believe, likely to cause serious trouble even in case of Ayub's success, which would, however, occasion much excitement till the character of the future relations between him and the British Government became known.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-General for Biluchistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

No. 287, dated Quetta, July 19, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan,
to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of Kandahar news received up to date.

Kandahar News.

16th July.—Wrote to Shams-ud-din Khan asking for a detail of the strength of the Amir's forces at Girishk, Kandahar, and on the road.

17th July.—Letters from Kandahar Agent, dated 10th and 13th, arrived. In the first he writes that a regiment of infantry with six guns had left for Girishk three days before, and a second regiment with four guns that day. The Sipah Salar states his intention of starting in two or three days. Shams-ud-din-Khan says that he is only waiting for the arrival from Kabul of seven companies of khasadars and six troops of cavalry, and will then join the army at Girishk. The approach of Ayub Khan is now generally known, and it is said that he has arrived at Farrah and his troops in Naozad. The son of Mir Alam Khan, Hotaki, has arrived in 18 days from Kabul, and says that he saw no sign of reinforcements on the road, and that the Amir is still at Kabul. There was, however, a small body at Deh Bori (a short distance outside Kabul). It would appear from this man's statement that there is little probability of the Amir coming to Kandahar. The Sirdars (of Kandahar) are still quarrelling among themselves. A man whom the Agent sent to Pusht-i-Rud reports that Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan had gone to his house at Nahr-i-Sarkar, and up to the 7th had not returned to the army. Some people said that he was angry and would not return; others declared that he would. It is certain that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan has come to Washir. The Barakzais and Alizais of Pusht-i-Rud have been subjected to much annoyance at the hands of the Amir's troops, and are looking forward to the approach of the enemy.

Nur Muhammad, a man whom the Agent had sent to Herat, has returned, and reports that when he left Ayub's army was at Shahbed, one march on this side of the city. It numbered 13 guns, four regiments, 1,400 irregular horse, and one squadron of cavalry. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan was at Saki (near Khash) with six guns and two regiments. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who had retreated to Farrah, has returned to Khash with the Farrah horse and some Herat cavalry, and is said to have come on to Naozad. Taj Muhammad Khan, who was taken prisoner by the Tirin people, has not yet been brought in to the city, and is not likely to be brought in now that Ayub is approaching.

The letter of the 13th gives the strength of the Amir's force as follows:—Four Kabul regiments (one lately arrived armed with breech-loaders) and one regiment raised in Kandahar, five in all, each 630 strong; two cavalry regiments of 400 sabres each; a thousand khasadars, 400 Tokhi and 600 Kandahari horse, 16 guns. All these have gone to Girishk. Shams-ud-din Khan has collected 700 sowars more whom he says he will take with him to Girishk. Gul Muhammad Khan had 600 Barakzai and Alizai sowars from Pusht-i-Rud under his command, but it is said they have dispersed to their homes. Ghulam Haidar Khan is still at Kandahar. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that two regiments of infantry, six guns, and six troops of cavalry have passed Kelat, and that he will take them on to Girishk directly they arrive. There is great excitement in the city in consequence of the approach of Ayub Khan. It is reported that large numbers of British troops are assembling in Pishin, and some say that their advanced guard is already at Gatai. A hundred Kandahari sowars stationed at Naozad have been forced by the people to return to Girishk.

A correspondent writes to me that he has heard nothing fresh from Herat, but that it would appear that Ayub's prospects are brighter than they were. Matters are going on very badly in Kandahar; plans being changed daily, and contradictory orders given. He gives the strength of the Amir's force in Pusht-i-Rud as follows:—Three regiments of infantry and 200 men of a fourth; 15 guns; two cavalry regiments; 1,000 khasadars; 500 Kandahari sowars; 800 Pusht-i-Rud sowars under Gul Muhammad Khan. Two regiments, 15 guns, and 800 Kandahari sowars are at Kandahar or on the way to Girishk. All the Kandaharis, except the few people of consequence who were prominently connected with the English, are eager for the arrival of Ayub Khan. The Amir's army unless compromised by the incompetency of its Generals will fight well, so it is impossible to say what will happen.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
 Officiating Agent to the Governor-General
 for Biluchistan.

Note.

The last remark in my opinion sums up the situation accurately. The Amir's main hope, as it has been from the first, lies in the superiority of his troops, which, if sufficiently manifest, may be expected to keep the Durani Chiefs to their allegiance, or at least cause them to stand aloof till the battle is over. It will be noticed that I overestimated the strength of the infantry in Kandahar in the last *précis*. It would appear that only three regiments and a detachment of another were sent from Kabul before the beginning of this month, when a fourth, armed with breech-loaders, arrived in Kandahar. Another seems to have been raised in Kandahar, but not, I believe, from Duranis. If it had, more would have been heard of it. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that three regiments of infantry with artillery and cavalry are on the way from Kabul. Unfortunately there seems reason to doubt the correctness of this assertion. If it is true, General Ghulam Haidar Khan will have a great superiority in numbers as well as in quality of troops, and ought to be able to defeat Ayub without much difficulty. If no reinforcements are on their way, the respective forces will stand approximately as follows:—

Each regiment numbers 630 beside officers—30 being drummers and buglers and 600 in the ranks.

Amir's army—

Five regiments of 600 bayonets	-	-	3,000
Khasadars	-	-	1,000
Regular cavalry	-	-	800
Irregular „	-	-	400
Guns, uncertain, but at least	-	-	16

Ayub's army—

Six regiments of 400 nominal, real strength 360 bayonets	-	-	2,160
Regular cavalry (maximum)	-	-	300
Irregular cavalry with Ayub	-	-	1,400
„ with Hashim about	-	-	600
Guns 19, according to Kandahar, 9 according to Herat correspondent, say	-	-	19

I have put the Amir's force at its minimum, and Ayub's at its maximum, and have omitted the Pusht-i-Rud and Kandahari horse from the calculation, as they will probably hold aloof. I have also omitted any irregular infantry that Ayub may gather about him, as they will not in a quarrel like the present take any active part in a fight, unlike the Kabuli and Ghilzai khasadars, who, though irregulars, are real soldiers. The superiority in number of cavalry is on Ayub's side, in quality on the Amir's. If it comes to a fair stand-up fight, Ghulam Haidar Khan's superior strength in infantry should enable him to hold his own without difficulty. An indecisive action would probably do less harm to him than to Ayub. He is nearer his base, has more abundant munitions and plenty of money, and may expect early reinforcements, while a single battle would well nigh exhaust Ayub's resources, and he has no reserves of men or material to draw on. A *bonâ fide* victory, on the other hand, would, I should anticipate, settle the campaign. With Afghans it means loss of guns and baggage and dispersion for the time. Ayub would, if defeated, lose all hope of support from the Duranis, and would have to retire to Farrah at least, if not Herat. If the Amir's troops are defeated, the Duranis of Pusht-i-Rud and Tirin would of course join Ayub at once. Whether Kandahar could be held would depend on whether there were any regular troops there or not. If so, they might hold the city till the defeated army arrived, and might even attempt to stand a siege, but the united force would more probably fall back on Kabul.

Another and very likely contingency is that Ayub finding Ghulam Haidar so much stronger than himself may avoid risking a battle and halt at Naozad or thereabouts, collecting volunteers and exciting the tribes to rise. If Ghulam Haidar has the courage to attack him, this would be of little consequence, but it is to be feared he also would stand on the defensive. This would probably be disastrous, as in the face of Ayub's superiority in irregular horse which would continually increase, he would find it very difficult to feed himself. A few days waiting would force him to fall back on Kandahar and stand a siege, of which the result would depend on the Amir's ability to send a force to raise it.

The last contingency is that, the probability of which was discussed last year, *viz.*, that Ayub abandoning his base might move round to the north into the Arghandab valley. This course he is no more likely to adopt than he was last year. It would

involve the abandonment of his wheeled artillery, and would place a Kabul army between the Heratis, of whom his force is mainly composed, and their homes.

Last year Ayub left Herat on the 18th June, reached Khash on the 9th, and the Helmand on the 19th July. This year he is exactly a week later, and as Ghulam Haidar Khan seems to have no intention of meeting him, collision is not likely to take place much before the 27th.

The news of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan's defection, if true, is serious. I do not think he is likely to go over to Ayub, but the mere fact of his holding aloof would influence the Duranis of Zamindawar against the Amir.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
Officiating Agent to the Governor-General
for Biluchistan.

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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

are now on the march from Quetta. Since these orders were issued, the telegram sent yesterday regarding break in railway line was forwarded to you. This morning I received the following telegram from General Phayre :—*Message begins*, Following received from General Wood,—‘*Telegram begins*, Jacobabad, 3rd July. Engineer-in-Chief reports breaks in line from heavy floods; transport of troops impracticable; have postponed move of 24th.’ *Telegram ends*. I have asked where breaks are and on what line. Will report further.—*Message ends*. Under these circumstances, it appears therefore to me for the present impracticable to bring any forces or reinforcements from the Reserve Division.”

II.—Dated the 6th.—Your telegram of 5th July. My telegram of yesterday will have informed you of all details of scheme. Head-quarters and wing, 4th Native Infantry, left Quetta for Kandahar on 3rd, and are to-day at Kila Abdulla. No further intelligence to-day as regards railway, but General Phayre reports he will endeavour to get 9th and 24th Native Infantry moved without delay.”

7th July.—General Phayre telegraphs from Kach on the 6th July :—

“I am doing all I can to push on the troops of the reserve. The breach in the railway line is about three miles. Colonel Lindsay will be here to-morrow; after consulting him will report again. I hope to get two Native regiments across in two or three days, and the Artillery and 15th Foot soon afterwards. The Bolan route is in good order and passable for all arms. Colonel Smith, R.H.A., and Dr. Bruce have just travelled by it from this to Sibi. The Sibi-Harnai line was closed for 10 days, owing to the Nari being in flood, but just now open. But if we get the usual heavy rains at the end of this month and in August, it will be again closed between Spintangi, Chotiali, and Harnai. The Marris and Pathan tribes have been giving a great deal of trouble lately. As regards the transport, the Director is collecting what we require at Nari. In order to preserve the health and efficiency of Europeans, I propose to push the men on in carts by double marches from Sibi to Dozan, one hundred at a time. Nothing will interfere with the progress of the troops as soon as transport is collected, if the railway stands and the Nari at Sibi is not flooded. The first 250 carts should arrive Sibi on 8th. I shall be here to-morrow, but go to Quetta on 8th to push on arrangements in in Bolan.

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar :—

I.—Dated the 6th. “On 1st July Colonel Tanner, commanding at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, hearing that Mahomed Aslam had brought a gathering of about 200 horsemen within striking distance of Khelat, marched to Sir-i-Asp, 10 miles off, with 200 of the Biluch Regiment and squadron of Sind Horse, against him. Mahomed Aslam retired, and our infantry could not get up to him. Sind Horse pursued, charged and killed 14. Loss on our side one sowar slightly wounded. Enemy dispersed in all directions.”

II.—Dated the 7th. “Lieutenant-Colonel St. John writes advanced brigade under General Nuttall reached Karez-i-Ak morning 6th, all right. He had no news from the Wali that day.”

8th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose telegraphs as follows from Kandahar on the 7th :—

“Following message received yesterday evening from General Phayre :—*Message begins*, ‘Kach, 6th July. Damage to railway appears between 91st and 93rd miles, so that the break is three miles long. General Wood is, however, trying to arrange for passage of two Native regiments at once.’ *Message ends*.”

9th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports from Kandahar on the 8th :—

“Lieutenant-Colonel St. John reports our advanced party arrived Khúsh-i-Nakhúd morning 7th, and marched to Mir Karez to-day. Last news is Ayúb's cavalry have reached the Khash Rúd; whether he has left Farráh is doubtful.”

10th July.—Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs from Quetta on the 7th, as follows :—

“I have received information, from fairly reliable sources, to the effect that Ayúb's march on the Helmand is not so much with the object of fighting with Sher Ali as to keep the country in a state of anarchy, and make its administration and collection of revenue as difficult as possible. Ayúb will, if he can, avoid fighting with the British troops. Sardar Abdúlla Khan Nassar is with Ayúb Khan, and is said to have been mainly instrumental in adjusting the differences existing between the Herat and Kabuli troops, which formerly prevented the march of Ayúb's army. Dissensions still exist. One of Wali Sher Ali's regiments is said to have deserted.”

The Governor of Bombay telegraphs as follows on the 9th :—

“The 2-11th embark on Sunday in fast steamer for Karachi. Commander-in-Chief, on report of medical authorities, proposes to forward 2-11th instead of 2-15th, in consequence of epidemic fever in latter; but one or other will be ready to move as soon as line is clear. Most undesirable to have block of troops at Sibi or elsewhere.”

No. 8.

No. 157 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 13, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 154, dated the 6th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

„ F. P. HAINES.

„ JOHN STRACHEY.

„ E. B. JOHNSON.

„ WHITLEY STOKES.

„ JAMES GIBBS.

„ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KHUSK-I-NAKHUD, 43 miles from Kandahar, July 7th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Some difficulty about supplies at last halting place, but abundance here. General Burrows with infantry nine miles in rear.

Wali writes yesterday from Girishk that enemy's cavalry had reached bank of Khashrud, and that remainder were in Bakwa. Doubtful whether he means remainder of cavalry or regular troops, probably the former.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

9TH JULY 1880.—Mir Karez, 23 miles from Helmund, July 8th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Have arranged to break march to-morrow at Oograkh, about 14 miles from here. Infantry brigade at Kushk-i-Nakhud to-day. All well.

Wali sends letter from Washir of 6th, giving intelligence that Ayub arrived at Farah on 30th with entire force. The families of Kabul regiments reached Farah three days

previously; and Muhammad Omar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken to protect them. The Luinab has collected a depôt of provisions at Dilaran, and his cavalry patrol daily up to the Khash river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Choghak, six miles from Helmund, July 9th:—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning, after 18 miles march over rather heavy ground. Ample supplies sent by Wali from Girishk. Heat much increased. Nothing fresh from Herat direction.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th July 1880.

FROM AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE march of the Herat army under Ayub Khan towards the Helmund has caused much excitement in country, but the impression seems to be that Ayub Khan does not intend to oppose the British, but merely Wali Sher Ali. Four railway coolies were killed near Hari gorge by, it is supposed, the relations of the six Marris reported last week as having been killed by the Sind Horse near Thall. The Marri Chiefs have promised Mr. Duke, Political Officer, to surrender the murderers.

No. 9.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 17TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

12th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 10th:—

“Following telegram received yesterday evening from General Phayre:—*Message begins*,—‘Quetta, 9th July. The Kasmore *band* burst yesterday, and as it is possible that the line may be flooded between Shikarpur and the desert. General Wood, in consultation with Chief Engineer of Railways, is pushing 24th and 9th Native Infantry across the Nari bank, where there are about 250 carts for their transport by Bolan to Quetta. Intelligence received last night that road from Sibi to Harnai impassable, and at Spintangi there is a lake thirty feet deep, sixty yards long; consequently 24th cannot go by that route, as I had intended.’ *Message ends*.”

The Brigadier-General commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows:—

I.—On the 10th. “Your telegram. Flood subsided. Through communication will be restored to Sibi on 17th. Line temporarily repaired, and I have ordered 9th and 24th Native Infantry to proceed immediately, as, owing to breach in Kasmore *band*, big floods are imminent, which might otherwise delay troops till September. Troops now proceeding by hand-shunt waggons over temporary repaired portions of line.”

II.—On the 10th. “Engineer hopes to repair breach, and prevent floods from Kasmore.”

III.—On the 11th. “All danger from Kasmore breach over.”

13th July.—The following messages, dated the 12th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—“The week has passed very quietly, without any alarm. No news of Ayub Khan’s movements received from Colonel St. John. I have heard here, from the Assistant Political, that the Sartip of Kokeran and Sirdar Habibullah Khan have fled from the Wali’s camp to a place called Naozad in Zamindawar. The Wali has sent in

orders to confiscate property of these Sirdars at Kokeran and in Terin. Family of Sartíp fled from Kokeran two days ago; their present whereabouts unknown. A son of the Sartíp made a prisoner here by Wali's son. Head quarters 4th Native Infantry, with 270 men, arrive here to-morrow."

II.—The following telegram, dated Quetta, 11th July, received from General Phayre:—*Message begins*, 'Report received last night that Surgeon Easton and Lieutenant Slater, Royal Engineers, whilst returning from Chapar to Kach with escort of 2nd Sind Horse, were fired on about midway. Lieutenant Slater's horse killed, Dr. Easton's wounded in two places: no further harm done. Captain H. Wylie at Kach. Am expecting further particulars.' *Message ends*. I will telegraph these to you so soon as received.

14th July.—Major-General Phayre telegraph from Quetta on the 13th July as follows:—

"Your telegram of 9th, conveying approval of Government for pile bridge across Nari Ford at Sibi, and branch rail to Pir Chauki. Please let me know to whom I am to apply for aid in crossing the ford. Part of 9th Native Infantry will arrive there this evening, and 24th Native Infantry was to have been brought to the river bank to-morrow, but the Nari came down in flood yesterday, and move of 24th has been temporarily countermanded. Unless some means are devised of crossing the men over the ford, the Kandahar reinforcements will be checked, as it is most inadvisable to collect Native troops at Nari bank if that river is impassable."

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:

I.—Dated the 13th. "I now have to report that the cavalry and artillery arrived on the bank of the Helmand on the 10th, and the remainder of brigade on the 11th; troops in capital health. The Wali has established a daily post between Girishk and Kandahar. The Superintendent of Telegraphs is expected here 15th, with materials for telegraph line; he will commence laying it as soon as practicable. Head quarters and 270 all ranks, 4th Native Infantry, arrived here to-day; other detachments *en route*. Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, arrived yesterday at Nari, and 24th Native Infantry at Jacobabad for line of communication."

II.—Dated the 13th. "Lieutenant-Colonel St. John reports Ayúb left Farráh; advance guard of his cavalry in Washir. Wali's forces at Girishk and Sádat Kila; he has sent strong body of cavalry to Naozád after the Sartíp. It is said that Lúináb with part of cavalry has left direct road and is moving northwards, probably with the object of raising Zamindawar and getting food."

III.—Dated the 14th. "In continuation of my telegram this morning, St. John writes that an intercepted letter shows Lúináb to have been in Washir on Saturday. Letter says Ayub close behind; they were not then aware of a force having left Kandahar, nor any of our troops being at Girishk."

The following messages have been received from Colonel St. John:—

I.—"Camp, bank of the Helmand, opposite Girishk, July 10th.—Arrived here this morning. All well. No news from Farráh. Three days ago Sartíp Nur Mahomed Khan, cousin of the Wali, attempted to excite the Wali's troops in Washir to mutiny and join Ayúb. On their refusal, he quitted the camp with some 80 horsemen, and has gone to Naozád, 40 miles to north-west of this. Wali has sent Sirdar Gul Mahomed Khan after him."

II.—"Camp, near Girishk, 11th July. General Burrows with infantry brigade arrived this morning. All well. The Helmand is fordable everywhere, and presents no obstacle to passage of an army. Forage and wood in any quantity about the river. Other supplies are being furnished in abundance by Wali. Sirdar Gúl Mahomed Khan marched for Naozád yesterday evening with strong body of cavalry. Trustworthy news has arrived that Ayúb's main body was at Saki in Bakwa on 6th, and that Lúináb was to turn off from that place with the cavalry into Zamindawar. A spy, however, states that Lúináb's main body was two days ago at Dilaram, and that his advance guard of a hundred men had arrived in Washir. The advance column of Wali's troops is about 20 miles north-east of this."

III.—“Girishk, the 13th.—Wali's regular infantry is utterly untrustworthy, having been corrupted by regiment brought by him from Kabul. I am taking measures, in concert with Wali and General Burrows, to minimise (by disarming a ———? or depriving of ammunition) the danger of this disaffection of force in our vicinity; but in face of orders forbidding passage of river, this is no easy matter. I beg that General Burrows may be authorized to use his discretion about crossing river.”

IV.—Dated Girishk, the 13th.—“My telegram to-day. As Ayúb Khan may appear before Girishk on Friday, General Burrows has decided to cross the river to disarm Wali's infantry without waiting for orders, should such a step appear imperatively necessary. If possible he will await authority.”

General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta as follows, on the 14th July:—

I.—“Transport, &c., will be ready at Nari bank for the move of the Europeans, to take place as follows:—

On 20th instant, Head Quarters wing, 11th Foot, will commence moving by 100 a day from Karachi. Next in succession the remaining wing of that regiment will move at 100 men a day from Hyderabad; after this F-2nd Royal Artillery will move in similar way.”

II.—“Your telegram to General Wood, Jacobabad, of this date. Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, crossed Nari ford on night of 12th instant, and marched on Quetta. Yesterday morning a flood was reported, and move of 24th Native Infantry was stopped; but as the water was reported to be rapidly going down it was ordered to move on. I have just received following, of this day, from Major Colvin, Assistant Quarter-master General, who, with Captain Watlin, left Quetta on 11th to arrange camps in Bolan. *Message begins.*—‘Sibi, 11 a.m., 14th. Road to Kirta good; thence to Pir Chauki very fair; from Chauki on, very heavy,—wants attention.’ *Message ends.* Superintending Engineer sent down party of labourers from this on 10th to clear ford between Kirta and Pir Chauki and repair bad *nullah* at Muskaff to which Major Colvin refers. We should, I think, avail ourselves of present break in weather to push up troops as fast as possible. In August the heavy floods may be expected to commence.”

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—Dated the 14th.—“Agent Governor-General, Biluchistan, wired yesterday that Kasmore band almost closed; no apprehension of flood reaching railway.”

II.—Dated the 15th.—“Letter received this day from Colonel St. John. No date to it, but presumed 12th July. Ayúb reached Farráh on 1st July, and his advanced cavalry left on 8th. He has 2,500 effective and 1,000 disaffected infantry, 800 regular cavalry, and 1,000 tribal cavalry, with 30 guns. Wali's troops shaky; one regiment all but openly mutinous, rest tainted; they have no ammunition, and St. John told Wali to take measures to put it out of reach. One other Sirdar deserted with his immediate followers, but failed to persuade others to follow him.”

16th July.—The following reports, dated Kandahar the 15th instant, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—Head quarters 9th crossed the Nari river yesterday morning, with all baggage.”

II.—“Your telegram 14th July. The Wali's troops are encamped on the right bank of the river.* They are in a state of mutiny, and it has been decided to disarm them. All supplies are drawn from the right bank. The fort also on right bank. Should Ayúb's army advance to Girishk, if troops cannot cross, the fort must be abandoned, and supplies of grain would be unobtainable.”

III.—“On the Wali ordering his force to retire from their camp at Kandanak to Girishk, his infantry deserted in a body except officers, taking arms and some ammunition. Cavalry stuck to Wali, and treasury is safe. Wali came across to St. John's camp yesterday. Above news came by sowar sent by Wali to his son here; no news of above from St. John or General Burrows, their latest date being 13. Have requested General Phayre to hasten up 28th and remainder of 4th; on arrival of former purpose sending it to Kúshk-i-Nakhúd. After writing above, following news received by second sowar from Wali,—the Wali's guns and the whole of our† ammunition for guns and small arms were carried off.”

IV.—Information received from Wali that his mutinous troops were followed up by a force despatched by General Burrows. The enemy were overtaken, totally

* The Helmand.

† i.e., given by us to the Wali for his use.

dispersed, 200 killed; gun and baggage taken. I have received no confirmation from General Burrows or Colonel St. John, but I think the information may be relied upon."

The following telegram, dated Simla the 15th July, has been addressed by the Commander-in-Chief to Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

"15th July.—Wali's troops having deserted, the situation has completely changed. General Burrows must act according to his own judgment, reporting fully. He must act with caution on account of distance of support."

Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta this day:—

"Telegram from General Primrose states Wali's infantry and guns with ammunition have deserted. General has ordered 28th Regiment from line of communication to Kandahar to ensure peace. I recommend Thal-Chotiali garrison, which is immediately equipped, being relieved by troops from Punjab, to enable it to act as moveable column along Harnai-Chaman line of communication."

17th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 16th:—

I.—"Following movements reported along the line yesterday:—Head Quarters 9th Native Infantry arrived at Pir Chauki; 24th Native Infantry crossed Nari: detachment 4th Native Infantry arrived Quetta; one company 10th Native Infantry marched for Gulistán; detachment 230 men of 16th Native Infantry marched from Chapar to relieve 28th at Chaman."

II.—Information received from General Burrows of the mutiny of Wali's infantry and their deserting him, taking with them artillery and baggage. He went in pursuit with E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, five companies 66th Foot, three companies Jacob's Rifles, and 400 cavalry. Guns and baggage recovered and brought back to camp about 8 p.m. Enemy's loss computed 40 killed; our loss three men 66th wounded, and several horses killed. Full particulars to Adjutant-General on receipt. No certain news of Ayúb's movements.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta under date the 16th:—

"The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now marching up Bolan, and I am trying to push the Madras cavalry to Kandahar as quickly as possible without interfering with the transport of European troops. Colonel Lindsay has placed an Engineer to construct raft for crossing Nari ford, in anticipation of construction of pile bridge."

No. 10.

No. 162 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 20, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 157, dated 13th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" WHITLEY STOKES.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th July 1880.

From Lieutenant Muir, Kandahar, to FOREIGN UNDER, Simla.

News confirmed that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan and Habibulla, son of Sirdar Khairulla Khan, have deserted from Wali's force and gone to Naozad. They had accompanied advanced force to Washir. Nothing further is known of their intentions. They had no following. Wali has written to his son here to confiscate their property.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th July 1880.

From Resident, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 12th.—An intercepted letter from Luinab shows that he was at Washir on the 10th, and that Ayub was not far in rear. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, failing to persuade the Naozad people to rise, has gone to Washir. A son of Sirdar Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan deserted the Wali's advanced guard yesterday with 20 men to join the Sartip.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From Resident, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th, 9.30 a.m.—All arrangements having been made by Wali for crossing to our side river and his baggage packed, Kabul regiment mutinied, seized guns and Wali's baggage, and drove his cavalry across river. Rest of infantry joined them, and they are now moving along west bank. Cavalry are going in pursuit.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From Resident, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th.—Cavalry, horse artillery, and eight companies infantry pursued mutineers, who were marching along west bank of river for several miles, and captured all their six guns which came into action to cover retreat, but after a few rounds from horse artillery were abandoned. Majority of infantry had previously dispersed, but a few desperate men held some enclosures and had to be dislodged by infantry. Mutineers' loss not great; may have amounted to 40 or 50; our loss one man, 66th, killed, and two wounded, with some horses. Captured guns and waggons brought in to our camp.

Ayub's army is to-day at Bibanak, three marches distant. Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry arrived here. They left army at Washir, and state Sartip Nur Muhammad has replaced Luinab in command of advanced cavalry, having declared to Ayub that Luinab was in correspondence with Wali. They also declare that Nur Muhammad has advised Ayub to remain in Zamindawar with regulars, while he raised the country with the tribal cavalry.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From Resident, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, 14th, 9.30 a.m.—Ayub Khan is probably at Lar, two marches distant.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP MIRKAREZ, July 16th.—Loss and discomfiture of mutineers greater than at first reported. Forty-six bodies were found and buried by villagers, among them colonel of artillery and a captain of Kabul regiment, in which most casualties took place. Part of this regiment marched westward yesterday, but all the others dispersed to their homes on evening of 14th. I found that all the flour and ghce collected by Wali for our use in his camp and the fort had been plundered and carried off. This left force entirely dependent on foraging, from which little was to be expected in neighbourhood of Girishk. The river offering in its present condition no obstacle in any place to the passage of troops, the Wali's army having ceased to exist, and reports reaching me from different quarters that Ayub's intention was to cross river further north, if at all, General Burrows determined rightly, in my opinion, to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, where several roads from Helmund to Kandahar meet, where supplies are abundant and communication with Kandahar easy. Accordingly entire force marched last night 23 miles to this place, and goes on to Kushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles further, to-morrow. The Wali is with us, part of his cavalry has dispersed; part is at Kushk-i-Nakhud with his nephews and other Sirdars.

Post from Kandahar interrupted for one day and bags lost, but is now coming in regularly. Captured guns brought with us, but three waggons with their ammunition destroyed for want of carriage.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 17th.—Force arrived here this morning. All well. Principal Sirdars and Chiefs are here, with about 500 horses. The Alizais of Zamindawar accompanied them, but asked and obtained leave to return to their homes to protect their families and property.

Many of the mutineers have been seized and disarmed, while passing through this on the way to their homes.

As far as can be ascertained the country about here is quiet.

No news of Ayub's force.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP, Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 18th.—All quiet in this vicinity *en route* to Kandahar, whence post and single messengers pass constantly without trouble. All accounts tend to show that mutineers, with few exceptions, have returned to their homes, many without arms. Two hundred of Ayub's cavalry reached Girishk yesterday and sent back word of its evacuation to main body then at Mahmudabad, some 16 or 20 miles distant. A servant of Wali's taken off by mutineers to camp of advanced cavalry, states that story of Luinab having been disgraced is untrue, and that he was apparently preparing to cross the river above Girishk. The camp here moves two miles nearer Girishk to-morrow. Supplies are plentiful; immense quantities of grain lying unthrashed in fields round camp, but wood is scarce.

No. 11.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 24TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

17th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 16th:—

I.—“Following movements reported along the line yesterday:—Head Quarters 9th Native Infantry arrived at Pir Chauki; 24th Native Infantry crossed Nari; detachment

4th Native Infantry arrived Quetta; one company 10th Native Infantry marched for Gulistán; detachment 230 men of 16th Native Infantry marched from Chapar to relieve 28th at Chaman."

II.—"Information received from General Burrows of the mutiny of Wali's infantry and their deserting him, taking with them artillery and baggage. He went in pursuit with E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, five companies 66th Foot, three companies Jacob's Rifles, and 400 cavalry. Guns and baggage recovered and brought back to camp about 8 p.m. Enemy's loss computed 40 killed; our loss three men 66th wounded, and several horses killed. Full particulars to Adjutant-General on receipt. No certain news of Ayúb's movements.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta under date the 16th:—

"The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now marching up Bolan, and I am trying to push the Madras Cavalry to Kandahar as quickly as possible without interfering with the transport of European troops. Colonel Lindsay has placed an Engineer to construct raft for crossing Nari ford in anticipation of construction of pile bridge.

18th July.—Extract from the diary of the Kandahar Residency, under date the 26th June 1880.

"Letters, the last dated 5th instant, arrived from an agent in Herat that Ayúb Khan, with all the regular troops, was encamped outside the city. The writer did not think it probable that he would be able to march, and felt sure that if they did, the Heratis and Kabulis would fall out on the road. He gives the detail of Ayúb Khan's army as follows:—

Kabulis.—Five infantry regiments, three batteries of artillery, three regiments of cavalry, (each about 300 men).

Kandaharis.—One regiment of infantry of 480 men, and one battery of artillery.

Heratis.—Four regiments of infantry of 360 men each, with one field and one mule battery.) This includes one regiment and one battery at Farraháh).

"Four thousand tribal horsemen had been ordered to assemble, but there were no signs of their doing so.

"The carriage required was estimated at 1,200 camels, of which 700 were ready."

19th July.—The following telegrams have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:—

I.—Dated the 17th.—"General Burrows reports that he has moved his force back from Helmand to Kúshk-i-Nakhúd, there to wait events or orders. This move was necessitated by there being no supplies for troops, nor grain for horses; the little there was on right bank was carried off or destroyed by mutineers. This point is of most strategic importance, having several roads converging on it. As the river Helmand is fordable, Ayúb could cross anywhere. I am of opinion General Burrows has acted judiciously in the matter."

II.—Dated the 18th.—"All quiet here, but there is an uneasy feeling in country around and along the line towards Chaman. Precautionary measures, however, have been taken, and the successive march of detachments now on move towards Kandahar will have the necessary reassuring effect."

III.—Dated the 18th.—"No letters or reports have been received to-day from General Burrows or Colonel St. John."

20th July.—General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 19th:—

"The European artillery and infantry, which were to have commenced moving to-morrow, have been put off until 23rd instant, owing to difficulty of getting their commissariat stores across break in railway."

The following reports, dated the 19th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—"Yesterday a gházi attacked a man, 4th Native Infantry, in city bazar; ghazi was felled and bayoneted, since dead. At 2.30 a.m. this morning a patrol was fired at from behind a wall close to cantonment bazar; one native officer slightly, one sowar mortally wounded, one horse killed, one wounded. The men who fired supposed to be some of Wali's mutinous infantry returned from Girishk. Wing 28th Native Infantry and detachment 4th Native Infantry left Chaman last night for Kandahar."

II.—“Your telegram 18th.—Taking into consideration that the Helmand is now fordable everywhere, it presents no obstacle to the advance of Ayúb at any point he chooses to cross it. Khúshk-i-Nakhúd is an important position, covering roads leading from the Helmand to Kandahar. Whilst remaining on the Helmand forage and grain could hardly be obtained, whereas they are plentiful at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd. Between the latter place and Girishk there is a desert, 25 miles broad. General Burrows, at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd, is within fair supportable distance from Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet. At present I am unable to obtain any definite intelligence of Ayúb's movements; an impression is abroad that he will not meet our troops in the open, but that, if he crosses the river at all, he will do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni, for political reasons. As regards Kandahar, great uneasiness prevails in the city; large numbers of the families are leaving daily, fearing the approach of Ayúb. There are of course a number of disaffected men in and about Kandahar ready for a disturbance if they get a chance. I keep the city constantly patrolled, and have placed three 40-pounders of 5-11th in the citadel, which has had the effect of quieting the minds of the peaceably disposed.

“Units of reinforcements will probably arrive here,—detachment 4th Native Infantry on 24th; details 28th Native Infantry on 25th, 26th, and 27th; last detachment 4th Native Infantry on 28th; 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now in Bolan, and will be in position probably 24th and 30th July. The 11th Foot come up Bolan in cart carriage, beginning by companies, on 20th, and doing double stages to Dozan; one wing will be concentrated at Quetta on 1st August, leave Quetta 3rd, and reach Kandahar about 15th; two more companies will leave three days later, and last two form escort to F-2nd Royal Artillery. Information about Madras Cavalry not yet received from General Phayre. Will wire to-morrow.”

III.—“Advanced guard of Ayúb Khan appears to have reached Girishk. Nothing certain known about Ayúb himself to-day.”

21st July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 20th:—

I.—“Following telegram received from General Phayre. *Message begins*, ‘Quetta, 19th July. Have just heard from Karachi that European infantry cannot move until 23rd, owing to delay in getting their commissariat stores across break in railways.’—*Message ends*.”

II.—“General Phayre has ordered Madras Cavalry to move at once; they will take posts furnished by the Poona Horse, which will be concentrated here.”

It has been ascertained that the Wali's mutinous infantry succeeded in carrying off with them 1,700 out of 2,000 muskets that had been given to the Wali by the British Government.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 21st instant.

Report from Sibi that Nari in high flood since yesterday evening. Arrangements for raft and wire ropes will be completed this evening; horses must swim across. Fresh break of fifty feet said to have occurred in railway twenty-four miles south of Sibi. The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are marching steadily up Bolan.”

22nd July.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 21st instant:—

“Agent, Governor-General, has just sent following to Foreign, Simla:—‘I have received fairly trustworthy information that Ayúb Khan meditates a night attack on General Burrows' camp with a combined body of cavalry and *gházis*; also on our communications in the Gúlistan, from Shoráwák. There is much excitement amongst the tribes. *Múllahs* of influence are moving about preaching *jehád*. The movement in Ayúb's favor is more extended and determined than, I think, believed at Kandahar. *Message ends*.”

The Brigadier-General commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows:—

I.—On the 21st. “Another slight break in railway from hill floods, but will be repaired by to-morrow.”

II.—On the 22nd. “The whole of the Madras Cavalry, as follows: 10 European officers, 16 Native officers, 389 rank and file, 601 followers, 407 horses, leave for Sibi to-night in three trains.”

The following telegrams, dated the 21st, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:

I.—“General Phayre reports Nari in high flood yesterday evening. Arrangements have been made to pass over Madras Cavalry, but delay may occur, owing to fresh break of fifty feet in railway line.”

II.—“Information from General Burrows, dated 19th. He has shifted his camp to a very eligible spot, three miles nearer Girishk. He reports 2,100 Ayúb's cavalry have arrived at Girishk, he (Ayúb) himself being at Mahmúdabad, 17 miles in rear, with his infantry and guns. It is reported that he intends to move either to the north of Girishk or the south of the Arghasán Valley, but this is merely surmise. He (General Burrows) has utilized the guns taken from the Wali by manning them from E.-B. and 66th regiment. I am sending out to-night, by forced marches, 12 of the Wali's artillery horses and harness, &c., to complete this battery as far as practicable, under an escort of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, whom I have directed to remain as a temporary arrangement with General Burrow, as he wished his cavalry increased.”

III.—General Burrows, under date 20th, writes:—“Situation remains unchanged. Travellers who have passed Ayúb's camp say things are not going on smoothly there, and that in all probability there will be a split before they reached the Helmand. General Burrows ready for them. Troops healthy and in excellent spirits.”

IV.—“News just received from Colonel St. John and General Burrows that Ayúb with his regulars, reached the Helmand on 20th. He has sent back his carriage for baggage, left a day's march in rear. Tribai sowars and some *gházis* have joined him. His intention stated to be to move *viâ* Sangbúr and Mir Karéz and attack General Burrows. At Sangbúr there are 200 *gházis*, with two standards. Spy states Lúinab with cavalry had moved down river, intending to skirt desert and attack.”

V.—“Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, arrived at Quetta this evening. Two hundred rifles of 10th and fifty sabres 2nd Sind Horse marched to-day on Kach, to accompany Captain Wylie to Kawás to collect revenue.”

VI.—“General Brooke and Major Adams, returning from the Argandab Valley, were shot at by men in hills at the Kotal-i-Múrcha this morning; one horse of escort shot dead. Parties sent out to capture the men unsuccessful up to 4 p.m.”

23rd July.—The following letter (No. 435-K, dated Kandahar, 8th July) has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

“With reference to my telegram of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Political Officer at Harnái having ascertained that the men implicated in killing the followers belonged to Lekram near Babian, parties were sent out from the detachments of the 5th Native Light Infantry at Sinári and Spenc Kach, with fifteen sabres of the 2nd Sind Horse, under Captain Lucas, to exact retribution, and accompanied by the Political Officer.

“The *Malik's* house was burnt down, one Pathan shot, nine made prisoners, and a large number of cattle, sheep, and goats brought in, together with the wives and children of those who bolted, without any loss on our side.”

The following telegram has been received from General Primrose, dated the 22nd July 1880:—

“General Phayre has sent me copy of a telegram forwarded by Agent, Governor General, to Foreign, extract from which is as follows:—‘In the Gulistan direction from Shorawak there is much excitement amongst the tribes. *Múllahs* of influence are moving about preaching *jehad*. The movement in Ayúb's favour is more extended and determined than is, I think, believed at Kandahar.’”

“With reference to above and present state of affairs, I would strongly recommend for consideration of Commander-in-Chief that General Phayre should concentrate a brigade or flying column, according to his judgment or further political news, either at Chaman or Killa Abdúla, as he may decide; the troops to be taken from the line between Sibi and Gwal, but on no account should the regiments under orders for Kandahar be interfered with, as the chief line of communication is the Bolan and *viâ* Quetta.”

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has sent the following reply to Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

“Yours of to-day. Chief concurs that troops under orders for Kandahar should not be interfered with. Arrange with Agent, Governor General, and General Phayre, regarding concentration of flying column at Chaman or Kila Abdúlla, if found necessary; no reference here needed. It has been ascertained, however, that there are considerable quantities of railway plant and stores between Sibi and Harnái; these must not be left unprotected.”

The following messages, dated the 22nd, have also been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—“Madras Cavalry leave Jacobabad this evening; all ready for them at Nari. First detachment European Infantry leave Karachi to-morrow. First detachment 9th Native Infantry arrive here to-morrow. All through Bolan.”

II.—“Letter from General Burrows, dated evening of 21st. No further news.”

The health of the 68th Foot having deteriorated to such an extent as to unfit it for field service if called upon, the 70th Foot (now at Sabáthú and Umballa) has been substituted for it on the rolls of the Bengal Reserve Division.

24th July.—The following messages have this day been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:—

I.—Dated the 23rd. “Report received from General Burrows, dated 22nd. No further news regarding Ayúb. Our force at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd well entrenched and defended against any night attack. Supplies plentiful, except wood, which is very scarce.”

“A detachment, 4th Native Infantry, escorting ammunition, arrives here to-morrow, and 200 rifles, 28th Native Infantry, the day after.”

II.—Dated the 23rd. “Report just received from Colonel St. John. Spies state that Ayúb has crossed the Helmand at Háidarabad. Party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbúr and returned again. Small party of *gházis* collected there; stated that they expected 5,000 horsemen to arrive to-day and main body to-morrow. Few supplies at Sangbúr, so Ayúb cannot halt there more than one day. Report raises number of men who have joined Ayúb to 4,000.

III.—Dated the 24th. “On morning of 23rd, our cavalry patrol, proceeding in the direction of Sangbúr, came upon the enemy’s advanced parties. Lieutenant Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse, who was in command, sent in word to camp, and dismounting some of his men, checked the enemy, who retired out of range. Brigadier-General Nuttall, with 180 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns, E.-B., Royal Horse Artillery, now came up, and a reconnaissance reported 600 sowars marching parallel with a body of infantry, three miles beyond our advanced post. General Nuttall advanced with 160 sabres and two guns for about three miles, the enemy retiring. When he got within 1,800 yards of the cavalry, our men opened on them, and they bolted faster than ever, making for cover. General Nuttall pursued until he was six miles from camp, when he gave up the chase. Some horses of the enemy were killed, and men carried off wounded. No infantry were seen.”

No. 12.

No. 169 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 27, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 162, dated 20th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 19th.—This morning General Burrows shifted his camp three miles back towards Girishk. Fifteen hundred or two thousand of Ayub's sowars arrived at Girishk yesterday. Main body still at Mahmudabad. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed along by roads to join Ayub, Abubekr, Alizai, who murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi last year, and headed the force at Colonel Malcolinson's engagement here, is said to have brought a number of men from Zamindawar. In our neighbourhood all quiet. Cavalry patrols regularly for ten miles in every direction.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL BROOKE and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, escorted by four sowars, were fired at by two men this morning in the Kotal-i-murch, a steep pass leading into the Arghandab valley, about five miles distant from cantonments. One of the sowar's horses was killed. Parties of cavalry and infantry were immediately sent out to surround the hills, and it is hoped that the men may be caught.

Shortly afterwards a report, probably caused by our troops being seen leaving cantonments, spread among the town people that the enemy were approaching, and a panic ensued. Order was quickly restored, and all is quiet and as usual.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-Nakhud, July 20th.—No symptoms of advance by Ayub, whose cavalry have not yet crossed the river. The country in this vicinity quiet, except about the Arghandeh, where Achakzai nomads are committing depredation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 21st, 9 a.m.—Enemy's main body reached Helmund about 12 miles above Girishk yesterday, and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them. It is stated to be Ayub's intention to attack us here, moving by Sangbar road. Luinab with a large number of cavalry is reported to have moved down the Helmund with intention of crossing to Arghandab and attacking our camp; but this requires confirmation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 22nd.—Spies report that Ayub's troops have crossed the Helmund at Haidarabad. A party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbar, 14 miles from here, but returned again. A small party of ghazis, who have collected there, state that they expected 4,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and the main body to-morrow. Few supplies being available at Sangbar, Ayub cannot halt there beyond a day. Being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy's numerous cavalry, General Burrows has

shifted his camp to a new position, in which the stores, sick, and baggage animals are in an enclosure. Report raises number of ghazis and men, who have joined Ayub, to 4,000.

Enclosure 6 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 23rd, 9 a.m.—Intelligence brought last night that Luinab with 400 sowars was moving on Maiwand to collect provisions. Main body of enemy was yesterday still at Haidarabad on this side river. Cavalry reconnaissance going towards Sangbar met about 400 enemy's sowars moving towards Maiwand. A demonstration of cavalry and artillery made them retreat by the road they had come. They state that regular troops will remain in reserve pushing forward cavalry and ghazis. Neither will attempt to move by main road, but keep along foot of hills. Herati regiments reported to be very uneasy at being taken so far from home.

Enclosure 7 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

In and around the city all is quiet. A few shots were fired from outside last night at the Shikarpur Gate, where a guard of our troops is stationed. No one was hurt. The Arghastan, Kadanai, and Derawat districts are slightly disturbed. The rest quiet. No more reports of gatherings, most of the malcontents having probably left to join Ayub. No further news of Abu Said's sons, who were reported trying to raise a gathering in Kadanai.

On the 14th, Muhammad Aslam with a body of sowars attacked a fort near Kelat-i-Ghilzai, occupied by Sirdar's men collecting revenue. He was repulsed. By latest accounts he was near Shahjui, with a following of about 40 men. District otherwise quiet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, 24th.—Retirement of enemy's cavalry this morning complete. None have passed us.

Enclosure 9 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 24th.—Reconnoitring parties sent out to Sangbar and Maiwand this morning saw no signs of the enemy. The cavalry driven back yesterday was commanded by the Luinab and fell back from Sangbar to the Helmund. Last night a body of 450 cavalry crossed the hills to the north three days ago, and came down to the Arghandab valley in our rear. It is believed to have been sent by the Sartip to bring away his family hidden in the villages there. A Populzai Khan of Khakrez has brought in letter from Ayub, calling on him to join his army, and reports that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, has passed up the valley trying to make the people rise. He has as yet had little success, though there is much excitement throughout the country. Much mischief is caused by false reports that the Wali is a prisoner in our camp. Fifty sowars of the Sind Horse arrived here from Kandahar on the 21st, and found road quiet.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM from GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRIMROSE telegraphs to-day from Kandahar:—Terrible disaster. General Burrows' force annihilated. We are going into citadel. General Phayre telegraphed to collect what forces he can, and march on Kandahar. Posts are being concentrated at Chaman. Message ends. I have telegraphed Simla. We can send another brigade if necessary.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL BURROWS has been seriously defeated by Ayub Khan. Primrose has vacated cantonments at Kandahar and retired to citadel. We are pushing forward reinforcements already on their way, as quickly as possible, and sending large additional reinforcements from India. It may be necessary to anticipate despatch of troops from England intended for this season's reliefs.

No. 14A.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 28th July 1880, to VICEROY.

IN event of reinforcements at Kandahar being urgently required, cannot Stewart spare force now with Roberts or Watson.

No. 15.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 31ST JULY 1880. (Extract.)

26th July.—The following messages have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Candahar:—

I.—Dated the 24th.—“Report received this morning from General Burrows that a cavalry reconnoitring patrol towards Sangbúr sighted 600 enemy's cavalry yesterday morning. Patrol kept them in check; was reinforced by 180 sabres and two guns; opened fire at 1,800 yards; killed two horses of enemy, who bolted and could not be caught up. News of this had spread in the city. Madras cavalry crossed Nari last night, and march to-night to Pir Chauki. Thirty sabres Poona Horse from Khúshdil Khan arrived Chaman to-day *en route* to Kandahar.”

II.—Dated the 24th.—“The guard on the ramparts over the Shikárpúr gate was fired at from outside by eight or nine men concealed behind wall of a garden. The fire was returned by the guard, and the men disappeared. The Superintendent of Telegraphs finds it impossible to lay line at present to Khúshk-i-Nakhúd, as no labourers will work outside the city walls.”

III.—Dated the 25th.—“Information received this evening that Ayúb's cavalry fell back last night to Helmand. Report received to the effect that 150 cavalry crossed into the Argandáb three days ago; believed to have been sent to take back Sartíp's family, hidden in village there. Efforts appear to be made by Habibúlla Khan, Barakzái, to raise people in Kakrez, without much success. There is much excitement throughout the country.”

IV.—Dated the 25th.—“General Burrows reports that in the event of enemy moving up north, he purposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and moving up Kakrez Valley, opening up fresh line of communication.”

Brigadier-General Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 26th:—

“One hundred men, 2-11th Regiment, passed through last night for Sibi.”

27th July.—The following reports, dated Kandahar the 26th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—“General Phayre writes:—*Message begins*, ‘First detachment 11th Foot expect to arrive Nari bank this morning; remainder are *en route* in succession; will reach Nari Bank at 4 a.m. daily. Transport officer had gone himself to Múskaff to assist Madras Cavalry. Weather much cooler there.’—*Message ends*.”

II.—Your telegram 21st July. General Burrows states that should the enemy advance direct on Maiwand or on Khúsk-i-Nakhud, he is prepared to attack him,

should he attempt to reach Maiwand *viâ* Malwand, he would intercept him by Gúrmá Valley. Should Ayúb's force try to avoid him by taking road to Nish *viâ* Melwand and Ghorak, he proposes to move by Maiwand in Kakrez. To do this he will reduce his baggage and send back some sick reported unfit, and I will assist him in every way to lighten his column and make it more moveable."

III.—"General Phayre reports that, owing to information received of an intended attack, he proposes to move head-quarters 9th (250) strong and two mountain guns to Gúlistán as nucleus of a moveable column. Last night at Kandahar some men outside the city walls fired a volley at the sentry on the rampart and then bolted; no one hurt."

28th July.—General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 27th:—

"Two mountain guns and head-quarters 9th (373 all ranks), left last night for Gúlistán to form nucleus of flying column, and will arrive on 30th instant. As 24th arrive here to-morrow morning, I can use part of them to support Pishin, if necessary. I can manage to collect 250 cavalry from Quetta and outposts."

The following telegram has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, dated Kandahar the 27th:—

"General Burrows' force completely defeated. We take refuge in citadel. Thirty sowars have escaped."

General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 28th that the telegraph beyond Chaman is stopped.

Consequent on the disaster to Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade near Khúshk-i-Nakhúd on the 26th instant, the following corps have been warned for immediate service in Southern Afghanistan:—

H-1st Royal Artillery	-	-	Mooltan.
8th Bengal Cavalry	-	-	Mooltan.
2nd Battalion 2nd Foot	-	-	Bareilly.
63rd Foot	-	-	Umballa.
3rd Bengal Native Infantry	-	-	Dinapore.
4th " " "	-	-	Ferozepore.
14th " " "	-	-	Umballa.
38th " " "	-	-	Meerut.

The Bombay Government having, however, intimated that they can spare M-1st Royal Artillery, the 2nd Battalion 15th Foot, and two regiments of Native infantry, it is probable that the 2nd Foot and the 14th and 38th Native infantry will not be required to move.

The Commander-in-Chief has intimated that A-C, Royal Horse Artillery, is also available if required for active service in the field.

The following message, dated Quetta the 28th, has been received from Sir Robert Sandeman:—

"Before the telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose:—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar: Dr. Burroughs, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffith, Whittuck, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost Smith, Justice, and Cole killed. In Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Aslett killed. Of Royal Horse Artillery, Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers."

The following are the officers referred to in the preceding message:—

Killed.

Lieutenant E. G. Osborne	-	-	E-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
Captain W. Roberts	-	-	66th Foot.

Lieutenant W. C. Aslett	-	-	1st Bombay Native Infantry.
Captain H. F. Smith	-	-	} 30th Bombay Native Infantry.
Lieutenant D. Cole	-	-	
Lieutenant W. N. Justice	-	-	

Wounded.

Major G. F. Blackwood	-	-	E-B, Horse Artillery.
Captain M. Mayne	-	-	} 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Lieutenant J. H. E. Reid	-	-	
2nd-Lieutenant H. Lynch	-	-	66th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson	-	-	1st Bombay Native Infantry.

Escaped unhurt.

Surgeon-Major C. H. Harvey, M.D.	-	-	E.B., Royal Horse Artillery.
Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan	-	-	3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Surgeon G. E. Burroughs	-	-	3rd Sind Horse.
Major C. V. Oliver	-	-	66th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith	-	-	} 1st Bombay Native Infantry.
Lieutenant F. Whittuck	-	-	
Surgeon A. H. C. Dane	-	-	} 16th Bombay Native Infantry.
Surgeon J. B. Eaton, M.B.	-	-	
Colonel W. G. Mainwaring	-	-	30th Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. St. John, Royal Engineers, the Political Officer, is also reported to have escaped.

30th July.—General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 28th :—

“ I have seven Native infantry regiments on line of communication. Threc of these will be required,—one for Sibi and Bolan, one for Quetta, one for line of posts to Chaman. This leaves four regiments for field column. In addition I have 2-11th Foot and F-2nd Royal Artillery, coming up from Sind. If in addition to these you send me one European infantry regiment and a field battery in succession to F-2nd, I think I shall have enough infantry and artillery to advance with. As regards cavalry, I ought to have at least nine squadrons, which I think I can make up from that on the line of communication, including Madras Cavalry. It would take at least fifteen days to form and equip this force here, and in Pishin, and within that time I hope to have sufficient transport. But certain movements of the enemy reported to be now taking place against Chaman may oblige me to push troops to the Kojak. I have Major Westmacott there, giving me information; and Agent Governor General also sent out men. I commence withdrawal of troops from railway line by retiring the Thal-Chotiali force on Harnái, whence it will march on Pishin, making over station to *maliks* and collecting the troops now posted along that line. Simultaneously with the advance from Harnái the Political Officer and Officer Commanding at Sibi will return to each post and settle with the *maliks* about stores, materials, &c., left behind between Spin Tangi and Nari mouth. The posts of the 23rd Native Infantry thus withdrawn take up the line of communication from Sibi to Siriáb by Bolán. In answer to your question about F-2nd, I do not think there is any necessity for altering the present arrangement. But H-1st should bring everything. I would recommend Colonel James, of 10th Bombay Native Infantry, now in command at Quetta, for the command of the line of communications. With regard to Native infantry and cavalry named in your telegram, I will communicate with you hereafter.

The following reply, dated Simla the 29th July, has been sent to Major-General Phayre by the Quarter Master General :—

“ Yours 28th Chief considers very satisfactory and assuring. Carry out original arrangement about F-2nd, and H-1st will be sent with equipment complete. Let me know as soon as possible when you will be ready for it. 63rd to be at Sukkur in detachments. There will perhaps be some modification in troops from this side, as Bombay can furnish some more. Do you wish for a British cavalry regiment ? ”

31st July.—The following arrangements for the provision of troops for service on the Kandahar line have been approved :—

To proceed from the Bengal Presidency :—

H-1st Royal Artillery.
8th Bengal Cavalry.
63rd Foot.

3rd Native Infantry.

4th

To be detailed from Bombay :—

M-1st Royal Artillery.

15th Foot.

——Native Infantry.

The 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, belonging to the Reserve Division, being in a weakly state, the 8th will be substituted for it. The 78th Highlanders and the 15th Bombay Native Infantry will be sent to Sind immediately to replace corps pushed forward from that province to the Kandahar line.

No. 5-8th Royal Artillery is to be sent from Kirkee to Kandahar *via* Allahabad and Lahore, in order that the sea passage to Karachi, which is considered dangerous at this season, may be avoided. It is possible, however, that this arrangement may yet have to be altered, cholera having appeared at Allahabad.

The following messages, dated Quetta, the 30th, have been received from Major-General Phayre:

I. *Quetta, 30th July.*—Your telegram of last night, ending with question about British cavalry. The cavalry work between Chaman and Kandahar, for nearly eighty miles, will be severe. The enemy, it is said, has some Turcoman cavalry with him. The great difficulty with us now is want of forage, no rain to speak of having fallen since end of 1878. I was about to apply for the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Gonne, 17th Lancers at Mhow, as brigadier of cavalry. Of course I should like to have his regiment also; and if we get rain shortly, the forage difficulty may be overcome. It is clear that with regard to cavalry and artillery, Ayúb Khan's force is far superior to any we have yet encountered, and I want to be strong in both."

II.—"Following report just received from Sibi:—*Begins*—'Your telegram. Sowars will be posted at once to bring in news if flood in Bolan occurs. General Wood arrived this morning. Morning cool. The 11th Regiment men look in splendid order and spirits.'—*Telegram ends.* First detachment 11th is at Dozan this morning; second detachment and Madras Cavalry at Mach."

III.—"On the morning of the 28th General Primrose ordered the Abdul Rehman, Mel Karez, Dabrai and Gatai posts to fall back on Chaman. The march has been accomplished safely under command of Major Jacob, 19th Native Infantry; and 96 sabres, Poona Horse, 25 sappers under Lieutenant D'Aguilar, R.E., and 190 rifles of the 19th Native Infantry have reached Chaman. They were attacked twice *en route* by villagers and killed several of the enemy. Particulars will be ascertained."

The 15th Hussars have been placed under orders to proceed immediately on service towards Kandahar.

No. 15A.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd August 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

IN consequence of telegrams received this morning, a powerful force of all arms under command of Sir Frederick Roberts has been ordered to march on Kandahar from Kabul.

No. 16.

No. 175 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 3, 1880.

IN forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further telegrams regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, in continuation of those forwarded with our Despatch, No. 169, dated 27th July 1880, we have the honour to summarize, as follows, the information which they contain regarding the reverse sustained by the force under command of Brigadier-General Burrows.

2. On the 12th July news reached Colonel St. John, the Political Officer with General Burrows' force, that the advanced portion of Ayub Khan's army was at Washir, and that Ayub Khan himself was not far in rear. The British brigade was then encamped on the Helmund opposite Girishk, the troops of the Wali of Kandahar being on the further bank of the river. On the 13th, it appeared that the infantry in the service of the Wali was in such an unsatisfactory state and so untrustworthy, that General Burrows and Colonel St. John deliberated on the question of disarming them. But the next morning, before any steps could be taken, the Wali's infantry deserted in a body, taking with them a battery of artillery. The mutineers were pursued by a portion of General Burrows' brigade and dispersed, the guns and baggage being recovered. At this time [14th July], Sirdar Ayub Khan's army was reported to be three marches distant from Girishk.

3. As the mutinous troops had plundered the stores of supplies collected at Girishk by Sher Ali Khan, and as reports had reached Colonel St. John that it was Ayub Khan's intention, if he crossed the river Helmund at all, to do so at a point to the north of Girishk, General Burrows determined on the 15th July to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, a distance of 30 miles from Girishk and 45 miles from Kandahar, where several roads from the Helmund to Kandahar converge, and where supplies were plentiful. This retirement was effected on the 17th. On the 18th all was reported quiet in the vicinity of Kushk-i-Nakhud, and it was believed that the majority of the mutinous troops had dispersed to their homes. The advanced portion of Ayub's cavalry had reached Girishk the day before. On the 19th, General Burrows shifted his camp three miles nearer Girishk, and on the 22nd he again moved it to a new position, in which he was able to place his sick, stores, and baggage, in an enclosure, being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy.

4. On the 21st it had been reported that Ayub Khan's force had reached Haidarabad on the Helmund, 12 miles above Girishk, and that the intention was to advance by way of Sangbar. On the 22nd, our cavalry appear to have come in sight of that of the enemy, who retired without coming into action, a demonstration with cavalry and artillery having sufficed to cause them to fall back. On the 25th Ayub Khan with his entire force was known to be at Haidarabad, while his cavalry occasionally occupied Sangbar, and it was reported to be his intention to advance on the 25th by Sangbar and Maiwand, and to endeavour to pass by General Burrows' force into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar. This news was received by us on the 27th July.

5. On the morning of the 28th we received a telegram from Lieutenant Muir, Assistant Political Officer at Kandahar, announcing the total defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force, with heavy loss in officers and men, and reporting that, in consequence, General Primrose had vacated the cantonment at Kandahar, moving all his troops into the citadel. This intelligence was gradually supplemented, during the 28th and 29th, by telegrams from Sir R. Sandeman at Quetta, who reported that telegraphic communication was broken down before noon on the 28th, between the Chaman Post, west of the Khojak Pass, and Kandahar; the last message received in Quetta intimating that the disaster, though severe, was not so complete as General Primrose had at first believed. The report that the whole of General Burrows' force had been annihilated, which was transmitted to England, and which is inconsistent even with the few details contained in the first account of the affair received at Kandahar, seems to have been founded upon a telegram sent direct by General Primrose to the Bombay Government. Nevertheless, the account of the action received this morning from Colonel St. John by a telegram, dated Kandahar 29th, leaves no doubt that the British force encountered an enemy greatly superior in numbers, well posted, and of formidable strength in artillery and cavalry, that our force was defeated, and that it fell back in great disorder on Kandahar, suffering heavy loss during the retreat, mainly through the exhaustion of the troops. At Kandahar General Primrose was reported to be making preparations against an attack by fortifying himself in the citadel, where provisions and ammunition are said to be plentiful.

6. We are taking all possible measures for speedily pushing forward reinforcements to the relief of the troops now in Kandahar. As the first step towards the attainment of this object, all the troops at Quetta, in Pishin, and on the railway line between Sibi and Quetta are being concentrated in Pishin, the railway works being temporarily abandoned, until the advance of reinforcements from India make it again possible to arrange suitably for their protection. Troops are also being forwarded from India as rapidly as possible, and a strong division, now under formation at Kabul, will be ready in a few days to march for Kandahar *via* Ghazni.

7. In Kabul and its neighbourhood all is reported quiet, and the necessary arrange-

ments are now being made with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, the newly-recognised Amir of Kabul.

	We have, &c.
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

No. 394, dated Camp Kushk-i-Nakhud, 17th July 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of Government a detailed account of the events of the last few days, with the leading incidents of which my daily telegrams will have kept you informed.

2. The advanced column under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with which I marched, reached Girishk on Saturday morning the 10th, and the main body under Brigadier-General Burrows the following day. The total force then consisted of one battery Royal Horse Artillery, two regiments of Cavalry, one company of Sappers, six companies of British Infantry, and two regiments of Native Infantry.

3. Our camp was pitched in comparatively low ground on the left bank of the Helmund almost immediately opposite the fort of Girishk, from which it was separated, first by the river itself, fordable at the present time at intervals of half a mile at most, and secondly by a belt of grass and jungle over a mile in width. A bridged road leads from the ford to the fort. The camp of his Highness the Wali was pitched about a mile below the fort, partly on the high sloping banks of the river's bed, and partly in the low land below. His force then consisted of three regiments of infantry, numbering about 1,300 men, two six-pounder smooth-bore guns, and about 1,000 tribal cavalry. The remainder of his force was in advance under his nephew Sirdar Roshndil Khan at Karezat, 20 to 25 miles distant, and consisted of 800 infantry, the remaining four guns of his battery, and about 1,500 tribal cavalry.

4. In the evening of the day of our arrival the Wali visited me, and gave me details of what I had heard by message from him in the morning, that his cousin Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had deserted the advanced camp at Karezat with his own sowars, 50 in number, after an ineffectual attempt to induce the rest of the troops to accompany him to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's camp, then in Washir. The Wali then told me that in spite of this evidence of fidelity on the part of the troops, he felt by no means confident in their loyalty. He was anxious for us to cross and camp on the west bank of the river, but I did not then think right to tell him definitely that the General in command had most stringent orders not to do so, hoping that Brigadier-General Burrows, who would arrive the next morning, would bring permission to act on his own discretion.

5. No such permission having been received, I told the Wali the next evening that under no circumstances should we cross the river. He was much depressed, and said that in that case it would be impossible for him to do anything to oppose Ayub's advance, and that he would concentrate all his troops at Girishk. To this I agreed, considering that if their fidelity was doubtful, it would be better to have the whole of them within reach than to leave a large proportion in a place where there would be no obstacle to their going over to the enemy.

6. The next day (Monday the 12th), I did not see the Wali, but finding from various sources that the disaffection among his troops was far more serious than he had led me to believe, and seeing that he was unwilling that I should go to his camp, I sent for his confidential Secretary, who confirmed the information. By him I sent a message to the Wali asking him whether it would not be better to disarm the whole or part of his regular troops, or, if he was unable to do so himself, to authorise us to take measures for the purpose. To this he eagerly assented, and he appointed the next morning to meet and talk the matter over.

7. At sunrise the next morning I met his Highness on the west bank of the river, and rode with him to the fort and across again to our camp, where he spent a considerable time in discussing the situation with General Burrows and myself. He freely admitted the untrustworthiness of his men, placing the blame mainly on the Sartip and on a certain Sardaru Khan, the principal officer of his army, who was known to have received many communications from Ayub Khan, some of which he had made over to the Wali. "But the only really disaffected corps," he declared, "was the Kabir regiment, about 450 strong, which had been sent to him last September from Kabul, where it had been stationed for 10 years." If this regiment was disarmed there would be no cause to fear the others, but he himself could not disarm it without our assistance. This the very stringent orders received by General Burrows prevented his doing as long as the Wali's force remained on the right bank, and his Highness therefore offered, on receipt of a written request from me, which he could show his officers, to bring the whole of his force to the left bank the next morning. Later on, General Burrows, as reported by telegram, determined to cross the river to disarm the Wali's troops should the step appear necessary. The next morning, while our own camp was being shifted to a better position a mile and a half up stream, I watched the Wali's encampment from the opposite heights. The tents were struck about six, and half-an-hour later the Wali's cousin, Sirdar Dilawar Khan, came across to fix a site for the new camp. Everything was, he said, proceeding satisfactorily, but a quarter of an hour later news was brought me that the troops had mutinied, seized the guns and baggage and driven the Wali and the whole of his cavalry and principal officers across the river. Riding back to the ford I met the Wali with a large number of horsemen; he said that after striking the tents and packing the baggage, the Kabir regiment had marched up to the high bank where the guns were, had seized them, forced the gunners to join them, and driven him and all but a few sowars who joined the mutineers out of the camp. The Wali added that many of the sowars who had accompanied him were untrustworthy, and begged me to fall back in the Kandahar direction at once. I told him that this would be quite unnecessary with our strong force, and that we would first punish the mutineers, and recover the guns. After some delay, mainly caused by uncertainty whether the mutineers intended to hold a position about the fort or move off

Battery, Horse Artillery.
2nd Regiment of Cavalry.
Company Sappers.
Four companies, 66th Regiment.
Four companies, Jacob's Rifles.

towards Herat, and of the attitude of the Wali's sowars, the troops, as per margin, moved across the river by a ford directly in front of our new camp, two miles above Girishk, at 9.30 a.m., the mutineers being then seen streaming along the opposite bank two miles distant. After the troops had crossed the ford

I rode on to the advanced guard, which brought the mutineers to bay a few minutes before 11 a.m. at a distance of four miles from the camp. Half-an-hour later they moved to a second position a mile further on, and opened fire with the 6-pounder guns on the cavalry. This they kept up at intervals till the Horse Artillery, whose passage was much delayed by irrigation channels and rough ground, came into action at half-past 12.

8. On the brief engagement that ensued it is not my province to enlarge: suffice to say that at 2 p.m. all firing had ceased and I returned to camp five miles off by a different road and ford to that by which I had come. I mention this to show the feebleness of the obstacle which the Helmund in a season like the present offers to military operations. During my stay of five days I crossed it in nine different places with a guide, in a distance of five miles.

9. On my return I found the Wali with a few servants in our camp; he informed me that the majority of his sowars were still with him, though a few had, he found, joined the mutineers, and a few more fled to Kandahar. Most of those that had remained had sent their baggage in the same direction. Before leaving camp, I had asked that a party with camels should be sent to bring across the atta, grain, and ghee stored for us by the Wali in the fort; this had been done, but the atta and ghee had disappeared, though large quantities of raw grain remained.

10. The next morning after consultation with the Wali as to the possibility of feeding the troops at Girishk, I reluctantly came to the conclusion to recommend General Burrows to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, whither the Wali had sent the whole of his sowars the night before.

11. The position of Kushk-i-Nakhud offers many advantages. Should the enemy cross at Girishk and follow the road we came, he would have to meet us either in an entrenched position here, or on ground of our own choosing, covering the first water-course on this side of the desert which separates us from Girishk. Should he take the northern road, he would have to meet us at Maiwand, 10 miles off, or, if he keeps to the river line, the Arghandab is less than that distance to the south. In fact, we are half

way between the mountains to the north and the sandy desert to the south, at the point where these approach each other most nearly.

12. Should Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, however, carry out what is, according to some reports, his intention of moving to Tirin and Darawut, and stirring up the country from there, the situation would be entirely changed, and the presence of so large a force here useless.

13. In conclusion, I have the honour to make a few remarks with reference to the effect on the country of this so far successful invasion. It is well known to you, that for many months Ayub Khan and his partisans have used every effort to inflame the religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us and our *protégé*, Sher Ali Khan. These had apparently little or no effect at the time and as long as the possibility of an invasion from Herat seemed more than remote, particularly after the failure of the first attempt. But the actual presence on the frontier of an army of their own fellow tribesmen, under a prince of their recent ruling family, the memory of whose oppression a year and a half of prosperity has sufficed to obliterate from the minds of this fickle people, has, I have reason to suspect, created a more powerful and general feeling in Ayub's favour than one who had only known Kandahar a year ago would believe possible; and it is far from improbable that, unless Ayub Khan's army be defeated and dispersed at once, something very like a general rising may take place. That this could attain the formidable dimensions which have been reached in Kabul, the unwarlike character of the modern Durani and the physical features of the country forbid, but it may cause considerable trouble and annoyance and involve somewhat extended operations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHU, July 24th.—If enemy moves up Helmund, General Burrows proposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar and moving up Khakrez valley, opening up fresh line of communications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre has received information from the Kandahar Road commandant corroborating what I previously told him that Ayub's cavalry meditate an attack in the Gulistan direction on our communication. The general is sending there to-morrow from Quetta a small column consisting of 450 infantry, 2 guns, and a few cavalry.

The 24th Native Regiment is at Darwaza, and hopes to reach Quetta to-morrow or next day.

Enclosure 4 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHU, July 25th.—Ayub, with his entire force, is still about Haidarabad. His cavalry outposts occasionally occupying Sangbar, near which two men of Sind Horse on outpost duty were surprised and killed. This morning spies report that he intends moving on the 28th by both roads through Sangbar and through Maiwand. His object being to get past us into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TOTAL defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force. Heavy loss in both officers and men. General Primrose has vacated cantonments and brought all his troops into citadel. Officers and men returning in small parties. Wali has arrived. Colonel St. John safe.

Enclosure 6 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

News of this morning from Kandahar. General Phayre and I have consulted together, and these are our views: That our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolan Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is what is to be done under present circumstances with the railway line under construction. We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiali to Quetta should be concentrated in Pishin with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali should, if possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once.

General Primrose has telegraphed that he is abandoning Kandahar cantonments and will defend himself in citadel. He has directed General Phayre to march on Kandahar as soon as he can collect army. Primrose says Ayub's army is strong in artillery, which numbers 35 guns well served. We trust as much artillery as can be spared will be sent from India, also Europeans and horses to equip the guns at Quetta. We are quite aware of the very bad political effect the abandonment of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali by the present garrison must have upon the country, unless troops from the Punjab can be sent to relieve them, but state of country and strength of tribes, in our opinion, leave no alternative.

Primrose telegraphed two of our guns had been taken by enemy, who pursued our retreating troops for three miles.

Enclosure 7 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2511 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and decides that the forces employed for protection of railway line must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will re-occupy railway line when possible, but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces toward Kandahar. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements.

Enclosure 8 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Your telegram to-day just received. General Phayre has issued the necessary orders for the troops now protecting railway line to concentrate on Pishin. Movement commences from Thul-Chotiali, and I hope the order for the march will reach Thul-Chotiali on the third day from this. I have directed political officers to heartily co-operate with commanding officers in carrying out General's orders, and to arrange as best they can with the head men of villages to take care of all stores, telegraph line, &c. left behind, until reoccupation of country by our troops. I am in constant communication with General Phayre, who is strenuously exerting himself to push forward all available forces towards Kandahar. His Excellency the Viceroy may rely on myself and officers using our best exertions to aid General Phayre.

Enclosure 9 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BEFORE telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose :—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar :—Doctor Burrows, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffiths, Whitecot, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost, Smith, Justice, and Coles killed; in Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Haslet killed. Of R.H.A., Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers.

Enclosure 10 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COMMUNICATION with Kandahar stopped at 11 this morning. I will inform General Phayre of your instructions.

Enclosure 11 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2521 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

WE hear wire cut towards Kandahar. Please use every endeavour to collect and send me early intelligence of passing events there.

Enclosure 12 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2,524 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

Do you know what day and time and where action was fought; also whether Burrows attacked or enemy attacked him.

Enclosure 13 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

HIS Highness the Khan has sent me the following message in reply to telegrams informing him of substance of what had happened, and asking him to assist us with camels :—*Begins.* Thanks for your three telegrams. I am certain that the enemy will get their due reward soon. I am glad to afford help. My head and my all belongs to the British. I shall never draw back. One hundred and fifty camels, and one hundred horses are ready at Mustung just now; inform me and I shall happily send them to you immediately.

Musa Khan left this three days ago for Quetta with 100 camels. Whatever grain or money is required by the British I am ready to supply. I am certain you will always keep me informed of what is going on for the future. *Ends.*

Enclosure 14 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE this morning again visited General Phayre, and have recorded a memorandum of our deliberations which will be posted to-day. After carefully reviewing the situation we are again forced to the conclusion that, unless other troops can at once occupy the railway line of works, it must be abandoned. I telegraph this to show Government that the abandonment of the line and valuable plant is imperatively necessary, though we have come to this decision most unwillingly.

Enclosure 15 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, dated this morning, asks where and when Burrows' action was fought, and whether he attacked. I regret I cannot give any information in addition to what I telegraphed yesterday. Primrose at the time wire was cut did not know the extent of the defeat. The last words that I understood he sent were to the effect that disaster was not so great as at first believed, but very severe; enemy only pursued for three or four miles; two of our guns taken, the others expected in; Brooke sent out to bring in stragglers; intended to abandon cantonments and occupy citadel; his only fear was scarcity of water.

Enclosure 16 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2531 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves your decision to abandon railway line temporarily. Two strong brigades are being sent up and reinforcements coming from England at once. Send all particulars of Burrows' action as early as possible.

Enclosure 17 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2534 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram 29th. Please convey at once to his Highness the Khan of Kelat, Viceroy's cordial acknowledgments of the friendship and loyalty toward the British Government attested by his prompt and valuable offer of co-operation.

Enclosure 18 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram of last evening expressing anxiety for news from Kandahar. Within a few hours of the receipt of the news about Burrows, I had sent off reliable men to Kandahar for information last night. The news from Chaman fort was that the Mel Abdul Rahman and Dubrai post, retreating from the line of communication on Chaman, had arrived at Gatai. Fighting was going on, but they were holding their own. Assistance is to be sent this morning from Chaman to help them in. They number 180 infantry and 70 cavalry. The country between Kandahar and Khojak Pass is in a state of insurrection, the difficulty therefore of communicating with Kandahar is very great. I have sent six letters to St. John and Major Westmacott yesterday at Chaman, despatched to him by messenger, with telegram from me. The country people say that the fight between the British and Ayub's army was severe and both sides lost heavily. I will again despatch letters; but even if my messengers succeed in reaching St. John, an

answer to my first letters on account of distance must take, counting from date of despatch, 10 days.

The Kakars and Aitchakzais are reported collecting; but in a few days, I trust, we will be strong enough to hold the country from Quetta to Chaman post.

Enclosure 19 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM Chaman I hear that Major Westmacott went out this morning with 50 sabres, Poona Horse, to assist Major Jacob retreating with road outpost detachments on Chaman. A skirmish took place near Gatai, but I understand there were no casualties on our side. Major Westmacott and Jacob are bringing their men safely into Chaman.

Enclosure 20 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram this morning. The detachments named therein have arrived at Chaman. No casualties.

Enclosure 21 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WE have received no direct news from our army at Kandahar. Native sources do not describe Burrows' defeat as crushing. They say that British cavalry and guns were induced to follow the enemies' cavalry, who pretended to fly and led them into a complete ambushade. Ayub's army then delivered its attack, and our troops suffered very severely in officers and men. A battle was then fought, resulting in our retirement on Kandahar, but Ayub's army suffered much. This news, I am sorry to say, requires confirmation. I send it because received from several sources.

Enclosure 22 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received the following news from a fairly reliable source:—Ayub Khan's army did not follow up British retreat to Kandahar. Burrows' force has arrived at Kandahar, and our whole army is now in the citadel. When messenger left Ayub was encamped where action was fought. This intelligence seems to corroborate news sent you yesterday that Burrows' defeat was not so crushing as at first believed by Primrose, and that Ayub Khan's army had suffered so much that they were vacillating regarding their further course of action.

Enclosure 23 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2571 E.P., dated 1st August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

HER Majesty the Queen has expressed her satisfaction at the news of the Khan of Kelat's loyal offers of assistance. Please inform Khan.

Enclosure 24 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

29th. Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning, 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 A.M., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared and formed line of battle—, seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being best posted. Till one P.M., action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and, in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 P.M., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Kandahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no efforts would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Kandahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, 40 miles from scene of action, at 7 A.M.; many not having tasted water since previous morning.

Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed and missing,—66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; Artillery, 40; Sappers, 21; Cavalry, 60. Officers killed, or missing,—Major Blackwood, Osborne, MacLaine, Artillery; Henn, Engineers. Galbraith, McMath, Garratt, Cullen, Roberts, Rayner, Honeywood, Barr, Chute, 66th; Owen, 3rd Cavalry; Hinde, Whitby, Grenadiers; Smith, Justice, Cole, Jacob's Rifles. Wounded,—Powell, Artillery; Lynch, Preston 66th; Anderson, Grant, Grenadiers; Iredell, Jacob's Rifles.

Preparations being now made for siege. Durani inhabitants expelled. Provisions and ammunition plentiful. Wali was present during action, and is now with us, assisting actively. Of course, whole country will rise.

No. 17.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING 7TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

2nd August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 1st:—

“Have given orders to occupy crest of Kojak with 25 sappers, two mountain guns, and head-quarters and 300 rifles 9th Native Infantry, who will entrench themselves there. Thus I hope to secure road and telegraph between Chaman and Killa Abdulla, where the wire has been cut since last evening. Colonel Sibthorpe wires from Kila Abdulla this morning a vague native report of two generals and a force in retreat; that one of the generals was badly wounded. This I conclude to be the first news of General Burrows' and General Brookes' (? Nuttall's) retiring force approaching Kandahar. Both Sir Robert Sandeman and I have sent several letters by independent means to General Primrose; the distance is very great and we cannot expect any reply for some days; but directly the troops from the railway line begin to reach Pishin, we shall be in a better position to make further efforts to obtain reliable information. I need scarcely assure his Excellency that no effort shall be wanting on my part to aid General Primrose with least possible delay.

Brigadier-General H. H. A. Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 2nd, that half of F-2nd Royal Artillery passed through that place for Sibi on the night of the 1st.

3rd August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 3rd :—

“ Your telegram last evening about military reports received ; will be attended to. Yesterday’s Kandahar news has had a most exciting effect on tribes. I have occupied crest at Kojak. Detachment sent there drove off about 150 men who had seized head of pass, killing a few of them. Am pushing all available men to front, including Engineer officers and sappers, to secure the Kojak position and outposts connected with it.”

The Government of India have this day directed Sir Donald Stewart to prepare a strong division to march on Kandahar from Kabul, under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts. This force will proceed, of course, *via* Khelat-i-Ghilzai, a threatened attack on which post has been rumoured.

4th August.—Sir Donald Stewart telegraphs from Kabul on the 3rd, that the following force has been detailed to be in readiness for special service under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts :—

INFANTRY DIVISION	<i>1st Brigade.</i>		Under Major-General Ross.
	92nd Foot.	23rd Pioneers.	
	2nd Goorkhas.	24th Native Infantry.	
	<i>2nd Brigade.</i>		
	72nd Foot.	2nd Sikhs.	
	5th Goorkhas.	3rd „	
	<i>3rd Brigade.</i>		
	60th Rifles.	15th Sikhs.	
	4th Goorkhas.	25th Native Infantry.	
	<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i>		
9th Lancers.	3rd Punjab Cavalry.		
3rd Bengal Cavalry.	Central India Horse.		
<i>Artillery.</i>			
6th Battery 8th Brigade.	No. 2 Mountain Battery.		
11th Battery 9th Brigade.			

This force is intended for a movement on Kandahar in aid of Lieutenant-General Primrose.

6th August.—The following message, dated Kandahar, the 27th July, has only now been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose.

“ General Burrows, under date evening 25th, reports situation unchanged. Two Sind horsemen shot while patrolling near Sangbúr. At Kandahar, I hear that Habíbúlla has been to Kakrez, and has tried to raise the people without success. He was at Taznee on Sunday, and then proposed crossing into the Argandáb. The second detachment 11th Foot left Sibi last night. Five men of 1st detachment struck down by sunstroke at Nari ; are all doing well. Head-quarters 9th and the mountain guns left Quetta for Gulistan this morning.”

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 4th :—

“ I beg to submit the following outline of the military situation, as it is at present, for his Excellency’s information :—

“ Chaman, at the northern foot of Kojak, is now our advanced post, with a garrison of 50 sabres, two mountain guns, and 400 Native Infantry. It is connected with our main position on the heights of that pass by a defile five miles long. Since we drove out the 150 Atchakzáis from their position on the heights on the 30th ultimo, they have collected more men, and a good deal of brisk skirmish has been going on in the defile and adjacent heights for the last three days, with a loss to the enemy of 20 to 30 killed, whilst our own loss has been trifling. They are now constructing *sangas* at certain

points, from which they will be driven in a day or two on the arrival of more infantry under Colonel James. I have ordered Colonel Lindsay, Lieutenant Whiteford, and other engineer officers now arriving at Kila Abdulla to arrange for the entrenchment of such commanding points as it may be necessary to hold for offensive and defensive purposes. Colonel James, with one company 11th Foot and a wing of 10th Native Infantry, will reach Gulistan to-morrow, and assume command of the troops between Chaman and Sigghi, whose movements he will direct in communication with me. The head-quarters wing 11th Foot will be placed in the Gulistan fort until we are ready to advance; the remaining wing, with F-2nd, will be pushed forward to the same point when ready. The troops from Thal-Chotiali and railway line ought to reach Pishin within a week.

"Yesterday a body of two or three hundred Kakars from beyond Toba attacked a convoy of empty carts near Dina Karez. The havildar, 10th Native Infantry, in command lost three killed and three wounded of his party, but killed six of the enemy and secured his convoy. Detachments of Biluch Guides and Native Infantry have been sent after these Kakars by Sir Robert Sandeman and myself.

"The above shows that the Pathan tribes of the Kojak and adjacent country are determined to molest our communications between Chaman and the Ghazaband Pass, and that they must be secured by strong detachments. The cavalry will be massed towards Khush-Dil-Khan, where forage is said to be plentiful.

"I this morning received a letter from Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster General, Kandahar, dated the 29th. After the force had withdrawn into the citadel, he says that the entry of General Burrows' force into camp had to be covered against the attack of villagers as far as Singiri. After all had got into the citadel, the *kacha* buildings of the cantonment were fired by natives. He details the force now in the citadel of Kandahar as follows: Guns, C.-2nd Royal Artillery, heavy battery of four 40-prs. and two mortars; about 120 of 66th Foot, 271 of 1st Grenadiers, 300 of Jacob's Rifles, 500 of 7th Foot, 4th, 28th, and half of 19th Native Infantry; also 40 of 3rd Cavalry, 200 Sind Horse, 200 Poona Horse. He mentions that a great number of townspeople have been turned out; that they have *bhusa* for animals for 20 days; supplies for men for over two months. His chief anxiety is water, because the season has been a dreadfully dry one; consequently whole country is parched up. After searching for wells, he says he has found hundreds, but water very low indeed in them. His description of Ayub's force and its attack is much the same as that already reported. The 66th Foot is said to have fought splendidly, and lost 400 out of 520 men present, and 10 officers killed. Some of Ayub's cavalry reached Kandahar on the 29th, but none of his footmen. They hope to have a chance of defeating some of his forces outside; and, just as he wrote, Colonel Phillips, Poona Horse, had cut up some men when reconnoitering outside the walls. He says that one good downpour of rain would give them their great want—water; but if rain fails they must go out and fight for it. He says, in conclusion, that he will try and send another messenger in a day or two, when he has succeeded in getting news of Ayub's force, its disposition, &c."

7th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 6th:—

"Officer Commanding Chaman reports he sent a gun and company native infantry to clear defile between Chaman and Kojak position they drove enemy with loss out of *sangas*. Simultaneously Lieutenant-Colonel Sibthorpe from top of pass sent a party to dislodge another gathering of enemy from their *sangas*, with loss of five killed. On our side Major Morse and one sepoy slightly wounded. Since these operations a convoy has passed unmolested. Colonel Lindsay reports that telegraph wire in defile has been cut to bits, and from other information of this morning it appears that wire between Chaman and Kandahar has been carried away on camels. Regarding Kojak position, Colonel Lindsay says that it is quite defensible; that no tribal gathering can touch it, but that he will extend and improve it. Now that native infantry are closing up and working parties available, communication with Chaman by heliograph will be opened directly instruments, on way there with Sappers, arrive."

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 7th:—

- I. "One hundred men 2-15th Foot passed through last night for Sibi."
- II. "Half wing 2nd Cavalry left last night for Sibi."

No. 18.

No. 179 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.To The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 10, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 175, dated 3rd August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

	We have, &c.
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram of this morning. My informant also states that the inhabitants of the villages round Kandahar and the city itself have fled to the hills. I also know from the conversation which passed between Primrose and Phayre at the Telegraph Office on the morning of 28th that Primrose intended turning all Afghans out of the city. I think these circumstances may account for the fact that St. John has not been able to communicate with me.

The crest of the Khojak Pass was occupied by the 9th Native Infantry and two guns this morning. Telegraphic communication between Chaman and Killa Abdulla is still interrupted, but expected to be restored very shortly.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

28th. Defeat of our force most complete, mainly attributable to unsteadiness of infantry. Cavalry and artillery covered retreat to certain extent, but infantry could not be rallied. Estimated loss killed and missing, 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 300; Artillery, 40; Sappers and Miners, 21; Cavalry, 50. Situation here matter for grave anxiety. Relief from Quetta difficult on account of want of water on the road for large force. Might not division of army be sent from Kabul? Would meet with little opposition, tribes being unprepared.

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

It is reported that Syud Khan, Nurzai, and Shah Muhammad Sahibzada, Kakar, were the leaders of the attack on the Dubrai Kadui and Mel Manda post, between Chaman and Kandahar. They are said to have been joined by some 2,000 tribesmen from Toba. Nur Muhammad Khan, Governor of Kadui under Wali Sher Ali, is reported to have fled. Ayub Khan is stated to have sent Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan with two cavalry regiments and a number of Herati and Turcoman horsemen to Kakran, to prevent the people taking supplies into Kandahar. Ayub Khan himself is said to have marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud to Mir Karez, the head-quarters of Umr Khan, Sahibzada. It

is rumoured that he has detailed two guns for the purpose of attacking Chaman. Yesterday ten Poona Horse were attacked in Khojak pass by party of Aitchakzai robbers; a fight ensued and resulted in the killing of seven Aitchakzais, without loss on our side. Last night a few shots were fired into post at Killa Abdulla. From Shorawak the news is that men are assembling under Pir Muhammed Khan, Barchi, with the object of attacking our posts at Segi and Dinar Karez in Pishin, at the request of Abu Syud Khan and Shah Muhammed Sahibzada. Pir Muhammad is believed to have sent a party to Kelat to endeavour to purchase ammunition from Sibi. Rai Hittu Ram reports that, on 25th July, Marri carried off from near Thalli a number of sheep and camels belonging to Brahuïs. In retaliation, Brahuïs have since raided from same neighbourhood 15 camels belonging to Mir Hazur, Chief of the Ghazni Marri. Rai Hittu Ram insisted on Brahuïs surrendering their plunder, and camels are now in his possession at Sibi. The Marri Chief, Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, is said to discountenance Marri raids, and to have left Kahan for the purpose of putting a stop to them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My news telegram of to-day. Rai Hittu Ram reports favourable settlement of Marri—Brahui raiding, and has arranged for mutual restitution of stolen property.

Enclosure 5 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I THINK that every exertion should be made to send troops to Kandahar. I have been informed attack in force is meditated on Kelat through Shorawak, with object of seizing Khan's treasure, said to amount to 30 lakhs. Could not troops be sent from Kabul to create diversion from that direction? Situation very serious.

Enclosure 6 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

News received of a meditated attack on Kelat, *via* Shorawak. Brahui Sirdars express themselves ready and anxious to assist His Highness the Khan, if anything of the kind is attempted. The Brahui clans are strong enough to defeat any invasion of His Highness' kingdom, unless undertaken by regular organized army.

The occupation of the Khojak Pass has been accomplished without much opposition. The tribes lost 12 men, our loss *nil*. Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Marri, has sent his eldest son to Sibi, accompanied by several of his principal headmen, and has expressed his desire to keep his tribe in order and prevent raiding. In this he is believed to be sincere.

Regiment of Madras Cavalry arrived at Quetta this morning; also 2nd detachment of 2-11 Foot, 1st detachment of same regiment, with detachment 10th Native Infantry, marched early this morning for the Khojak Pass, which is being strongly held by our troops. No further news from Kandahar.

Enclosure 7 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, No. 2616 E. P., dated 3rd August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

Yours, 2nd, regarding meditated attack on Kelat. We are sending strong division from Kabul, but report whether you consider any special measures necessary for security of Khan, whom it is essential to protect effectually.

Enclosure 8 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, No. 2637 E. P., dated 4th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

PLEASE endeavour to let St. John know that his telegrams, 28th, 29th, have reached us, that we are most anxious for more news, and glad he is safe; also that very strong division under Roberts marches at once from Kabul. Send special messenger to communicate with Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and obtain news. Your exertions at this time are much appreciated here and in England.

Enclosure 9 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880, 15h. 20m. Received 5th, 1 p.m.

From Agent, Governor-General, Quetta, to Foreign, Simla.

No further definite news from Kandahar. The main body of Ayub's army is reported to have been four days ago on march to the west of Kandahar.

A convoy returning from Killa Abdulla to Quetta was attacked before daylight yesterday morning near Dinar Carez by a large number of tribesman. A Havildar of 10th Native Infantry, commanding escort, showed much skill in successfully resisting attack. A Naik, two sepahis, and three cartmen were killed, also five of the enemy. Captain Mosley, with 60 Biluch Guides and 100 infantry, marched from Quetta last night to Guzaband Pass to hunt up the marauders.

This morning there was a skirmish near Chaman; about two of the enemy were killed. On our side three men were wounded and five horses killed. The tribes have erected strong sangars at the entrance to Khojak Pass on south side. Major Westmacott was attacked this morning on his way to Chaman from Killa Abdulla, but beat off his assailants with loss of only two horses.

Field Telegraph Office has been opened at Gulistan Karez, and telegraphic communication with Killa Abdulla still continues.

Colonel James is on his way to the Khojak Pass with 200 of the 10th Native Infantry and 100 of the 2-11 Regiment. He will command line of communication with Quetta Major Blowers from Kowas with 200 rifles, 10th Native Infantry and 50 Sabres, 2nd Sind Horse, reached Killa Abdulla this morning, and marches at once for crest of the Khojak Pass. Lieutenant Whiteford, R.E., with Sappers and Miners, accompanies Blowers to fortify the heights.

The Thull-Chotiali garrison has reached Spin-Tangi, and is expected at Hurnai tomorrow. A 3rd detachment of the 2-11 Regiment arrived here this morning. 2,500 transport bullocks have safely reached Sibi from Sangan through the Marri Hills.

Enclosure 10 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Kandahar from Quartermaster General to Phayre gives strength British force as follows:—Eight guns Royal Horse Artillery, four forty-pounder-guns and two mortars; 120 66th Regiment Europeans, 300 Jacob's Rifles, 270 Grenadiers, 600 7th Regiment, Fusilier, whole of 4th and 28th Regiments, Native Infantry, and half of 19th Regiment Native Infantry; 900 Cavalry, native. Ample supplies for two months; forage for twenty days. Many wells contain little water, which is the principal difficulty, but good showers would remedy this.

Ayub's army consists of ten Regiments, some thousands Ghazis, and 35 guns. Troops admirably handled. Burrows was outnumbered and surrounded. 66th European Regiment behaved splendidly, but conduct of Jacob's regiment of Rifles described as very bad.

Enclosure 11 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BRAHUI Sirdars' messengers, who were despatched to obtain news of Ayub Khan's movements, have returned, and state that up to 1st August army was at Sangbar, the leaders were in perplexity, not knowing whether to advance or remain where they were. Ayub's loss very heavy. Messengers say he had no hope of successfully attacking Kandahar. I give this news as received. Doubtless there is truth in it.

Enclosure 12 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LIEUTENANT JENNINGS telegraphed yesterday from Spin-Tangi that the Thull-Chotiali garrison marched from Thull-Chotiali without any opposition whatever from the people. On the contrary, they maintained a friendly attitude to the end, and aided the march of the force with bullock carriage.

Enclosure 13 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

It is reported on good authority that, on 1st instant, Ayub was at Sanjiri, one march north-west of Kandahar. His army is stated to have suffered much in Burrows' engagement, and to doubt its power to attack Kandahar. Large numbers of Ghazis are collecting round Kandahar.

Henry Wylie arrived at Killa Abdulla this morning. Yesterday he reported from Gulistan that there does not yet appear to be any regular rising of the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Khojak Pass, and the attacks on convoys have been committed by gangs of thieves. The news from Shorawak is more satisfactory. Some supplies are still coming thence to Gulistan. General Phayre has heard from Chaman that the post has been made strong enough to resist any tribal attack, though not tenable against artillery fire. Colonel Lindsay has also reached Killa Abdulla, and has gone to mark out position on crest of Khojak which is now occupied by 300 of 9th Native Infantry, and 200 of 10th Native Infantry, and two mountain guns. At Gulistan there are 200 of the 2-11th Regiment, the head-quarters of which arrived here this morning.

The Madras Cavalry marched early this morning for Khusdil Khan from Sharig. The Officer Commanding telegraphs that owing to reported gathering of Wanechis and Kakars, he withdrew two small posts at Nassak and Shor near Poongi. The Nassak party was attacked by eighty Pathans, one of our sowars and two or three of the enemy were killed. The Pathans fled on reinforcements coming up. A few other Pathans attacked a convoy near Spin-Tangi, but were beaten off with a loss of eight killed. Lieutenant Tobin received the thanks of the General for his good management.

Enclosure 14 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Your telegram, dated the 3rd. His Highness the Khan has to-day replied as follows:—*Begins.* Many thanks for your kind offer of assistance. Certainly I will ask you for help should I require it. Kabul, Kandahar, Pishin, and Quetta, are all Sulh-dád (?), belong to British Government. I do not fear. The Pathans are my enemies, because they know I am a true ally of the British. By God's help I shall look to my affairs properly. I have sent my men to fetch news from those places. I shall inform you as soon as I receive any news. I hope you will, for the future, also keep me informed of all news. *Ends.*

I am keeping a good look-out, and, should any further measures be necessary will at once telegraph.

Enclosure 15 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ALL going on well. Excitement among the tribes seems to have partially subsided. There has been some little skirmishing in Khojak Pass between Killa Abdulla and Chaman. Major Morse, 9th Bombay Native Infantry very slightly wounded. Enemy easily driven out of Sangars by shots from one mountain gun.

The Aitchakzai levies still remain at their posts.

No further news from Kandahar.

Enclosure 16 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Kandahar, 3rd August. Beyond slight skirmishes between country people and troops covering working parties nothing has occurred last three days. Ayub reported to intend reaching Kokaran to-morrow or next day. No news from Chaman or Kelat-i-Ghilzai since we shut ourselves up in city. Preparations for defence proceeding satisfactorily, all buildings outside walls being demolished. With very few exceptions entire Pathan population has left or been expelled city. Wounded officers doing well. Colours of both 66th and Grenadiers lost. Accurate loss not yet ascertained, but estimate given in former telegram not far wrong. About 1,100 out of 2,800 killed and missing.

Enclosure 17 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th August 1880, 16h. 7m. Received 8th, 10 a.m.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YESTERDAY a telegram, dated 3rd August, was received through Killa Abdulla from St. John, reporting all well at Kandahar. Ayub's army had not marched Kokaran, and no troops had been detached against Kelat-i-Ghilzai, or Pishin.

A large tribal gathering exists about Takht-i-pul. St. John's messengers were obliged to pass through Registan. The Rhoghani pass in the Amran Mountains is said to be held by 200 tribesmen. The messengers also stated that Ayub's loss in action on 27th was extremely heavy.

Some Pathan Maliks in the Lora Valley who showed signs of disaffection have been seized by Mr. Ingle, escorted by party of the Madras Cavalry and brought to Quetta.

Captain Henry Wylie reports bodies of Badozai robbers from Shorawak in Lora Tangi.

On night of 6th, 26 contract camels conveying Commissariat stores were carried off with their loads by Aitchakzais from Kuchali on Hurnai line.

Mr. Duke, Political Officer, reports that the Marris are giving some trouble to the troops evacuating the railway line. First Detachment 2-15th Regiment arrived at Nari bank this morning.

Rain was threatening in the plains. Bridge over Nari river commenced.

No. 19.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 14TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

8th August.—The 63rd Foot, proceeding on service to Kandahar, will probably leave as follows :—

						Men.
On the 12th	-	-	-	-	-	200
„ 13th	-	-	-	-	-	200
„ 14th	-	-	-	-	-	198
„ 15th	-	-	-	-	-	197
„ 16th	-	-	-	-	-	101
Total						896

The several detachments will be looked through to the Nari bank. They will reach Sukkur on the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th August.

9th August.—The following messages have been received from Sir Donald Stewart from Kabul :—

I. Dated the 7th.—"March to Kandahar force deferred to Monday, and the rest of force to Wednesday, owing to non-arrival of sick carriage."

II. Dated the 9th.—The following is a detail of the force proceeding to Kandahar under Sir Frederick Roberts :—

	EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned officers and men.
Staff - - -	79	—	-	—
No. 6-8th Royal Artillery	6	95	-	139
No. 11-9th " "	6	95	-	139
No. 2 Mountain Battery	5	—	-	140
9th Lancers - -	19	318	-	—
3rd Bengal Cavalry	7	—	-	394
3rd Punjaub " "	9	—	-	408
Central India Horse	11	—	-	495
60th Foot - -	21	616	-	—
72nd " - -	23	787	-	—
92nd " - -	19	651	-	—
15th Bengal Native Infantry	10	—	-	650
23rd " "	8	—	-	701
24th " "	7	—	-	575
25th " "	8	—	-	629
2nd Goorkha Regiment	7	—	-	501
4th " "	7	—	-	637
5th " "	8	—	-	561
2nd Sikh Infantry	7	—	-	612
3rd " "	7	—	-	570
Total	274	2,562		7,151
9,987				

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad :—

I. On the 8th.—"One hundred men, 2-15th, passed through last night for Sibi. Also remaining half wing 2nd Light Cavalry left for Sibi."

II. On the 9th.—"One hundred men, 2-15th Foot, and one squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry, passed through for Sibi last night."

The following messages have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Quetta :—

I. Dated the 8th.—"Tribes have been threatening communication between Ghazaband and Kojak for last day or two, but each post is being placed in a defensive state, and they are checked for the present. Maliks of refractory villages have been seized. Madras cavalry reached Khúshdil Khan in time to prevent strong attack there. Headquarters wing 11th Foot gone to Gúlistán escorting large convoy. Left wing now here and with F-2nd, which will arrive to-morrow, will shortly proceed to Gúlistán. All reported quiet on Kojak position and Daman. Reports this morning from Sibi state first detachment 15th Foot left for Bolan last evening. Nari in high flood. Raft wire across has slackened so as to be useless. Large boat expected to-day from Sukkur, by which guns and infantry will be crossed. Bolan also said to be in flood. First party 15th will therefore halt at Pir-Chauki until fords passable. Large tribal gatherings on hills at Takht-i-Pul, said to amount to 2,000; occupation of Kojak and concentration of troops there has prevented this body from joining other tribes in harassing our Pishin communi-

cations. Messenger with letters from Kandahar avoided them by skirting desert to westward. As already reported, Ayub's forces were not to reach Kandahar until 5th."

II. Dated the 8th.—"Following received by Sir Robert Sandeman from Mr. Duke, Assistant Agent, Governor General, Nari. Begins—"We have reached this place. The 'sick and wounded are within two miles; will have to be brought in on camels and 'bullocks, owing to state of roads. The whole of the Quothnand (?) at Inneris (?) are 'up; have broken away entirely from chiefs. * * * * rode under fire with us, and 'believe did their best. We were compelled to abandon all our baggage and treasure in 'passes between Kúcháli and Gandakindaff. Five European * * * * cut up. The 'loss of followers and coolies very heavy. Estimated ten sepoy killed and wounded. 'Will report particulars later.'"—Ends.

III. Dated the 9th.—"It was in the Kuchali and Gandakindaff defile, within their own territory, that the Marris attacked Lieutenant Tobin's retiring force, referred to in yesterday's telegram. The defile is four miles long and very narrow in parts, being enclosed between lofty precipices. The road crosses the river several times. This part of the line, namely, between Spintangi, Kuchali, Gandakindaff, &c., is not mentioned in paragraphs 20, 29, 37 of Sir Richard Temple's minute, dated 25th of November 1879, and the Marris are extremely discontented at our occupation of it.

"Last night Officer Commanding at Sibi reported Lieutenant Tobin's arrival as follows: *Begins*—"Lieutenant Tobin and party arrived here. Tobin badly wounded in left elbow; nine or ten men killed and few wounded. Tents, kits, and baggage of party wholly abandoned. Men have nothing but what they stand in. Gatacre and his detachment also arrived: has brought in all his baggage, &c., except one tent lost in river.'"

Captain Shepherd telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 9th:—

"Major Peter wires,—'Attacked by Marris on march Sibi side Kuchali. Six clerks and 20 coolies killed; baggage and treasure lost.' Have called for report, and on receipt will forward details."

The Deputy Quartermaster General, Bombay, telegraphs from Sukkur on the 9th:—
"Last squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry left yesterday for Jacobabad."

10th August.—The following message, dated Quetta the 9th, has been received from Major-General Phayre:—

"In consequence of what has occurred between Spintangi and Nari Gorge, Sir Robert Sandeman and I consider that Sibi and its vicinity should be held as follows: At *Nari Gorge*, 50 sabres and 100 rifles; *Gulo-ki-Sher*, 50 sabres and 50 rifles; *Thalli*, 50 sabres and 100 rifles; at *Sibi*, one troop cavalry and 200 Native infantry. For the present we must use the 8th Bengal Cavalry and 23rd Bombay Native Infantry for these posts. The 4th Bengal Native Infantry will, on arrival at Sibi, relieve the 23rd Native Infantry at the above post, and will also take those in the Bolan up to Siriab."

Brigadier General Wood reports as follows from Jacobabad on the 10th:—

"One hundred men, 2-15th Foot, and 8th Bombay Native Infantry passed through for Sibi last night. Also one troop 8th Bengal Cavalry left for Sibi."

11th August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 10th:—

I. "Your telegram of last evening. I will make my estimate of transport to-day, and give an approximate idea of force and date of March. I fear I shall have to take on some carts to save time. A very cheering letter come from Adam, just received, dated 5th; all in capital spirits, and only want some guns to take offensive. Ayub got hurt in trying to stop a fight between Kabuli and Herati regiments. This Marri rising between Sibi and Kuchali is going on, taking away troops I require for front. I reported yesterday the steps taken to check it; further information shows tribe to be unmanageable."

II. "The following is my programme of movement for the relief of Kandahar. By 24th instant I shall have collected at Quetta and in Pishin for above service exclusively,

European artillery, 310 and 12 guns; Native Artillery, 186 men and six mountain guns; also a rocket party; cavalry, European 410, Native, 950; Sappers and Miners, 200; infantry, European, 1,350, Native, 3,000. As far as Chaman there is no difficulty about transport, there being a fair cart-road. It is on the 80 miles of road from that to Kandahar that difficulty exists. In order therefore to reduce transport I shall march as light as possible with the above force, leaving behind as many grass-cutters and superfluous followers as possible to follow with the reserve. Executive Commissariat Officer calculated that ten days' rations for above force can be carried on 800 camels, including German horse-biscuits. All heavy kits and most of tents will be left at Kojak in charge of a small party of each corps, ready to be brought on to Kandahar as soon as information from me, by heliograph or other means, reaches Chaman. If all goes right, the whole of the above force should be collected at Chaman on 29th instant, whence I shall endeavour to reach Kandahar in four marches, arriving there about the 2nd September.

"Recent occurrences require alteration of force for line of communication originally submitted, which will be as follows:—

Sibi and Bolan.—4th Bengal Native Infantry and three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry; if more infantry should be required at Sibi in consequence of yesterday's information, an extra Native infantry regiment would have to be sent there until the Maris quiet down; at all events the three troops Bengal Native Cavalry and 4th Bengal Native Infantry, should be relieved as soon as possible, as they are required for the front. For *Quetta Station*, 23rd Native Infantry and one squadron Madras Cavalry.

"Next, with regard to the communication between Quetta and Chaman, I have been obliged, in consequence of the state of the country, to occupy fortified posts as follows, a measure which has had the desired effect of securing our communications:

Mehtarzai, 25 sabres; crest of *Ghazaband pass*, 30 rifles and 26 sabres; *Sighi*, 75 rifles and 25 sabres; *Gūlistān*, 100 rifles and 25 sabres; *Kila Abdulla*, 150 rifles and 25 sabres; *Khūshdil Khan*, 150 rifles and 150 sabres; *Kojak position*, 500 rifles, three 9-pr. guns from Quetta Arsenal (? manned) by detachment from 14-9th Royal Artillery, and 25 sappers; *Chaman*, 230 rifles and 40 sabres; on north-east at *Kach*, 300 rifles. Thus, for the Pishin line of communications two strong Native Infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment are required, instead of one Native Infantry as before estimated. These can be held by the 24th Native Infantry, 3rd Bengal Native Infantry and 1st Madras Cavalry. Lastly, for the reserve there remain H-1st and A-4th Royal Artillery and three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry and 63rd Foot and two Bombay regiments; and as I take only ten days' supplies with me from Chaman, a reserve force, with 20 days' supplies and baggage left behind, ought to be ready to march from Chaman 2nd September at latest."

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad on the 11th:—

"One hundred men 2-15th Foot and half-battery D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, passed through last night for Sibi."

The following telegram, dated 11th, has been addressed by the Quartermaster-General in India to Major-General Phayre:—

"Following telegram, dated 10th, received from Quartermaster-General, Bombay: *Begins*—'The 78th Highlanders embarked at Bombay yesterday, the 15th Native Infantry will embark on 12th, and the 13th Native Infantry about 17th. All will wait orders from General Phayre at Karachi.'—*Ends*. The 78th will remain for the present at Karachi."

12th August.—Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad:—

I. *On the 10th.*—"Your telegram yesterday. Three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry ordered to Sibi by General Phayre for protection of railway."

II. *On the 12th.*—"One hundred men 2-15th, and half battery D-B, passed through for Sibi last night."

Major-General R. Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 12th:—

"Messenger arrived at Chaman from Khelat-i-Ghilzai with the following letter from Colonel Tanner, dated Sunday, 8th August:—*Begins*—'As I cannot get news from Kandahar (the last received here was dated 25th July), I send the bearer with this

‘note, he promises to return on eighth day or earlier. Please write all news of what has happened at Kandahar, and regarding its relief. We heard that Kandahar force is shut up, but do not know anything for certain. Here we are all right at present, but the people about will rise *en masse* if they hear of a reverse at Kandahar. I am very well off for supplies, so am in no danger at present.’”

13th August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 12th:—

“Your telegram yesterday. Sir Robert Sandeman and I have several times endeavoured to communicate with Primrose, but messengers cannot obtain entrance. I have now received letter from Adam, explaining how messenger can be admitted, and have informed Sir Robt. Sandeman, and hope to succeed.”

Brigadier-General Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 13th:—

“One hundred men 2-15th and first detachment 15th Hussars passed through Sibi last night.”

14th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 13th:—

“Your telegram of this day. I have made arrangements for fifteen days’ supplies for the whole force at Kandahar, including Roberts, to follow me within four days of my departure from Chaman, escorted by 3rd Brigade. With this brigade military posts will be established and the telegraph lines re-laid. Sir Robert Sandeman and I had a meeting this morning with several officers, and the whole plan has been arranged. Copy of these proceedings by post. We should do the above work from both ends, *viz.*, from Chaman and Kandahar after my arrival there. I have no doubt that ten days’ supplies will be ample under these circumstances; to take more with my force would hamper my movements in the face of a powerful enemy. Even travelling light, as I intend to do, I shall have at least 2,000 camels or their equivalent. To-day I informed Chief, Bombay, fully on this subject, in reply to a reference from him. I can assure His Excellency I am not running any risk.”

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 13th:—

“One squadron 15th Hussars passed through for Sibi this afternoon.”

No. 20.

No. 185 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, HER MAJESTY’S
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 17, 1880.

IN continuation of our letter, dated 3rd August,* we have the honour to submit,

* No. 175. for your Lordship’s information, a connected account of the events and circumstances, so far as they have come to our knowledge, which preceded and attended the march of Sirdar Ayub Khan from Herat to Kandahar, up to the time when his army appeared upon the Helmund. It will be remembered that this account is based upon intelligence received at different times from various quarters, much of it being necessarily unauthenticated; and that we are still imperfectly informed of the motives and objects of the Sirdar in attacking Kandahar.

2. In September 1879, two Kabul regiments at Herat broke out into mutiny, and murdered General Fakir Ahmed Khan, who was commanding the army there under Sirdar Ayub Khan. This occurred two days after the outbreak at Kabul against the British Embassy; but the news of this latter event, and of the march on Kabul of a British force, must have reached Herat soon afterwards, and from that time all the Kabuli regiments, which are mainly composed of men from the North-Eastern tribes, appear to have been anxious to leave Herat for their own country. The best and easiest route from Herat toward Kabul and Eastern Afghanistan is by Kanhar; the Kabuli soldiery, whom Ayub Khan could not pay, and whose excesses soon exhausted

Herat, where they lived at free quarters, had every incentive to regain their homes and to rejoin their clans. Ayub Khan tried at first to disarm and disband them; but they refused to leave Herat except as an organized body, with their artillery. So early as in November 1879, reports were received at Kandahar that the Kabul regiments were pressing Ayub Khan to lead them against Kandahar, that they were quite beyond the Sirdar's control, that they had seized all the revenues collected, and that the standards were already set up outside the city for their march. Ayub Khan himself telegraphed to the Persian Minister on the 24th November, announcing that, since Yakub Khan appeared to have made terms with the English, he (Ayub Khan) had proclaimed the *Jehad*, and was moving off that day to Kandahar with his whole force to attack the English there. The Sirdar appears to have brought into Herat, in November, some regiments from Maimenah. Between these regiments [generally called afterwards the Herati troops] and the local levies on one side, and the Kabuli troops on the other side, there soon broke out disputes and fighting. Ayub Khan actually marched out of Herat with all his forces early in December, but an opposite faction seized the city, and closed the gates on him; whereupon a battle ensued between the Kabuli and the Herati regiments, ending in the defeat of the latter party. This affair probably stopped the march of the Kabuli troops; and it also induced Ayub Khan to abandon for the time his projected expedition against Kandahar, which he was supposed to have undertaken mainly under compulsion of the mutinous regiments.

3. At the beginning of January 1880, it was reported through Teheran that the Kabuli and Herati parties in the army had become reconciled, from fear lest Persia should take advantage of their disputes to seize Herat. Ayub Khan's chief advisers were Sirdar Khushdil Khan (usually called the Luinab) and other military commandants, most of whom are connected with Kandahar; and these were probably the real planners and leaders of the expedition, for all our intelligence supported the belief that the Sirdar himself was at this time entirely in the hands of the army, while it was suggested that the dissensions among the troops had been fomented by him with the object of breaking their power. The Kandahar reports of January contained frequent references to military disturbances, and to the loss of power by Ayub, who was apparently endeavouring to get help from Persia and other quarters. Nevertheless, during January and February rumours of Ayub's advance were prevalent, intermixed, however, with stories of fresh quarrelling among the regiments, of the discomfiture of the Kabulis, and of their partial dispersion.

4. The arrival at Herat of a Persian Commissioner created much speculation early in March; but throughout the month the rumours were conflicting; while the constant repetition of the news that a *Jehad* had been proclaimed and the march of the troops about to begin, rather weakened than strengthened the force of these warnings. It was evident that the Kabuli regiments were anxious to return to their own country, and that intrigues for the purpose of raising disturbance were rife in Furrâh and Zamindawar; but Ayub seemed to be steadily losing authority over the troops and the country. Letters received from Herat at Kandahar in April said that he was a prisoner in the hands of his troops, and that his administration was in great confusion. On the whole, therefore, although there could be little doubt that the Kabuli troops were likely soon to abandon Herat, the general impression was that the Heratis would not join them, and that no organized expedition, regularly led and equipped, was to be expected; nor did the Wali Sher Ali Khan appear to have any apprehension that a formidable invasion of South Afghanistan was impending. He had brought the western districts up to the Khash river under his authority, and his levies occupied Washir.

5. During the month of May the reports of Ayub's movements and intentions continued to be uncertain and inconsistent. At Kandahar it was first said that he intended to leave on the 11th, afterwards on the 26th, and that the Kabuli and Herati troops were reconciled. But in reply to a reference to Teheran, information was received that dissensions still continued, that Ayub's arrangements had fallen through, that the Kabuli troops were on bad terms with the Herati troops, and that they intended returning toward Kabul by Turkistan, with or without Ayub Khan's permission. The presence of Ayub's troops in Furrâh was to some extent accounted for by a report, from Meshed, that, owing to some apprehension of the approach of Sher Ali Khan's troops, a detachment would be sent there from Herat to protect the place. Affairs at Herat were generally described, by a letter dated 13th May, to be in a state of disorder and discontent; while Ayub's preparations for departure were supposed to be dictated by a desire to escape from his own troops. On the 29th May, a report reached Kandahar from Herat that Ayub Khan had encamped at Rozabagh outside the city; and that a body of horsemen had started on the Kandahar road; but on the 4th June came intelligence that the march was again postponed, owing to the internal quarrels of

he troops. This was corroborated by further reports which reached Kandahar on the 12th June; and in the meantime it was reported that the intelligence of the defeat inflicted on the tribes by Sir Donald Stewart near Ghazni had produced a profound impression on the Kabuli soldiers, increasing their anxiety to return to their homes. Up to the 17th June, the messengers from Herat reported at Kandahar that no attempt had been made at an advance, beyond planting the standards outside the gate; and at Kandahar the expectation of Ayub's coming was said to be subsiding.

6. On the 21st June, however, the Wali of Kandahar, who had been at Girishk since June 1st, sent word to Colonel St. John that he had received authentic news of the regular infantry having gone into camp outside Herat, and that the Luinab was reported to be intending a movement on Zamindawar, with 2,000 horsemen. The news was at once communicated to Teheran with inquiry for intelligence through Meshed. On the 25th, Mr. Ronald Thomson telegraphed that a special messenger had reached Meshed with a letter, dated 18th June, from Herat, announcing that Ayub Khan had left Herat for Kandahar on the 9th June. The strength of his force was variously estimated; it was known to be strong in artillery and cavalry, with 10 regiments of regular infantry. On the 30th June, a letter was received by Colonel St. John from the Wali, reporting that the Luinab with Cavalry had arrived in Furrak.

7. Upon the receipt of Mr. Thomson's telegram of the 25th, the question of the measures to be taken in consequence of the intelligence that Ayub Khan's army was actually moving toward Kandahar, was at once considered. After consulting Sir D. Stewart, and Colonel St. John, with whom General Primrose concurred, we determined that a British force should advance to the Helmund, and that reinforcements should be pushed up to Kandahar as quickly as possible from the line of communication and from reserves collected in Sind. The necessary orders were issued as soon as possible, and a brigade under General Burrows marched for the Helmund. In the opinion of all those best qualified to advise upon the situation, it was essential, upon political and still more upon military grounds, that Ayub Khan's advance should be checked by a demonstration toward the Helmund. The advance of the Herat army directly threatened our military position at Kandahar, which had been declared to be the point upon which his movement was directed; and the consequences of our troops remaining in cantonments there while Ayub crossed the river and gradually approached the capital, might have been seriously disadvantageous in various ways. The Alizai chiefs of Zamindawar had been reported to have joined the Wali's camp at Girishk; and Colonel St. John considered that the despatch of a brigade to Maiwand would help to confirm the fidelity of the Wali's troops, to overawe the Zamindawar tribes, and to maintain confidence at Kandahar. There was every probability that Ayub Khan's force, if allowed to draw near without interruption, would gather Ghazis and other recruits from the armed and disaffected population of the districts, and that his foraging parties would create disturbances throughout the whole province, and along our line of communications. For these and other reasons it appeared unadvisable to await the enemy at Kandahar, while if Sirdar Ayub Khan, avoiding the city, had moved without interruption from the Helmund straight upon Kelat-i-Ghilzai (where we have a garrison) and Ghazni, the effect upon our military reputation, and upon the political situation generally in Afghanistan, would have been exceedingly damaging. It was thought probable at Kandahar that the appearance of a British brigade on the Helmund would check the progress of Ayub Khan, that the Herati troops might hold back, and that the Kabuli regiments, whose main object was to reach their homes might break up and leave his standard.

8. We have already, in our despatch of the 3rd August, reported to your Lordship the course of events, so far as they were known to us, that followed the arrival of General Burrows' brigade upon the Helmund. We have as yet received no information whatever from General Primrose of the circumstances under which General Burrows engaged the enemy on the 27th, of his defeat, or of the present situation of the British troops in Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The occasional communications from Kandahar, and the scanty intelligence from other sources, that from time to time reach Sir R. Sandeman and General Phayre at Quetta, are regularly transmitted to your Lordship by telegraph.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

No. 21.

No. 186 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT. HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 17, 1880.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 179, dated the 10th August 1880, we have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Zurgun Shahr, 10th August.

WE are getting on well. Sun is hot between ten and four. Troops are healthy and in grand spirits.

It seems likely that we shall meet with opposition in neighbourhood of Ghazni, where I hope to be on 15th August.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th August 1880.

From VICEROY, Simla, to General Sir D. M. STEWART.

IN view of questions in House of Commons, Secretary of State is anxious for answer as to supplies for Roberts' force. I should therefore be glad of a reply to mine of 12th as soon as you can send one.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th August 1880.

From General Sir D. M. STEWART, Seh Baba, to VICEROY, Simla.

YOUR Excellency's telegram, 12th. There is no ground for alarm about supplies on the road. Sheep, grain, and forage plentiful at this season. Roberts has all European supplies for a month. There probably will be a difficulty in regard to tea, sugar, and rum at Kandahar; but the troops can do very well without these for a time, though every effort should be made to push them on from Sind.

Enclosure 4 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from Captain Henry Wylie: *Begins*—Spy, who left Pishin on 1st, has returned with news of everything being right at Kandahar up to 5th. Ayub had reached

Kokaran, out had made no advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, or Pishin, nor attack on city. Particulars by special sowar.—*Ends.*

Enclosure 5 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 6th. Ayub arrived Kokaran, six miles from city. Preparations for defence complete. Provisions, except forage, for thirty-five days. Our losses exaggerated in previous reports; do not exceed one thousand killed and missing, of which 400 Europeans and twenty-one officers.

Here had no communication from Kelat, or Chaman, since 28th. Wali in city with relations and families. All the Afghan's, except a few merchants, turned out.

Enclosure 6 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

A TRUSTWORTHY agent sent to Kandahar returned, and reports impossibility of obtaining access to city, entrances to which are strictly guarded by our troops, who prevent ingress. Three of my letters to St. John have been intercepted by enemy, who have also seized other messengers, men, and women, trying to enter and leave Kandahar with letters. Every village and road is watched to prevent letter passing.

On the 5th, Ayub's regular troops are said to have reached Chunni, about seven miles from Kandahar. The villagers are suffering much oppression from Ayub's regular and irregular forces.

It is stated that twelve British soldiers who lost their way in the retreat after Burrow's action, were captured by ghazis the following day, between Maiwand and Kandahar and taken to Ayub. Some Syuds, who sheltered the fugitives at Maiwand, have been killed and made prisoners by Ayub. Hadji Sirbuland Khan, Aitchakzai, and his son, Ghulam Nabi, are also said to be in confinement. Ayub's whole force, including ghazis and tribesmen, is now estimated at 20,000. Great want of discipline prevails.

Enclosure 7 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM dated 9th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

EVACUATION of railway line by troops completed. Would have been altogether successfully carried out, but for apparent disregard by Major Peters, R.E., of my own, and General Phayre's instructions. This morning Mr. Duke telegraphs from Sibi that Major Peters, at Sharig, although repeatedly warned, delayed despatching his carts until almost the last day. When carts arrived at Spin-Tangi, they were found to be accompanied by 1,000 coolies, and to contain, among other things, one and half lakhs treasure. According to instructions, all stores it was intended to remove and not leave for safe custody with Maliks should have been made over to the troops under Colonel Roome proceeding to Pishin. For some reason not yet known, this treasure was instead allowed to come down with much other heavy baggage and coolies, through the worst portion of the Pathan and Marri hills with the last convoy for Sibi. Escort consisted of about 180 sepahis, of whom a large proportion were sick, under Lieutenant Tobin, who had previously been badly wounded. With the report of our defeat at Kandahar was circulated a report that 10 lakhs of treasure were being carried down. All the Pathan and Marri robbers united for the sake of plunder and attacked the carts in the pass between Kuchali and Gundakin Duff. The progress of the carts was delayed by a heavy fall of rain and the flooding of the Nari River. In spite of the utmost efforts, 180 carts and all the treasure and baggage had to be abandoned. Four European subordinates, 12 sepahis, and 20 coolies were killed, and four sepahis wounded.

Mr. Duke accompanied the convoy and with him were three Marri Chiefs, who, he says, exerted themselves to the utmost to help, but had no control over the robbers, a number of whom are said to have been killed. I greatly regret what has occurred, and have telegraphed to Mr. Duke to submit a written report without delay.

Enclosure 8 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, No. 2719 E. P., dated 9th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

IMPORTANT to inform Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison, through St. John, or direct of Roberts' march. He left Kabul yesterday, and will push on as rapidly as possible.

Enclosure 9 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, No. 2741 E. P., dated 10th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram, 9th. Evacuation of railway. Please report by letter fully circumstances of attack and loss of treasure and lives, showing orders issued and on whom responsibility lay for miscarriage of arrangements.

Enclosure 10 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th August 1880. 14h. 41m.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre received to-day a letter from Major Adam, Quartermaster-General, Kandahar, dated 5th August. The garrison have water, food, and ammunition in abundance. Their defences have been strengthened; buildings outside city walls destroyed; guns mounted, and every preparation made to resist attack. Spirit of troops good, and one or two successful skirmishes with villages have taken place. Communication with outside world most difficult. Herati and Kabuli troops are said to have quarrelled over booty captured after Burrows' defeat, and Ayub is reported to have been wounded in quelling disturbance.

From Khojak all reported quiet. Heliographic communication established between crest of Khojak and Killa Abdulla. The last detachment of troops and convoy leaving Marri hills was attacked by Marri and Pathan robbers in a difficult pass and a large quantity of treasure and baggage was lost.

A gathering of Kakars near Barshor in the direction of Ghazni has broken up, attributed to the arrival of the Madras Cavalry at Khushdil Khan Killa in Pishin.

Enclosure 11 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, 9th. Letter despatched to Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

Enclosure 12 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LIEUTENANT JENNINGS, Political Officer with Thull-Chotiali troops, telegraphed last night their safe arrival at Durgai. All well; expected to reach Kach Amadan tomorrow, and march for Kojak on 13th.

Enclosure 13 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE gatherings in Toba and Shorawak have dispersed. All quiet in the Khojak Pass.

A report that Sartip Nur Muhammad was on his way to attack Chaman with two guns proves to be untrue.

Colonel Roome, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, with the Thal-Chotiali and Hurnai forces under his command, has arrived at North Chappar without encountering any opposition. Three nine-pounder guns drawn by bullocks, escorted by a detachment of the 2-11th Regiment, leave this evening for the Khojak.

Enclosure 14 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Colonel Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 8th August, received at Chaman, reports all well there, and supplies plentiful. Colonel Tanner says he has received no authentic news from Kaudahar since 25th July, but rumours of garrison being shut up in city had reached him.

Henry Wylie reports all quiet in the neighbourhood of the Khojak pass and Khushdil Khan Killa in Pishin. Native information states that much perturbation exists among the Kabuli soldiery in Ayub's army, who have heard of Amir Abdul Rahman having ascended the throne. No attack on Kandahar has yet been reported.

Enclosure 15 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TELEGRAPHIC communication between Killa Abdulla and Chaman restored.

Enclosure 16 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS of the 9th from Kandahar states that Ayub Khan is intriguing with the Aitchakzais in the neighbourhood of Toda and Chaman, through the sons of one of their chief sirdars, named Fateh Khan. Ayub has promised to assist the Aitchakzais with guns and regular troops, for the purpose of attacking our line of communications.

In Ayub's camp it is said to be debated whether they should endeavour to undermine the city walls, or to attack by escalade. Ayub is reported to have decided in favour of an escalade and to be making the necessary preparations. It is also reported that Ayub has endeavoured, without success, to mediate with the Kandahar garrison and to obtain the release of his brother, Yakub Khan.

From Pishin information has been received of an attack on a village by some Kakozaïs, resulting in the death of four policemen. A large party of Zhobites are reported to have passed through the Kowas Valley last night. Their intended destination and object have not yet been ascertained.

The first detachment of the 15th Regiment arrives to-morrow.

Enclosure 17 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th August 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 11th. All well. Defences and demolitions complete. Enemy throwing up siege works at present insignificant. He has about 37 guns, of which six 12-pounder Armstrongs, 4,000 or 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and varying number of Ghazis, perhaps averaging 5,000. Provisions, except fresh meat and forage, abundant. News from Kelat to 4th. All well there and quiet.

Rumours have reached tribes of advance from Kabul, no general rising appears to have taken place yet, except immediately round Kandahar. Wounded officers doing well; one or more officers said to be captives in Ayub's hands. Have written to ask him.

Enclosure 18 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th August 1880.

From Sir R. SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE following from Wylie giving Kandahar news to 11th: *Begins*—My kossid, sent on 7th, just returned with news from St. John to 11th, giving details of action of 27th, and state of Kandahar. Our losses on 27th were in officers same as before stated, only add Captain Harris, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General wounded, and that Colonel Iredell's wound is dangerous. Men killed: Artillery, 18; sappers, 23; 66th, 282; Grenadiers, 365; Jacob's Rifles, 250; Sind Horse, 10; 3rd Cavalry, about 20.

On the 11th Ayub was still three miles from Kandahar, and had made no attack on it, though his guns threw occasional shells into city. His Herat troops had deserted, and his strength was believed to be 4,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a miscellaneous heap of Ghazis. Has no guns better than home-made 12-pounder Armstrongs.

My kossid says country people are making trenches and approaches towards Shikarpur Gate, and he warned St. John of this. Says the city defences have been placed in as good a state for defence as possible, and everything cleared round the town for some distance, and the position ought to be impregnable. Garrison has plenty of provisions, except fresh meat and forage.

Enclosure 19 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE military post at Kach Amadan was attacked at 4 a.m. this morning by Kakar Pathans, who were beaten off with the loss of 80 killed. Our troops pursued the Kakars for two miles. Particulars not received, as the wire was cut. When message given them was being transmitted, we had been warned of probable attack on post, and General Phayre last night had sent a detachment of troops from Quetta to bring away

the sick. Telegram from Chaman last night stated that letters had arrived there from Colonel Tanner from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 12th August, in reply to letters from me. My letter was the first intimation Colonel Tanner had received of the march of Roberts' force. Country was quiet, quiet in fort, supplies abundant. Tanner says he will be able to help Roberts' force with supplies. More particulars on receipt of letter which is coming from Chaman by special messenger. Tanner mentions that communications with Kandahar very difficult.

Enclosure 20 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, 2809 E.P., dated 6th August 1880.

FROM, FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

ST. JOHN's telegram, 11th, says one or more officers reported captives with Ayub. If this is true, will money promised or paid assist their protection or release? Whatever you or St. John may think fit may be spent. Tell St. John secretly.

No. 22.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 21ST AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

15th August.—Consequent on Major-General Phayre having made a demand for extra troops for service on the Pishin line of communication, the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry and the 38th Bengal Native Infantry, two of the corps held in reserve, have been ordered to proceed at once to Sibi.

16th August.—The following telegram, dated the 14th, has been received from the Officer commanding at Jacobabad:—

“One squadron, 15th Hussars, passed through for Sibi this morning.”

The Deputy Quartermaster-General at Sukkur reports, on the 14th, that the second squadron of the 15th Hussars left that place for Sibi that day.

General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta:—

I. *On the 15th.*—The following received from Colonel St. John, through Chaman and Kila Abdulla:—Begins: “Kandahar, 11th. All well. Defence and demolitions complete. Enemy throwing up siege works; at present insignificant. He has about 37 guns, of which six are 12-pounder Armstrongs, four or five thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and varying number of ghazis, perhaps averaging five thousand. Provisions, except fresh meat and forage, abundant. News from Kelat to 4th; all well there and Quetta. No general rising appears to have taken place yet, except immediately around Kandahar. Wounded Officers doing well.”—Ends. Following from Brigadier-General James, commanding in Kojak:—Begins: “Westmacott says country people report that heavy firing was heard from Kandahar on night of 12th; also report of a force coming this way; nothing definite.”—Ends. Captain H. Wylie adds:—Begins: “My kossid sent on 7th has just returned with news from St. John to 11th, giving details of action of 27th and state of Kandahar. Our losses on 27th, were in Officers same as before stated, only add Captain Harris, 66th Foot, wounded, and Major Iredell's wound dangerous. Men killed,—Artillery, 18; Sappers, 23; 66th, 282; Grenadiers, 365; Jacob's Rifles, 250; Sind Horse, 10; 3rd Cavalry, about 20. On the 11th, Ayub still three miles from Kan-

“dahar, and had made no attack, though his guns threw an occasional shell into city. His Herat troops had deserted; his strength was believed to be two thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry, and a miscellaneous heap of ghazis. Has no guns better than home-made 12-pdr. Armstrong. Kossid says country people are making trenches and approaches towards Shikarpore gate, and he warned St. John of this. St. John says city defects have been placed in good state of defence as possible, and everything cleared round town for some distance, and position ought to be impregnable. Garrison has plenty provisions, except fresh meat and forage. St. John's letter is being copied, and will be forwarded by express. Kossid says no troops have advanced from Kandahar towards Pishin. Sarbaland is still with St. John, but not trusted with important work, as spy says our Officers do everything themselves. Country people around city suffering much from want of *attah*. St. John now knows of Robert's advance.”—Ends.

II. *On the 16th.*—Head-quarters, wing, 16th Native Infantry, attacked in Kach post at 4 a.m. to-day, by combined tribes of Kakars. Enemy driven off with loss of 80 killed. Loss on our side slight. Just as Colonel Pierce* was about to telegraph particulars wire was cut. Am sending out a few cavalry, with Biluch guides from Sir Robert Sandeman, through Sarakula Pass, to warn a detachment of 100 Native Infantry which left this for Kach last night to bring in sick.

17th August.—The 3rd Bengal Native Infantry left Dinapore on the evening of the 15th, *en route* to Sibi.

The last squadron of the 15th Hussars and a wing of the 4th Bengal Native Infantry left Sukkur on the 16th, *en route* for Sibi.

Brigadier-General Wood reports as follows from Jacobabad on the 16th :—

“Half battery, 15/9th, passed through for Sibi last night; also one squadron, 8th Bengal Cavalry, strength 81 sabres, left for Nari bank by order of General Phayre.”

General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 16th :—

I. Reply received at Chaman from Colonel Tanner. Two letters despatched a short time ago. His letter is dated 12th instant. All well there. He is delighted at receiving intelligence of the Kabul column. Says the tribes around there are all quiet, although Ayub has sent to call upon them to rise. He finds communication with Kandahar as difficult as we do. Referring to my telegram this morning, Colonel Pierce appears to have pursued the enemy for two miles from Kach. We shall restore telegraphic communication with Kach as soon as possible.

II. In consequence of attitude of Marris, I have already alienated more troops for Sibi and Bolan than has ever been the case; consequently, I am crippling my advance force. Notwithstanding this, Sir Robert Sandeman is asking me for more troops. These I cannot possibly give without stopping advance on Kandahar. I have advised Sir Robert Sandeman to represent the case to Government, and to make a requisition for what he considers necessary in consequence of hostility of Marris. All that is now going on in that part could be managed by tribal levies better than by troops under present circumstances. I have reminded Sir Robert Sandeman that there is a stream of troops passing up the Bolan, and will be for the next month. Intelligence just received here that the Shorawak tribes are collecting to attack Quetta and Kelat.

18th August.—Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 18th :—

“Two hundred men, 63rd Foot, and remaining wing, 4th Bengal Native Infantry, passed through for Sibi last night.”

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 13th :—

“I shall require the 78th Highlanders in reserve at Pishin. I am arranging with Major Colvin, Sukkur, regarding train arrangements, so as not to interfere with movements of Bengal troops.”

* Colonel T. W. W. Pierce, 16th Bombay Native Infantry.

19th August.—The following corps will take part in the advance on Kandahar, under Major-General Phayre, C.B., early next month.

<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Infantry.</i>
D/B, Royal Horse Artillery.	11th Foot.
F/2nd, Royal Artillery.	15th „
No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery.	63rd „
	5th Bombay Native Infantry.
<i>Cavalry.</i>	8th „ „ „
15th Hussars.	9th „ „ „
1st Madras Light Cavalry.	10th „ „ „
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry.	16th „ „ „
Detachment of Poona Horse.	19th „ „ „
2nd Sind Horse.	} Detachments (about 400 men).
	23rd „ „ „
<i>Sappers and Miners.</i>	24th „ „ „
3rd, 4th, and 5th Companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners.	27th „ „ „

The whole of the above troops will be concentrated at Chaman by the 29th instant, with the exception of the following, which will not reach that place until the dates expressed opposite to them :—

D/B, Royal Horse Artillery	-	-	30th August.
15th Hussars	-	-	5th September.
63rd Foot	-	-	3rd „
9th Bombay Native Infantry	-	-	3rd „
23rd „ „ „	-	-	5th „

The following telegram has been received from Major-General Phayre, dated Quetta the 17th :—

“In consequence of reliable information regarding investment of Kandahar by Ayub and commencement of siege works, received last evening, have resolved taking with advance force two 25-pounder guns in Quetta Arsenal, which I can man and provide draught for. Enemy has four 12-pounder Armstrongs; therefore, knowing ground as I do, and strong position he has taken up on east and south sides in villages of Deh Kwaja and Deh Khati, I feel necessity of having with me guns of superior calibre to his.”

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad on the 19th :—

I. Two hundred men, 63rd, passed through Sibi last night.

II. The 15th Bombay Native Infantry passed through Sibi last night.

The 38th Bengal Native Infantry having been declared unfit to proceed immediately on service, owing to its consisting largely of recruits, who are unfit to take their places in the ranks, the 17th Bengal Native Infantry has been nominated to take its place, and will proceed from Morar to the Pishin line of communications.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 14th :—

“Distribution of forces ordered for relief of Kandahar and details of staff published in this day's Division Orders :—General Phayre, Commanding; Major Cunningham, Assistant Adjutant-General, sick, Captain Cooke-Collis officiating; Major Jopp, Assistant Quartermaster-General; Major Heyland, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Phayre, Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant Fitzroy Somerset, Extra Aide-de-Camp; Major Swinhoe, Assistant Commissary-General; Major Wooldridge, Director of Transport; Deputy Surgeon-General Bruce, Principal Medical Officer. Artillery Brigade,—Colonel Smith, Commanding; Captain Blaksley, Adjutant: Troops,—D/B, Royal Horse Artillery; F/2nd, Royal Artillery; No. 2 Mountain Battery. Cavalry Brigade,—General Wilkinson, Commanding; Major Morris, Brigade Major; Captain Muir, Orderly Officer: Troops,—15th Hussars, 1st Madras Cavalry, 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, 2nd Sind Horse, and 198 sabres, Poona Horse. Engineer Force,—Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Commanding Royal Engineer; Lieutenant Whiteford, Adjutant: Troops,—Three companies Sappers and Miners. Engineer Officers for duty,—Lieutenant Selby, in charge of signalling; Lieutenants Fuller,

Davidson, Hickson, Assistant Field Engineers; Lieutenants O'Sullivan, Robinson Neville, Coles, Slater, Assistant Field Engineers. Attached to Sappers,— Captain Joseph, Bombay Staff Corps, Assistant Field Engineer. 1st Infantry Brigade,— General James, Commanding; Captain Cooke-Collis, Brigade-Major; Major Sanders, Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant-Colonel Barras, Transport Officer: Troops,—2/11th Foot, and 8th and 10th, and 400 rifles of 16th and 19th Bombay Native Infantry. 2nd Infantry Brigade,—General Brown, Commanding; Major Stock, Brigade-Major; Major Fagan, Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant Mackenzie, Transport Officer: Troops,—2/15th Foot, and 5th, 24th, and 27th Bombay Native Infantry. 3rd Infantry Brigade,—General Wood, Commanding, sick, General Walker officiating; Captain Andrews, Brigade-Major; Lieutenant Wood, Orderly Officer: Troops,—63rd Foot, and 9th and 23rd Bombay Native Infantry. Line of communication from Sibi to Chaman,—General Henderson; Captain Watling, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Brigade-Major, vacant. Sibi and outposts,—One regiment Native Infantry; three troops Cavalry. Bolan post,—Half regiment Native Infantry. From Quetta to Chaman, including Kach and Kushdil Khan,—Two regiments Native Infantry; two squadrons Cavalry. Quetta garrison and reserve troops, staff vacant: Troops,—A/4th, H/1st, 5/8th, 14/9th Royal Artillery, one squadron Cavalry, and one and half regiments Native Infantry.

20th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 19th:—

I. Intelligence by Shahan kossid, through Sir Robert Sandeman, states that at Modga, a place inhabited by Panazais, Badzais, and Mehtarzais, there was a tribal gathering whose intention was to attack Kach. Shah Jehan, of Zhob, and Faizu are, he states, at Abadoon with 8,000 men, consisting of Panazais, Dammahs, Zumatans, Sharans, Sharanzais, Mehtarzais, and Adinzais. The leaders give out that they intend to attack Kach first, then the Bolan, and finally Quetta. Informant came from Kach through the Sarakula pass, and on this side the Machbauzi; saw bodies of armed men who had taken up different positions.

II. By reports received last night from Colonel Pierce, the combined tribes from Zhob, Chappar, Toba, &c., instead of retiring to their homes after their defeat, have collected in greater force on the heights around Kach, and fire on parties attempting to leave it. In addition to the sick and wounded of Colonel Pierce's force, there are the sick from Chappar, Thal-Chotiali, &c., amounting in all to 150 men, who must be brought to Quetta. Colonel Pierce also reports that his supply of forage has ceased, and that his grain for transport cattle is finished. Under these circumstances, I have been obliged to order two mountain guns, three troops of Cavalry, and a regiment of Native Infantry of my advance force from Pishin to Kach, *via* Ghurki defile. I proposed to Sir Robert Sandeman to evacuate the post altogether, as Chappar, Sharigh, Harnai, &c., have been; but he so strongly deprecated the measure on political grounds until some effort has been made to pacify the tribes, that I consented to await the report of Captain H. Wyllie, who will accompany the above field column and endeavour to arrange for a month's supply of *bhúsa* and barley being stored in the fortified storeyard.

“ If Captain Wyllie succeeds, the garrison of 300 men would remain, and the sick and wounded only be brought into Quetta. These isolated posts, so far from the line of communication, are most objectionable in a military point of view, as they alienate men and animals that cannot well be spared. The importance of Kach as an influential centre cannot be doubted. Sir Robert Sandeman thinks that a garrison of 300 Native Infantry would be sufficient under present circumstances. However, I think that Kach itself should be held by two mountain guns and 400 rifles, and that a fortified post of 50 rifles should be established in the Sarakula Pass, half way between Quetta and Kach. The distance to Kach by this pass is 28 miles; round by Kuchlak and Ghurki defile it is 44 miles. I have ordered the field column to do its work as quickly as possible, in order that, if possible, my advance may not be delayed beyond the date named.

III. The following intelligence just received from Gulistan that a large body of Barakzais are collected at Argantai, beyond the Spintaga. This rumour was brought by an Achakzai, who disappeared immediately after. From another quarter the following intelligence received by Sir Robert Sandeman,—that Ayub Khan had detailed 60 horsemen and two guns to go with inhabitants of Argistan-Kadani and the Achakzais to Murgha, to the aid of Gholam Hyder Khan; that the guns and sowars had crossed the Zakird Kotal on their way to Murgha; also that two infantry regi-

ments, 600 strong each, three cavalry regiments of 200 sabres each, with a few guns had been detailed for Shorawak, but had not yet started from Kandahar; also reported that Ayub Khan was erecting fortified enclosures at five different places.

The Officer commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs that 200 men of the 63rd Foot passed through for Sibi on the 18th, and 200 more on the 19th. The third party of the same regiment left Sukkur on the 19th.

21st August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, reports, that the fourth party of the 63rd left that place on the 20th for Sibi.

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 21st:—

“Tribal gathering around Kach has dispersed. Convoy of sick, &c. arrived here this morning; no enemy seen. Field column from Pishin arrives there to-morrow, and having settled local questions, returns to Kojak. Hope there will be no more trouble on that flank from Sibi-Chaman. I leave for front this afternoon. From to-morrow please address Killa Abdula.”

No. 23.

No. 363 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,*

* G. G. O. No. 480, dated the 20th August 1880, and documents published therewith.

relating to an action fought on the right bank of the Helmand river, near Girishk, on the 14th ultimo, between the force under the command of

Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ J. STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ W. STOKES.
 „ J. GIBBS.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Simla, the 24th August 1880.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 20th August 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 480.—Under the orders of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the following correspondence and Despatch are published for general information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 7893 K., Kabul Field Operations, dated Simla, 20th August 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 4342 A., dated the 13th August 1880, forwarding a despatch relating to an engagement between the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar.

2. In reply, I am directed to state that the Governor General in Council awaits the promised report from Brigadier-General Burrows, and meanwhile the despatch forwarded with your letter under reply will be published in the "Gazette of India" for general information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 4342 A., "Kabul," dated Simla, 13th August 1880.)

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit to Government Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose's Despatch, No. 1, dated the 23rd July 1880, reporting an engagement on the 14th idem, six miles from Girishk, on the Herat road, between the troops under the command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar's forces.

2. Brigadier-General Burrows' report of the action has been called for, and when received will be forwarded.

3. As far as can be judged from the despatch now submitted, it appears to His Excellency that the operations, which resulted in the capture of the guns in the hands of the mutineers, were well carried out.

Enclosure 4 in No. 23.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the Kandahar Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 1, dated Kandahar, the 23rd July 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that early on the morning of the 14th instant the infantry regiments of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar (numbering two thousand), who were stationed at Girishk, on the right bank of the Helmand, with the object of opposing the advance of Ayub Khan on Kandahar, mutinied, and, taking with them a battery of artillery, moved off on the Herat road, apparently with the intention of joining Ayub Khan, whose troops were reported to be within two marches of Girisk on that date.

2. The Wali's cavalry, two thousand five hundred strong, accompanied him across the river; but Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the majority were completely out of hand, and went off at once in the direction of Kandahar.

Corps.	Officers.	Sabres.	Rank and File.
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery -	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners -	1	—	45
3rd Sind Horse -	4	207	—
3rd Light Cavalry -	6	300	—
Six companies, 66th Foot -	20	—	518
1st Bombay N.I. (Grenadiers) -	8	—	603
30th Bombay, N.I. (Jacob's Rifles) -	8	—	592

3. The force as per margin, under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, which had been sent out from Kandahar to support the Wali, was then encamped on the left bank of the river.

4. On its being reported that the infantry had mutinied, and were marching off with the guns, Brigadier-General Burrows ordered troops, as per margin,* to cross the Helmand and pursue, leaving two companies of the 66th Regiment, the 1st Grenadiers, and five companies of the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, to guard the camp.

* E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
 No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.
 3rd Sind Horse } 410 sabres.
 3rd Light Cavalry }
 Four Companies, 66th Regiment.
 Three companies, Jacob's Rifles.

5. The cavalry and horse artillery under Brigadier-General T. Nuttall pushed on at once to feel for the enemy, and hold him in check until the infantry could be brought up.

6. The ground being much cut up by numerous wide and deep canals, difficulty was experienced in getting the artillery along; and Brigadier-General Nuttall, fearing that the enemy might make good his retreat, sent the 3rd Sind Horse, under Colonel J. H. P. Malcomson, rapidly to the front, leaving the 3rd Light Cavalry with the guns.

7. They came upon the mutinous troops about six miles from camp, formed up in a strong position on a rocky ridge, their left rising on the left bank of the Helmand, which was here steep and precipitous. Here they held them for three-quarters of an hour, being unable to charge in consequence of the cramped and enclosed nature of the ground.

8. Before the guns and infantry could get up, the enemy moved off in a direction parallel to the river, but, being followed and threatened by the cavalry, came into position again, and opened fire on them with his artillery.

9. In the meantime four guns of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, were brought into action, and in the course of half an hour the enemy's guns were silenced and abandoned by their gunners.

10. The cavalry at once charged to seize them, but, on reaching the guns, were received by a heavy musketry fire from a body of infantry who had taken up a position on the reverse slope of the hill from which the guns were firing.

11. They were in consequence slightly withdrawn behind the crest of the hill, and some dismounted men, being formed under cover of the wagons, returned the fire of the enemy until the infantry and guns arrived.

12. On this the enemy immediately retreated, under our artillery and infantry fire, into the valley below, dispersing in all directions, and leaving sixty dead on the field.

13. Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the country was dotted over with villages and intersected by water-courses and walls, rendering pursuit almost hopeless. Moreover, he had a long and difficult march back with the captured guns, the horses of which had been carried off by the enemy, and he was anxious to recross the river by daylight.

14. He therefore recalled his infantry, and sent the cavalry on to secure the baggage, &c., which the enemy were taking off.

15. Brigadier-General Nuttall states that he followed the retreating troops closely, hoping to engage them in some favourable spot; but they at once quitted the bank of the river, leaving the whole of their baggage, ammunition, &c., and retreated through country over which it was impossible for cavalry to act.

16. He therefore abandoned the pursuit, and secured the baggage which the enemy had left behind, consisting of 53 camels, a quantity of small arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and supplies.

17. The battery captured consists of four 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and three ammunition wagons; but, being unable to move the wagons, they were destroyed, the guns and howitzers being brought safely into camp.

Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the behaviour of all ranks left nothing to be desired, and particularly brings to notice the fact that the men of the 66th Regiment dragged the captured guns over three miles of difficult country until teams could be obtained for them.

18. Our casualties were as follows :—

Corps.	British Troops.									Native Troops.											
	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.				Wounded.				Missing.			
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sowars and Sepoys.	Horses.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sowars and Sepoys.	Horses.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sowars and Sepoys.	Horses.
66th Foot	-	-	-	-	-	4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3rd Sind Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1
3rd Light Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2

* One since dead.

19. Brigadier-General Burrows informs me that he received every assistance from his Brigade-Major, Captain W. H. M'Math, 66th Regiment; from his Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain T. Harris, 66th Regiment; and from Captain J. R. Slade, Royal Horse Artillery, his Orderly Officer, to whose untiring energy he is indebted for the guns being brought on intact with their carriages into camp.

The cavalry under Brigadier-General Nuttall was well handled; and the determined energy with which the artillery was brought up to the front reflects the highest credit on Major G. F. Blackwood, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

20. Brigadier-General Nuttall states his thanks are particularly due to Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, C.B., commanding the 3rd Sind Horse; Major A. P. Currie, commanding the 3rd Light Cavalry; Major G. C. Hogg, Poona Horse, Cavalry Brigade Major; Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, Orderly Officer; and Lieutenant G. S. Jones, Royal Artillery (on transport duty), who accompanied Brigadier-General Nuttall as galloper.

21. A sketch by Brevet-Major E. P. Leach, Royal Engineers, illustrating the day's operations is attached.

No. 24.

No. 194 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 24th August 1880.

IN continuation of our Secret Despatch, No. 186, dated 17th August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

"

F. P. HAINES.

"

JOHN STRACHEY.

"

E. B. JOHNSON.

"

WHITLEY STOKES.

"

JAMES GIBBS.

"

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

REPLIES to letters received last night from Kelat-i-Ghilzai through Chaman, dated 12th August. All well there, and Political Officer will be able to assist Roberts' force with supplies. Some of local Chiefs friendly, and helping to bring in provisions. Letters intercepted from Sartip Nur Muhammad's son, inciting tribes to rise, but no attack on garrison made or anticipated. Communication from Kelat-i-Ghilzai with Kandahar extremely difficult, but road to Chaman comparatively open.

At 4 this morning, outpost at Kach Amadan was attacked by large number of Panizais and Zhobites. Enemy were beaten off and pursued two miles, leaving 80 dead bodies on ground. On our side, no one killed, few sepoy wounded. Telegraphic communications with Kach Amadan interrupted after the fight.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS from Kandahar of the 12th shows that Ayub Khan has taken up strong position in the immediate vicinity of Kandahar. His army is divided into three divisions, composed respectively of Herati, Kabuli, and Kandahari troops. The last is commanded by Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. Occasionally a few shots are thrown into the city, but up to the present little harm has been caused by enemy's fire. Several messengers, attempting to convey written messages into and out of the city, have been captured by Ayub's people.

Ayub Khan is reported to have sent one infantry regiment and four guns to Shorawak. An attempt to raise the Aitchakzais against us has been partially unsuccessful.

Further news from Kach Amadan shows that only 48 dead bodies were found outside entrenchments; other dead bodies and wounded men were seen in numbers carried away. The principal leaders in the attack were Shah Jehan, and Syfulla Khan of Zhob, and Faiz Muhammad Khan, Panizai Kakar, the principal instigator in the murder of late Major Showers.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from His Highness the Khan, repeated for information :—

Begins: Thanks for your telegram about Kach Amadan and Kandahar. I often told you that these Pathans and Brahuis are first to be punished, and afterwards kindness must be shown. If done otherwise, the result will be what Panizais have done now.

My Havaladar, Shirdad, of my artillery, went to Sherod and returned yesterday, states that Kandahar city is safe. Ayub Khan is outside empty handed. All animals in the city have been removed outside by British officials. Up to date Ayub has done nothing. Am certain he can do nothing. I shall, in future, inform you what news I get from Kandahar. I hope you will do the same, should you hear of any. Ends.

Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received to-day that Ayub's guns and troops from Shorawak have not yet started, but that a son of Sartip Nur Muhammad, and a brother of the Aitchakzai

Sirdar, Fateh Khan, have sent messengers to announce their approach and for the Barettis to join them.

Mehrulla Khan, Chief of the Marri clan, has sent letters, expressing his regret at the plundering of the railway convoys on the Hurnai line, and saying that it was the work of a noted robber, named Piara, and that, with the aid of the British Government, he will punish him and his gang.

The Khan telegraphs that Azad Khan, of Kharan, has sent his son with 100 sowars to join Ayub at Kandahar. The correctness of this intelligence is, however, somewhat doubtful.

Enclosure 5 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LATEST news from Kandahar states that ten Tokhi sowars had arrived from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and informed Muhammad Ayub Khan that it was impossible for the tribesmen to attack Kelat-i-Ghilzai without guns, and they begged he would aid them with a few. Muhammad Ayub Khan had not given any definite reply when the messenger left Kandahar.

It is stated that Muhammad Ayub Khan has detailed two guns and 60 sowars to assist Sirdar Ghulam Hassan Khan, Aitchakzai. The guns and sowars are said to have crossed the Jakir Kotal last Friday, on their way to Murghi Chaman. 600 cavalry and 1,200 infantry, under Sirdar Ahmed Khan, are reported to have been directed to proceed to Shorawak, but have not yet started. Muhammad Ayub Khan is fortifying his position near Kandahar.

A reconnoitring party from Kach Amadan reports that there is still a very large gathering of Zhobites and Pathan tribesmen under Shah Jehan in the surrounding hills. Colonel Roome has been ordered to proceed with two mountain guns from Assad Khan in Pishin to disperse them. Captain H. Wylie, political officer, accompanies the force. This may delay General Phayre's advance on Kandahar; but unless the gathering is dispersed, there will be no safety for our line of communication in Pishin, and supplies for Roberts' and Phayre's united forces cannot be forwarded from Gulistan.

Captain Lucas, of the Sind Horse, telegraphed that a large body of Barettchi Pathans are reported to have collected on the Kandahar side of the Gwaja Pass beyond Spin-Tangi.

Enclosure 6 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

No further news from the garrison in Kandahar, but it is reported that some differences have arisen between Ayub Khan and the tribesmen round Kandahar. The latter are impatient that Ayub should assault the city before the British armies advance to its relief, but Ayub is unwilling to risk the lives of his regular troops.

Emissaries from Abdul Rahman are stated to have arrived in Ayub's camp, with the object of alienating from him his Kabuli troops.

It is further stated that some of Ayub's Herati troops have deserted, but this requires confirmation.

The Barettchi Pathans in Shorawak are said to meditate an attack on Mushki, and the inhabitants are removing their property into the fort.

General Phayre and staff start to-morrow for the Kojak. General Phayre hopes to advance from Chaman on the 31st. A squadron of the 15th Hussars arrived this morning. There is much difficulty in getting letters conveyed to Kandahar on account of the sharp look-out kept by the Ghazis round the city.

Enclosure 7 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM Kandahar it is reported that a sortie was lately made by the garrison, in which 40 of Ayub's Herati troops were killed. Our loss not known. Tribal gatherings in the neighbourhood of Toba and Murghi Chaman, to the north of the Kojak Pass, are reported with the object of attacking our line of communication in Pishin, after the advance of General Phayre's army.

A large convoy of sick and wounded arrived this morning from our post at Kach Amadan. To enable it to start, the tribal gathering surrounding the outpost had to be dispersed. In the village of Amadan, a quantity of telegraph wire and a complete soldier's kit were found. The village was burned.

No. 25.

No. 196 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, the 24th August 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted in the margin,* on the subject of the difficulty experienced in communicating with the British garrison at Kandahar, and containing some particulars reported by one Syad Paind Shah regarding the engagement of the 27th July at Maiwand and the subsequent movements of Sirdar Ayub Khan

* From Agent, Governor General, Biluchistan, Nos. 1050 and 1051 A.G.G., dated 10th August 1880.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

Substance of a Statement made by Sirdar FAIZ MUHAMMAD, Durani, to Captain CURZON WYLLIE, Assistant Agent, Governor General, on the 9th August 1880.

ABOUT eight days ago I sent a sowar with Sir Robert Sandeman's letter to Colonel St. John at Kandahar. The sowar has returned, and states that on his arrival at Chaman he found the road between Kandahar and Chaman quite unsafe, and in consequence he was unable himself to go beyond Chaman. He, however, succeeded in finding an Aitchakzai Syad at Chaman, whom he sent on with the letter to Kandahar, having promised the man a reward of Rs. 30 for its safe delivery. The Aitchakzai Syad concealed the letter by sewing it inside one of his shoes, but on arrival at Zakir, near Kandahar, he was seized by Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, and, after careful search, the letter was discovered. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan sent the man to Ayub Khan, who ordered him to be put to death. Fortunately, a Syad of Herat prevailed on Ayub Khan to spare his life and allow him to return to his home. The Aitchakzai messenger was thus enabled to escape back to Chaman, but without

delivering the letter to Colonel St. John. The same messenger also carried a letter for Colonel St. John from the Officer commanding at Chaman; this was likewise seized. Ayub Khan arrived at Kandahar five days ago, but no fight has yet taken place between his force and the British. Ayub Khan is preparing ladders to escalate the city wall.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25.

No. 1051, A.G.G., dated Quetta, 10th August 1880.

From Major Sir Robert SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., Agent, Governor General, Biluchistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

THE accompanying translation of a letter from Sirdar Syad Paind Shah, late Governor of Pishin, is forwarded for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Translation of a letter from Syad Paind Shah, late Governor of Pishin, to Major Sir Robert Sandeman, dated 7th August 1880.

The three letters for Colonel St. John I sent by three different messengers; my son, Muhammad Akbar, also accompanied the messengers. My son arrived near Kandahar on Monday, and himself took the letters towards the city for delivery. When he reached the Shikarpuri gate he found that some British infantry had come out to destroy the walls in front of the gate, and that the horses of the garrison had been sent to graze on the Chaman. The tribesmen attacked and compelled the British infantry and horses to retire into the city, and again closed the gate. My son three or four times wandered round the city wall, but could find no way of getting into the city. He tried to get over the wall, but failed, as the British soldiers prepared to fire at him. My son was therefore obliged to return to the village of Zarrak on this side of the Zakar hills, and here he succeeded in finding a native of the place to send with the three letters to the city. Until Tuesday my son heard no tidings of his messenger, so on Wednesday he went himself to find out where he was. On arrival at Zakir he heard that the man had been taken prisoner by Ayub Khan's people, and that the letters had been seized; he also heard that two women and ten or fifteen other men had been captured with letters they were carrying to or from Kandahar. The tribesmen had collected in force, and had surrounded the town, and in every village and on every road tribesmen were stationed to seize messengers and prevent letters reaching the British Officers in Kandahar.

At 10 o'clock on Thursday Ayub Khan and his regular army arrived at Chunni. His troops occupied the ground between Chunni and Goshkhana. The tribesmen of Herat, Jaldak, Maruf, and Registan have entered the outskirts of the city. The inhabitants of the neighbouring villages are suffering great oppression at the hands of the regular and tribal forces, as it is the nature of the Pathans to be cruel. No justice is done to the people by Ayub Khan. In fact, he dare not ask any explanation from his followers.

The particulars of the Khushk-i-Nakhud fight are as follows:—

The Herati troops first attacked the British force, but were repulsed. Then the Kabuli and Kandahari regiments attacked, and two whole Kandahari regiments, which were under the command of Muhammad Kabir and Muhammad Anwar, were destroyed, including their two commanders. Ayub Khan has made Khushdil, son of Shahgasi Sherdil Khan, a prisoner, because of the defeat of the Herati force, of which he was the commandant. After the British defeat at Khushk-i-Nakhud, 12 British soldiers missed their way, and arrived at Maiwand, where the sons of Syad Salaam carefully sheltered them, and sent them on the next day towards Kandahar. On the road these 12 men were seized and taken to Ayub Khan, who made them prisoners. Ayub Khan has put one son of Syad Salaam to death, and made prisoners of two of his other sons, who were in the village of Kotwal. He has also destroyed their homes, because they gave refuge to the 12 British fugitives. Ayub Khan has made Sirbiland Khan, Atchakzai, and his son, Ghulam Nabi, prisoners.

Sirdar Sher Ali (the Wali), his son, and nephew are with the British officers in the Kandahar citadel. All the Afghans have been turned out of the city, but their pro-

perty is permitted to remain there. Only Parsiwans and Hindus are allowed to live in the town. The inhabitants of Mel, Rabat, and Kadni, as well as the Ashaizais, Kakozaïs, and Alazais are collected near Chaman intending to attack it.

My son left Kandahar at 2 o'clock on Thursday, *i.e.*, four hours after Ayub Khan had reached Chunni, and he arrived here yesterday.

No. 26.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 28TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

23rd August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, reports that 5/8th, Royal Artillery, with two guns for E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, and the last party of the 63rd Foot, left that place on the 21st for Sibi, followed on the 22nd by H/1st, Royal Artillery, and a detachment of signallers.

The following reports have been received from the Officer commanding at Jacobabad :—

I. Dated the 22nd.—“ 5/8th, Royal Artillery, division for E/B, and details of 63rd and 4th Bengal Native Infantry, passed through for Sibi last night.”

II. Dated the 23rd.—“ H/1st, Royal Artillery, 40 military signallers and the 13th Bombay Native Infantry passed through for Sibi last night.”

24th August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General at Sukkur telegraphs as follows on the 24th :—

“ Last half A/4th, Royal Artillery, left to-day. Programme here finished, except 17th Native Infantry a week hence. The 78th commence move to-day from Karachi.”

25th August.—The Officer commanding at Jacobabad reports that the remaining half of A/4th, Royal Artillery, passed through that place for Sibi on the 24th.

The following messages have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Kila Abdulla :—

I. Dated the 24th.—“ I have just received the following from General Henderson, Quetta :—Message begins : ‘ Officer commanding Jacobabad telegraphs as follows,— ‘ Officer commanding Pulaji outpost reports gathering of 1,500 Marris at Much, about ‘ sixteen miles east of Mittri. ‘ Officer commanding Lehri outpost reports number of ‘ marauders collecting daily in the village, and also a large gathering of Marris at ‘ Kahan. Have reported this to political authorities. More troops urgently required ‘ here. I have telegraphed this message to Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, ‘ and Quartermaster-General, Poona. Major Colvin telegraphed me a very strong ‘ regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, reaches Sibi to-morrow. Please instruct me.’ Message ends. I have communicated this to Sir Robert Sandeman. I have replied to General Henderson that he is on no account to interfere with destination of troops for Kandahar force here, and that troops for Jacobabad should be settled under your orders.

II. On the 24th.—“ Obligated to open out to the front and right flank from Chaman to get water-supply for Gatai, forage and grain for cavalry, and to re-establish the telegraph line and fortify posts, which I learn from spies have not been so much damaged as at first reported. Two field columns leave Chaman, 26th instant, to effect this. Right column (two mountain guns, one company Sappers, two regiments Native cavalry, 300 rifles Beluch Battalion) proceeds to Murgha, Chaman, Akbar Khan, and that vicinity. Left column (two mountain guns, one company Sappers, 230 rifles, 16th Native Infantry) to Gatai. Colonel Lindsay, with his Engineer Officers, and Major Westmacott accompany right column, and, after arranging for Gatai, will reconnoitre onwards. I hope to be able to draw supplies from the Mirzai villages, Kalani Valley, on to our old fortified posts, which will be restored as quickly

as I can get Native infantry to the front to garrison them. The transport cattle from Sighi to Kojak get no grain and only 30 lbs. forage."

III. Dated the 24th.—"Following cipher letter just received from General Primrose. Begins: 'Kandahar, 21st August. No news received from you since your cipher of 30th July. On 16th we attacked village Deh Khwaja, and got through it, but, finding it strongly occupied and reinforced by contingent from villages, had to retire to fortress. Our losses were General Brooke, who commanded assault; Cruickshank, Royal Engineers; Trench and Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; Wood and Marsh, 7th Fusiliers; Newport, 28th; and Rev. Gordon, killed. Vandeleur and Conolly, 7th; Wood, Transport; Nimmo, 28th; Shewell, Commissariat; and Malcolmson, Sind Horse, wounded; all latter doing well. Enemy's loss heavy. Our cavalry made two charges, and cut up good many. Supply blusa running short; everything else ample. Ayub's main position faces east, and is between high hills on west and Arghandab, covered by canals in front. Some regular infantry in villages east and south of city, supported by large contingents of ghazis; Durani cavalry picquets on Mandi Hissar and Kushab roads; on picquet hill, two Armstrong 12-pounders; head-quarters garden, one of our captured guns; in front Shikarpur gate, one 12-pounder howitzer; Deh-Khwaja, one 6-pounder. Ayub making indefinite overtures Walida Bibi Howa.' I learn from another source that General Brooke was killed while trying to carry off Cruickshank when wounded."

The officers referred to in the preceding message are:—

Killed.

Brigadier-General Henry Francis Brooke, *h.p.* 109th Foot.
 Captain George Macdonald Cruickshank, Royal Engineers.
 Second Lieutenant Frederick Phillip Forster Wood, 7th Fusiliers.
 Second Lieutenant Everard Swaine Marsh, 7th Fusiliers.
 Major Richard John Le Poer Trench, General List, Bombay Infantry; Wing Commander, 19th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Lieutenant Francis Charles Stayner, Bombay Staff Corps; Wing Officer and Officiating Adjutant, 19th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry Newport, Bombay Staff Corps; Second in Command, 28th Bombay Native Infantry.
 The Reverend Mr. G. M. Gordon was not in the service; he belonged to the Church Missionary Society.

Wounded.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Mark Shewell, Bombay Staff Corps; Principal Commissariat Officer in Southern Afghanistan.
 Colonel John Henry Porter Malcolmson, C.B., Bombay Staff Corps; Commandant, Sind Horse.
 Lieutenant Hastings St. Leger Wood, 15th Foot, Transport Officer.
 Major Thomas Burton Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers.
 Captain William Conolly, 7th Fusiliers.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Rose Nimmo, Bombay Staff Corps; Commandant, 28th Bombay Native Infantry.

26th August.—The following message has been received in the Foreign Department from Captain Martelli, Assistant Agent, Governor General, Jacobabad:—

"No truth in reports of Marri raids in Sibi and Kachi plain. Marris are collecting in large numbers at Kahan; reason not known; but it is generally believed that Chiefs are endeavouring to make amends for raids on convoy. Native officer in command of outpost at Lehri reports rumours of small gatherings of Marris and Mach; but this has not been corroborated."

With reference to the above and to the previous reports of raids, the Bombay Government have been informed that if they think it desirable they may add another regiment of Native Infantry to the garrison of Sind.

27th August.—The Officer commanding Jacobabad telegraphs on the 27th:—

"205 men, 78th Highlanders, passed through for Sibi last night."

Major-General Phayre reports from Chaman on the 26th:—

"Received to-day, under date 23rd instant, from General Primrose, duplicate of letter of 21st, and several telegrams of officers of garrison to their friends, all of which

have been despatched. The want of grain and forage throughout Pishin is most serious; the usual water springs have partly dried up in consequence of continued drought. Column for Aktar Khan leave Chaman this evening. I hope thereby to feed Cavalry Brigade and stock Gatai with grain and forage, and after that Dabrai also."

28th August.—Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 26th :—

"No further news from Kandahar, but, as far as is known, no more fighting has taken place since the sortie on the 16th.

"A partial rising of the Khan's troops occurred last night at Khelat. The mutineers did little damage, and went off, numbering about 144, it is believed, taking the Chappar Ziarat road to Shorawak, to join the army of Ayub Khan at Kandahar. Have arranged with General Phayre to detach 400 of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, now *en route* from Sibi, to remain at Khelat for a time and restore confidence through the country. Mr. Duke accompanies as Political Officer.

"General Phayre now leaving for Chaman. Captain Curzon Wyllie left Quetta this morning for Kandahar."

General Phayre reports as follows from Chaman on the 27th :—

"In consequence of the reported mutiny of the troops of His Highness the Khan of Khelat, I have, at Agent Governor General's urgent request, directed half battalion, 78th Highlanders, to proceed to Khelat from Darwaza, under arrangements made by Sir Robert Sandeman, in communication with General Henderson, it being highly probable that these troops (about one thousand strong) will excite Shorawak Pathans to attack Gulistan and that part of our communication. I have ordered a company of 2/15th Foot to garrison Gulistan Fort, and another company Kila Abdulla Fort, both of these places being threatened by tribal attacks for some time past."

The Officer commanding Jacobabad reports on the 28th :—

"200 men, 78th, passed through for Sibi last night."

The following telegram, dated the 24th, has been addressed by the Punjab Government to Sir Robert Sandeman :—

"Commissioner, Derajat, telegraphs 20th, that Marris, after plundering Katchi and Sibi, assembled at Vitakri and decided to plunder Katchi again in force, for which purpose they left on 17th. Commissioner fears they may corrupt Bugtis and other tribes. Telegram of 24th reports Marris moving about restlessly in direction of Sind, Katchi, and Bolan. One report mentioned their retirement to hilly country. Precautions have been taken along Dera Ghazi border."

No. 27.

No. 201 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 31st August 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 194, dated 24th August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servants,

(Signed)

RIPON.

" F. P. HAINES.

" JOHN STRACHEY.

" E. B. JOHNSON.

" WHITLEY STOKES.

" JAMES GIBBS.

" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE news of the desertion of Ayub's Herati troops is not confirmed. The Khan has received a second letter from Ayub, which he is sending to the Agent, Governor General.

From Gulistan report received that some of Ayub's sowars are in Shorawak trying to stir up the people. Sirdar Hyder Khan, Aitchakzai, is said to be at Dangar Kach near the Bogra Pass, on the north side of the Amran range, with four of Ayub's guns.

All quiet at Kach Amadan and in the Marri country.

The 15th Hussars have arrived, and march towards the Kojak Pass to-morrow.

The Agent, Governor General, leaves Quetta for Chaman on the 25th. General Phayre hopes to advance from Chaman on the 30th.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 21st. Sortie took place, 16th, against village on east face of city; has secured us from further molestation on that side, but loss very heavy. Brigadier-General Brooke, Captain Cruickshank, R.E., Colonel Newport, 28th, Major Trench and Lieutenant Stayner, 19th, Lieutenants Marsh and Wood, Fusiliers, and Rev. Mr. Gordon, killed. Wounded,—Colonel Nimmo, 28th, Major Vandeleur, 7th, and Lieutenant Wood, Transport, all severely; Colonels Malcolmson and Shewell. Casualties among men about 180. Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., reported missing after Maiwand, prisoner in Ayub's hands, but well treated. Enemy throws a few shells into city occasionally, and keeps up fire on ramparts from sharpshooters with captured rifles, but does little harm. Investment entirely trusted to Kandahari troops and ghazis, Kabulis being encamped round Ayub, three miles off on Herat road. Ayub has about 5,000 regular infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 37 guns; number of ghazis uncertain and fluctuating, may amount to 10,000, of whom one third have fire arms. Meat and firewood scarce in city; other things plentiful; weather cooler; general health good.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From Sir ROBERT SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

A letter from Colonel Tanner to my address was received this morning by Officer, Chaman. Telegraphed to him to open it and wire its contents, which was done. They are as follows:—

Contents begin:—Dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 20th August. My dear Sandeman. Just one line to say I have heard from General Roberts to-day, he is four marches off, and will be here on the 24th. I received your letter dated 10th, and replied to it the same day. We are all well, and collecting supplies for Roberts, and on the road towards Kandahar. We are well off for supplies here. Roberts expects to be near Kandahar on the 29th. Ends.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ALL quiet in Pishin, Quetta, and Bolan Pass.

Letter from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 20th, reports that Roberts was expected there on 24th. All well with him and at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Supplies being collected abundantly. From Chaman it is stated that 100 of Ayub's sowars have been foraging in the direction

of Abdul Rahman. A force with six guns sent by Ayub across Zakurd Kotal to Abdulla Karez, with the object of attacking Chaman, had been recalled by Ayub, owing to a sortie having been made by the Kandahar garrison.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YESTERDAY, at noon, I received a telegram from His Highness the Khan, asking eagerly for news from Kandahar, and saying that some of his Pathan sepoy had returned from leave that day and spread a report that the English had again been defeated before Kandahar, and Muhammad Ayub Khan had either taken, or was about to take, the city. I sent a reassuring reply to the Khan, who again telegraphed that there was much excitement in Kelat.

About 11 last night Mr. Dempster reported to me that the Khan's guard at the Telegraph Office had advised the signaller to fly, as the Khan's troops had broken into open mutiny, and firing was going on in Kelat. A munshi of the Khan with 14 sowars shortly afterwards arrived at the Telegraph Office, and the signaller was able to remain.

I sent a message to the Khan to say that if he required help in troops to let me know at once, and I would apply to the British Government for them.

This morning the Khan has sent me the following message:—

Begins: Your telegram offering me assistance of British troops. As soon as I require them, I shall certainly ask you. As soon as mutineers heard news of Kandahar they came and asked me to rise and fight against English; if not, that they would rise against me. I, being a sincere ally of the British Government, gave them a decided reply that I would not. Some of these sepoy were from the Nurwai and some from the Shanawazi regiments, and amount in all to about two hundred men. They mutinied last night about 10 o'clock, broke open the jail, and carried away 30 prisoners, taking the Chapar Zairat road. No other damage done. If they do any mischief on the road to-day, I will inform you. I have my other troops ready and have sent my Brahui sowas after the mutineers. Am expecting return of these sowars. The mutinous sepoy are residents of the British district of Pishin and of Kandahar. If you can send a force to intercept them, I shall be glad. Message ends.

I have warned the Brahui tribes of what has occurred, and any stragglers will be seized, but the mutineers will certainly make for Shorawak, *via* Mungrocher, and thence to Kandahar.

I have informed General Phayre, and recommended a wing of the 78th Highlanders being sent to Kelat for a time to restore confidence to the country. Major Reynolds would accompany the troops. There is good barrack accommodation at a considerable distance from the town. I am certain the Khan would be glad were this arrangement carried out. The troops could be easily fed at Kelat.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from Extra Assistant Commissioner, Rai Hittu Ram, dated Sibi, 25th:—

Message begins: Dooroo Langhani's nephew, arrived with Sirdar Miharulla Khan Marri's share of spoil, taken from railway convoy on 8th, informs that about 300 Marris are assembling opposite Thalli with intention of attacking that place and Mall to-morrow. If permitted, I can collect double their number of Khajaks and Pannis, and proceed to Mall and Thalli for three days to prevent this, and cause them to disperse. And messenger also informs that Sirdar Miharulla Khan is going to Katmundai. Can I go and meet him at Thalli? If proposed arrangements for collecting Khajaks and Pannis are sanctioned, I shall have to feed them as long as they are out with me. Message ends.

I have replied as follows :—

Message begins: Clear the line. Your telegram, dated this evening, informing me of intended raid by Marris on Thalli and Mall. I entirely approve of your proposals and sanction them. Collect Khajaks and Pannis and go at once to Thalli and Mall. I sanction your feeding the tribes. Report early the result of your proceedings. I am glad the Sirdar of the Marris is to meet you. Help him in every way, and give him my salaams. Message ends.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR. No communication from Government has reached us since 28th, and only one from Wylie, Pishin, dated 6th. Kelat all well; and surrounding country clear on 12th. Ghazis reported diminishing in numbers. No Ghilzais have joined, and few Chiefs of rank from outlying districts. Ayub has sent to Herat for ammunition, which may arrive 12 to 15 days hence. Meat and firewood scarce in city. Other necessaries plentiful.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received late last night from the chief Sirdar of the Marris that the sections of the clan, who plundered the railway convoy, are again meditating mischief, and intended making a raid in the direction of Thalli or Mall. The Chief at same time sent to Sibi the portion of the plunder set aside for him as Chief of the clan, taken from the railway convoy. Rai Hittu Ram started with a tribal gathering of the Sibi clans to meet the Marris, and, if possible, disperse them. Sirdar Mihrulla and Rai Hittu Ram hoped to meet at Thalli. A troop of cavalry has also gone to Mall from Sibi.

No further news from Kandahar, but, as far as is known, no more fighting has taken place since the sortie on the 16th.

A partial rising of the Khan's troops occurred last night at Kelat. The mutineers did little damage and went off, numbering about 144, it is believed, taking the Chappar Ziarat road to Shorawak to join the army of Ayub Khan at Kandahar. Have arranged with General Phayre to detach 400 of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders now *en route* from Sibi to remain at Kelat for a time and restore confidence through the country. Mr. Duke accompanies as political officer.

General Phayre now leaving for Chaman. Captain Curzon Wylie left Quetta this morning for Kandahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From ASSISTANT AGENT, Governor General, Jacobabad, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MARRIS are gathering at Sherinal near Thalli, with the object, it is believed, of making a raid. It is not yet ascertained what direction they intend taking.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received information that Ayub Khan has withdrawn his army from the positions taken up in front of Kandahar, and has retired to Singiri, eight miles east of Kandahar. Roberts arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the 24th. I have received letters

from Colonel Tanner and Captain Yate, dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the 19th. They go to you to-day in original. The troops sent to Kach Amadan with Captain Henry Wylie have returned to the Kojak after settling that part of the country. All quiet there again. Shah Jahan has returned with his people to Khob.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram asking my opinion of nature of Marri gathering at Kahan. I believe council of Chiefs assembled at Kahan at Sirdar Miharulla's request, who asked their assistance to aid him to force raiders to return plundered railway property. What reply the Chiefs gave Sirdar Miharulla I do not know for certain, but will ascertain shortly. The Sirdar has sent into Sibi 37 railway transport bullocks, and is believed now to be on his way to meet Rai Hittu Ram at Thalli. I will telegraph further news shortly. I think it would save Government much possible anxiety were the news telegraphed direct as hitherto about Marri movements from Quetta, as I am nearer to the Marris than any other officer, and directly in communication with the Sirdar. I do not think the clan as a body contemplate going against the Government. It is only the sections to which the robbers belong who plundered the railway convoy who are giving trouble.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received of arrival of General Roberts at Kelat-i-Ghilzai on morning, 24th. Ayub has consequently raised siege of Kandahar, and retired eight miles from city, occupying position at Sangiri on Herat and Zamindawar roads. He is said to be short of ammunition, and to have sent for more to Herat, but it cannot arrive for 15 or 16 days. His troops have abandoned Mandi Hissar, and all the country south and east and north-east of Kandahar, as well as Kojak line.

General Phayre reached Chaman this morning, and General Wilkinson with cavalry brigade arrived Killa Abdulla.

All quiet at Kelat. Khan is arranging carriage for wing, 78th, from Dasht.

Captain Henry Wylie reports tribal gathering on Pishin frontier and at Kach Amadan reduced to 300 robbers.

Enclosure 12 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, No. 2942 E.P., dated 28th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor General, Quetta.

YOURS 26th. Please telegraph to Khan of Kelat that Viceroy is gratified to learn that the mutiny of a portion of Khan's troops had no serious consequences, and that Khan may be assured of the readiness of the Government to afford him assistance and support. Have British troops been actually detached to Kelat?

Enclosure 13 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COLLECTION of Aitchakzais and other bad characters still reported at Toba, acting under orders of Sultan Khan and Muhammad Hassan, brother and son of Sirdar Fattah Khan. Their intention is to attack line of communication between Chaman

and Quetta; and Shorawak people, who have been joined by Khan's mutinous sepoy, are reported to be similarly inclined. Taking into consideration that General Roberts is now close on Kandahar, I have asked General Phayre before marching from Chaman to place a moveable column at my disposal for employment in Pishin, and to secure the country between this and Chaman against local disturbances. Information has been received from Mungocher that the Kelat mutineers have looted the villages of Chappar Ziarat and Goruk, and Naib Abdul Latif, with two guns and 500 men, was in pursuit of the rebels.

Enclosure 19 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram regarding despatch of British troops to Kelat. No troops available as yet; 500 are under orders to go to Kelat, and march from Siriah.

Enclosure 20 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

KELAT-I-GHILZAI, 23rd August. Clear the line. The force under my command arrived here this morning. Authorities at Kandahar having stated, on the 17th instant, that they have abundant supplies, and can make forage last until 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 126 miles during the last eight days. The troops are in good health and spirits. From this purpose moving by regular stages so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distant 20 miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Taktipul I should also hope to communicate with him, and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the fort over to Muhammad Sadik Khan, a Tokhi chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879. The present Governor, Sirdar Shirindil Khan, refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage which at this season is plentiful. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent order. Our casualties to date are, 1 soldier, 72nd Highlanders; 1 sepoy, 23rd Pioneers; 1, 2nd Sikhs; 2 sepoy, 3rd Sikhs; dead—1 sepoy, 4th Goorkhas; 2 sepoy, 24th Punjab Native Infantry; duffadar, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, missing; 6 camp followers dead, 5 missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from Ghazni on 13th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.

Enclosure 21 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kelat-i-Ghilzai, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KELAT-I-GHILZAI, 24th August. The force under my command halts here to-day, and continues march to-morrow, reaching Robat, 20 miles from Kandahar on the 29th.

Latest date from General Phayre is 12th August. I am sending messengers to him daily now, and keeping him fully informed of our movements.

From Kandahar a letter has been received from Officer commanding here, written by Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, on the 17th instant. It states, yesterday morning, hoping to pull down the loop-holed walls facing the Kabul and Bar Durance gates, we made a sortie with 300 cavalry and 800 infantry, furnished by 7th Fusiliers, 19th and 28th Native Infantry. The result was not satisfactory. The village was found to be strongly held and honeycombed with loopholes. Our infantry managed to push through, but could not effect a hold, though the supports of the

enemy got a good slating from our cavalry and our infantry and artillery fire. We had to get back to the walls under a heavy fire from their loopholes, and our losses, in Officers more especially, were pretty heavy. Wood, Marsh, 7th Fusiliers; Trench and Stainer, 19th; Newport, 28th, with Padre Gordon, General Brooke, and Cruickshank of the Engineers, were killed; Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, severely, Nimmo, 28th, severely, Shewell, Commissariat, slightly, Conolly, 7th Fusiliers, slightly, Malcolmson, slightly wounded. The enemy must, however, have seen that we still have some fighting power in us, and we hear that the regular regiments under Ayub would not turn out to reinforce, so that an effect has been produced, and the *morale* of the troops here is still good. A letter from Colonel St. John, of same date, states that 200 soldiers were killed and wounded during the sortie.

I have sent General Phayre an estimate of our daily requirements in food, and have urged him to have sufficient quantity of tea, sugar, and rum, &c., pushed on to Kandahar, unless he is satisfied that there is enough there already. Grain must be procured locally, but I fear there will be considerable difficulty in doing this within any reasonable distance of Kandahar, as I understand that Ayub Khan's army has requisitioned that part of the country freely.

Boots will shortly be required by most of the British and by Native soldiers of this force. I hope that several thousand pairs will be sent to Kandahar without delay; also shoes for the 92nd Highlanders, and great coats for that regiment. They have only 100 left fit to be worn; these used for night duties.

Enclosure 22 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Jaldak, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

DATED Jaldak, 25th August. Reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai on 23rd August; halted there for one day, and marched towards Kandahar to-day, taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with us. Muhammad Sadik Khan, one of the Tokhi Chiefs has been left in charge of the fort. Have heard that Muhammad Aslam intends attacking Muhammad Sadik. No opposition up to present. Country quiet.

Many people openly recognize Abdul Rahman as Amir, but they are anxiously watching events at Kandahar. Opinions are divided as to what Ayub will do. I believe he will be compelled to fight.

You will have heard about the late sortie from Kandahar, in which so many were killed and wounded. Object of sortie not yet known.

Jawar plentiful, but I do not know what we shall do for supplies and forage on our arrival at Kandahar, as everything is said to have been taken by Ayub's army.

Letter sent to-day to Kandahar by hand of messenger who has managed to get in twice before. Letters sent every day since our arrival at Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Chaman.

Enclosure 23 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th August 1880.

From Captain H. WYLIE, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from St. John,—Message begins:—

Kandahar, 25th. Ayub Khan has completely abandoned investment and withdrawn his whole force to a position on the Argandab, due north of city. News of the approach of Kabul force known to have reached his camp, where it is reported that it was yesterday at Tirandaz.

Nothing heard of Quetta force since Wylie's letter of 6th, but enemy's cavalry on Quetta road appear to have returned.

Lieutenant Maclaine still a prisoner in Ayub's camp. Continued efforts being made to obtain his release.

This morning I visited village, scene of action of 16th with Taj Muhammad Sistani horse, and found 40 bodies of our men. Colonel Newport and Captain Cruickshank recognized. All will be buried this afternoon. Wounded doing very well. Message ends.

Enclosure 24 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th August 1880.

From Captain H. WYLIE, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from St. John,—Message begins :—

Kandahar, 26th. Yesterday afternoon a working party buried bodies of officers and men killed on 16th. General Brooke, Colonel Newport, and Captain Cruickshank among them. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, died of wounds received on 16th.

A report is current outside city that Musa Khan is in Ayub's camp, but I do not believe it. Reports of an action, near Chaman, are reaching us, but no news of advance of reinforcements from that direction.

Kabul force said to have been yesterday at Khel-i-Akhoond, but this is improbable. I do not expect them before 31st. Latest news from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 12th; from Chaman, 6th.

From Ayub's camp it is reported that he wished to retreat to Girisk, but was prevented by Kabuli troops.

A foraging party brought in large quantity of fodder yesterday. Message ends.

No. 28.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 4TH SEPTEMBER 1880. (Extract.)

29th August.—Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 29th :—

“ Report from Sibi this morning that Marris, about 600 strong, came out of hills in direction of Mal. Cavalry at Mal drove them back, and the troops from Thalli met them and killed four men, capturing four mares and recovering part of the cattle they had looted from Mal.”

30th August.—Brigadier-General Henderson reports as follows from Quetta :—

I. On the 29th.—“ The Officer commanding at Kach reports another gathering of Zhob people within forty miles. I propose to send two mountain guns to Kach when I have infantry available to escort them. Telegraph communication with General Phayre interrupted to-day between Gulistan and Kila Abdulla.”

II. On the 30th.—“ Siege of Kandahar reported raised; Ayub fifteen miles off in Argandab valley; Roberts reported close. Above news dated 26th instant.”

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Chaman on the 30th :—

“ Letter of 26th just received from Kandahar. Ayub had withdrawn from investment of city to bank of Argandab at Baba-Wali. All well, and looking for General Roberts and my forces. Most urgently advocates re-establishing of posts and establishment of a transport train. Both of these very important measures am carrying out as far as the great difficulties I have to encounter from want of forage and grain and from desertion of transport followers will admit of. Gatai post already re-established, and Dabrai will be so to-morrow; and then I shall be able to clear Takht-i-Pul Kotal. A number of private letters received and forwarded.”

31st August.—Colonel St. John telegraphs as follows from Kandahar (through Chaman) on the 26th :—

“ Siege being practically raised, country quieting down, and Ayub Khan's force reduced to regulars and a small number of ghazis, is it worth while, in face of certain difficulties of supplies, that Phayre should bring more than a brigade of all arms with him?”

The following telegram, dated Quetta, the 28th, has been received from Sir Robert Sandeman :—

“ The following telegram I have to-day sent to General Phayre to Chaman:— Begins,—‘ I desire to continue my telegram of yesterday, recommending that a moveable column for Pishin should be formed as soon as it can be managed. To-day I have received fresh news confirming information already received that there is a considerable collection of Achakzais and bad characters on Toba, acting together under the orders of Sultan Khan. Their plan is to take the field directly your troops have advanced from Chaman towards Kandahar. They intend to attack our lines of communication between Kojak and Quetta, and the villages in Pishin which have aided us with supplies. It is also reported that the Shorawak people have similar intentions, and that 150 of the Khan’s mutinous sepoy have gone there. I earnestly bring the matter to your notice, and trust you will secure the safety of Pishin by placing a moveable column at my disposal to protect the country before you march for Kandahar. It will be a very serious matter if any of the Brahui convoys are attacked when conveying food to Kila Abdulla. Further, Wylie informs me that the state of the transport animals is bad, owing to the paucity of grain and forage, which are being supplied from Pishin to date wholly by political officers. He is very anxious that no opportunity for raiding in Pishin should be given; and has brought this matter urgently to my notice.’—Ends.

“ I repeat the foregoing to Government of India for information, because I understand Phayre is moving his entire force on Kandahar; and surely, owing to the rapid advance of Roberts, the necessity for this no longer exists. It will increase the supply difficulty greatly, that is to say, if the supply of food to the entire Kandahar army, as I understand is the case, is dependent on the safety of the lines of communication from Sibi to Quetta, and thence to Chaman through the Kojak Pass.”

The Officer commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs on the 29th :—

“ 200 men 78th, one European Officer and 33 Native gunners of No. 1 Mountain Battery, with two 9-pounder guns and eight drivers of 5/8th Royal Artillery, passed through Sibi last night.”

The following telegrams, dated the 30th, have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Chaman :—

I. “ Just received letter from Roberts, dated Khelat-i-Ghilzai, 24th, having crossed my letter to him of 29th. Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison had joined him. He left for Kandahar by ordinary marches on 25th; to-day he is at Robat, and will try and communicate with me by heliograph to top of Kojak; to-morrow he will be at Momand and attack any force opposing his entry into Kandahar on 31st. By this time he has, I hope, learnt my position, and famine-stricken state of country through which I have to march. His march most successful in every way; has supplies to 8th September. My advanced troops at Aktar Khan and Gatai doing best to collect forage and grain. Had to blow down towers of Abas Saiad’s, for he was preventing that group of villages helping us; this should cause grain and forage to flow into Dabrai and Gatai. Have ordered field column to Shah Passang and Dari river route, so as to secure as plentiful a supply of wood, water, and forage as possible. My advanced force forms at Gatai on 30th; we shall then push on as fast as weakly state of transport animals will admit. Estimate of daily requirements Roberts’ force and Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison (Europeans 3,200, Natives 9,000, horses 2,300, transport—1,590 mules, ponies 5,926, camels 400, donkeys 400),—meat 5,000 lbs., bread stuff 49 maunds, vegetables 4,000 lbs., rice 900 lbs., salt 33 lbs., sugar 600 lbs., tea 150 lbs., rum 80 gallons, atta 320 maunds, dhall 51½ maunds, ghee 19¼ maunds, salt 8½ maunds, grain 800 maunds.”

II. “ Your telegram of yesterday about moveable column for Pishin. Before receipt of Sir Robert Sandeman’s telegram I had issued orders for column for Pishin under General Walker, who is also appointed to command posts between Sighi and Chaman. Gulistan and Kila Abdulla being strongly held by detachments of mountain guns, European detachment and Native Infantry with Cavalry. But I submit for His Excellency’s consideration that the intelligence received from General Roberts yesterday and that given by Primrose to-day, that Ayub Khan had withdrawn his force to the Argandab, four or five miles north-west of Kandahar, and that the whole country from this to Kandahar and around that city for a radius of fifteen or twenty

miles has been denuded of all supplies, renders it matter for immediate and serious consideration whether, under the circumstances, I should advance more of my troops from Chaman towards Kandahar than will be sufficient to re-establish and stock with provisions the posts *en route*, re-establish the telegraph and clear Takt-i-Púl Kotal of the tribal gatherings which still appear to be hovering about it. One brigade of Infantry, with some Native Cavalry, mountain guns and the field batteries will, I think, be sufficient for this, setting free the 15th Hussars and wing of 2/15th Foot for Shorawak, agreeably to Sir Robert Sandeman's earnest request that a force should be sent there to allay existing excitement, not only in Shorawak itself, but also in Khan of Khelat's adjacent territory. I am informed by Captain H. Wylie, Chief Political Officer with my force, that plentiful supplies of grain and forage can be had for these troops in Shorawak, and should His Excellency approve the measure, our scanty resources on the line of communication will be at once relieved and a political object of the highest importance gained. Moreover, the Hussars will be in a good climate, ready to advance or return to India at the proper time, as the course of events may appear to dictate. I have most of ten days' supplies for force already at Gatai; the rest follow to-night. To-morrow I shall occupy Dabrai, after that clear Takt-i-Púl Kotal and re-establish Abdul Rahman post, and thence open communication by the shortest line with Kandahar. In this way I can stock the road with supplies, economise men and food, and do the utmost possible to assist the large force at Kandahar. The German horse-biscuit, on which I mainly depended for use from this to Kandahar, I have just learned was left at Sibi for some days, in spite of special instructions personally given to have it forwarded by *dák* on arrival."

III. "In continuation of my first telegram this morning, the following passage in the Kandahar letter was omitted by mistake,—'Colonel Shewell can supply both 'forces, yours and General Roberts', for a month or six weeks, but forage must be 'sent up the line, and also the reserve reports (?) which are at Quetta.' With reference to this, my reports from Gatai outposts are that very little forage or grain is procurable there; the whole route has already been foraged by Ayub's troops. Regarding supplying General Roberts' force for a month, the opinion of the Deputy Commissary-General may alter when he sees the list of daily consumption, that (?) forage. Perhaps he includes Quetta reserve, which I am trying to take up."

Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta, on the 30th August:—

"The following clear the line message received from St. John this morning, dated Kandahar, 26th August 1880:—

"'Siege being practically raised, country quieting down, and Ayub Khan's force reduced to regulars and a small number of Ghazis, is it worth while, in face of certain difficulties of supplies, that Phayre should bring more than a brigade of all arms with him.' Ends.

"I entirely concur with St. John. Troops are required to garrison Pishin as formerly during Stewart's occupation at Kandahar, when country would quickly settle down."

1st September.—The following reports have been received from Sir Frederick Roberts:—

I. Dated Shahr-i-Safa, 27th August.—"Reached Shahr-i-Safa to-day, 27th August. Received letter from Colonel St. John. He writes:—Begins: 'The rumours of the 'approach of your force have been sufficient to relieve the city from investment. On 'Monday night the villages on the east and south were abandoned by their mixed garri- 'sons of ghazis and regulars. Yesterday morning Ayub struck his camp and marched 'to a position on the Argandab, between Baba-Wali and Shikh Chila, due north of 'the city, and separated from it by a range of rocky hills. He has about 4,000 'infantry, regulars; six 12-pounders, and two 9-pounders, rifled; four 6-pounder 'smooth bore batteries, and one 4-pounder battery; 2,000 sowars, and, perhaps, twice 'that number of ghazis, of whom a third have firearms. The Kizilbashis and Kohis- 'tanis in his camp (about 1,200 infantry and 300 cavalry) offered to meet and join 'us directly we make a show of attack; they are at last aware of Abdul Rahman's 'succession, but I think Ayub will remain unmolested until arrival of Kabul force. 'He will, I expect, strike away north into Khakrez, on which line a vigorous pursuit 'should give us his guns. MacLaine, Royal Horse Artillery, is still a prisoner; I am

'making every effort to obtain his release, but I am not very hopeful of success. This morning, the 25th, I went to the field of the sortie of the 16th, and found the bodies of the poor fellows who fell there, some 40 in number; they will be buried this afternoon. All the wounded are doing well. No signs or tidings of Phayre.'—Ends. General H. Gough with two regiments of cavalry is at Robat; they are in heliographic communication with Kandahar. General Primrose heliographs that Ayub Khan has entrenched his camp at Baba-Wali. The force marches for Robat to-morrow, 17 miles distant from Kandahar.

II. Dated Robat, the 29th August.—"Force marched here yesterday, and halts to-day, proceeding to-morrow towards Kandahar by two easy stages. This is desirable on account of the increased heat, to give the sick some rest and enable the men and transport animals to reach Kandahar in good form. Sick rate still continues to be moderate; detailed report will be made from Kandahar. Colonel St. John and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, joined me here yesterday, bringing useful information. They return this evening to Kandahar, accompanied by Major Badcock, Deputy Commissary-General, and Colonel Low, Chief Director of Transport, who will arrange for the supply of the force. Yesterday I received a letter from General Phayre, dated Kila Abdulla, the 24th; he expected to leave that place on the 30th, and provided he encounters no greater difficulties than he has hitherto met with, should not delay until matters are definitely settled with Ayub Khan. We are still fortunate about supplies, and will be able to assist the Kandahar garrison with shecp."

The following messages have been received from Sir Robert Sandeman from Quetta :—

I. Dated the 29th August.—"General Robert reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 23rd. Message now in transmission from General Roberts to Viceroy, which gives the news. All well. Tribes very unsettled still. Marris made raid on Mal, but were driven back into their hills with loss of four killed. No particulars received yet."

II. Dated the 30th August.—"Following from Commissioner in Sind :—Begins : 'Good deal of excitement prevailing here, from rumours of gathering beyond frontier in Las Beyla direction. As far as I am aware these are entirely without foundation, but I shall be glad to know whether you have any information on the subject.'—Ends. Have replied as follows :—Begins : 'The rumours have not reached this. Were any thing wrong his Highness the Jam would be certain to report it. His Highness is quite strong enough to keep his country quiet. I believe the people to be well disposed to the English.'—Ends."

III. Dated the 31st.—"Rai Hittu Ram reports that the Marris killed three of the Mal villagers when they made the raid on the 28th; but that the troops came up with raiders, and they were severely punished, and almost all the plundered cattle recovered. Captain Martelli is at Sibi. I have telegraphed to him for particulars, as it is said 30 raiders were killed. Rai Hittu Ram further reports that Sirdar Mihrulla Khan is again sick, and quite unequal to controlling his tribe at the present time, as they have quite broken loose from all restraints."

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Chaman :—

I. On the 30th August.—"Messenger who brought General Primrose's telegrams of 26th from Kandahar this morning states situation was as follows :—Ayub, with 13,000 troops, was in position on right bank of Argandab, opposite Baba-Wali; this number is irrespective of ghazis, &c., but he will only fight if attacked by considerably inferior number. Ahmad Khan, son of Sartip, with 400 Kandahar horse and 150 foot, was at Tukt-i-Pul three days ago, and prevented messenger's passage, who then came through Barganah Pass, which he found occupied by bands of ghazis, who detained him two days and robbed him of cash. Messenger reports that enemy's loss was very heavy in sortie when General Brooke was killed."

II. On the 31st August.—"I leave to-night for Gatai."

4th September.—The Officer commanding at Jacobabad reports that the remainder of the 78th Highlanders passed through that place on the night of the 3rd, *en route* to Sibi.

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 4th :—
 “News received of the defeat of Ayub Khan and capture of 27 guns.”

No. 29.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS.

I CONGRATULATE you and your brave force on the great success of the 1st.
 I have announced all known details in House of Commons, who have received news with great satisfaction.

No. 30.

No. 205 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
 of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, the 7th September 1880.

WE have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of telegrams received during the past week reporting the arrival at Kandahar from Kabul of Sir Frederick Roberts' division, and the total defeat, by the troops under his command, of the Afghan forces under Sirdar Ayub Khan.

2. In forwarding these papers to your Lordship, we desire to record our high appreciation of the admirable manner in which Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts has performed the important duty entrusted to him. The march of his force from Kabul to Kandahar, a distance of 327 miles by the route which he followed, was accomplished in 23 days, and the division under his command arrived at its destination in excellent health and unimpaired vigour. On the following day [1st September] the enemy was attacked and Sir F. Roberts' skilful dispositions, carried out in the most gallant style by his troops, secured, with comparatively little loss on our side, the complete overthrow and dispersion of Ayub Khan's army and the capture of his guns. We trust that your Lordship will agree with us in thinking that the services thus rendered to the country by Sir F. Roberts and his army have been of the most distinguished kind.

3. We must also express our sense of the obligations which we owe to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. Stewart for the great energy and zeal with which he organized Sir F. Roberts' force and despatched it fully equipped in every way for the arduous task which lay before it.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER received from General Roberts, dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 24th, states he was leaving for Kandahar on 25th by ordinary marches, taking on Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with him, and would try and communicate by heliograph from Robat on 29th, enters Kandahar to-day, has supplies to 8th September.

General Phayre's advanced force collecting forage and grain at Aktarkhan and Gatai.

Messenger from Kandahar states that Ayub, with 15,000 troops, is on right bank of Arghandab, opposite Baba Wali. He has besides them ghazis, &c., but will only fight if attacked by greatly inferior numbers. Ahmed Khan, son of Sartip, with 400 Kandahar horse and 150 foot, was at Takht-i-Pul four days ago and prevented messenger passing, who then came by Roghani Pass, which was occupied by ghazis. They detained him two days and robbed him of cash. He reports enemy's loss in sortie very heavy; and that Colonel St. John had invited inhabitants of Kandahar to return to city. The son of Sirdar Azad Khan of Kharan is with Ayub.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Robat, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

August 29th. Reached Robat yesterday, halt here to-day, go to Mohmund, eight miles ahead, to-morrow, and Kandahar following day. General intends attacking Ayub the next day, who, according to information from Kandahar, intends fighting.

Musa Jan and party will have reached Ayub's camp, and he may be compelled to fight.

A letter to General from Ayub received yesterday. He excuses himself for fighting, says it was forced on him, asks for friendly advice. The reply sent is to effect that he must give up his prisoners, and submit unconditionally to British Government. The original letter and the reply will be submitted.

General has had a sharp attack of fever, but hopes he will be well day after to-morrow.

The sight of our force will have a good effect on the Kandahar garrison. General Phayre, in a letter received yesterday, holds out no hopes of being here for the next eleven days.

Some supplies procurable, but the villages have to be visited to get them.

St. John has been out here. He returns to Kandahar to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Robat, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ROBAT, 28th. Came out here yesterday afternoon at General Roberts' request to meet him. Two regiments Cavalry, under General Gough, arrived here yesterday, after 22 miles march, and main body with General Roberts this morning. This early arrival of the Kabul army quite unexpected, as we considered it impossible for them to cover distance before 1st September. Sick are one day's march in rear.

Sirdar Hashim Khan and Ahmed Ali Khan have arrived in Ayub's camp with Abdulla Jan's mother, and Musa Jan expected to-day.

Herati troops signified their intention of retreating to Khakrez, but have been dissuaded, and sworn on Koran to fight. Ayub has written long apologetic letter to Roberts, asking for advice and friendly settlement. I return to Kandahar to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COLONEL St. John and Major Adam from Kandahar met General Roberts at Robat on 28th. They returned to Kandahar on 29th. General Roberts' army was expected to arrive Kandahar yesterday, the 29th.

Ayub Khan's army still in position on right bank Arghandab. He has been joined by Sirdars Hashim Khan and Ahmad Ali Khan, with Abdulla Jan's mother. Musa Jan was expected in Ayub's camp on 31st. Kazzilbashs and Kohistanis in Ayub's army are inclined to desert, as they have heard of Abdul Rahman's recognition by British Government as Amir of Kabul.

General Phayre marched last night for Kandahar, taking with him the whole force collected at Chaman, as he expects opposition at Takht-i-Púl.

Ayub Khan has been endeavouring to negotiate terms.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received news from Ayub's camp as follows:—Sartip Nur Muhammad advised Ayub Khan to retreat to Girishk, but Sirdar Abdulla Khan strongly urged Ayub not to desert his friends, which advice he decided to follow.

Musa Jan, Hashim Khan, and other Sirdars have, it is said, 15,000 followers with them, chiefly Ghilzai tribesmen, and they also had begged Ayub not to leave Kandahar, saying, if he did so, their cause was lost.

Ayub is said to have sent back his family from Farah to Herat.

Sirdar Sultan Khan, brother (?) of Fattah Khan, Aitchakzai, with a tribal following, is at Takht-i-Púl.

There seems no doubt but that Sirdar Azad Khan of Kharan's son is with Ayub Khan.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Mohmund, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

30th August. Force arrived here to-day; marches to Kandahar to-morrow.

General Primrose heliographs a letter from Ayub's camp, brings information that mother of late heir-apparent, Abdulla Jan, with other ladies, have been sent to Zamin-dawar. Arrival of the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is also there. The position is being strengthened specially on the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two regiments. From former information I learn that the Baba Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp is at Mazra, where it is said the majority of his guns are parked.

I propose to encamp the infantry to west of Kandahar, immediately under the walls, cavalry under the walls to south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist, I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is from description and map extremely difficult and easily defensible, and each separate advance will require careful study and reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life.

Enclosure 7 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Mohmund, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

30th August. Reached Mohmund, seven miles from Kandahar, which is in sight. Ayub still holds the position he took up, and there is every probability of an engagement. Generalis better.

Enclosure 8 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September, 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 31st August. The force under my command arrived here this morning without opposition.

Enemy are said to be in considerable strength at Mazra; but the ridge of hills which divides Kandahar from the Arghandab completely covers their position; and at present I have only been able to ascertain that the Baba Wali Kotal and one or two other points on this ridge are held in great strength; and that the enemy are busily engaged in defensive works. Reconnaissances are now being conducted, and I shall soon I hope be sufficiently acquainted with affairs generally to enable me to arrange for an attack.

The Kandahar garrison are in good health. The horses and transport animals appear to be in good condition. Major Vandeleur has died of his wounds. The remainder of the wounded, both officers and men, are generally doing well.

Troops from Kabul are in famous health and spirits. The assurance of the safety of this garrison enabled comparatively short marches to be made from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which much benefited both men and animals. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent condition, and the transport animals are, as a rule, in very fair order. General Primrose has arranged for the sick of force from Kabul being accommodated inside the city. Many of the cases are sore feet. None are serious.

To-morrow the telegraph line towards India will commence to be reconstructed; and as General Phayre is probably on this side of the Khojak to-day, through communication should soon be restored.

Enclosure 9 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Dated 30th. I returned last night from General Roberts' camp at Robat, where it halted yesterday. It is encamped to-day at Mohmund, ten miles from Kandahar, and will march here to-morrow.

Report of Musa Jan's arrival in Ayub's camp confirmed. Mother of Abdulla Jan and all other women have been sent to Zamindawar. Ayub's troops continue entrenching themselves in new position behind Baba Wali Pass. Weather still very hot.

Enclosure 10 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

31st August. General Roberts arrived to-day. Ayub still in force, and apparently intends fighting. Abdulla Jan's mother and other ladies sent to Zamindawar.

Enclosure 11 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TELEGRAPH communication with Chaman restored. Roberts arrived Kandahar, 31st, is reconnoitring Ayub's position, which is a strong one, and which he is entrenching. Phayre arrived 1st September at Muhammad Ameen, 26 miles from Chaman, 4 miles south of Dubrai; halted on 2nd to allow transport to rest. Cavalry brigade under Wilkinson was to have advanced to Takht-i-Púl on 2nd. Phayre expected to arrive Kandahar with whole force on 5th. Telegraph wire and poles left Quetta for Chaman some days ago for repair of wire from Chaman towards Kandahar. Curzon Wyllie with Wilkinson's force hoped to push on to Kandahar for Takht-i-Púl with despatches. Aitchakzais of Arambi giving much trouble, carried off caravan of 28 camels laden with flour on night of 1st.

Enclosure 12 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd September 1880.

From Sir R. SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre telegraphs through Chaman. Message begins. Roberts attacked, dispersed Ayub's force, captured 27 guns. Kabulis retreated up Arghandab. Message ends.

Enclosure 13 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 1st September, 6 p.m. Ayub Khan's army was to-day defeated and completely dispersed with, I hope comparatively slight loss on our side. His camp was captured, the two lost guns of E/B, R.H.A., were recovered, and several wheeled guns of various calibre fell to the splendid infantry of this force. The cavalry are still in pursuit. Our casualties are—Captain Straton, 22nd Regiment, killed; 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, Captain Frome, killed, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Monro wounded, 7 men killed, 18 wounded; 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant Menzies and Donald Stewart wounded, 11 men killed and 39 wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, 2nd Goorkhas, and Major Slater, 2nd Sikhs, wounded.

It is at present impossible to ascertain casualties amongst Native troops, but I have no reason to believe they are excessive. Full details will be telegraphed to-morrow.

The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant MacLaine, R.A., were found on the arrival of the British troops in Ayub Khan's camp.

Ayub Khan is supposed to have fled towards Herat.

Enclosure 14 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 1st September, 6 p.m. General Roberts attacked and carried Ayub Khan's position this morning about noon. Ayub fled, abandoning tents, standards, baggage, and at least 17 guns, including breech-loaders and Horse Artillery guns lost at Maiwand. General Gough with cavalry still pursuing. Our losses comparatively slight, but include Colonel Brownlow and Captain Frome, 72nd, and Captain Straton, Army Signalling Department, killed. Lieutenant MacLaine's body discovered close to Ayub's camp with throat cut, still warm. By account of other prisoners he was murdered by guard after Ayub's departure on approach of our troops. Column marches to-morrow to occupy two first halting places on Chaman road.

Enclosure 15 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 2nd. Cavalry under General Gough killed about three hundred fugitives of Ayub's army, and Bombay Cavalry, under General Nuthall, one hundred more. Twenty-seven guns captured. A large number of Ayub's cavalry, Kazilbashs and Tajiks, who took no part in action, sent in this morning placing themselves at our disposal; have been recommended to make the best of their way to Kabul, and place their services at disposal of Amir.

Ayub is believed to have fled to Khakrez. Hashim and his brother have gone to a village they own in Zamindawar. Musa Jan's whereabouts unknown, but he probably went off with the women some days ago. Kabuli infantry, which seem to have fled without fighting, has retired up Arghandab valley. Heratis made straight for Helmund.

Sir F. Roberts has withdrawn city from military jurisdiction, and placed Major Protheroe at my disposal for its management. The Afghan inhabitants will be invited to return from to-morrow. Great scarcity of flour and ghee, but other supplies will be forthcoming without difficulty. The cavalry go to Kokaran to-morrow to facilitate collection and distribution. Major Euan Smith accompanies force going to meet General Phayre to-morrow, and will be deputed to make all arrangements with tribes on line of communication.

Colonel Shewell died last night of wounds received in sortie of 16th.

Enclosure 16 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 2nd September. The report of the reconnaissance carried out by General Hugh Gough and Colonel Chapman on the 31st August afforded me all necessary information regarding enemy's position. I found it was quite practicable to turn his right, and thus place myself to the rear of the Baba Wali range, where Ayub Khan's main camp was. I decided on doing so, and commenced to attack shortly after nine yesterday morning. To cover my design I made preparations for a direct attack upon the Baba Wali Kotal. This feint was entrusted to the troops of the Kandahar garrison under Lieutenant-General Primrose, who also arranged to occupy my advanced positions of the previous day. At the same time the Cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough advanced upon our left, and, without difficulty, reached the Arghandab, when it was well placed for pursuit, should the enemy break either towards Girishk or Khakrez. The attack was made by the 1st and 2nd Brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Macpherson and Baker respectively, with the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Macgregor, in support, the whole of the Infantry being under the command of Major-General J. Ross. An elevated village within 1,200 yards of our position was strongly held by the enemy, and had first to be taken. This was done, in the most gallant manner, by the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Goorkhas covered by the fire of C/2 R.A. and the new screw gun battery. The two brigades then advanced through orchards and enclosures fighting steadily, the left of the 2nd Brigade being brought gradually round until the village of Pir Paimal was reached. At this point, the enemy were in great force, and fought most resolutely, but nothing could resist the determined advance of the British troops. Shortly after this, the reverse slope of the Baba Wali Kotal was reached, and the standing camp of Ayub then at Mazra, became visible. All the enemy's attempts to stem the torrent were fruitless. By 12 noon, the camp was in our possession with 27 pieces of ordnance, which include our own guns lost on the 27th July.

The casualties in addition to those yesterday reported include three Officers of Cavalry, slightly wounded, viz., Major Willock, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant Baker, 3rd P. C., Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse. The 92nd Highlanders had 51 wounded, 3 of whom have since died. The 72nd had 17 wounded, 1 of whom has since died. Amongst the Natives 11 killed, 72 wounded. Total wounded of casualties, about 210. The Cavalry brigade marches to-morrow to

Kokaran, where it will be well placed, and this will facilitate supplies being brought into the city. The 19th Bombay N. I., with 3rd Bombay Cavalry, march to-morrow to open up communication with General Phayre, to whom I am writing, requesting him not to push on too many troops, but to utilize his transport as much as possible in the conveyance of stores and supplies.

Enclosure 17 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Agent, GOVERNOR GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS received last night of complete defeat by General Roberts of Ayub Khan's army, capture of his camp, and recovery of our two lost guns, also capture of 27 guns of various sizes. Ayub's loss severe. British loss believed not to be excessive. The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant MacLaine were found on the arrival of the British troops in Ayub's camp. British cavalry in the pursuit that followed are said to have killed 500 fugitives.

Gathering in Marri hills reported to have dispersed. Their loss in late raid on Mall nine killed and several wounded. Aitchakzais still giving trouble.

Enclosure 18 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM information furnished by General Gough and Colonel Chapman, General Roberts decided to turn Ayub's right and get in rear of his camp. General Primrose feigned direct attack with Kandahar garrison, Cavalry under Gough being placed so as to pursue in event of enemy's flight towards Khakrez. 1st and 2nd Brigades under Macpherson and Baker, supported by Macgregor and 3rd Brigade, then attacked a village strongly held by the enemy. 92nd and 2nd Goorkhas, covered by C/2nd, Royal Artillery, and screw guns, carried this most gallantly, and reaching Pir Paimal, which was resolutely defended by a large force, continued their irresistible advance till they occupied Ayub's camp. Total casualties about 210, including 72nd, Colonel Brownlow, Captain Frome, and seven men killed; Captain Murray, Lieutenant Munro, and 17 men wounded, one since dead; 92nd, Lieutenant Menzies, Donald Stewart, and five men wounded, three since dead, 11 men killed; Colonel Battye, 2nd Goorkhas, Major Slater, 2nd Sikhs, Willock, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, Baker, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, wounded; Captain Straton, 22nd Foot, killed. Natives, 11 killed and 72 wounded. 19th Native Infantry, and 3rd Bombay moved to open communication with General Phayre.

Political Officer, Sibi, reports Marri gatherings dispersed. Alarm of attack on Sibi gorge unfounded. The Marri Vakeel Shaban Khan arrived at Sibi with message from Sirdar Mihrulla Khan.

Enclosure 19 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 3rd September. Cavalry brigade marched this morning for Kokaran with a large number of sick transport animals.

The sick and wounded of this force are all comfortably housed in buildings; and the British portion of the force have sufficient barrack accommodation to save them from the sun during the day. The wounded, with a few exceptions, are doing well. Two of the 72nd, and three of the 92nd, have died. The casualties on the 31st August and 1st September amounted to 248. The wounded includes two Officers, not hitherto mentioned, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Rowcroft, 4th Goorkhas, and Lieutenant Chesney, 23rd Pioneers, both slightly wounded.

The total number of artillery pieces captured was 32. This includes our own two guns, but not the six given to the Wali. These latter, I am told by some Afghan

artillerymen, who have given themselves up as prisoners to-day, we shall find lying on the Girishk road. These same prisoners state that Ayub Khan had only 31 guns with him, and that his flight was so precipitate, he could get none away.

Enclosure 20 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre reached Abdul Rahman last evening. Officers belonging to his staff rode in here this morning. His troops will remain in convenient locality near their present whereabouts to avoid too great pressure on the Kandahar supplies.

A telegraph office was opened last night at Mundi Hissar.

The wounded are doing well.

Enclosure 21 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 3rd September. The whole of Ayub's guns found and brought into citadel. Ayub fled to Khakrez without stopping, and left yesterday morning for Gurak. He is probably in Zamindawar to-day. Hashim Khan and the other Sirdars and Chiefs, with the exception of the two Gbilzai Generals, Hafizullah and Taz Muhammad, went with him to Khakrez. He had no baggage and no troops, but the Herati horse; is said to have announced his intention of going straight to Herat.

City gates have been opened, and peaceable Afghan inhabitants invited to return.

General Gough, with cavalry, has gone to Kokaran. A regiment of infantry and one of cavalry have marched to open communication with General Phayre. Major Euan Smith telegraphs from Mundi Hissar, first stage, that all is quiet there.

Enclosure 22 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 4th. Nothing more heard of fugitives, except that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan fled with Ayub to Khakrez. I estimate the enemy's loss on the 1st at about one thousand.

People are gradually returning to city, of administration of which Major Protheroe has taken charge, as a temporary measure.

Enclosure 23 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE following particulars of General Roberts' victory over Ayub Khan have been received from several sources. A successful reconnaissance of enemy's position was made on 31st August by General Gough, accompanied by Colonel Chapman, Chief of Staff. They were able to ascertain clearly the enemy's position, which was found to be as follows:—Their camp was pitched behind the Baba Wali range on the Arghandab, and extended to the village of Pir Paimal. They also held the two passes, called Baba Wali and Murcha, leading from Kandahar to the Arghandab. This position was strongly held with guns, and, before our troops could gain it, they had to pass through dry canals, gardens, orchards, and some detached villages. Roberts determined to make a feigned attack in front on Baba Wali with the heavy guns and Bombay troops under Primrose, his real attack being entrusted to Kabul Army, and directed against the village of Pir Paimal, which, once in his possession, would enable him to take the whole of Ayub's position in flank, roll up his line, and give him possession of his guns. The cavalry under Gough with horse artillery was on the left, acting independently. The attack was commenced at 9.30 a.m. The heavy guns shelled Baba Wali and silenced the batteries. C/2 R.A.

and screw guns shelled the nearest village, which was then carried by a rush of the 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Goorkhas, and the rest of the 1st Brigade. Baker's Brigade then joined the 1st Brigade, and the advance was made towards Pir Paimal. Severe fighting took place on this advance in the gardens, canals, and orchards, but Pir Paimal was, after a short time, without check as gallantly taken as the first village. Two small camps of the enemy then came in sight, but they were easily captured. The result of the capture, together with that of the two villages, and the arrival of the British force on the flank of Ayub's position, was a panic, which quickly spread to the main camp, and the enemy commenced flying in all directions, abandoning their guns. Our cavalry under Gough and Nuttall at once went in pursuit, and followed the flying enemy for fifteen miles, killing, it is said, 500 of the fugitives. Some of the victorious British troops bivouacked in Ayub Khan's standing camp, which was taken, together with large supplies of our ammunition. The rest of the troops returned to Kandahar over the Baba Wali Kotal, Ayub's standards and stores of all kinds were taken, and he himself fled with a small party of Herat horse to Khakrez, and did not draw rein till it was reached. He is supposed next day to have continued his flight without baggage or troops towards Zamindawar and Herat, his army being completely dispersed. The whole of his guns have been captured and taken into Kandahar.

General Phayre and his troops ordered from Killa Abdul Rahman to garrison, Kandahar.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th September 1880.

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO VICEROY.

THE Government desire to express to Commander-in-Chief great satisfaction of the Queen at success of measures taken for relief at Kandahar.

No. 32.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 11TH SEPTEMBER 1880. (Extract.)

6th September.—The following is a complete list of the Officers killed and wounded at the battle of Mazra, on the 1st instant:—

<i>Killed.</i>		
Captain Edward Straton	-	22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling.
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Brownlow, C.B.	-	72nd Highlanders.
Captain St. John Thomas Frome	-	72nd Highlanders.
<i>Wounded.</i>		
Major George Woodward Willock	-	3rd Bengal Cavalry.
Lieutenant Louis Samuel Hyde Baker	-	3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Lieutenant Neville Francis FitzGerald Chamberlain	-	2nd Central India Horse.
Captain Robert Hunter Murray	-	72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Seymour Charles Hale	-	
Monro	-	72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Stewart Alexander Menzies	-	92nd Highlanders.
2nd Lieutenant Donald William Stewart	-	92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Duncan Chesney	-	23rd Pioneers.
Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Battye	-	2nd Goorkhas.
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Frederick Roweroft	-	4th Goorkhas.
Major James Barry Slater	-	2nd Sikh Infantry.

*“ Quetta, 5th September.—*Kindly reply to my telegrams dated 31st August and 3rd September, recommending that two small columns be sent to Kawas and Shorawak to open up sources of local supply formerly available. Kindly inform me at as early a date as possible the garrison that is to be maintained at Pishin and Quetta during winter. We have had little or no rain for two summers, and if early winter sets in, which is probable, arrangements ought now to be made by commissariat to store forage and firewood for winter consumption. The Principal Commissariat Officer, Kandahar,* has died of his wounds, and the Commissariat Officer in Pishin has died from pneumonia. No time should be lost in bringing up supplies, and deciding amount required for winter. Bráhuís will not carry supplies at any price after snow falls, as the intense cold on Dasht plain kills men and animals.”

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs the following information regarding the action at Mazra :—

*“ Quetta, 5th September.—*The following information regarding attack on Ayub has been received:—A reconnaissance having been carried out, General Roberts decided to attack, and, finding it practicable to turn Ayub's right, arrangements were made to do so. General Primrose, with the Kandahar garrison, was detailed to make a direct attack on the Baba-Wali Kotal, at the same time the Cavalry Brigade, under General Hugh Gough, advanced on the left, and took up a good position to pursue. Two brigades, under Generals Macpherson and Baker, made the flank attack, supported by 3rd Brigade under General MacGregor, the whole infantry under General Ross. A village on a hill, within 1,200 yards of our position, had to be taken; the 92nd and 2nd Goorkhas, covered by the fire of C/2nd Royal Artillery and screw-guns, gallantly stormed and took it. The advance brigades fought their way steadily through orchards and enclosures. The enemy was in great force and fought desperately, but could not stand the steady advance of the British troops. The enemy strove in vain. By 12 noon his camp was in our hands, with 28 guns, including the two lost on 27th July; six guns more had previously fallen into our hands. Standards, standing camp, and all their equipage were taken. The body of MacLaine was found in a tent, still warm, with his throat cut, murdered by his guards before they retreated. Casualties in cavalry among Officers—two killed,† one wounded; wounded officer—Lieutenant Chamberlain, slightly; 92nd Highlanders—51 wounded, three of which died since; 72nd Foot—17 wounded, one since dead.”

THE Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sakkar, telegraphs that the 17th Bengal Native Infantry left for Sibi on the 5th.

THE Officer Commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows :—

*“ Jacobabad, 5th September.—*Eighty-three men, drafts for 7th, 2/11th, and 2/15th Foot passed through for Sibi last night.”

8th September.—The following message has been received from Sir Frederick Roberts :—

*“ Kandahar, 5th September.—*The following are the names of British soldiers killed in action on the 1st September, or who have since died of their wounds :—

“ 92nd Highlanders.

“ Killed.—Colour-Sergeant Richard Fraser, Corporal Lewin Friendship, Privates Alexander Easton, Thomas Kerr, John McKenzie, Robert McKenzie, William Reid, Neil Ross, James Scott, John Strachan, William Wilson.

“ Died of wounds.—Privates William Henderson, Peter Hocy, James Wilson.

“ 72nd Highlanders.

“ Killed.—Lance Sergeant William Cameron, Lance Corporals Josiah McIlvenna and William Gannon, Privates Mill Erskine, Alexander Hodge, James McQueen, James McGowan.

“ Died of wounds.—Privates James Baggin, George Haseltine.”

* Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Bombay Staff Corps.

† This was a mistake; no Officers of cavalry were killed.

The following reports have been received from Sir Frederick Roberts :—

“ *Kandahar, 5th September.*—Mail bags received this morning, bringing letters from England of 21st July and Indian newspapers to 20th August. A royal salute will be fired here at sunrise to-morrow, in honour of the victory over the Afghan army; orders issued for similar salutes to be fired at all stations and camps in the command where artillery may be present. After careful inquiry I have ascertained that the enemy suffered very severely on the 1st September; it was to be expected they would, as they made one or two most determined stands after our troops got quite close up to them. A small column will start in a few days for Singiri, and thence on to Khushk-i-Nakhud, for the purpose of burying our dead, and also to open out that part of the district for supplies. I am also desirous of clearing troops out of the city, which will be overcrowded now that inhabitants are allowed to return. Telegraph here is open to Abdul Rahman, 25 miles.”

“ *Kandahar, 6th September.*—General Phayre arrived this morning, having found at Karez-i-Zarak, about twelve miles south of Kandahar, a convenient site for the encampment of his horse artillery and cavalry, with ample forage and supplies. The infantry brigade of his force will be advanced to the same neighbourhood during the next few days. The weather is unusually hot. The wounded are, however, doing well, and the troops are, generally, fairly healthy.”

Brigadier-General Walker reports as follows :—

“ *Kila Abdulla, 7th September.*—Composition of General Phayre's force that he took on from Chaman :—Brigadiers-General Brown, Wilkinson, and James, with staff; D/B Horse Artillery, F/2nd Royal Artillery, 15th Hussars, two squadrons Madras Cavalry, two squadrons 2nd Bombay Cavalry, 2/11th Regiment, two companies 63rd Regiment, 1st Biluchis, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Bombay Native Infantry, three companies Sappers, and No. 2 Field Hospital.”

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows :—

“ *Quetta, 7th September.*—Latest news from Kandahar, no further news of fugitives. Sartip reported to have fled to Khakrez with Ayub. Estimated loss of enemy on 1st, 1,000 men. People gradually returning to city, the civil administration of which has been placed under Protheroe. General Phayre at Kandahar with his troops.”

No. 33.

No. 209 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 14th September 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Southern Afghanistan.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble Servants,

(Signed)	RIPON.
„	F. P. HAINES.
„	JOHN STRACHEY.
„	D. M. STEWART.
„	WHITLEY STOKES.
„	JAMES GIBBS.
„	C. U. ATTCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received hearty congratulations from the Khan of Kelat on Roberts' victory.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 7th September. The third brigade Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, under command of Brigadier-General Macgregor, together with the Central India Horse, will march to-morrow for Killa Abdulla, and there await the orders of Government regarding withdrawal to India. The movement is made to ease off the pressure regarding supplies experienced in consequence of the assembling of so large a force in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. I accompany the brigade party to obtain change of air, and to be as soon as possible in direct telegraphic communication with India, as some days must elapse before through communication is restored.

On the 9th instant, Brigadier-General Daubeney's brigade, consisting of C/2, R.A., 7th Fusiliers, 4th N.I., 2nd Biluchis, Sind Horse, and Poona Horse, will march for Kushk-i-Nakhud, for the purpose of burying the remaining of our dead, opening up communications, and endeavouring to get supplies from the outlying district. Latest telegram from India dated Simla, 3rd.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MOKADDAM Nehal Khan, Chief of the Loharani Marris, whose tribe occupy the country adjacent to the Shum and Peelawa plains, situated on the Punjab frontier, has sent a messenger with a letter addressed to me to say that he and his section of the tribe were in no way concerned in the robbery of the convoy and raid on Mall; that they are servants of the British Government, and will obey any orders sent them. The letter was written and despatched prior to General Roberts' victory.

Enclosure 4 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Abdul Rahman, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ABDUL Rahman, 9th. Proceeded yesterday with the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, to Mundi Hissar, and this morning visited the cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Wilkinson, at Karcz-i-Zarak. On the line of march I met Brigadier-General Brown's brigade, and a portion of Brigadier-General James's brigade, proceeding to join General Phayre's cavalry brigade.

Supplies and forage are coming in slowly along the line of communication.

I propose to remain at Killa Abdulla a few days for rest and change of air, and have asked Sir Robert Sandeman to meet me there to discuss the all-important questions of transport and supplies between Sibi and Kandahar.

A convoy of carts reached Kandahar yesterday, and another convoy is here to-day, but the road requires improvement to make it easy for carts' traffic. No telegram was despatched yesterday.

Enclosure 5 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 9th. Ayub Khan and the other fugitive Sirdars have passed Zamin-dawar some days ago. It is believed that Hashim Khan and his mother, the Wali's sister, will remain there; that Ayub will attempt to enter Herat; and that the mother of Abdulla Jan will go on to her father, Nur Afzul, at Meshed.

A column, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, three infantry, and one battery, leaves for Kushk-i-Nakhud to-morrow, to recover the five guns abandoned on the road, and bury the dead. Lieutenant Muir accompanies it as Political Officer.

General Macgregor, with 60th Rifles, 4th Goorkhas, and 25th, marched to-day for Pishin. The 15th N. I. and 23rd Pioneers follow to-morrow.

General Roberts, with Colonel Chapman, Major Hastings, and Captain Ridgeway, leave this afternoon for Pishin.

Major White and Captain Carew left this morning for Sibi.

Enclosure 6 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 9th September. The Wali's sister, who was in Ayub's camp with the mother of the Waliahad, writes to him from Zamindawar that the latter lady with Hashim Khan's mother and Musa Jan have gone to Herat. Ayub himself had preceded them, accompanied by only 200 or 300 Herati Sowars. The Herat infantry was scattered over the country.

All the prominent Chiefs of Ayub's army, except General Taj Muhammad Khan and the Sartip, were with him. Of the Sartip nothing is known, but Taj Muhammad has gone towards Kabul. Of Ayub's 30 guns 29 are now in the citadel; the remaining one, a mountain gun, is believed to have been taken by the Kabuli troops.

Reports of a serious insurrection at Herat are current, and it is said that Abdul Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzal, left by Ayub as Governor, has been murdered.

Enclosure 7 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Mel Karez, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MEL KAREZ, 12th. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, marched to Mel Karez this morning, meeting No. 3 Companies, Sappers and Miners, *en route* to Kandahar. The difficulties regarding supplies and forage along the line are great, but local Officers are hopeful that they may obtain a sufficiency for ordinary demands. Everything is being done to re-assure the people, who are bringing in supplies in small quantities. Telegraphic communication between Kandahar and Gatai was established yesterday evening. Only 18 miles to complete through communication with India.

Enclosure 8 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

DUBRAI, 12th September. The 3rd Brigade marched to Dubrai this morning. Storms have been prevalent; heavy in the Bolan; telegraphic communication being interrupted for two days; weather everywhere cooler; wounded at Kandahar doing well.

I will report fully upon transport and supply arrangements on reaching Killa Abdulla, where Sir Robert Sandeman is to meet me.

No. 33 A.

TELEGRAM from GOVERNOR, BOMBAY, 19th September 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

General Primrose telegraphs that the word "annihilate" was telegraphed without his knowledge by Assistant Quartermaster-General, and while responsible he declares that he was not aware of the term used till Roberts' arrival.

No. 34.

No. 213 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 28th September 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from Major E. G. Hastings, Chief Political Officer with Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, dated the 3rd September 1880, enclosing a letter from Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, in which he asks the advice of Sir F. Roberts, and also the reply of the latter, recommending the Sardar to submit unconditionally to the British Government.

We have, &c.,	
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	D. M. STEWART.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

From Major E. G. HASTINGS, Chief Political Officer with General Sir F. Roberts' Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Kandahar, 3rd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council,—

- (1.) Letter in original from Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan to General Sir F. Roberts, with translation;
- (2.) Copy of a letter from Sir F. Roberts to Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, with translation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from SARDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN to General Sir F. ROBERTS, dated Friday, 19th Ramazan 1297.

AFTER compliments.—May this letter find you in perfect health and strength. After which be it known to you I have at all times regarded the English Government with friendship, and still continue so to regard it. I have not altered in this. Before this time you despatched to me from Kabul several letters by the hand of Sardar Abdur Salam Khan, but these were seized in Kandahar, and were not allowed to be forwarded to me. They kept your letters and sent on others of their own. I too on several occasions made known my friendship (*i.e.*, wrote letters), but received no fitting reply until such time as the news reached me that Sardar Sher Ali Khan was marching on Herat and had arrived at Girishk. I marched and came to Farah. I there received news that troops had been sent to Washir. I left Farah, and when I reached Washir, the army of Sardar Sher Ali Khan retired, and at Girishk they all dispersed. After that I was informed that the English had halted at Kushk-i-Nakhud. On the receipt of this news I thought it well that my troops should not take the road by Kushk-i-Nakhud, but should proceed by that of Maiwand, and I hoped that the

English might show me friendship. Early in the morning, when my troops were marching by Maiwand, in pursuance of my orders, in the neighbourhood of Maiwand, the English army came and began to fight. What was pre-ordained came to pass. I have given you the particulars, and this is the real truth. On no account will I relinquish the friendship of the English Government. If the Government have been informed in any other sense, the real truth is what I have written. I now write to you in this friendly manner that you may write and tell me in a friendly way what you think is the best course for me to pursue, and these affairs may be settled in an amicable manner.

Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS K.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., to SARDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, dated 29th August 1880.

AFTER compliments.—In answer to your letter asking my advice, I can only recommend you to send in the prisoners in your power to Kandahar, and submit yourself unconditionally to the British Government.

No. 35.

No. 434 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 5th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the defeat at Maiwand, on the 27th July last, of the brigade under the command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows.

* G. G. O., No. 551, dated the 27th September 1880, and documents published therewith.

2. We propose to address your Lordship in Council a letter in full detail regarding the whole of the proceedings at Ghiriskh, Maiwand, and Kandahar, up to the date of the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.
" D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, 27th September 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 551.—The Governor General in Council directs that the following correspondence and Despatches, concerning the action of Maiwand on the 27th July 1880, shall be published for general information in the "Gazette of India Extraordinary."

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8453 K., Field Operations, Kabul, dated Simla, 27th September 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 5351 K., "Kabul," dated the 25th September 1880, forwarding a Despatch from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I.,

giving cover to Brigadier-General Burrows' and Brigadier-General Nuttall's accounts of the operations which took place under the direction of the former Officer on the 27th July last.

2. The Governor General in Council concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as to the meagre and unsatisfactory character of the accounts furnished, which, notwithstanding the time that has elapsed since the date of the occurrence to which they refer, still leave the Government of India in ignorance as to the true facts of the case and the exact circumstances to which the reverse sustained by Her Majesty's arms is to be attributed.

3. The Governor General in Council, however, understands that a full report of the situation, drawn out by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, after his arrival at Kandahar, is now on its way to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and as doubtless this will throw much light on what these Despatches leave in obscurity, the Government of India will await the arrival of the report before deciding on any further course of action in connection with the operations of the 27th July 1880.

4. It is not, however, necessary to wait for further information to enable the Governor General in Council to express his hearty concurrence in the high tribute paid by the Commander-in-Chief to the admirable behaviour of the Officers and men of the E/B Battery of Royal Horse Artillery.

Notwithstanding its loss of guns, and that the result of the day was disastrous, the E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, may look back on the action of Maiwand as one in which they nobly maintained the credit of their distinguished regiment.

5. The Government of India entertained no doubt of the good conduct of Her Majesty's 66th Foot, but it is still a satisfaction to have obtained the voluntary testimony of the enemy to the devoted courage with which the colours of the regiment were defended to the last against overwhelming odds.

6. The Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in receiving the names of those Officers whose services are specially brought to notice by His Excellency.

7. The names of those of the British troops who were killed and who have since died of their wounds have been telegraphed to the Secretary of State. The complete lists of casualties, both British and Native, will be published, together with the Despatches and this correspondence, in the "Gazette of India."

8. It is, I am to add, needless to give expression to the deep grief the Government of India feel in reading this sad roll of the losses sustained by the force employed under Brigadier-General Burrows.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5351 K., "Kabul," dated the 25th September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., giving cover to Brigadier-General Burrows' and Brigadier-General Nuttall's accounts of the operations which took place under the direction of the former Officer on the 27th July last.

2. Circumstances have delayed the receipt of these Despatches, and even now they contain but isolated and bare statements of the sad events of the day, almost entirely failing to convey to us information as to how they were brought about.

3. Before proceeding to a general review of the operations, and in order to make the reports now submitted clear, it is necessary to annex the following copies of telegrams :—

I. From the Quartermaster-General in India to General Primrose, Kandahar, dated 9th July 1880 :—

"Yours, 8th. Under the circumstances, you can order up any troops from the line of communication you and General Phayre consider can be safely spared to reinforce Kandahar."

II. From the Commander-in-Chief in India [Quartermaster-General] to General Primrose, Kandahar, dated 15th July 1880 :—

“Wali’s troops having deserted, the situation has completely changed. General Burrows must act according to his own judgment, reporting fully. He must act with caution, on account of distance of support.”

These telegrams refer to paragraphs 3 and 10 of General Primrose’s Despatch.

4. In paragraph 2 of Brigadier-General Burrows’ report, a reference is made to certain instructions received, and copies of correspondence from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, thereon, are attached.

The two telegrams there given only form a small portion of the correspondence between the Army Head Quarters and General Primrose, and it becomes, therefore, requisite to give copies of the telegrams which passed on the subject of Brigadier-General Burrows’ movements, from the date of his return to Khushk-i-Nakhud from the Helmand, up to the day of the action at Maiwand. These telegrams are annexed.

5. It should be stated that up to this time the intelligence regarding Ayub’s strength is contained in the following copy of a telegram from General Primrose to the Quartermaster-General in India, dated Kandahar, 14th July 1880 :—

“Letter received this day from Colonel St. John. No date to it, but presumed 12th July. Ayub reached Farrah on 1st July, and his advanced cavalry left on 8th. He has 2,500 effective and 1,000 disaffected infantry, 800 regular cavalry, and 1,000 tribal cavalry, with 30 guns. Wali’s troops shaky. One regiment all but openly mutinous; rest tainted. They have no ammunition, and St. John told Wali to take measures to put it out of reach. One other Sirdar deserted with his immediate followers, but failed to persuade others to follow him.”

6. Brigadier-General Burrows has not informed us what military measures he took for ascertaining the strength and disposition of Ayub’s army after it had crossed the Helmand, whilst it is evident that the information on which he broke up from Khushk-i-Nakhud, and marched with the intention of anticipating Ayub at Maiwand, was either incorrect or reached him too late.

It appears to Sir Frederick Haines that had he been aware that Ayub could possibly have presented himself at Maiwand in such force as that ascribed to him, General Burrows would have considered himself hardly strong enough to attack him, but would rather have contented himself with retiring towards his base at Kandahar, keeping a close touch on the enemy with his cavalry, and would certainly have taken steps to rid himself of the enormous amount of stores and baggage with which he was encumbered on the day of the action.

It appears that the only reinforcement sent to him from Kandahar consisted of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, but it will be observed in paragraph 8 of his Despatch that General Primrose had troops at Kandahar on the 23rd July from which to support him, and that he had arranged to do so, to the extent of 230 men of the 4th Native Infantry, but for some reason or other, not explained, this reinforcement was not sent.

7. Defective information was but a prelude to what followed. The apparently wholly unauthorized commencement of the action on the left by two guns of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant H. MacLaine, escorted by a troop of Sind Horse under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, committed General Burrows to an action on ground not deliberately chosen by him, and with an enemy entirely unreconnoitred. This was highly prejudicial to his chance of success, for the position thus hurriedly taken up was in perfectly open ground, with both flanks *en l’air* in the face of vastly superior numbers.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief firmly believes that had the Native Infantry stood their ground and stemmed the rush of the ghazis, a victory might have been achieved, but when the line gave way from the left and the 66th Regiment was thus thrown into confusion, there was but one chance, and that was a cavalry charge, but the cavalry failed to charge, and a rout was inevitable.

8. There can be no doubt that General Burrows was vastly overmatched as to numbers, and that he had to fight a desperate battle under most unfavourable circumstances.

The unsteadiness of the two companies of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) early in the day, must at once have destroyed all confidence in that corps, but it is evident that up to the moment of yielding on the left of the line, the conduct of the troops, with the above exception, had been excellent.

It is His Excellency's pleasing duty to bring to the notice of the Governor General in Council the admirable behaviour of the Officers and men of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, who fought most gallantly and suffered severely.

The guns which commenced the action were those apparently which were lost eventually. The gallant young Officer who commanded them is not here to justify or explain his movement, for he met a tragic end at Mazra, after a month's imprisonment in Ayub's camp, and this must be a lasting disgrace attaching to Ayub's name.

The detachment of the 66th under Lieutenant G. de la M. Faunce, which manned the smooth-bore battery, is also reported to have behaved extremely well; and an incident, not known to General Burrows when he wrote his despatch, is worthy of record here, as a lasting tribute to the undaunted gallantry of the Officers and men of the 66th Regiment from the mouth of the enemy.

General Roberts, under date 16th September, telegraphs as follows :—

“Colonel St. John reports from Kandahar as follows :—From the accounts of one of Ayub's officers present at the action of Maiwand, it appears that a stand was made by remnant of the 66th Regiment round the colours, in an enclosure; informant estimated their number at 100, and states that they were surrounded by the whole army, and that when all but 11 were killed, these made a desperate charge, and perished fighting bravely to the last man.”

This stubborn defence may have delayed the pursuit, as well as checked the desire to pursue.

9. The Artillery maintained their military formation and *morale* during the retreat

But, though the Cavalry appear to have kept together, the General had lost all confidence in them, apparently with reason, and from this cause was unable to halt at Hauz-i-Madat.

Had this been done, no doubt many valuable lives, and some stores and transport animals, might have been saved, while some appearance of military formation might have been restored.

The retreat was thus continued without a break to Kandahar, notwithstanding that the pursuit, never vigorous, was not pressed beyond the third or fourth mile from the field. This restless flight must have increased the tale of loss and suffering at every step.

It is to be noted that amongst the casualties in the Cavalry, no Native Officer is mentioned as either killed or wounded.

On the morning of the 28th July the leading fugitives reached Kandahar. Their report of the complete annihilation of General Burrows' brigade was accepted as fact, and so reported to the world.

It is satisfactory to know that, unfortunate as were the events of the day, together with their results, they fell far short of the description first given of them. His Excellency the Governor General in Council is aware that on this report the cantonments were precipitately abandoned, and refuge taken in the citadel.

Ayub did not, however, fully invest Kandahar until the 6th August.

10. To return to the events of the 27th. It is worthy of remark that General Burrows makes no mention of efforts on the part of Officers to steady their men, nor are the Commanding Officers or other of the corps engaged mentioned with approval; but the casualty rolls, taken in connection with the undoubted heavy losses of the enemy, are a sufficient proof of the gallantry and devotion of those who fell.

11. Of the survivors, the Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of Government the Officers named by Brigadier-Generals Burrows and Nuttall, viz. :—

Captain J. R. Slade, R.H.A.
Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E.
Major G. C. Hogg, Brigade Major.
Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse.

12. The casualty rolls have already been submitted to Government with my No. 5327 A., of the 24th instant.

Returns of ordnance and of arms and accoutrements lost or enclosed, also a return of ammunition expended.

TELEGRAMS referred to in the Adjutant-General's Letter forwarding the Maiwand Despatches, paragraph 4.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 17th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 17th July. General Burrows reports that he has moved his force back from Helmand to Khushk-i-Nakhud, there to await events or orders. This move was necessitated by there being no supplies for the troops nor grain for horses. The little there was on the right bank was carried off or destroyed by mutineers. This point is of most strategic importance, having several roads converging on it. As the river Helmand is fordable, Ayub could cross anywhere. I am of opinion that General Burrows has acted judiciously in the matter.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4978, dated 17th July 1880.

SIMLA, 17th July. Chief wishes to know what General Burrows' views and intentions now are. Please tell him to report daily everything that goes on, for the information of Viceroy. Yours of 16th, giving information from General Burrows about pursuit and dispersion of Wali's mutinous troops and recovery of guns, very satisfactory.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4995, dated 17th July 1880.

SIMLA, 17th July. Yours 17th. Chief considers General Burrows acted judiciously in retiring on Khushk-i-Nakhud under the circumstances.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4997, dated 18th July 1880.

SIMLA, 18th July. Do you consider Khushk-i-Nakhud the most favourable position for covering Kandahar, and striking a blow at Ayub, should he cross the Helmand? Favour the Commander-in-Chief with a full expression of your views, both as regards the city and Ayub's probable movements. Reply in cipher. Also give dates on which you calculate that the different units of the reinforcements can reach Kandahar.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 19th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 19th July. Advanced guard of Ayub appears to have reached Girishk. Nothing certain known about Ayub himself to-day.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 384 K., dated 19th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 19th July. Your telegram, 18th. Taking into consideration that the Helmand is now fordable everywhere, it presents no obstacle to the advance of Ayub at any point he chooses to cross it. Khushk-i-Nakhud is an important position covering roads leading from the Helmand to Kandahar. Whilst remaining on the Helmand, forage and grain could hardly be obtained, whereas they are plentiful at Khushk-i-Nakhud. Between the latter place and Girishk there is a desert 25 miles broad. General Burrows at Khushk-i-Nakhud is within fair supportable distance from

Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet. At present, I am unable to obtain any definite intelligence of Ayub's movements; an impression is abroad that he will not meet our troops in the open, but that if he crosses the river at all, he will do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni, for political reasons. As regards Kandahar great uneasiness prevails in the city; large numbers of the families are leaving daily, fearing the approach of Ayub. There are of course a number of disaffected men in and about Kandahar ready for a disturbance if they get a chance. I keep the city constantly patrolled, and have placed three 40-pounders of 5/11th in the citadel, which has had the effect of quieting the minds of those peaceably disposed.

Units of reinforcements will probably arrive here—

Detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 24th.

Detachments, 28th Native Infantry, on 25th, 26th, and 27th.

Last detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 28th.

9th and 24th Native Infantry are now in Bolan, and will be in position probably 24th and 30th July; 11th Foot come up Bolan in cart carriage, beginning by companies on 20th, and doing double stages to Dozan. One wing will be concentrated at Quetta on 1st August, leave Quetta 3rd, and reach Kandahar about 15th; two more companies will leave three days later, and last two form escorts to F/2nd, Royal Artillery. Information about Madras Cavalry not yet received from General Phayre. Will wire this to-morrow.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. Precedence. Information from General Burrows, dated 19th. He has shifted his camp to a very eligible spot, three miles nearer Girishk. He reports 2,100 Ayub's cavalry have arrived at Girishk, he himself being at Mahmúdabad, 17 miles in rear, with his infantry and guns. It is reported that he intends to move either to the north of Girishk or the south by the Argasan Valley, but this is merely surmise. He has utilized the guns taken from the Wali by manning them from men of E/B and 66th Regiment. I am sending out to-night by forced marches 12 of the Wali's artillery horses, and harness, &c., to complete this battery as far as practicable, under an escort of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, whom I have directed to remain, as a temporary arrangement, with General Burrows, as he wished his cavalry increased.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. General Burrows, under date 20th, writes:—Situation remains unchanged; travellers who have passed Ayub's camp say things are not going on smoothly there, and that in all probability there will be a split before they reach the Helmand. General Burrows ready for them. Troops healthy and in excellent spirits.

TELEGRAM from COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (Quartermaster-General), Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 5109, dated 21st July 1880.

SIMLA, 21st July. You have not answered Chief's question relative to suitability of Burrows' position for striking a blow at Ayub. It is of the utmost importance that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked. As your reinforcements arrive, to what extent can you strengthen General Burrows? What are that Officer's views and intentions, and what steps are taken by Intelligence Department to obtain information of Ayub's movements? The Argandab road should also be observed.

You must keep Chief more fully and early informed of situation, as reports of Ayub's and Burrows' moves are received by Foreign long before yours.

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P A P E R S.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 27th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

TELEGRAM from Thomson at Teheran says, Ayub Khan marching against Kandahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Kandahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrab, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

My telegram of 27th. Early answer requested.



No. 3.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 30th June 1880, to VICEROY.

Yours, 27th and 30th. Instructions to Primrose approved.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 1st July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

AYUB's advance guard reported to have arrived at Furrab. Orders sent to Primrose and Phayre in accordance with my telegram of the 27th.

No. 5.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 3RD JULY 1880. (Extract.)

28th June.—The following reports, dated the 26th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—“On evening of 24th a Ghazi attacked a party of officers near Baba Wali. He was at once killed by a soldier of 66th Regiment. No one wounded.”

II.—“Two men of the 5th Native Infantry and three followers killed near Harnai some few days ago. As doubts have arisen as to how they met their death, General Phayre is causing inquiry to be made. Report will be furnished soon as details received from him.”

1st July.—The following reports, dated 30th June, have been received from Kandahar from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—“The following intelligence just received from Political Resident:—“Letter from Wali's nephew in Washir, dated 26th, states intelligence reached him that Luinab with advanced guard of horsemen had left Herat some days before Ayub, who was then probably at Sabzawan. Luinab supposed to have reached Farrah.””

II. "The following further intelligence received from Political Resident :—' Wali sends second letter from his nephew in Washir, giving intelligence that Luinab has arrived in Farrah with 800 sowars, and is collecting levies there. Travellers who have arrived from Herat in twelve days say that when they left Ayub was at Rozabad with regulars.' "

2nd July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports that the health of the troops under his command at Kandahar is "fair."

3rd July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose telegraphs as follows from Kandahar on the 1st :—

"The Political Resident furnishes the following intelligence this day :—' Wali writes on afternoon of 29th that messengers from Farrah state Luinab with 1,000 horsemen arrived there about 23rd June, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kush Kaba, sixteen miles north Farrah. Ayub was with army. Kabuli troops had their families with them. Wali calculates Ayub arrived Farrah six days ago. Enquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advanced force at Washir. Second letter, written evening of 29th, states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khermalik, twenty-one miles, and his advanced guard at Chahigez, fifty miles this side Farrah and four marches from Kandahar frontier.' Political Resident strongly urges immediate advance of brigade."

Instructions have been issued for the advance of a brigade from Kandahar to Girishk, but it is not to cross the Helmand. Also for a brigade of the Reserve Division to be pushed forward from Karachi to Kandahar.

No. 6.

No. 154 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 6, 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

'TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTERS from Herat of 5th instant report that Ayub had some time before sent 1,200 letters to Kabul, addressed to different chiefs and officers, announcing his approach with a powerful army. Informant reports Ayub more than ever in the hands of the Kabulis, and personally unwilling to make any move; also expresses disbelief that any move will be made, and predicts that if it does, the Herati and Kabuli troops are sure to quarrel before they have gone far.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SEVERAL caravans have arrived from Herat in last few days with news up to 5th. Some preparations were being made for the intended march, and six regiments were at

Rozabad. The Governor of Meshed was preventing the exportation of gun caps to Afghanistan. The harvest at Herat has been very fine.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NINTH June is day on which regular troops known to have camped outside Herat. Actual start probably some days later. Nevertheless I recommend despatch of brigade to Maiwand as quickly as possible, if only to confirm fidelity of Wali's troops, overawe Zemindawar tribes, and establish confidence here. Am asking General Primrose to make preparatory arrangements in anticipation of orders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880. (Extract.)

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

In answer to letter of mine about report of desertions written some days ago, Wali writes that 50 or 60 men had returned to their homes when ordered to Washir, that a few of his men were mutinous, but the majority quite trustworthy.

His monthly disbursements for pay amount to one lakh six thousand rupees.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, No. 2122 E.P., dated 1st July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegrams, 27th and 30th. Orders are issuing for brigade to Maiwand. Your political instructions are that no hostile troops must cross Helmund, and Wali must be supported, if necessary, in maintaining order this side river. Beyond Helmund he must rely on his own resources.

Enclosure 6 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes on afternoon of 29th, that messengers from Furreh state Luinab with 1,000 horse arrived there about the 23rd, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kushkaba, 16 miles north of Furreh. Ayub was with army. Kabul troops had their families with them. Wali calculated Ayub arrived Furreh six days ago, inquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advancing forces in Washir.

Second letter written night of 29th states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khor Malik, 21 miles, and his advance guard at Chargaz 50 miles, this side Furreh and four marches from Kandahar frontier.

I am writing to Wali not to risk collision with Ayub's regular troops in Washir, but in absence of orders not giving him definite assurance of active support from here. But I strongly urge immediate advance of brigade.

It is possible that Ayub may delay on frontier; but he may be at Girishk in 10 days or less.

Enclosure 7 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the week in Kandahar territory; but the menaced invasion from Herat is causing much excitement in the city and neighbourhood.

Ayub Khan appears to have left the city finally about the 18th, and to have reached Furrak, where he was at the date of the latest advice, about the 24th. He has with him 2,500 horse, including 900 regulars, 10 regiments of infantry, varying from 350 to 500 men each, and six batteries of artillery, including at least one mule battery. He is said to be well provided with ammunition, except caps, of which a supply expected from Meshed had been seized by the Persian authorities at the frontier. A party of 1,000 cavalry under the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, are four or five days' march in frontier, and at date of latest report were in Bakwa.

Before leaving Herat the Ulemas assembled in a mosque and invested Ayub with title of Amir. He has also had money coined in his name.

The Wali is at Girishk with main body of his forces, two regiments of infantry, four guns, and 1,500 horse being in Washir under his nephew, Roshdil Khan.

The weather is much cooler.

Enclosure 8 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Two regiments cavalry and a battery Horse Artillery marched this morning for the Helmund. There is no news from the Herat direction.

No. 7.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 10TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

5th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 4th :—

“ Five hundred sabres 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse, E-B Royal Horse Artillery, 40 Sappers and two companies infantry, left to-day for Helmund, under command of General Nuttall. Six companies 66th, and 1st and 30th Native Infantry, leave to-morrow under General Burrows' commanding column.”

6th July.—The following message, dated Poona, the 5th, has been received from the Governor of Bombay :—

“ General Phayre telegraphs to Commander-in-Chief here as follows :—‘ Kach, July 4th. I have just heard that telegraphic communication with Kandahar interrupted near Takt-i-pul. Four hundred Pathan sepoys of Khan of Khelat's State troops have deserted. Sibi Railway interrupted by floods at unbridged *nallahs*; Traffic Superintendent says it cannot be restored within ten days.’ *Message ends.*”

6th July.—The following message has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar, dated the 5th :—

“ Your telegram of 3rd July. My telegram of yesterday to you will have informed you of the departure of cavalry and artillery for Helmund near Girishk. The infantry, 66th Regiment (six companies), 1st Grenadiers, and 30th Native Infantry, left this morning, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Burrows. A month's supplies have been forwarded with the troops. Lieutenant-Colonel St. John accompanies the force.

As regards reinforcement from the Reserve Division, I have, in accordance with your instructions, requested the General Commanding at once to forward up two Native infantry regiments in the first place, to be followed as soon as possible by battery of artillery, 15th Foot and 1st Madras Cavalry, the three latter to proceed direct to Kandahar. The Native Infantry regiments were to replace two others ordered from line of communications to Kandahar. The head-quarters and wing 4th Native Infantry